THE GIFT OF

PROF. HOWARD MUNFORD JONES
PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

Crito

EDITED
ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION
BY
LOUIS DYER
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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THE GIFT OF

PROF. HOWARD MUNFORD JONES
Richard Holt Gurney

Harvard College  Cl. : 7 1902

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PREFACE.

This edition of the Apology of Socrates and the Crito is based upon Dr. Christian Cron’s eighth edition, Leipzig, 1882. The Notes and Introduction here given have in the main been confined within the limits intelligently drawn by Dr. Cron, whose commentaries upon various dialogues of Plato have done and still do so much in Germany to make the study of our author more profitable as well as pleasanter. No scruple has been felt, however, in making changes. I trust there are few if any of these which Dr. Cron might not himself make if he were preparing his work for an English-thinking and English-speaking public.

No editor of Plato in England or America can escape the influence of Dr. Jowett’s labors upon Plato; certainly not one who owes so much to Dr. Jowett’s teaching and friendship as I do. This is a debt which, because it is contracted unconsciously for the most part, can hardly be adequately acknowledged. Riddell’s valuable edition has suggested many changes and additions in the Notes, and Stallbaum has been assiduously consulted.

The Appendix to the Introduction differs very materially from the corresponding portion of Dr. Cron’s book. There as elsewhere I have been constantly advised and as constantly enlightened by my kind friend and former teacher, Professor W. W. Goodwin. But this list of my creditors must necessarily remain incomplete, for I cannot mention those who have helped me most, nor can I record here the names of all my pupils, past and present, whose needs have been my guide and my impulse in preparing this book.
PREFACE.

The Text is substantially that of Dr. Cron's edition; where there is alteration, reasons are given in the Critical Appendix. In no case have the illustrative citations of the German commentary been inconsiderately omitted; so far as possible, indeed, further citations have been made. The dramatists, especially Euripides, have been constantly drawn upon for new citations. It is easy to underrate the importance of Euripides to the reader of Plato; it is impossible to overstate in the interests of higher scholarship the desirability of having even the youngest students of Greek letters discipline themselves in the reading and heeding of citations offered to illustrate their author.

LOUIS DYER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
July, 1883.
INTRODUCTION.

The endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought (ratio) is the soul of which the body is utterance (oratio), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word (λóγος) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

The merest glance at the history of philosophy justifies this statement. Greek philosophy first gave signs of life in the cosmogonies and theogonies of early poets who were anything but

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philosophers; and even those famous worthies, the seven wise men, belong rather to the history of politics and civilization in general, than to the special history of philosophy. The name of Thales, one of the wise seven, stands at the beginning in Greek philosophy. He, and with him his fellow-townsmen and successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, asked this question: What is that something out of which everything in Nature grows and is made? At Miletus, a town whose political and intellectual vigor gave it precedence among the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, these three men lived and sought for something omnipresent and unchanging, for the real substance which underlies the unceasing surface-changes offered to man’s senses in the world. They all found this in elementary matter of some description. Thales described it as water, Anaximander as ὡς ἀόρατος, the unlimited. Anaximenes called it air. But this elementary matter no one of the three opposed to Spirit; for the opposition of “spiritual” and “material,” or of “matter” and “mind” came much later. To the Milesian philosophers matter was a something which, if not divine, was instinct with divine energy.

Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underly ing all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his name. These Pythagoreans believed that number was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to

Mayor's Sketch of Ancient Philosophy
from Thales to Cicero. Cambridge, 1881. Pitt Press Series. Special works on Plato are: (1) K. F. Herrmann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. (2) Steinhardt, Einleitung zu Platon's Sämtliche Werken, übersetzt von H. Müller, und Platon's Leben. (3) Susenbhl, die genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philo-
sophie, 2 Theile. (4) The Dialogues of Plato translated into English by B. Jowett. (5) Grote, Plato and the other companions of Sokrates.

1 Matter stripped of limits or boundary-lines; a something which, being everything and anything, is, according as it is limited in one way or another, "everything by turns and nothing long."
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the moral world,—to the whole field of human action. But the Pythagoreans framed no philosophy of right and wrong. They contented themselves with a few practical maxims which were useful in the work of their society. Among the various doctrines attributed to Pythagoras and his school, we can with certainty connect only one with Pythagoras himself. He certainly maintained the theory of the Transmigration of Souls. Philolaus, probably an elder contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, first stated the tenets of this school in writing. He came to Thebes, where he taught, nearly at the same time with Lysis, his well-known brother-Pythagorean. Of the book by Philolaus entitled Περὶ Φύσεως, such fragments as have been preserved are collected by Boeckh, and supply an invaluable source for the history of the old-school Pythagoreanism. Of the later Pythagoreans Archytas of Tarentum, who lived in the fourth century B.C., is the most noteworthy. He distinguished himself in politics and in mathematics. The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual conception of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originator of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the All is the One, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C., at Elea, a Phocaean colony in Italy, first devel-

1 Number is the law and the bond that holds the world together; everything, if we are to know it, must be numbered, i.e. odd or even. Odd numbers are limited, even numbers are unlimited, and all cases of opposition are, as it were, cases of the opposition of odd to even so that the following list of opposites may be made and evnroξλας, under two heads: —

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2 Cf. The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I. 130 ff.; also Ovid, Metam. XV. 105 ff.

3 Philolaos des Pythagoreer Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes, von August Boeckh. Berlin, 1819. The authenticity of these fragments has recently been called in question.

4 To fix this date cf. Plato’s Theaetetus, p. 183 e, and Parmenides, p. 127 b, where it is said that Socrates, in early youth, saw both Zeno and Parmenides, and that the latter was a very old man. The age of Parmenides was sixty-five, while Zeno’s is placed at
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oped the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists. Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics. The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

1 Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time limited and limitless. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are limited. But they are also limitless; because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

2 If there is no Being, why do we talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.


4 Cf. the placing of "good" and "bad" on the Pythagorean list of pairs, p. 3, note 1 above.
of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: "Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living fire, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold." The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of becoming or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, "The father of all things is war," meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. "Concord," he said, "is the daughter of strife."

By making his system account for the world of sensible things Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus's stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means
for connecting pure Being on the one hand with Not-being on the other, and, unlike Heraclitus, they cleave the world in twain and find no way of uniting the two parts. In the second place, Parmenides teaches that outside of the thought of the One there is no true thinking but only deceptive 'opining,' while Heraclitus urges that the 'universal' which pervades all things (τὸ γενός = τὸ κοινόν) alone has understanding. This understanding the 'individual' shares only in proportion to the degree of its submission to and submersion in the 'universal.' Here is substantial agreement, but here again Heraclitus takes a wider view than Parmenides, and accordingly makes a fuller provision for the facts.

Though Heraclitus did not follow the example of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but wrote his work¹ in prose, he expressed himself most obscurely. It was on this account that the ancients themselves nicknamed him ὁ σκοτεινός, the man of darkness. We hear that Socrates, when asked by Euripides for his opinion of Heraclitus's book, gave this answer: "All that I could fathom was excellent; what I could not fathom is no doubt the same, only we had better send to Delos for a man to do the diving." Aristotle says that Heraclitus is obscure because it is impossible to decide how his words are to be combined, and of the parts of his book that are preserved not a few justify this statement. For instance, a passage that has been much discussed ἵνα συνήθως κτενώθησαν ὑπὸ θαλα καὶ θάλατα Σενώνος οὖν τὰ ἔργα gives rise to two questions, neither of which can be satisfactorily answered. Shall we put a comma before or after καὶ θάλατα? How are the various words in the sentence to be construed?

Empedocles of Agrigentum stated his doctrines in a didactic poem after the manner of Xenophanes and Parmenides. He chose the epic form, and his work was the model after which Lucretius wrote his De rerum natura. Empedocles flourished in the eighth-fourth Olympiad, near the middle of the fifth century B.C. This date is confirmed by the report that he visited the newly founded

¹ Schleiermacher has collected and explained the fragments that are preserved (Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft, I.3, Berlin, 1808; or, Werke zur Philosophie, Ill 1). See the attempted restoration of the original sequence of the fragments, Heraklit von Ephesius, by Dr. F. Schuster, Leipzig, 1873. See also Heracliti Ephesii reliquae, ed. L. Bywater, London, 1877.
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colony of Thurii. His system is closely connected with the Eleatic as well as with the Heraclitan scheme of things, and also shows traces of Pythagorean influence. Starting from the first principle, that Not-being can no more come to be than Being can decay and cease to be, he concludes that what men call growth and decay are respectively cases of the combination and of the disintegration of primal elements. His four elements are the familiar ones, to each of which his imaginative genius gives a mythological name. Fire, described as flaming Aether, he names Zeus; Air, Hera; Earth, Ailoneus; Water, Nestis. These four elements were at the beginning inseparably united within the eternal Globe (Σφαίρα), which in all its parts was of like consistency. But outside of this globe ruled Strife (Νῆσσος), who finally invaded it, causing complete disintegration. The resisting impulse of Love (Φιλία) reacted from within and brought about a partial reintegration. This reaction and reintegration gave rise to the frame of the world (Κόσμος) with all the particular things which it comprises. In his detailed account of sensible perception, feeling, and intellectual apprehension of the good and the bad, Empedocles applies his fundamental principle with an unsteady hand, and is often involved in contradictions. His religious theories are set forth in a separate work called Καθάρσις.

Neither the date nor the place of the birth of Leucippus can be determined, but we know that he founded the school of the Atomists. Democritus of Abdera, born in the eightieth Olympiad, about 460 B.C., was certainly his younger contemporary, and probably his disciple. Upon Democritus devolved the task of developing this new system of thought. The Atomists were unwilling to say either with Heraclitus (1) Being is a process of constant change, or with Parmenides (2) Being immutable and unchangeable exists apart from all particular things, but like Empedocles they said (3) A number of ORIGINAL ELEMENTS exists. Instead, however, of four elements, they supposed an unlimited number of ATOMS (ατόμον, sc. σωμάτων or οίδαμ). These indivisible Atoms were in-

1 For the interesting fragments of his well-written work, cf. Mullach's "Democriti Abderitae operum fragmenta." Berol. 1843. Also his work referred to above, p. 4, note 2.
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wardly alike in essence, and so small as to be indistinguishable; they differed in shape, arrangement, and position. Their combination means growth; their separation means decay and destruction; the difference in their situation and arrangement is at the bottom of such variety and change as we see in the world. But why, we may ask, should these Atoms combine or separate? Because, says the Atomist, necessity forces them to move. This necessary motion comes, not from any source or cause beyond and above them, but is derived partly from an original rotary motion, a twist which they take at the start, and partly from their constant collision one with another and the consequent reaction. But to move at all they need room to move in. This room is a vacuum which offers no resistance; it is free and empty space or void, while the atoms are space compacted and filled full, or fulness. Reality consists solely of these Atoms, and hence they are Being, while the Void is Not-being. And yet Not-being in this sense has a relative existence. Therefore the Atomists did not hesitate to say: Being no more is than Not-being. By Atoms not the physical world of the senses only, but also the soul, is explained. The body is the cabin, σπήρα, of the soul, and on this basis an attempt is made to explain mental activity and the life of the soul. Here the shortcomings of the Atomistic explanation of the world show themselves. Still, against the Atomists the point is not well taken that, by necessity, an Atomist must mean chance or what is arbitrary, and all praise is due to the determined logic with which they apply their principle consistently to every detail. Democritus is credited with a number of admirable moral maxims; they express, however, the plain common-sense of a man who means to make the most of life, rather than a matured philosophy of conduct.

10 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born in the seventieth Olympiad about 500 B.C., and thus his birth preceded that of Empedocles and Democritus; but he must be counted as belonging to a mature phase of thought.1 When Anaxagoras said: "Order is introduced

1 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 3: "Αριστοτέλεια Μεταφυσικής Α, 3: "Αριστοτέλεια Μεταφυσικής Α, 3: 

his book Περὶ Φύσεως a number of frag- 
ments are preserved. Schaubach ha
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into the All by mind," there was no further use either for the half-mythological forces of Empedocles, or for the blind necessity of the Atomists. And yet, there was much upon which all the three schools would have agreed; Democritus and Empedocles would have welcomed Anaxagoras's dictum, "The Greeks are wrong in believing that there is such a thing as growing to be out of nothing or perishing away into nothing; nothing grows to be and nothing perishes, but all things are the mingling together and the falling apart of elements that really exist. So, therefore, to grow into being is properly to-be-compounded, and to perish is to-fall-apart." These elements that really exist Anaxagoras did not define as Empedocles defined his elements or as the Atomists defined their atoms. He often calls his elements seeds, σπόροι, and they have certain determinate qualities which make them the seeds of this, that, or the other particular kind of thing, e.g. gold, wood, bone. Flesh, blood, and bone are respectively combinations of parts, each one of which parts has the peculiar properties of the whole of which it is one part, and the whole has the properties of each of its parts. In speaking of such a whole, as well as of its parts, Aristotle used the word ἐνόμος (ὁμος, like, and πᾶς, part); therefore, the whole theory has often been called homonomic. In the beginning, the sum of things infinitesimally small and infinite in number, no one of which could be perceived on account of its smallness, lay in a mass together. Finally mind intervened, separating like from unlike and introducing order. The most delicate and purest of essences, mind enters into combination with nothing else; it understands all things for and by itself, and over all it rules supreme. In such unmistakable terms as these did Anaxagoras set forth the idea of an all-wise and all-powerful essence completely distinct from matter. The words which he chose are no doubt inadequate because borrowed from the domain of the senses, but their import is clear. The fact that he reached this conception of mind gives to Anaxagoras a conspicuous place in the history of Greek philosophy, and yet he hardly knew the

published them: Anaxagorae Clazomenae fragmenta collecta et illustrata, p. 20 d.
Lips. 1827. Mullach has also put
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full bearing of his discovery. Mind, he says, when in the beginning all things lay in a motionless mass, gave them their first impulse and lent the motion which brought order into all. In other respects Anaxagoras's explanation of nature is materialistic, the same in kind with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. This is what Plato and Aristotle say, and it is of this that they both complain. In order that the conception of mind reached by Anaxagoras might be made fruitful, there was need that it be completely worked out, and for this the foundations of philosophy had to be laid anew. For this necessary work of reconstruction no more favorable place could have been found than Athens. Indeed, it was at Athens, and in the society of its most noteworthy men, especially of Pericles and Euripides, that Anaxagoras himself lived. He was, however, finally accused of atheism and exiled by the enemies of his great friend Pericles. Leaving Athens, he retired to Lampascus, and there ended his days.

After numerous attempts to account for the world of sensible things on a physical basis, the very school of thinkers who sought to explain matter by matter began to feel the need of some first cause which should lie outside of matter and above it. Henceforward the one thing indispensable for the full recognition of such a first cause was a vigorous impulse which, arousing and uplifting the moral energy of national thought, should re-shape Philosophy by the help of this new conception. This required impulse was found in the practical demand, now for the first time made upon philosophers, that they abandon the retirement in which, with little or no reference to what was going on about them, they had up to this time carried on their speculations. Now the time had come when the world demanded a new departure in education, and now was the opportunity for Philosophy to try her strength. At first this trial seemed to lead rather to destruction than to reconstruction; the wear and tear of practice threatened completely to swallow up all theory. Various tendencies, indeed, the obvious

1 They show no little impatience and disdain of every-day men like ourselves. It matters little to them whether we keep pace with their discussions or fall behind.—every man of them steadily goes on his chosen way. Plato, Sophist, p. 243 a.
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results not a few of them of doctrines previously taught, accomplished nothing but their own destruction. But this very destruction served to point a moral, since it showed that the engrossing aim of sound philosophy must not be to adorn its devotees with irresponsible cleverness and to train their faculties in that kind of intellectual dexterity whose chief reward is success. For it became evident that a moral ideal was required which, in the teaching of the Sophists, was absent. This lack of a freshly grasped and high moral standard, coupled with the effort to turn their disciples into dextrous performers on the stage of life, characterized many different teachers at this time. These teachers were the Sophists, and their teaching is usually called not Sophistry but Sophistic. This term is accordingly applied to the teaching of men who, in the details of their theories, often had little or nothing in common. Men who appeared as public professors of wisdom called themselves Sophists, and were so called by the public. They gathered about them old and young, and, for a stated fee, gave lectures to hearers fresh from the heat of a keen and active political strife in such branches of knowledge as were likely to interest men so pre-occupied. In short, the practical needs of political life led them to annex the widening territory of rhetoric to the traditional domain of philosophy. They devoted much energy to the art of vigorous speech-writing and of finished speech-making. These were the outward graces which a Sophist used in order to make his teachings and lectures attractive. Rhetoric and Sophistic were sister Arts, inseparable from the outset, and for every man who was anxious to find the best market for his proficiency in

1 Grote, in his History of Greece (ch. 67), is certainly right in rejecting this designation, if it must mean that the teachings and principles of all Sophists were the same or that all of them taught in the same way. The word Sophistic may, however, be said to imply such similarity in methods of teaching and in doctrine as would (1) fairly distinguish the Sophists from Socrates, and (2) lead us to class the Sophists together. Three negative statements apply to all the Sophists which do not apply to Socrates: first the Sophists did not teach free of charge, second they did not in any strict sense lay foundations for the future development of philosophy, third they did not cast their lot either with their own or with any adopted country.
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these arts, Athens, at that time the centre of all the intellectual activity of the day, was a natural place of abode.

Among the representatives of the new turn which thought had taken, Protagoras and Gorgias are especially prominent. Accordingly, more than all the rest, these two have earned a place in the history of philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera was the first who claimed as his distinguishing title the name of Sophist. When he was born and when he died cannot be satisfactorily determined. At all events, he was a contemporary of Socrates, though considerably his elder. Protagoras, during his long life of seventy years more or less, made repeated and protracted visits to Athens. He was, however, forced to discontinue them on account of a vote of the Athenian assembly condemning him as an atheist. His philosophical theory was based upon the dictum of Heraclitus that all things are constantly in a state of flux. But, in applying this principle to human thought and human action, he reached conclusions which were not infrequently opposed to those of the great Ephesian. In place of Heraclitus's ἐνὶ τοῖς ἐρρόσιν he maintained that Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not. By man he understood man as this or that

1 See Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 a, b.

2 His birth is variously placed between 400 and 480 B.C. (In 487, 486, or 481), and his death between 420 and 408 B.C.

3 Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 e: ἀφαντός ὅσον στρέφεται ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἡσυχίως πάρα πάντα, there is not a man of you all whose father I might not be so far as years go.

4 The original words as given by Diog. Laert. (Ixx. 51) are: "πῶς οὖν χρηστός μετρεῖτο συμμετρει, τῶν μὲν δὸς τῶν ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ἔστωμι ὡς οὖν ἔστων." This is sometimes so interpreted as to mean simply that nothing can be measured, i.e. known, unless there is some one to measure or know. This might then mean that the right measure of all things would be taken only by the right man; by an ideally perfect man endowed with ideally perfect knowledge. In saying that Protagoras did not mean this ideal man Cron agrees with the following account, translated (freely) from Plato's Theaetetus, p. 101 c: "In other respects I am charmed with the doctrine of Protagoras that what seems to each man is, but I can never swallow his beginning. Why did he not commence by saying the measure of all things was a hog or a dog-faced baboon or some still worse monster, and that so far as wisdom went he himself was no whit wiser than a tadpole? If each man is his own best judge and all that he decides upon is right and true, how then is Protagoras wise enough to teach the rest of us, and to charge us roundly for it?"
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individual. This amounted to cutting away all footing for knowledge, after reducing knowledge to the sensation or sensible perception of a given individual.

Gorgias of Leontini¹ in Sicily appeared at Athens in 427 B.C., on an embassy from his native town.² His mission was successful, and his brilliant oratory won such golden opinions that large numbers crowded to listen to his show speeches and paid him handsomely for his trouble. Later he revisited Athens and travelled to various places in Greece (Xen. Anab. ii. 6. 16 ff.), always with the same success. It is said that he was a hundred years old when he died.³ His philosophical views and method of reasoning were based upon the Eleatic system, and are summed up in the following words from his book (ἡ φύσις ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀτομή ἢ ἀτομεία, Nature, or that which is not): "Nothing is; if anything is, it cannot be known; if anything can be known, it cannot be communicated." But the chief concern of Gorgias was the teaching of rhetoric; here he sought to win fame. Still, his instruction seems to have been confined to practical hints in regard to details and he objected to being called a Sophist.

Among the other distinguished Sophists, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were especially famous. Hippias was chiefly noted for his extensive knowledge of genealogy and of mathematical astronomy, but he also plumed himself upon his miscellaneous accomplishments in various practical directions. Prodicus is best known for his nice discriminations between words of similar meaning, and for his moral lectures. Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 21) has preserved one of these, the very clever story of the Choice of Hercules.

The bustling activity of these and of other Sophists who had no fixed abiding-place, produced no marked effect upon philosophy beyond making clear the insufficiency of all previous speculation. After a hundred years and more, Greek thought had reached the conclusion that to talk of real truth was idle, and that all knowl-

¹ This same name is applied to the inhabitants. Ptolemaeus is alone in calling the town Ἀτομεία.
² Diodorus xii. 53. Thuc. iii. 98 does not mention him by name.
³ The dates given for his birth vary from 490 B.C. (Foss) to 485 B.C. (Frel); for his death, from 394 B.C. to 376 B.C.
⁴ See on Apol., p. 18 ff.
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edge depends solely upon sensible perception and sensation. So, therefore, knowledge could at most change worse sensations into better ones,—more profitable and pleasanter ones.

16 This doctrine virtually involved the destruction of all philosophy. Therefore Socrates, who won the day against it, is rightly called the deliverer and the new founder of philosophy.

17 Socrates, the son of a sculptor Sophroniscus,1 was born at Athens, and as a boy followed his father's occupation. Soon, however, he abandoned sculpture and devoted himself to the profession to which he thought God called him; this was a continuous warfare carried on against the conceit of sham knowledge in all its forms. Wherever and whenever he met it he was bound to expose sham knowledge as real ignorance.2 As for himself, he claimed no knowledge beyond the capital fact that he knew nothing. By this, however, he did not mean that real knowledge was as the Sophists maintained impossible. For though Socrates said that God alone was really wise, his meaning was that the whole duty of man was comprised in the struggle toward that real knowledge which alone gives the power to do right. And just here Socrates declared that all virtues, ἀρετή, were essentially forms of knowledge, and were based upon the understanding of some class of things. This involved the final identification of virtue in general with understanding. If virtue3 is understanding, it follows that no one does wrong knowingly; men sin only in so far as they are in ignorance of what is right. A man who knows the right, who has real knowledge, will do the right, for then that knowledge will be stronger within him than any desire. Naturally the standard of this genuine knowledge is not arbitrary, nor is it borrowed from anything outside of the soul. Socrates based all knowledge upon necessary obedience to the commandment inscribed upon the temple at

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1 The ordinary date given for his birth is Ol. 77, 3 or 4 = 470/69 B.C.; probably Ol. 77, 2 or 1 = 472/1 B.C. is nearer the truth. Cf. infra note on § 30, and Apol., p. 17 d.

2 Cf. Apol., p. 20 d ff., particularly the explanation of ἀρετή, ἀρετή.

3 It cannot be denied that even in Socrates' conception of ἀρετή, the old notion so manifest in Homer (cf. Doderlein, Hom. Gloss., p. 538) of 'skill' or cleverness was still very strong. The German word 'Tugend' and its corresponding idea are similarly connected with 'Tauglichkeit' and 'Tüchtigkeit.'
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Delphi, Ἱταλικοὶ εὐεργετοὶ. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) gives an account of Socrates's explanation of this. ¹

Two questions arise concerning Socrates's idea of knowledge as the foundation of righteousness. (1) What constitutes this knowledge? (2) What is the field in which it works? Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle vie with one another in declaring that Socrates would always ask about everything under discussion: What is the general idea of which this, that, or the other is a particular instance? αἱ ἰδεῖς τῶν ἱδεῶν. Let every man first answer this question, and then he is a fit guide for his friends; otherwise it is a case of 'the blind leading the blind.' Hence, when Socrates found a man who claimed the possession of knowledge, his test question was, Can you define the thing which you say you know? And he usually found his man incapable of giving the required definition, and accordingly showed up the boasted knowledge as ignorance.

In applying this test, and in taking the steps by which he led up to and determined the definition required, consisted the peculiar method of Socrates. He always began with everyday facts, and then proceeded by the method of question and answer, either (1) to the definition and general idea required, or (2) to the irresistible conclusion that some definition in vogue which he had taken up was wrong. The steps taken in going from a given class of particulars to their universal, which is the general idea including them all, are called ἐσωκορια, induction. Hence, Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the discovery of the epagogic or inductive method (τὰς ἐσωκορια λόγους), and of the definition of universals (τὰ ἐφεξῆς καθολικά, — hence ἕρως = definitio).

By the dialectic of Socrates is meant simply his acuteness in so guiding a series of questions and answers that something was finally done toward determining a general conception and reaching some measure of truth. This process required a living issue raised between a man skilled in questioning and some one willing to answer him. But, soon after the day of Socrates,

¹ We may summarize the philosophical situation as follows: Protagoras said: Man is the measure; Socrates met this by asking: What is man? Gorgias said: We cannot have real knowledge; Socrates met this by saying: Before we give up knowledge let us seriously try to know ourselves.
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'dialectic' became a philosophical term applied particularly to the more developed and many-sided method of Plato; indeed, it finally became identified with Plato's logic or theory of ideas. Quite apart from Socrates's dialectic is the controversial art of certain Sophists (στοιχειωμενοι), for, whereas this controversial art only sought perpetual controversy, the essential peculiarity of the dialectic of Socrates was that it aimed at the understanding of truth.

20 The discussions of Socrates were almost always ethical. Nearly all questions which up to his day had engrossed philosophers he summarily excluded from the field of his investigation. He asked: What is virtue? what is holiness? what is justice? what is courage? And his answer, in every case, was understanding,—the understanding of what is good in reference now to one and now to another class of facts. Courage, for instance, is the understanding of what is good in relation to things terrible and dangerous; and he has courage whose conduct is right in cases of terror and danger. Yet Socrates recognized that the original bent with which the individual is born here disclosed itself; since he saw that, just as one man's body is born stronger than his neighbor's, so one man's soul was born more courageous than his neighbor's. Yet he maintained that every man, be the qualities born in him what they might, could advance in excellence (πρωτείου) by learning and practice.

21 Such is Socrates's doctrine in its outlines, as Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle have represented it in their writings. Socrates himself, as is well known, was the author of no books. We have, therefore, no direct statement of his views at first hand. The most important authority for his teachings is Xenophon, especially his four books of "Memoirs of Socrates" (ἀντιγραφή, commentarii, Memorabilia). In this work the writer undertakes to defend the memory of his friend and master against the accusations and slanders of all enemies. With this in view, he sets forth all that he can remember of the conversations of Socrates. All must be ready to allow that Xenophon, who was nothing if not a man of action, failed to understand Socrates's position in

1 It has been claimed that the Memorabilia are referred to by Horace (A. P. v. 310), as Socraticus chartas. The poet's allusion, however, is probably more vague.
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the history of Greek philosophy; he could not adequately appreciate him as a philosopher. But of the man his portrait is invaluable, in spite of this or perhaps on account of this. Writing from a popular point of view, he corrects Plato's ideal representation of the master Socrates, and helps us to the facts about Socrates as he lived and taught. Further, in the judicious remarks scattered here and there through Aristotle's writings, we have always a most welcome supplement, and often a most wholesome corrective; by drawing from all these sources we are enabled to bring our ideal Socrates within the limits of historical fact.

An account of Socrates's theory gives no adequate knowledge of his historical significance. A necessary aid must be sought in some description of his personality, of Socrates during life and Socrates facing death.

It has already been said that Socrates thought his life consecrated to the service of a higher power and his every act the fulfilment of a task laid on him by God. This it was that forbade his following any of the pursuits which engross the majority of men. He was poor, but his poverty was not so complete as his frugality. The fulfilment of God's command imposed upon him abstention from politics, except in cases where to abstain would be to neglect the plain duties of a citizen. He served as a hoplite in three campaigns, and showed in battle that he was no mere talker about courage. This same temper, this untiring obedience to duty, unswerving in the way of right and law, he displayed as one of the senators and prytanes on the occasion of the memorable popular assembly which illegally condemned the generals victorious at Arginusae. Here he faced the arbitrary caprice of the people with the same strength of mind which made him

1 When Xenophon is used as our authority, it should be remembered that the subtler qualities of such a man as Socrates were likely, either to escape so unimaginative a mind, or, if felt, to be represented inadequately by a writer comparatively destitute of dramatic power. These are just the qualities which distinguish Socrates from all other teachers, and these are given by Plato alone. Cf. 'Socrates,' a translation of the Apology, Crito, and parts of the Phaedo. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

2 Apology, p. 23 e and note; also Xen. Mem. I. vi.

3 Apology, p. 28 e and note; also Laches, pp. 181 a b, 188 e, and Symposium, pp. 219 e—221 e.

4 Apology, p. 32 b with note.
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afterwards prefer death to a cowardly and unrighteous submission to the thirty tyrants.

24 Critias, like Alcibiades, was for a time a disciple of Socrates chiefly for the reason that he expected in that capacity to learn certain useful accomplishments. Later, as the leading spirit among the Thirty, this same Critias undertook to make the habitual occupation of Socrates uncomfortable for him. The conversation between the two is preserved by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 31 ff.). The passage is characteristic of both speakers, and should certainly be read by all, for it familiarizes us with the plan of active operations to which Socrates devoted all of his life and energy.

25 Xenophon tells us that Critias, and with him Charicles who was also an influential member of the Thirty, had been irritated by Socrates’s freedom of speech. They pointedly reminded him of the terms of a law which they had promulgated to meet his particular case, and threateningly bade him obey its behests: λογος τεχνης μη βασιλευειν, no one shall teach the art of words. It is no matter for surprise that this law should have been aimed at Socrates, for two reasons: first, because of the tendency to classify Socrates as one of the Sophists. Indeed, he seems to have been looked upon simply as the most popular and effective of Sophists, and hence he became for the comic poets the representative Sophist. The second reason is, that the words λογος τεχνης, taken in their widest sense, do apply to Socrates’s characteristic way of question and answer, as well as to rhetoric; and yet there were really many outer and palpable marks which distinguished Socrates and his teaching from the Sophists and their art. A Sophist charged for his instruction, and hence would usually teach in some place of private resort; Socrates, since he was the servant

1 Apology, p. 32 c d with note.

2 In the Clouds, first put on the stage in n.c. 423, Aristophanes brings Socrates before his audience in that capacity. An added piquancy was given by Socrates’s peculiar personal appearance, which fell so very far short of the Hellenic ideal of beauty. Indeed Socrates himself frequently compares himself with the statues of Silenus (Xenophon, Symposium, ch. 5; Plato, Symposium, ch. 33). How then could we expect the comic poets to abstain from caricaturing one so easy to caricature? Anybody could recognize a mask which was meant for Socrates.
of God, would take no man’s pay. Hence, he naturally pre-
ferred the most public places, such as the market, the gymnasium, 
a public porch, or some workshop. Being no respecter of persons 
he was ready to discuss with every man, and eager to share the 
search for truth with any new comer. The genuineness of this 
desire for cooperation was undoubted, for he declared himself 
able alone to get at any knowledge. To exemplify this his 
homely description of his art as intellectual midicifery (μάθημα) 
and his comparison of it with the profession of his mother, the 
midwife Phaenarete, may be mentioned.¹ This idea made him 
protest against being called any man’s teacher, indeed he stoutly 
denied that he had any pupils. As substitutes for these names 
of teacher and pupil, Xenophon and Plato use words which all of 
them describe the pursuit of truth on equal and friendly terms.

The chief delight of Socrates was to gather about him young 26 
men of good parts who were eager for knowledge. This led him to 
frequent places where they habitually assembled, such as the palace-
tra or the gymnasium. No doubt the Thirty bore this in mind when 
they bade him not to consort with any one under thirty years of 
age. But Socrates was ready to talk with men of all ages and all 
stations, no matter where he found them. He was often seen con-
versing eagerly with workmen, and this led him to draw freely upon 
their familiar surroundings and occupations for topics and for 
illustrations. And hence we hear the frequent complaint that 
he was continually harping upon cobbling, cobblers, carpenters, 
smiths, and the like. He was considered a bore who repeated the 
same thing about the same subject ad nauseam; whereas, the Soph-
ists were at infinite pains never to use the same phraseology twice 
in discussing the same thing. Of course this implied that their 
attention was riveted upon the way of putting things: they dazzled 
their hearers and drew from them tumultuous applause, little caring 
if the enthusiasm lasted but for a moment. But the whole energy 
of Socrates was absorbed by the central purpose of rousing a right 
understanding and of implanting a firm and fruitful conviction. 
That the knowledge itself which Socrates strove for was far other

¹ Cf. Alcibiades I., p. 431 e; Theactet., p. 149 a.
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than that which the Sophists so glibly taught, is best shown by a contrast between one characteristic attribute of his discourse and theirs. The Sophists made a great flourish of trumpets (τραγανός); they began with a perfectly rounded self-complacency. Socrates began by protesting that he was sure of one thing only,—his own ignorance. Wisdom, he declared, is of God; and this, said he, was the meaning intended by the oracle at Delphi by the words: No man is wiser than Socrates. This self-knowledge is nothing more than a purified form of the genuinely Greek idea of temperance, ἡσυχία. It is based upon the immemorial belief that the gods are jealous and refuse to tolerate men who put themselves upon a pedestal. The conceit of self-knowledge with which the Sophists were puffed up, Socrates undoubtedly considered a case in point. Against this conceit he waged war with his incomparable irony, before which all their wisdom became as nothing. He made it plain to them, and to whomsoever it might concern, that all their general notions were confused and worthless. A tempered form of his irony is seen in his treatment of young and enthusiastic votaries of learning. First of all, he helps them to an understanding of their ignorance, but yet he leaves in their souls such a sting as stirs them to an earnest struggle for real insight. Indeed, we have seen that the humility of Socrates's self-measurement was by no means incompatible with a fixed determination to win the truth which leads to righteousness. Socrates said, in short: Let no man call himself a φιλόσοφος, owner of wisdom, but let every man be a φιλόσοφος, lover of wisdom.

There is, indeed, no uncertain ring in the religious tone of Socrates's philosophy. By his conversations he strove to rouse in others the religious sense, and at the same time he exhibited in his own life a heartfelt piety, rooted in the purest gratitude for the goodness of God, and manifested in the most scrupulous conformity to all the outward rites and observances of public worship. Even the popular practice of consulting oracles and interpreting omens, he did not, according to Xenophon, reject. He merely sought to confine it

1 Hdt. I. 33.
2 Cf. Apology, p. 37 e; Republic, p. 337 a: ἡσυχία ἐκείνη ἐλεύθερα ἔφεσα Ζενοβίου.
3 See Xen. Mem. i. 4 and iv. 3.
4 Cf. particularly Mem. i. 2 sqq., especially 6-9; see also Anabasis iii. 1. 5-7.
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to difficulties for dealing with which God had given to man neither the knowledge nor the capacity. In all these cases, Socrates himself was singularly favored in that he possessed a gift sent of God, — a heavenly voice of warning. Whenever this voice spoke within him he knew that what he was about to do would result in harm and that therefore he must abstain from it; when the voice was silent he was the stronger in his purpose and strengthened others in theirs.¹ Socrates most certainly did not conceive of this voice as an emanation from a special and independent divinity, but as a revelation of the love and the wisdom of God. Such a revelation, he thought,² might well come to any man, though perhaps not in the same way. Still Socrates may have been uncommonly sensitive to this influence, and more conscientious than most men in doing what it prompted. Be this as it may, what we know about the matter serves to prove that his trust in God was exceptional; indeed this is nowhere made clearer than in cases where Socrates did not hear the voice, and yet, without its warning to direct him, was deaf to the clamors of selfish fears which greatly disturb other men,—cases where he did what he knew was right without petty anxiety as to the end.

Intimately connected with this remarkable strength of moral character is the absolute control in which his body was held by his mind. The capital manifestation of this is to be found in the accounts which have been preserved of his "staying power" while he was engaged in following up a train of thought. The best instance of this Plato gives in the following story of Socrates at the siege of Potidaea.³ Early one day a subject of thought occurred to Socrates while he was walking, and he stopped; for twenty-four hours he stood stock-still, because he could not come to any conclusion until

¹ Cf. Apol., pp. 31 c d, 40 a b; Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1-5. In the Appendix to his edition of the Memorabilia, Brehmtenbach enters into this whole ques-
tion. See also Susemilil in Bursian’s Jahresbericht I. 5, p. 540, and Zell-
er II., pp. 69-83 of the third edition. ⁵ Cf. Riddell’s Apology, Appendix A, and Cardinal Manning’s The Daeron of Socrates, Longmans and Green, 1872.

² Schleiermacher proves this in his note on Apology, p. 27 b, by showing that Plato and Xenophon alike use ἄκριτος as an adjective. Cf. on Apol., p. 31 d.

³ Symposium, p. 220 c d; see also, on the credibility of the story, Zeller II., p. 69.
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the next morning. In other respects as well his endurance was remarkable: he was hardened to every privation. Winter and summer alike he went barefoot, and always wore clothes of the same texture and thickness. This, in fact, made the rigours of a winter in Thrace tell upon him far less than upon his comrades in arms. Apart from his soldiering, hardly anything could induce Socrates to leave Athens, as he is made to say himself in the Crito. As for temperance and frugality, we have seen that he was remarkable for both.

29 The outline given above may be regarded as an historically trustworthy account of the character of Socrates. And now we need hesitate no longer in agreeing with the enthusiastic estimate of Socrates given at the end of the Memorabilia. But all this certainly leaves us but ill-prepared for the manner of the great man’s ‘taking off.’ Prosecuted in his declining years, on a most serious charge, he was, after a legal trial, sentenced to death. And all this happened, not during any oligarchical or democratic reign of terror, but at the very time when everybody was admiring the moderate spirit of the newly-restored Athenian democracy. It was shortly after the archonship of Euclides and the deposition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasylulus. As far as history has determined them, the facts about this trial are as follows:—

30 In the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, while Laches was archon, and when Socrates had already passed the limit of threescore years and ten, Meletus, seconded by Anytus and Lyco, came forward with his accusation. In Plato’s Euthyphro Meletus is described as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is treated with a measure of contempt. Some identify him with the poet Meletus, others say he was the poet’s son, though ‘a chip of the old block,’ since the words (Apol. 23 e) ὅπο τῶν ὄρην ὤφθη
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ἐκθέσεως imply that he was poetically inclined. He led the prosecution, the other two being technically his συντρόποι. It is plain, however, that the substantial man of the three was Anytus, since it was the influence of Anytus which chiefly secured the verdict. Anytus, who had inherited a handsome property and had filled the highest offices in the commonwealth, was at this particular time one of the most popular men in public life. He had worked with all his might to help Thrasybulus expel the Thirty and to restore the democracy. Not only did he condemn Socrates as being one of the Sophists against all of whom his bitterness was uncompromising, but in addition he owed him an especial grudge. For Socrates, it appears, had made certain indiscreet and irritating comments upon his private affairs. Lyco is absolutely unknown beyond what is said in the Apology (22 e). There he is represented as a professional speech-maker, and it is reasonable to infer that as such he contributed far more than Meletus toward the success of the prosecution.

The indictment was submitted by Meletus to the ἔργον βουλής, 31 whose jurisdiction covered all cases involving religion. Its formal terms were: Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods believed in by the state, and also of introducing other new divinities. Moreover, he is further guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty proposed is death. This was an indictment for an offence against the state; accordingly it was technically a ὑπάρξει (public suit), and, as further qualified by the specific charges, a ὑπάρξει ἔργος (a public suit on the count of impiety).

As to the negative clause of the first count (ἐνδοτα ὑπὸ τῶν τερότα τὸ ἔργον τοῦ κακοῦ), it certainly is difficult to see any fact to justify such an accusation, inasmuch as Socrates expressly recognized the law of the land (τὸν ἐνδοτά) as the final arbiter in all that concerned the worship of the gods; and, indeed, himself scrupulously

1 Apol., p. 36 a.  
2 [Xen.] Apol. 29, sqq. Probably there is some reference to Anytus’s unjust hatred of Socrates in Xen. Cyrop. Ill. 1, 3, sqq.  
3 'Ἀκείτε ξαπάνησαν οὐκ μὲν ἦ νῦν ὑπότα τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν τερότα τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐπειδὴ κανεὶς ἐκ τῶν τερότα τοῦ κακοῦ μὴν ὑπάρχει ξαπάνησαν.  
4 See infra, § 67, and Apol., p. 19 b.  
5 Apol., p. 20 d.
observed all its requirements. The terms of the second (affirmative) clause (ἐφ' ἐκ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων) apparently refer to the much mooted ἔμφασις, — the mysterious communication from God to Socrates. This allegation was a slander, but had it been true could hardly have had much weight at Athens, where the introduction of new divinities was not a crime.

It is, however, probable that the first count was introduced as a foil to the second, and was primarily intended as a means for giving a legal foothold to the suit. For among all known provisions of Athenian law there is not one under which Socrates could have been prosecuted on the second count (ἐπαγγέλτως νῦν ἔμφασις τείχος ἐπιστημονίου). This view is confirmed by the difficulty which even the thirty tyrants had in interfering officially with Socrates’s dealings with young men. They had to pass a special law for the purpose, and that law was doubtless abolished when the democracy was restored. At all events it is certain that in the accuser’s mind the second count was the most important. We have only to remember the prejudices of Anytus, and to recall the fact that he was still smarting under Socrates’s sharp criticism of the way in which he educated his son. We can understand his indignation, though we do not share it. Now Anytus was a citizen in excellent standing, and naturally felt sure of success against such heresies in any appeal to the law. What, then, is easier to understand than his eagerness to take advantage of any pretext that offered itself against Socrates? He was eager to save his country by redressing his own grievance. Nor is it difficult to see why many of the judges should have been inclined to sympathize with him. They were enthusiastic for the democracy, and looked with disfavour upon any man like Socrates who had so often and so sharply criticized institutions dear to the democrat’s heart. Still, it is more than questionable whether such criticisms were amenable to the law of a commonwealth whose shibboleth was free speech (μαρτυρία). A connection, on Socrates’s part, with overt or covert attempts at revolution cannot be thought of; any suggestion of the kind falls by its own weight, for it is pure and unadulterated slander. But still it was urged that Alcibiades and Critias, notorious scourges of the body politic, were for some time
the companions of Socrates. And, though Xenophon has abundantly shown the injustice of remembering this against Socrates, the judges could not forget it. The memory of these men's crimes was still so fresh that every one was inclined to mistrust the man to whose teaching many attributed the misdeeds which had so lately made life unbearable. This teaching they were therefore determined to stop, and nothing could better have served their purpose than the first count of the indictment, an accusation of atheism, for at Athens it had often gone hard in the courts with those who had to meet this charge.

This whole accusation was from the first met calmly and collectedly by Socrates, and he showed the same temper at the bar of the court. There is a story, told twice of Socrates,¹ which brings this unruffled spirit vividly before us, and Plato's Theaetetus does the same more subtly. Plato represents that intricate and abstruse philosophical discussion, carried on by Socrates with phenomenal fair-mindedness and consummate ease, as taking place immediately before the great teacher was compelled by the summons of Meletus to appear for preliminary examination before the magistrate² (ἐπικρατάς). It was a sense of duty only which forced Socrates to appear, both at this time and afterwards, at the trial. It was his duty, he thought, to appear in his own case and to make his own plea,³ though he made it without real hope or serious

¹ "Hermogenes, the son of Hippocrates," a friend of Socrates, "noticed that Socrates, though he conversed freely on things in general, avoided any allusion to the impending suit. 'My dear Socrates,' said he, 'surely you ought to be attending to your brief.' 'Why, do I not seem to you,' answered Socrates, 'to have passed my life with my brief constantly in view? What do you mean by that?' asked Hermogenes. 'I mean that I have shunned evil all my life, that, I think, is the most honorable way in which a man can bestow attention upon his own defence.'" [Xen.] Apol., § 3 sqq. Cf. Mem. iv. 8. 4 sqq., where the story is almost verbally repeated.
² Theset., p. 210 e d.
³ Cicero (De oratore I. 54) is our chief authority for the following tale about Socrates's defence. The celebrated orator Lysias, out of the fulness of his friendship for Socrates, wrote him a speech for his defence. Socrates declined it when offered, because he thought it would be undignified for him to use it, and in spite of the fact that it was a marvel of pleading. The story is probably founded on the fact that upwards of six years after Socrates's execution Lysias wrote a rhetorical exercise (declamatio) on the theme of Socrates's defence, as an answer to
desire of escaping the death-penalty proposed by his accuser. His defence was made without previous preparation, and there breathed in it such noble pride and such uncompromising independence that its effect must rather have irritated than conciliated his judges. In the court-room as on the battle-field Socrates was always the same fearless champion of his own and his country's honour. Where other men consulted their own safety, God required Socrates to be faithful and to obey orders.

35 And so it came to pass that the judges brought in the verdict of 'guilty,' but by no large majority. In cases of this nature the law did not fix the penalty beforehand, and Socrates had still the right of rating his guilt at his own price, ἀντιμάσθω, his accuser having proposed, τιμᾶσθαι, the penalty of death. After the defendant had named his counter-penalty, the court was bound to choose one of the two. Just as in his plea Socrates had disdained the ordinary means of working upon the feelings of the court by tears and supplications, so now he scorned the obvious way of safety still open to any man whose guilt had been affirmed by verdict. He absolutely refused to suggest any real counter-penalty, and hence an increased majority sentenced him to death.

36 The same courage which had animated him while speaking his defence, the same rooted conviction that they who love God need fear no evil, supported him now when his execution had become a question of days and hours, and prevented him from countenancing any plan for disobeying the laws of the state. Exceptional circumstances delayed the execution of his sentence for thirty days after

a speech on the other side of the case by the rhetorician Polycrates. For a discussion of the matter, see Spengel (Συνεχεία τρισκ. p. 141) and Rauchensperger (Philol. XVL 1).

"But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." Matthew xii. v. 19.

1 Apol., p. 30 a and ibid. note on αὐτοκράτορι τιμᾶσθαι.

2 Ibid., p. 35 d and infra, § 73.
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it was rendered, and his friends, perhaps with the connivance of
the authorities, offered him means of escape and also oppor-
tunity to use them. But he was firm in refusing these, just as
while on trial he had been firm in rejecting every opportunity to
secure either a favourable verdict or a lighter penalty. The tale
that shortly after his death the Athenians repented and actually
called the accusers to account rests on such slender authority that
it must not be taken as history.

Of all the companions of Socrates none more deeply revered the 37
master's noble life than Plato, and no heart was more deeply stirred
by the pathos of his death. At the time Plato was still young, barely
thirty years of age.\(^1\) Aristo his father and his mother Pericione
were both of good old Athenian stock. Codrus was one of his
ancestors on his father's side, and by his mother he was descended
from Solon. At the age of twenty he became a disciple of Socrates,
having until that time devoted his energies to poetry. It is
said that he was already so much of a poet that he was on the eve
of bringing out a tetralogy; but when he became a disciple of Socrates
he gave himself entirely to philosophy. At last he had
found a field which was to be all his own, a field where his genius
was soon to work wonders; for his philosophy was to guide the
spiritual and intellectual life of his countrymen to a new and
splendid consummation. Before this he had not been unacquainted

from Delos. During this time not one
of his familiar friends could detect
in his case any change in the manner
of his life from what it had always
been. And as for his previous career,
he certainly always commanded un-
paralleled admiration for living a
cheerful and contented life.\(^1\) The
annual festival and embassy to Delos
—another festival, also called Δήλω,
was celebrated every four years—
came in the tenth or eleventh month
of the Athenian year (Μαιωνις or
Θαρράλιον), hence the death of Soc-
rates probably occurred in Thargelion
(our May and June); the year was
399 B.C.

\(^1\) Various dates are given for Plato's
birth. (1) The usually accepted one
depends on Athenaeus, and is the
archonship of Apollodorus, Ol. 87, 3
= 430/29 B.C. (2) Diogenes Laertius
gives Ol. 87, 4 = 429/28 B.C., Epa-
meinon's year as archon, and the year
of Pericles' death. (3) Zeller follows
Hermodorus, a pupil of Plato, and
fixes upon 428/27 B.C. The birthday
is said to have been the seventh day
of Thargelion, a day sacred to Apollo.
In the year 428/27 B.C. this came on
May 20/27, or, as others claim, May
20/30. \textit{Cf.} Steinhart.
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with philosophy, and we are told that Cratylus had initiated him into the mysteries of Heraclitus; but not until he met Socrates had he found the guide and friend who was to lead him in all his speculations toward the goal of truth.

38 It is not possible to decide whether some of Plato's earliest writings (e.g. the Lysis) were produced during Socrates's life, or all of them after the master's death. The bias of opinion now-a-days inclines to the latter view, and insists upon the unhistorical and ideal picture of Socrates which Plato everywhere alike has drawn. At all events, the questions dealt with by Plato's earliest works were just the ones constantly discussed by Socrates, though even here and at the outset Plato displays originality. His vocation was to connect together the definitions insisted upon by Socrates and to reduce them to an ordered system by the application of a single law or principle. At the very outset he took up the same lines which his whole life was devoted to following out, and he ended by establishing dialectic as a science. Yet he never lost sight of Socrates, who always moved before him as the perfect philosopher. He valued philosophical writing only so far as it mirrored the ways, the wisdom, and the words of the ideal philosopher, and his works are pictures of the marvellous personality of Socrates. Hence it is that Plato, when he wrote, could not dispense with the peculiarly Socratic form of question and answer, but in his hands the dialogue is fashioned and developed into a new form of literature. His early interest in art and his familiarity with all the forms of poetry naturally stood him in good stead here, and we need not wonder that the poetic fire and dramatic vividness of his dialogues are universally admired.

39 Among the dialogues which he first wrote the Protagogoras is perhaps the one which most conspicuously exemplifies these great qualities. Both in the subject dealt with, and in the conclusions arrived at, the Protagogoras belongs to the school of Socrates. Virtue is there defined as knowledge of what is good, and in this are contained and summed up all particular virtues. Therefore, (1) virtue can be taught, and (2) no man is wicked freely and of his own proper choice. Wickedness is ignorance of what is good, and perfect goodness belongs only to God. Man's virtue is incomplete
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and tentative only,—it is a constant struggle; God alone is invariably and forever good. There is nothing discussed here which was not an every-day topic with Socrates and his friends.

In the Gorgias Plato discusses the relation of goodness to pleasure, a matter barely touched upon in the Protagoras. The opposition between rhetoric and dialectic is most effectively drawn by contrasting the sophist and his scheme of morals with the true philosopher. Rhetoric is a sham art of living, the beau-ideal of which is the unbridled indulgence by each individual of every passing whim, a fool’s paradise where the bodily appetites are gorged. The true art of living, on the other hand, seeks and finds everywhere law, order, and righteousness (σωφροσύνη), even though in so doing all temporal happiness and life itself be sacrificed. Higher than this earthly life is life eternal and the hereafter, where he only is blessed who has walked upon earth in the paths of righteousness. Therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The former does harm that lasts but a day, the latter brings enduring contamination.

This bare outline is enough to suggest that the fate of Socrates was in the mind of the writer of the Gorgias. This is confirmed by the merciless directness of its arguments, and by the tone of severity and almost bitterness which pervades the whole work. The Gorgias contains the moral teachings of Socrates and a great deal more, for there we find them as it were transfigured. Moreover, we get a glimpse of Plato’s political creed. An aristocrat by birth, he could hardly have learned the love of democracy from Socrates, though even without this master there was enough in contemporary political events to incline him to the views which he held. It has been supposed that Pericles died in the course of the same year which saw the birth of Plato.1 Plato’s earliest impressions about politics may therefore best be understood by reading in Thucydides the history of that time. It was the era of decay in Athenian morals both public and private, an era which Thucydides described with a heavy heart. If Plato went a step further and, in seeking for the cause of so much harm, attributed this

1 This chronological coincidence is not certain. See p. 27, note 1.
degeneration to Pericles, it surely can be urged that such a view of
the great statesman’s leadership is not absolutely untenable even
when judged by the strictest standard of historical impartiality. But though Plato loved democracy less, it was not because he loved
the thirty tyrants more. Two of his mother’s kin, his uncle Charmides and also Critias, were conspicuous among the Thirty, but
Plato was neither of them nor with them. What Socrates had to
endure revealed to his disciple the infancy of the Thirty and their
lust for power, while any dawning hopes from the moderate temper
shown by the newly restored democracy which supplanted them
was more than obscured by Socrates’s trial and condemnation.
He found in these events new reasons for adopting the plan of
life which of old had been congenial to him, and he was thus
confirmed in his inclination to serve his country by shunning all
active participation in his country’s affairs. It would surely be
rashness to urge that, in deciding upon the manner of his life,
Plato lacked either patriotism or common sense.

To avoid political entanglements, and at the same time to add
to his intellectual attainments, Plato left Athens shortly after Soc-
rate’s death, and retired to Megara, the home of a group of his
philosophical friends. Euclides of Megara, a warm friend of
Socrates, was the central figure among them. Like many other
disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes for example, Euclides was at
great pains to reconcile the Socratic definitions or general ideas
with the Eleatic doctrine of the oneness of pure being. Plato
who, in the Euthyphro, early fore-shadows a more abstruse account
of these general ideas than Socrates had given, naturally sought to
profit, while thinking out his own views, by those of Euclides. But
the Eleatic motionless Being worked apparently like a palsy upon
the Megarians, for Plato gained no new light from his friends at
Megara. However he certainly was impelled by his sojourn

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1 The opinion of Pericles expressed
by Thucydides (II. 65) is very favour-
able. Grote warmly defends the reput-
tation of Pericles against the less
favourable comments of Plato, Aris-
 tôtle, Plutarch, and a certain number
of modern writers. Recently Bäch-
senschütz in his ‘Besitz und Erwerb
im griechischen Alterthum’ has again
accentuated the other side, and Herz-
berg in turn argues, Jahrbücher für
Ph. u. P. 100, 5, in favour of Pericles.
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there to supplement what he knew of the Eleatic doctrine by more thorough studies. If the Socratic philosophy may be called the ground in which the tree of Plato's knowledge took firm root, what he gained at Megara, and the familiarity with the Eleatic doctrines which he soon acquired, may be compared to the showers which watered that ground, and enabled the roots of the tree to strike deeper, and helped its branches to a fuller growth.

This same end was subserved by his further travels. He first went to Cyrene,—perhaps by way of Ephesus, where he may have wished to become acquainted with the living representatives of Heraclitus's school,—and there spent some time with Theodorus the mathematician. Though Theodorus was the reputed exponent of Protagoras's philosophy, Plato was chiefly drawn to him as a great mathematician and geometer. The Athenians certainly were not likely to forget the learning which he had exhibited when he visited their city. The importance attached by Plato to mathematics as a necessary part of right education is notorious, as is also his own proficiency in that branch of learning. After a visit to Egypt, he proceeded to Magna Graecia that he might there consort with the Pythagoreans, from whose learning he obviously expected to derive great benefit. The chief man among them was Archytas of Tarentum. Distinguished alike for statesmanship and as a general, Archytas had originated the analytic method in mathematics, and had solved many problems in geometry and mechanics, besides achieving a great name in philosophy. The society of Archytas and his school revived Plato's interest in practical government, which had died with Socrates. As a sight-seer Plato extended his tour to Sicily, and was there introduced by Dio to the court of the elder Dionysius. But his Athenian visitor was too outspoken for that tyrant, and finally incurred his ungovernable resentment. At the time, just before the peace of Antalcidas, there was war between Athens and the Peloponnesians,—and so it

1 Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10.
2 Over the door of his lecture-room was written, it is said: Let no one unversed in geometry enter here, πολιτοὺς ἄγεων τεχνὸς αὐτοῖς.
3 It is very commonly asserted that he solved the Delian problem (the doubling of a cube), and on doing so, criticized the usual manner of dealing with mathematics.
occurred to Dionysius that his guest should become Sparta's prisoner of war. He was sold and carried as a slave to Aegina, whence he was finally ransomed by the generous zeal of Anniceris of Cyrene.  

At the age of forty Plato was again in Athens, and he brought with him great treasures of knowledge and of experience. During his absence, moreover, he had been busy writing, and the Theaetetus serves as a reminder of his sojourn at Megara and at Cyrene. It is a dialogue within a dialogue; the introductory conversation may be called Plato's dedication of the whole work to his friends at Megara. The question, What is knowledge? is asked, and every typical answer to it, beginning with the most obvious one, Knowledge is sensation (αισθηση), and ending with the most abstruse one, is first stated with fairness and then with equal fairness refuted. In this dialogue we find Socrates and Theaetetus represented more effectively than anywhere else in Plato's writings, while in the companion pictures, so eloquently drawn by Socrates, of the philosopher and the practical man or lawyer, Plato seems to be vindicating himself against fault-finders.

This whole account of Plato's being sold as a slave and then ransomed is not well substantiated by trustworthy authorities.

It is important at this point to have clearly before the mind some statement of Plato's theory of ideas. In the Theaetetus (p. 210 a) Socrates is made to say: "Then, Theaetetus, knowledge is not (1) sensation (αισθηση); nor is it (2) true opinion (διάδεξις διαφημή); nor again, (3) true opinion coupled with definition (λόγος προογγερημένον)." This of course represents the view of Plato and not of Socrates, for (3) is very nearly what Socrates would have called knowledge. Without any direct allusion to his theory of ideas, Plato shows in this dialogue that no definition of knowledge is logically possible unless the definition itself contains the term defined. To define true opinion we must distinguish, and to distinguish we must have already a true opinion of the characteristic differences between one notion and another. Plato's way out of the difficulty, which closes in on all sides and seems to leave no avenue of escape, is a recourse to his theory of ideas, and for a statement of this theory we have to go to his other dialogues. He did not reject Socrates's definitions, but rather erected them into a symmetrically organized scheme of thought, of reality. These ideas are the realities dimly suggested by the world around us; but neither they nor anything else would ever be suggested to us or known by us if we had not lived in another and a better world where these ideas exist. We know things in this world because, before coming here, we have seen
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In the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Parmenides, we have 45 works more or less obviously connected with the Theaetetus. These are the dialectical dialogues, so called because they are devoted to a connected account of dialectic. At the same time they contain a searching criticism of Heraclitus and of the Eleatics. One characteristic of the three works last named is that in them 1 it is not Socrates who leads the discussion.

As soon as Plato returned to his native land he gathered pupils 46 about him in the Academy, a suburban gymnasion close to his own house and garden. Here he taught with but few interruptions throughout the remaining forty years of his life. About the matter or manner of his teaching in the Academy we know nothing, unless we find it in those of his writings which were written while he was engaged in teaching.

There are weighty reasons for surmising that the Phaedrus was 47 written at the beginning of this period, 2 and accordingly it is prefaced, appropriately enough, by a graceful sketch of the scenery near Athens. Here dialectic is treated as something more than the science of that which really is (ideas); it is that and also the genuine art of putting things or oratory, and as such it is as far superior to ordinary rhetoric as reality is to sham or instruction to persuasion. Both teaching and learning are based upon the history of the human soul, and consist in a revival of memories (ἀνάμνησις) which are stored away in every soul while it is yet living in the divine world of ideas and before it comes to dwell on earth in a mortal frame. The relation of teacher and learner is spoken of as under the control of the pure and heaven-sent passion of love. The two become as one in order to bring forth knowledge from

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1 Lately there has been a revival of the doubt as to whether Plato wrote these three dialogues.

2 Schleiermacher considers the Phaedrus as Plato's maiden discourse; with this view other writers of eminence either wholly agree, or at least place it among Plato's earliest works.
the learner's soul. The Symposium (συμπόσιον, banquet) and the Phaedo like the Phaedrus are masterpieces of style and may be called companion pictures: the Symposium represents the philosopher in his moments of conviviality; the Phaedo portrays him face to face with death. The Philebus contains an inquiry into the idea of the good and is not so conspicuous for the charm of its style, since it deals with most abstruse ethical and dialectical (metaphysical) points. In the course of the dialogue a great deal is said of the Pythagorean philosophy as stated by Philolaus.  

In the Philebus, more than in any of his previous works, Plato strives to throw the light of philosophy upon the facts of life, and this he does to a still greater extent in those of his works which usually are considered his latest: the Republic (τὰ Βούλευτα), the Timaeus and the Critias, all three of which are closely connected, and the Laws. These discourses, because they are attempts to mould facts into harmony with ideal principles, to construct the world as it should be, are called his constructive works. The most celebrated of these, and indeed the most admirable of all Plato's works, is the Republic. Beginning with the question, "What is justice?" the writer soon develops the fact that justice, belonging as it does to the state as much as to any individual citizen, can most easily be seen in the former, where it is 'writ large.' Recognizing three classes of citizens as natural and necessary in the state, he connects them with his tripartite division of the soul. His class of rulers correspond to the reason (τὸ λογικόν); his class of warriors to the (irascible) impulsive part (τὸ θυμόσα); his class of producers to the appetites (τὸ ἐνέπησεν). These three classes in combination work out the happiness of the whole state, and it is the happiness of all which determines the teaching and training of each. The rulers follow wisdom (σοφία); the warriors, courage (ἀρετή); rulers, warriors, workers in unison

1 Cf. supra, p. 3, n. 3.
2 This division into three parts is based in the Timaeus upon a division into two parts. The soul has (1) its immortal or rational part, and (2) its irrational or mortal part. This last (2) is subdivided into (a) a noble part (θυμός) and (b) an ignoble part (ἐνέπησεν). These three divisions are explained as faculties of the soul by Wieditz, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychologie, in the Philosophische Monatschrift, 1873.
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follow self-control (σωφροσύνη). Justice (δικαιοσύνη), the virtue of virtues, works toward the determining ideal for the sake of which, the limbs of the body politic cooperate; and while the collective happiness of all citizens depends on justice, justice is gained by having each of the three classes pursue its characteristic perfection or virtue. This certainly is not the Socratic doctrine of the unity of all virtues, but a modification of it. With this great work are connected the Timaeus and the (unfinished) Critias. The Timaeus describes the universe as an organic and rational creation, just as the state is described in the Republic. The Critias represents the ideal state as having existed in Attica before the deluge. There is also the story of their wars with the Atlantids. The dates and the facts thus given are of course purely mythical, and purport to be derived from foreign traditions. In what relation the twelve books of Plato's Laws stand to the ten books of the Republic is a question still under discussion, as is also the question whether Plato himself put the finishing touches upon his Laws as they have come down to us. Whether he wrote it as it actually stands or not, the work, in spite of the many eccentric views and odd turns of speech which it contains, is broadly conceived and of very great interest.

The general drift of these last works prepares us for Plato's last two visits to Sicily, where the younger Dionysius showed such promise both intellectual and moral that Plato hoped with his help to realize his new theories of government and of education. At the instance of Dio he accepted an invitation from the younger Dionysius, and again went to Syracuse in spite of the harsh treatment which had so precipitately terminated his former sojourn in that city. The too irascible elder Dionysius had died Ol. 103, 1 = 368-7 B.C. On his arrival Plato carried everything before him and it became the court fashion to imitate young Dionysius's enthusiasm for the new philosophy; but back-stairs intrigues soon turned the tables upon the reformer. His friend Dio was incan-

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1 Socrates said that wisdom was virtue. Plato said (1) wisdom acquired and exercised for the whole state is the ruler's virtue, (2) wisdom in boldly executing the ruler's commands is the warrior's virtue, (3) wisdom in obedient service to his betters is the workman's virtue.
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tious, and his indiscretion was promptly punished with banishment by the same clique of flattering courtiers which soon after brought about, against the wishes of Dionysius, the dismissal of Plato. But the repentant king again urged Plato to come back, promising that Dio should be recalled. The Pythagorean circle at Tarentum urged acceptance, and finally, still hoping to carry his pet theories into effect at Syracuse,\(^1\) Plato made his third visit to Syracuse. It was not long, however, before all the influence of Archytas was required to get our philosopher back to Athens alive. How little Plato's high hopes of the younger Dionysius were realized, is but too plain from the character of that tyrant as afterwards exhibited.

50 The remainder of Plato's life was engrossed by teaching and writing. Of his pupils many were from foreign parts, and among his numerous Athenian bearers there were not a few marked men, statesmen and generals such as Chabrias Timotheus and Phocion, orators such as Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Though hard to prove, it is easy to believe that Demosthenes's keenness and irresistible readiness in argument was stimulated and perfected by a training in the dialectic of Plato. Plato lived to a green old age,\(^2\) and death finally surprised him in the full possession of all his faculties when upwards of eighty (Ol. 108, \(1 = 348-7\) B.C.). The vigor of his mind at the time is brought home to us by the tale that after death they found under his pillow a draft of the opening passage of the Republic, which he had covered with erasures and corrections. Pausanias, who made his 'grand tour' in the second century after Christ, saw the tomb of Plato in the Ceramicus (Κεραμεικός), not far from the Academy. The post left vacant by Plato, the charge of his school which became known as the older Academy, was undertaken by Speusippus, a son

\(^1\) Cf. Laws iv., p. 700 e sqq. This passage irresistibly suggests the general condition of things which Plato, on the occasion of his last two journeys, expected to find at Syracuse, and indeed largely what he actually did find.

\(^2\) Seneca is probably repeating an 'idle tale' when he says that Plato died on his birthday, just as he had completed his eighty-first year. A similarly unauthenticated tale is repeated, by Cicero, who says (Cato major 5. 13): "uno et octogesimo ano scribens est mortuus." Perhaps his word "scribens" is simply a version of the story of the tablet discovered under the philosopher's pillow.
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of Plato's sister. The Chalcedonian Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus.

We may well call it a lucky chance that has preserved for us all 51
of Plato's works. They are an exhaustless treasurehouse filled to
overflowing with thoughts which have been the inspiration and the
delight of successive generations of men, for they appeal alike to
the philosopher and to the poet; to the former by the fulness of
their wisdom, to the latter by the beauty of their style. Plato chose
the form of question and answer, and in presenting philosophi-

cal truth dramatised the process by which such truth is reached.
Once chosen, that form became, in the hands of so great a master
both of thought and of style, something new under the sun, and
took its place among the other exemplars of literary art created by
the Greeks as the Greek method of presenting philosophy. The
various forms in which previous philosophical speculations had ap-
peared were but the imperfect statements of unperfected theories.
The one thing which these forms perfectly represented was the lack
of completeness which characterized the early systems of philoso-

phy. Socrates brought down Philosophy from the clouds of
heaven to the needs of life upon earth, and, the uncompromising
ordal of his cross-questioning once passed, her worth and strength
became manifest. Then at last, transfigured as it were by Plato's
genius, she appeared in all the beauty of a form of literature
quite worthy of her message. This is the moment which at
the opening of this sketch was anticipated. In Plato's dialogues

\[1\] Besides the works already enu-
merated and the Apology and Crito,
there are quite a number of others.
Some of these Plato has been supposed
not to have written. Those whose
authenticity has been questioned con-
nect themselves with the Protagoras;
they are: the Ion, Hippias Maior
and Minor, the first and second Alci-
biades, Lysis, Charmides, Laches Eu-
thyphro. Then there are dialogues
connected with the so-called dialecti-
cal discourses: the Meno, the Euthy-
demus, the Cratylus. The Menexenus
remains, and the only dialogues with
which it can be in any way compared
are the Apology and the Phaedrus.
Of course no mention is here made of
such other short discourses as have
been falsely attributed to Plato but
are now admitted by all to be spurious.

\[2\] The best account of the compara-
tive inefficiency of these early philoso-
phers is Plato's own. Cf. the passage
from the Sophist quoted \textit{supra}, p.
10, note 1.

\[3\] Cicero, \textit{Tusc. v. 4}, 10, and \textit{Academ.}
\textit{r. 4}, 15.
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the central purpose and the crowning result is to stimulate in every reader a self-reliant vigor of understanding which shall grapple boldly with the self-imposed task of seeking after the fundamental idea, and achieve in the end a clear insight into the whole subject discussed. Without this effort of mind no man can ever emerge from darkness into light. That Plato did not overestimate the value of his own or of any writings is clearly shown in the Phaedrus. The views there expounded probably influenced him to choose the dialogue-form, which is a reproduction, a mirror, as it were, of the words of living truth spoken by the living teacher. That he did not however underestimate the value of philosophical writing he shows rather in deed than in word. For how, otherwise, can we account for the long series of writings produced by him from the age of thirty until the time of his death,—a period of fifty years? By writing he increased the number of those who felt his influence, and this he might well seek to do while still believing that, compared with the spoken word, the written word was dead.

The many resources of Plato’s artistic imagination are apparent in the varied settings of his dialogues. The simplest form (1) has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons. Instances of this form of dialogue are the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, which best exemplify the dramatic power of Plato even in this simplest form of dialogue. More intricately dramatic and effective are the narrated dialogues, to which the second and third classes belong. These are (2) without preface and with no account of the persons to whom the narration or reading, as the case may be, is made,—e.g., the Republic; or (3) introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners. In (3) sometimes, though rarely, the narrated dialogue is momentarily interrupted before the close, and at the close a few words are commonly exchanged between the narrator and his auditors. Dialogues of this kind are the Symposium and the Phaedo. Just as these various forms are used accord-
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...ing to the demands of the subject discussed or the artistic plan the author, so in certain of Plato's later writings, in fact ve commonly where very abstruse points are considered, the drama form is subordinated and all but disappears. Something must now be said of the two works before us. They are both of them closely connected with the trial and death-sentence of Socrates. Of the two the first is...

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

If we heeded our first impressions on reading the Apology, should pronounce it a report of what Socrates actually said court, since it is given as a speech made by Socrates and we convinced that Socrates would naturally have made just such a speech. But there is nothing in this fact alone that necessarily bears such a construction, for Plato's dialogues are all of them conversations more or less fictitious, and yet are represented as carried on in the most life-like manner by historical personages. To reach any trustworthy conclusion as to the historic accuracy of the Apology would require more information than that supplied by Plato himself, and yet Plato is the only witness whom we can trust. We have, therefore, to depend chiefly upon internal evidence. There is no doubt that, not Plato only, but any disciple and friend of Socrates who had been present on such a momentous occasion would have been more than eager to spare no pains in accurately reproducing the words of his master,—of the father of his soul's new-birth. He would have left no stone unturned in striving to reach and to write, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

1 We are not warranted in pinning our faith to Xenophon's (?) Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, a production whose origin and value are equally doubtful. Xenophon's Memorabilia, on the other hand, is inadequate for our purpose. 
2 Schleiermacher and Zeller uphold the accuracy of Plato's report. The former argues that the speech suits all the circumstances too well to allow of its not being an exact report, while the latter strives to deal with the arguments used to prove his untrustworthiness. Uebereut has taken this same point of view with great decision. In the admirable introduction of Steinhart is to be found the best presentation of the opposite view.
truth,' that it might live as a monument of the great man's moral and intellectual worth forever. And individually Plato must have regarded such an undertaking as his opportunity to appeal to the supreme court of intelligent and unprejudiced mankind from the death-sentence pronounced by an unjust court upon the incomparable master. In such an enterprise Plato's memory would undoubtedly do good service. Yet it is hard to see how a mind like his, distinguished rather for its devotion to speculative truth and for its obedience to the laws of artistic and poetical symmetry than for its submission to the inelastic canons of history, could, even in such a case as this, have endured the straight-jacket of stenographic accuracy. Plato doubtless heard with attentive ears and held with retentive memory all that was spoken before the court by the man he loved best. And indeed no hand was better trained than his in presenting faithfully the peculiar conversational genius of Socrates. But for all that, and by means of it all, he has gained and used the second sight of a sympathetic and creative imagination; he has given us more than the actual defence of Socrates in court. In Plato's Apology, Socrates on trial for his life stands before us in clear outline, sharply contrasted with any typical presentation of the drift of contemporary public opinion; for public opinion, so far as it opposed him and his ways, is personified by his named and unnamed accusers. He is condemned in court, but before the tribunal of the eternal fitness of things he and his life-work stand acquitted.

However, we have no right to assume that this could not all be accomplished without unduly sacrificing historical accuracy. The nobler, the more appropriate we suppose Socrates's actual words to have been,—and no one will inclined to say they were not appropriate and noble,—the less would Plato feel called upon to depart from a simple report of what he had actually heard. In the absence of anything like convincing proofs of the contrary, it is reasonable, with due allowance for Plato's artistic bent and after taking into consideration the circumstances under which he wrote, to conclude that his Apology of Socrates resembled very closely

1 Cf. Apology, p. 18 a b sqq.
the speech actually made in court by Socrates. The circumstances under which Plato wrote lead however to the following qualification of this statement of substantial identity. Any speech reported in writing necessarily differs from the speech as originally made, and no orator even can write down from memory the words he has used, — as for Socrates he spoke on the spur of the moment without previous notes or preparation of any kind. Plato heard him just as Thucydidès heard Pericles, and as Thucydidès, with the most earnest desire to reproduce as a part of history Pericles’s speeches,2 could not avoid making them by his manner of statement to some extent his own, so it was with Plato and the speech of Socrates. He could not, in spite of the accuracy which he observed in reproducing the situation at the trial and the words to which he had so attentively listened, avoid giving the Apology of Socrates in a way which makes it a work of his own, though at the same time it is the genuine defence of Socrates.3 The success with which Plato brings before us the living persons concerned in Socrates’s trial is the best proof that he allowed himself a certain freedom of expression in presenting the matter and manner of Socrates himself. Among Plato’s many works distinguished for vividness of dramatic characterization, the Apology is one of the most noteworthy. In the Apology we have the most life-like of Plato’s many portraits of Socrates.

We find many inequalities in the speech of the Apology, and 56

1 Cf. Apology, p. 17 c. Those unconvinced by the genuine ring of this passage may still doubt. We know Socrates chiefly from Plato, hence discussions of Plato’s trustworthiness are apt to beg the question.


3 There is an important difference between the relation of Thucydidès to Pericles and that of Plato to Socrates. The intimacy of ten years’ standing between the two latter made their case one of ideal friendship, where, at least in intellectual matters, what belonged to Socrates was Plato’s, and vice versa. Therefore Plato, if he made the defence of Socrates characteristically his own, could be sure that it was also and for that reason characteristically Socrates’s. Was not Plato, therefore, better prepared to deal with Socrates, the friend of his youth, than was Thucydidès to deal with Pericles, who certainly was not one of his intimates.
indeed a tendency here and there to repetition and circumlocution. This is not only characteristic of Socrates in general, but particularly characteristic of him or of any one when speaking off-hand. Equally characteristic of Socrates is the cross-examination and the frequent recourse which is had to the dialogue form; for Socrates undoubtedly went as far in this direction as the rules of Athenian pleading would allow.

No matter whether we take the speech as a verbal report or as, in the main, an invention of Plato, if we once admit that its aim was to vindicate Socrates before the whole world no less than to influence the particular men who were his judges, it is easy to understand the line of defence taken in the Apology. The counts in the indictment against him are summarily dealt with, for Socrates is chiefly anxious to show that the sole cause of his accusation is the wide-spread prejudice against him. This prejudice he grapples with, and seeks by analyzing to remove it, appealing in justification of all that he had habitually said and done to his commission from God. The careless way in which he quotes the terms of the indictment,—he reverses the order of the counts against him and deals with them in that order,—would prove the speaker’s indifference to the opinion of his judges, if such laxities were not known to be very common in the Athenian courts. Far more important, therefore, or rather all important, is the fact that he does not meet the accusation of disbelief in the gods of Athens. We have seen that nothing would have been easier than a triumphant refutation of this charge; yet the matter is passed over, and Socrates prefers to merge the narrower question in a consideration of the more sweeping charge of downright atheism, of disbelief in all gods. Evidently Socrates cared little for winning his case, but much for the opportunity afforded him to enlighten his fellow-citizens as to the wider and deeper import of the point at issue. The device by which the terms of the accusation to be met were enlarged was one sanctioned by the traditional procedure in

1 Cf. Apol., p. 20 b ad fn. and e, also p. 28 e sqq.
2 Cf. Apol., p. 20 a–e; p. 29 e at the end sqq. and elsewhere.
3 Cf. supra, § 31.
4 Cf. Apol., p. 20 b sqq.
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courts\(^1\) at Athens. Under cross-examination on the meaning of his bill of indictment, the accuser himself gave to Socrates the wider interpretation best suited for the answer with which it was to be met.

The manner in which Socrates talks of death and of the hereafter is very striking. There is more than a conviction that compared with wickedness death is no evil, for that conviction is made the firmer by the comforting hope that death is but the door which leads to everlasting life and happiness. If this be considered not Plato’s addition but Socrates’s literal statement, then the moral steadfastness and the joy with which Socrates hailed death’s deliverance was the best re-enforcement for Plato’s own doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is stated in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

The closing words on immortality play an important part in the tragic development of the situation; for the first part and the verdict of guilty which succeeds it awaken a sense of cruel injustice, which, by the second part and the ensuing sentence of death, is soon brought to a second climax but is finally mitigated by the closing words of Socrates. This third part bears we may say to the two parts that precede it a relation similar to that borne by the Eumenides of Aeschylus to the preceding plays of the Oresteian trilogy, and solves a tragic situation by merging a narrowed view of justice in a broader one by which it is superseded.

The first of these three subdivisions, which is the defence proper, is complete in itself. Though all the laws of oratorical art are here carefully observed, the usual practices of oratory are sharply criticised. The five natural heads of the argument certainly are unmistakable, since, by carefully following the connection of thought, we can easily mark the words in which the speaker dismisses one point and takes up another.

\(^1\) Cf. infra, § 71, note 2.
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Analysis of the First Part, or the Defence Proper, cc. i–xxiv.

(a) cc. i. Introduction (ἐστραγμόν, εξορίαμ) = {principium.

(b) cc. ii. Statement (ἐπίθεμα, propositio) of the case and of the plan in the plea.

(c) cc. iii–xv. Refutation (ἡμέρα, confutatio).

(d) cc. xvi–xxii. Digression (ἐπισκεύασμα, dieresis) on Socrates’s life.

(e) cc. xxiii, xxiv. Peroration (ἐνδοτικίς, peroratio). This is an attack upon the usual form of peroration, and ends with a confession of trust in God.

An introduction (a) is always intended to prepare the hearers for listening to the speaker’s plea. This is especially hard in the face of prejudice against the speaker’s person or against his case. The rules of speech-writing here prescribe recourse to insinuation ἔφοβος, a subtle process by which the speaker wins over the sympathies of his audience. He may do this (1) by attacking his opponent, (2) by conciliating his audience, (3) by strongly stating his personal hardship in the case, or (4) by putting concisely the difficulties involved in dealing with the facts. After the introduction follows (b) the statement ἐπίθεμα. This is commonly a plain unvarnished tale covering the matters of fact involved. If such an account be unnecessary the statement sets forth simply the plan of the plea. This plan is not unfrequently accompanied by a subdivision (partitio), which is sometimes simply a summary of heads (enumeratio), and sometimes a detailed account of topics (expositio). Here, again, Socrates’s defence follows the rules of oratory. Next comes the most important part, the proof (ἡμέρα, probatio), represented by (c) the refutation which naturally falls, as indicated above, under two heads. In the manner

1 Rhet. ad Herenn. I. 10, 17: Enumeratone usumur, cum dicemus numerus, quod de rebus dicturi simus. 2 Ibid. Expositio est, cum res quibus de rebus dicturi sumus, exponimus breviter et absouta.
of refutation here given, the genuine Socrates is in his element, and here he is pictured to the life. After proof or refutation, as the case may be, comes, in the programme of oratorical orthodoxy, (d) a digression. This was the orator's opportunity to try his wings. The theme chosen in a digression needed no more than an indirect bearing upon the argument of the case, and the ornamental part which the digression often played has led to the use of another term for it, i.e. exornatio or embellishment. This, too, can be found in Socrates's speech, and so perfect is its beauty that the laws of school- oratory are more than satisfied. Yet, embellishment though it be called, this part of the speech has nothing that is far-fetched or beside the point; in the Apology it is the complement of the preceding negative refutation, its positive and required reinforcement (confirmatio). The transition to (e) the peroration is plainly marked. At this point the orator, and more than ever if he were on trial for his life, made a desperate appeal to the feelings of his hearers. No means of moving the judges were left untried. Recourse to such methods Socrates condemned as equally dishonourable and dishonourable. This part of

1 Rhet. ad Herenn. II. 29, 40; Exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et rebus indicatibus et amplificationibus et ceteris rebus quae pertinent ad exactionem et collocupletandam argumentationem.  
2 Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4: "οὕτως ἠθέλετος τοῦ εὐθύτατου τῷ διαστηθεῖσι παρὰ τοῖς συμμετέχοις, ἵνα ταῦτα καταγένεται, και ὑπετάσσεται τὴν κατάθεσιν τῶν ἀδικίας, ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ τὴν προμαχούσαν τοὺς πάντας, εἰς τὰς προσεχείς καὶ ἀπειλητικές καθοδικευμένας καὶ τὰς προσεχές καὶ ἀπειλητικές καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμένας καθοδικευμέ

Hence, if all legal proceedings were regulated as in certain states distinguished for particularly good laws, these emotions would play no part whatever. Indeed, all agree on this point, some urging that the law should prescribe this course, while others enforce the principle, and rule out any plea which is off the point. This is the rule of procedure before the Areopagus, and a very good rule it is. A judge should certainly never have his mind warped by the influence of anger, of jealousy, or of pity brought to bear upon him. To have recourse to these is exactly the same as for a carpenter to give a twist to his rule before using it. To the procedure of the Areopagus we may perhaps apply Quintilian's words (VI. 1, 7): "Athe-
the Apology is an attack upon the ordinary practice of pleaders in court. Not unwomanly subserviency to men, but manly submission to God’s will are heard in the closing words of this defence.

Such was the temper of the Apology written for Socrates by Plato, and as such, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it must have been in striking contrast with the drift of the plea which Lysias is said to have elaborated for the same case. The tradition that Plato undertook to plead in the capacity of Socrates’s advocate (advocatus) but was not allowed to do so rests on very slight authority. It is therefore ridiculous to suggest that this plea, which Plato did not prepare, was the first outline afterwards worked up in the Apology.

The second and third parts, which come respectively after the first and the second verdict, can hardly be expected to answer all the requirements of a set speech. And yet these are symmetrically arranged, and their topics skilfully set before us. The second part naturally opens with an allusion to the verdict of ‘guilty’ just rendered; any regular peroration would have been out of place before the third, which is the suitable conclusion both for the first part and the second. And where, indeed, is there a more eloquent and nobly impressive ending than this? That part of it addressed to the judges who voted for Socrates’s acquittal is certainly made most prominent and very appropriately so. For these judges, they who alone are worthy of that title, are his chosen friends; to their kindred souls he confides the unspeakable hopes of happiness after death that are stirring within him, and invites them to be of good cheer and not to fear death. In so doing, even while death stares him in the face, he does not bleench, but obeys his captain and works as the servant of God.

Closely connected with the Apology is the dialogue called the

CRITO.

This dialogue belongs to the first class of Plato’s dialogues; it is a conversation pure and simple, neither narrated nor read to an

1 Cf. supra, § 34 and note.
2 Cf. supra, § 62.
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audience introduced at the beginning. There are two speakers only, Socrates and Crito. Their close friendship has been mentioned in the Apology (p. 33 d). This intimacy was unbroken; and though Crito was much absorbed by the care of his extensive property, yet, in all the fortunes of Socrates's life, Crito had been his firm friend. And now that a sentence which he could not but regard as unjust had been pronounced upon his friend, Crito rebelled against its execution and against the shame of seeing Socrates die a criminal's death. To prevent this he was willing to risk his fortune and his civil rights. The lucky combination of circumstances which furthered the plans made for this end has already been explained. 1 Apparently, nothing prevented Socrates's escape from prison but Socrates. At this juncture Socrates stands before us as the ideally loyal citizen. Though opposed to the principles of the democracy at Athens, he submits without reservation to its laws and exhorts all others to do the like. This, he declares, is the first and the most imperative duty of every citizen. Such is the historical groundwork of the dialogue. The dramatic picture given of this situation admits of the application of various terms used to designate the development of the plot in a Greek tragedy.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO.

63

(a) cc. i, ii. Prologue (προλόγιον); the characters and their mental situation (ψυχὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων).

(b) cc. iii-x. Entanglement (διάβασμα or σκέψις) of the logical situation.
1. c. iii. The threats of the multitude.
2. c. iv. The prayers of friends.
3. c. v. The jeers of enemies.

1. cc. vi, vii. The threats are many but duty is one.
2. c. viii. Nothing should warp our idea of duty.
3. cc. ix, x. It is wrong to run away from prison, and wrong should not be done, even in retaliation.

1 Cf. supra, § 36 and note.
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(c) cc. xi-xv. Clearing up (λύσει). The laws of Athens require his submission and his death.
1. cc. xi, xii. Socrates owes them life, liberty and happiness.
2. cc. xiii, xiv. They require and he has promised obedience.
3. c. xv. He will gain nothing by disobedience.

(d) cc. xvi, xvii. Epilogue (ἐπίλογος). There are laws in Hades which can reach him who disobeys law upon earth.

64 Like the Apology, this work bears memorable witness to the nobility of Plato’s mind, and it reveals especially his lofty patriotism. As for Socrates, we see in both these works that not words only but deeds prove him a more law-abiding citizen than scores of men whose spurious good-citizenship is well portrayed on many pages of the Crito (e.g. p. 45 e). The very laws of the land, as well as the example of Socrates submitting to his unjust sentence of death, declare in no uncertain tones to every Athenian what true patriotism is and how it is preserved.

65 The Crito is by no means simply the chronicle of a conversation actually held; though it is based upon facts, it must still be recognized as Plato’s work. This is proved by the finished skill both of plan and execution displayed in this dialogue, short and simple though it is. Moreover, in the Crito we see that Plato has made a step forward in his notion of duty. For here is the earliest statement of Plato’s ‘golden rule’: Injustice always is wrong; it is wrong to retaliate injustice by injustice.3 In the Gorgias (see supra, § 40) this rule is applied more universally and put upon its rational basis. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view we may regard the Crito and the Apology as a suitable preface to the Gorgias, if we do not forget that both are primarily pictures of the one great master whom Plato in all his works most delighted to honor.

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1 For most of the details of the analysis given above Cron is not responsible, though it is substituted for his § 93, where there is a less detailed analysis of the dialogue on the same principle.
2 See on δὲ of ἐπὶ λόγον, Crito, p. 49 b.
APPENDIX

ON ATHENIAN COURTS OF LAW. 1

Six thousand Athenian citizens were entrusted with the power to decide law-suits. Choice was made by lot every year of six hundred men from each of the ten tribes, and any citizen over thirty years of age was eligible. Every one thus chosen was liable, after taking the prescribed oath of office, to be called upon to act as a ἐκαστός; ἐκασταί, jurymen; 2 was the official name by

1 The chief authority is Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Proces, Calvary (Berlin, 1884). See also K. Fr. Hermann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer, and G. F. Schömann, Griechische Alterthümer, 3 volumes, of which the first has been translated into English, and published under the title Antiquities of Greece by Rivingtons (London, 1890).

2 The oath, which is cited in the speech of Demosthenes against Timocrates (140-151), is of doubtful authenticity. Schömann and Lipsius (p. 153, note 17), by omissions and bracketed additions change the formula there given into the following, which, excepting the last bracketed clause, is not far from the real form: ἕσσετε καὶ τοιὸν τὸν ἐξωτερικὸν τοῦ ὅμοιον τοῦ λαβώνα καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν παντακοινῶν, [τηράς ἀλλ᾽ καὶ τοιὸν τὸν ἐξωτερικὸν τοῦ λαβώνα καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν παντακοινῶν], τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, καὶ οὕτω χάριτος ἱκανόν ἐστι' [ἐκτελεῖσθαι]. . . καὶ ἐξαφαίρεται τοῦ τε καταγόνου καὶ τοῦ ἀναπηγομένου δικαίου λαμπρού, καὶ ἐστήσωμαι περὶ ἀυτού ὡς ἂν ἦν ἄλλος, [καὶ εφοροῦμαι μὲν μέχρι τῆς πολλᾶς καὶ ἀγαθῆς ἐπιφοροῦμαι καὶ ἐφάλλειν αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει] I will vote in accordance with the laws and enactments of the Athenian people and of the Senate of Five Hundred, [and where there is no law, in accordance with my best knowledge of what is just, unmoved alike by favor and by enmity]. . . . and I will give impartial hearing both to the accuser and to the defendant, and vote on the question at issue in the suit. [If I keep this oath let blessings be my portion; if I break it let ruin overtake me and all mykindred.] See on ἄκουστος κτλ., Apol., p. 35 c.

3 The use, in other connexions, of ἐκαστός with the meaning of judge leads many to translate ἐκασταί judges and not jurymen. Neither of these words is satisfactory, but to describe a body of citizens without any technical knowledge of the law as judges is certainly more misleading from a modern point of view than to call them jurymen. It must be remembered, however, that the presiding magistrate did not perform the duties of a modern judge in any important respect, so that the ἐκασταί had the substantial powers both of judge and jury in all cases brought before them.

4 The customary form in addressing them was ἂς ἔσθησα ἐκασταί, but this could be varied. We have sometimes ἂς ἔσθησα ἄκουστος, sometimes ἂς ἔσθησα, and once and again ἂς ἄκουστος. Cf. Apol., pp. 17 a, 22 c, 26 d, 30 b.
which they were addressed. These six thousand were divided into a reserve of one thousand, to be used as substitutes etc., and a main body of five thousand for regular service. A subdivision of the five thousand was then made into ten *courts*, of five hundred each, called *ἑκατὸν*; for, like the English word court, *ἑκατὸν* may mean a judicial body as well as the place where such a body sits in judgment. Sometimes a court was composed of less than five hundred jurymen, e.g. of two or four hundred; sometimes we find two or more courts of five hundred sitting as one, but it is doubtful whether the whole six thousand ever sat as one court. The even numbers, 200, 500, 1000, etc., were habitually increased by one, and for that purpose a *ἑκατὸν* was drawn from the 1000 supernumeraries. This precaution was taken to avoid a tie vote.

On days appointed for holding court each of the subdivisions above mentioned was assigned by lot to one of the places used as court-rooms, and there tried the suit appointed for that time and place. Each juryman received as the badge of his office a staff (*ἑκάτηρα*) corresponding in color to a sign over the door of his court. He also received a ticket (*κοπάταριον*), by showing which he secured his fee after his day’s service. *Cf. Dem. De Cor. 210*. A fee of one obol (about three cents) for every day’s session was introduced by Pericles, and afterwards trebled by Cleon.

Almost all cases except those of homicide were tried in these Helastic courts, and the jurymen were called also *ἡκατον* from the name *ἑκαταον*, given to the largest court-room in Athens. The most general term to designate a law-suit is *σκέλος*, though the same word also has the narrower meaning of a private suit. According as the complaint preferred involves the rights of individuals or of the whole state, *σκέλος* in the wider sense were subdivided into (1) *σκέλος* in the narrower sense, *private suits*, and (2) *σκέλος* in the wider sense, *public suits*. Since the state was the real plaintiff in public suits, any fine which in such suits might be imposed upon the defendant went to the state; accordingly in public suits, the accuser, as a rule, was entitled to no part of the penalty.

In the ordinary course of procedure, every plaintiff was required to present his indictment (*ὑποθέσιν*), or complaint (*λογία*), in writing to the particular magistrate whose department included the matters
involved. Most suits thus came before the nine archons, commonly before one of the first three or before all of the remaining six. The first archon, called ἁγιόν χριστόν excellence, dealt especially with charges involving family rights and inheritance; the second archon, called βοφελές, with those involving the regulations and requirements of religion and public worship; the third archon, called πολιτέας, dealt with most cases involving foreign-residents (μετόχοι) and foreigners; the remaining six, called the Them loophetae, dealt with almost all cases not especially assigned to the first three. There were, however, cases which were disposed of by other magistrates, or otherwise especially provided for.

The accusation had to be made in the presence of the accused, 69 who had previously been served with due notice to appear. Legal notice required the presence of two witnesses to the summons (ἀνώτεροι). If the magistrate allowed proceedings in the case, the terms of accusation were copied and posted in some public place, and at the time of this publication a day was fixed, upon which both parties were bound to appear before the magistrate for the preliminary investigation (ἀνώτατος). There the plaintiff’s charges and the defendant’s answer,1 both of them already written down and handed in, were reaffirmed under oath, and both parties submitted to the magistrate such evidence as they intended to use. The reaffirmation or confirmation under oath was called διαμωνείω, sometimes διαμωνεία.2 The evidence submitted consisted in citations from the laws, documentary evidence of various kinds, the depositions of witnesses, and particularly any testimony given under torture (βάρανος) by slaves, which had been taken and written down in the presence of witnesses. The magistrate fixed his official seal

1 Cf. (Dem. xlv. 46) the written charge (Ἀξιόν) in a private suit: Ἀκαλλάματος Πεταύνων Ἀχαρνίος Πτερύγων Ἀκαρνάνων Ἀχαρνίας ἑθνομαρτύρων, τίμησεν τάλαντον. τήν ἑκατέραν κατ’ εἰκόνα τοὺς ἑθνομαρτύρους τά τῆς ἐν τῇ γραμματείᾳ γραμματέων, Ἀπολλοδόρου τοὺς Ἀκαρνάνων, κόμος τοῦ Πατοιοῦ, ἁκουσάς Στεφάνου τοῦ Ἀρκανιοῦ, ἱκανούς, ἠγούμενα διαμωνείως διαμωνείαν ἀνέγραψε τὰ ἐν τῇ γραμματείᾳ γραμματέων, the testimony which I... gave is true as recorded in the evidence submitted. The answer is: Ἀνώτατος Ἀκάρνανων Ἀχαρνίος τῆς ἱστορίας ἑκατέραν κατ’ εἰκόνα τοὺς ἑθνομαρτύρους τὰ τῆς ἐν τῇ γραμματείᾳ γραμματέων, the testimony which I... gave is true as recorded in the evidence submitted.

2 διαμωνεία refers strictly to the double oath of the two parties; διαμωνεία to the defendant’s oath. But both are used for each singly.
upon all the documents thus submitted, and took charge of them against the day when the case was to be tried.

70 On the day (ἡ ημέρα) when a court was to sit upon any case, the magistrate who had presided over the preliminary investigation proceeded to the appointed court-room, where he met the ἔκπληκτος assigned by lot (τυχαιομούντο) to the case. Both parties to the suit, having been previously notified, were required to put in an appearance. Proceedings in court were opened by some religious ceremony; then the clerk (γραμματεύς) read aloud the written accusation and the reply, and finally the parties to the suit were successively called forward to state their case. This was the opening of the case (ἐστίν ὁ πληγή) by the magistrate (ἐστίν ὁ πληγή). Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 860 ff., Antipho, vi. 42.

71 The law required that every man should conduct his own case in person, and hence those who were not themselves skilful pleaders generally recited speeches which had been written for them by others. Still, the law permitted a man to appear in court accompanied by advocates (συνήφοροι), who came as his friends, and therefore were not supposed to be paid for their trouble; not infrequently, after a short speech from the principal, the most important part of his plea was made by one of his advocates. E.g. Demosthenes's speech on the Crown was made as Ctesipon's advocate. The water-clock (κλαίνοντα, sometimes called simply τὸ ἀπο) was used to measure the time allotted to each for pleading before the court. When called for, the written documents offered in evidence were read by the clerk, and meanwhile the clock was stopped. By way of precaution, the witnesses whose depositions were read had to be present in court and acknowledge their testimony. While making his plea a man was protected by law from interruption by his opponent, and the law required his opponent to answer his questions. The jurors had a right to interrupt the speaker.

1 To this correspond the words ἔκπληκτος τῆς δικαιας, Crito, p. 456, just as we find ἐπέδραυ used both of τῆς δικαιας and of τῶν ἐρωτηθητων. Correspondingly, we find ἐπέδραυσθαι and ἐπέδραται said both of the suit and of the parties to the suit, meaning substantially the same thing. Hence the presiding magistrate, ἀγωγὸς τοῦ δικαίωμα, is also called ἐκπληκτος.

2 According to the terms of the νόμος quoted in Dem. xlvii. 10: τοιω τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔκπληκται εἰς ἐκπληκτηθεῖσας ἀλληλον τὸ ἐρωτήματος, μαρτυρεῖν ἡ μη.
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(1) If in their opinion he was off the point, (2) if they required fuller explanation on any point whatsoever. Of course, there were frequent attempts to prejudice the jurymen instead of enlightening them, and nothing was commoner than to make appeal to their sympathies. It was by no means an unusual occurrence for a defendant to appear in court with his wife and children, or with infirm and helpless parents, and sometimes with friends of great popularity or of high character; he depended upon these to act as his intercessors with the court. Such practices, though manifestly tending to disarm the severity of the law and to defeat the ends of justice for which the court was organized, seem never definitely to have been prohibited in any court except the Areopagus.

When the pleas had been made, the jurymen proceeded without 72 preliminary consultation to decision by a secret vote. In public suits, only one speech was allowed to the plaintiff, and one to the defendant. In private suits, two were allowed to each. The jurors generally voted with bronze balls or discs, either solid (to denote acquittal) or perforated (to denote condemnation). These were called ἄδεια. If the vote was a tie, the case went in favor of the defendant; and, in a public suit, if less than one-fifth of the votes were for the plaintiff, he was fined, and also debarred from ever again acting as plaintiff in a similar suit. This fine was fixed at 1000 drachmas, about $170. The plaintiff in such a suit also incurred both these penalties if, without good and sufficient excuse, he failed to appear in court, and thus by his own act allowed that his case was bad. If the defendant failed to appear, the case went against him by default (see on ἐπίθετ᾽ κατηγορίαν, Apol. 18 c), and he was pronounced guilty in contumacia. In most private suits, the plaintiff, under similar circumstances, forfeited one-sixth of the sum which he claimed; this forfeiture was called ἀμβάλλει, one obol for every drachma.

Suits, both public and private, were divided into (1) ὄργανον 73 ἀμφοτέρων, in which, if it decided against the defendant, the court had still to determine the degree of punishment to be inflicted

the two parties to the suit are required to but cannot give testimony as witnesses, answer each what question the other asks, Cf. Apol., p. 25 a.
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(τίμημα), because no penalty was fixed by law; and (2) δέσμενος
dεσμεύτω, in which, after deciding against the defendant, the court
had no further decision to make, because the penalty was fixed
by law. In cases of the former kind, if they were public suits, —
like the γραφὴ δεσμεύτω brought against Socrates, — the accuser
proposed the penalty which he considered adequate,1 and the
accused, if convicted, had the right to make a counter-proposition;
then followed the decision of the court.2 It is still a moot
point whether the judges were confined to a choice between these
two propositions or could, if they saw fit, inflict a third penalty
midway between the two.

74 The ordinary penalties for crimes against the state were death,
banishment, loss of rights of citizenship (δικαια), confiscation of
property, and fines. All these are summed up in the formula
constantly used at Athens: δι τῷ χρῆ αὐτῶν ἢ δανίων,3 what a man
must suffer or pay for his offence. In case the convicted defendant
was not an Athenian by birth, he might be sold into slavery, and
thus additionally punished by the loss of his freedom.

75 The magistrates who had to oversee the execution of the pun-
ishment of death were called the Eleven (εἴκοσιά). Ten men on
this board were chosen by lot every year, one from each of the
ten tribes; the eleventh was a scribe, γραμματέας. They had
general charge of all prisons, and they issued the order requiring their
subordinates4 to execute the penalty of death.

1 Cf. supra, § 31; also, § 60 and note.
2 The technical terms which were
used are found in Apol., pp. 30 b, 37 c.
3 It is noticeable that not only τραυματίσειν
(Xen. Apol. 23) were used.
4 Cf. Phaed., p. 116 b.
I. "O ti μεν ὑμεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμων καθγόρων, οὔκ οἶδα. ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ὁλγοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθμην. οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καί τοι ἀληθεῖς γε ὦ ὤς ἔτοι εἰπέων οὔτεν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα Ὑ τὸ ἂντών ἐν εἰράματα τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ἐφεύσατο, τοῦτο ἐν δὲ ἐλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μη ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατη·

3. Ἐλγοῦ: sc. δὲ, used abs. G. 1334; H. 950 and 743 b. Cf. 22 a.—

πιθανῶς, ἀληθεῖς: these words state and contrast the respective aims of rhetoric and of dialectic (philosophy).

4. ὧν ἔτεκεν: qualifies the sweeping denial in oǐδε, hardly anything. G. 1634; H. 950. For an equiv. idiom in Herodotus, cf. Hdt. ii. 15, τὸ ἑβλαταὶ ἐκάποτε ὑμᾶς τὸ καὶ ὑμῶς ὑπὸ λεγὼ εἰπέων, ἀπαγγέλλω, has only recently, so to speak, come to light.

5. τῶν ἐν Ἐθάρων τῶν ναυλῶν: connect both gena. with ἐν, about, or, about them, designates the persons who are responsible for the ἐν (cf. below b. τοῖς μοι εἰμὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοιμοτριχῶν). τῶν ναυλῶν gives the sum of which ἐν is part. See also on τῶν ναυλῶν in 18 b.—τοῖς: explaining ἐν and in appos. with it.—ἐν δὲ: refers to the passage where the statement is made.

6. χρῆ: the original warning was χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρῆ, but not χρῆ, would be grammatically possible. G. 1497; H. 932. For the use of χρῆ, cf. 33 d, 34 a, and Lact. 181 c. G. 1400; H. 897.

καὶ αὐτῷ: even myself, sc. "Now then may not you have been affected!"
πλάτωνος

θήτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτικά ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθῆσαι εἰργαὶ, ἐπειδὰν μὴ ὤτωστιον φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτο μοι ἐδοξέω αὐτῶν.

10 ἀναποστάτωταυ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρα δεινῶν καλούσων οὕτω λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντων, ὁμολογοῦν ἂν ἔγνω ὡς κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὕτω μὲν γοῦν, ὡσπερ ἐγώ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ ὁδῷ ἀληθῆς εἰρήκουσιν ὑμεῖς δὲ μου ἀκοῦστεθεὶς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μεντοί

11. εἰ πάρει: if indeed. This use of πάρει, like many others, shows its connection with ἄρα. The supposition is merely restated.

12. οὐκ ἑκάστη ὑπάρχει: but not after their pattern. A parenthetical statement, which he proceeds to explain (see on μὲν, 21 b, and cf. 27 c). The explanation begins with ὡς μὲν ὑπάρχει and ends with the chapter. Pending this explanation, these words mean a better or a worse speaker than they, i.e. one not on their level.

13. γοῦν: at all events.—ὅτι ὡς: little or nothing. Cf. Hdt. iii. 140. ἀκουστεῖ ποῖς τοῖς ὡς ὁδῷ καὶ τοῖς ἑπτανόοις ὡς ὁμολογοῦσιν, hardly a single one of them has ever been here. Xen. Cyro. vii. 5. 45. τοῦτον ὡς τὸν ἑπτανόον ὡς τοὺς ὡς ὁδῷ ὁμολογοῦσιν, now of these bystanders I know next to no one at all.

14. ὡς μὲν δὲ μου διεύθυνα: instead of ὥστε ἄκουστε. The position of ὥστε suggests a contrast with ἄκουστε μὲν; the sense calls for ὡς μὲν (ὡς ὁμολογοῦσι) διεύθυνα. This collocation leaves opportunity for bringing out ὡς μὲν the ἀλθῆια with great prominence. For a similar shifting of emphasis, cf. Xen. An. iii. 1. 25, καθό δέ, εἰ μὲν ὡς ἔχετε ἐφήμων εἰς τούτα, ἤτοις ὡς μὲν βοῦλοι, εἰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ταύτα μὲ γέιτονα, οὕτω ἄρρητοι τοῖς ἑπτανόοις, now I for one, if you are minded to bestow yourselves to accomplish this, am ready to follow your lead; if you however appoint me to lead you I make no excuse on the score of my age. See App.

15. κακολευκηθήκοντα: in Crat. 390a ὡς ὁμολογεῖς is quoted as a ἀρα; when changed to ἀλλάζειν it becomes an ἄραμ. ἄραμ means words, ἄραμ means phrases. In grammar ἄραμ means word, ἄραμ means verb. The ἄραμ τῶν ἄραμ (ornatus) means specifically the use of tropes and figures of speech. Orators took great pains in the choice of single words, and in the collocation and suitable arrangement of their words in phrases. Accordingly, in Symp. 108b, Socrates is made to bestow unstinted praise upon Agathon's speech: τοῦ καλὸν τῶν ἀραμῶν καὶ ἀραμτών τις ὁ δὲ ἄραμτος ἀράμος, who not have been beside himself on hearing words and phrases of such marvellous beauty? Then he contrasts his own fashion of speaking with Aga-
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15 μὰ Δία, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι. κεκαλλιεκημένους γε λόγους. 17 ὁσπέρ οἱ τοιτῶν, βίματι τε καὶ ὄνομασιν οὔτε κεκοσμη-
μένους, ἀλλά ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λέγόμενα τοὺς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὁ
ὄνομασι. πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἡ λέγει, καὶ καθεῖς ὑμῶν
προσδοκησάτω άλλως. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὄμην πρέπει, 18 ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, τῇ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὁσπέρ μερικών πληστύντω λόγους
εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναι καὶ μέντοι καὶ τάνυ, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι,
tοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμας. ἐάν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων
ακούσφε μου ἀπολογουμένου δὲ ὅσπερ εἰσθα λέγεσι καὶ ἐν

17 thon's as follows: ἔρι οὖν ἡ τι καὶ
tοιτῶν λόγον δεῖ, πρὶν ἑρωτεῖ τιλλήθη
λέγομεν ἀκούση, ὕματε ἡ καὶ
ἴθοι πρὸ ἄν τοιτωί, ὅποι οὐκ ἂν
τὰ τὰ υπελογίσε, κοινὸν νωθήτων, καίρα
55. See the similar use of ἀρ. — καὶ μέντοι καὶ
τάνυ: yes, and most fervently too. καὶ
μέντοι = a rhetorical 'yes,' the second
adverb adds a specification of the intensity
with which the request is made, “and indeed I beg of you, and I beg
you most fervently too.”

18. δέομαι: referring to the speech
which follows, my plea. — μοδίσῃ προσ-
dοκησάμενοι: for the sor. inv. third
person in prohibitions, see GMT. 200;
G. 1347; H. 874 b.

20. τῇ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: for a man as old
as I. πλήττετοι agrees in gender with
ἐσπε, i.e. the person involved in πλή-
ttov 

17 the comparison is attracted into the
dat., i.e. δέομαι μερικών stands for
δέομαι μερικῶν καὶ πληστύντω.
21. εἶ μὲν: before you, ο. τοις
κατειχώστε, i.e. τῷ διακόσμησαν. Cfr.
the similar use of ή: — καὶ μέντοι καὶ
tάνυ: yes, and most fervently too. 66.
καὶ μέντοι = a rhetorical 'yes,' the second
adverb adds a specification of the intensity
with which the request is made, “and indeed I beg of you, and I beg
you most fervently too.”

22. δέομαι καὶ παρέμας: cf. 27 b,
porphyracata. — τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων:
"this has respect primarily to the
conversation with Meletus, which is
prefaced by the request, 27 b, μ' ζυγω-
βεϊν τῷ τῇ εἰσηθήτω ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων
ποιμά. But, as something like this
was recognized under the name of
πράπησις (see Introd. 71), the reference
here prob. extends to the conversations
rehearsed (20 a), alluded to
(21 c. σφ. 23 e), and imagined (28 b,
20 e), in the course of the defence;
perhaps also to the castigation inter-
mingle it with it (30 d, 31 e, 36 b,
c).” R.

23. καὶ ἐν ἄγορᾳ καὶ ἀλληλ: see
Introd. 26.


24. τραπεζών: τράπεζες (banks) as well as shops, esp. those near the market place, were favorite lounging places at Athens. Cf. ι. x. 6, ἄλλοι μὲν τὰ προϊόντα διαλέκτο τῇ τῇ φυλάν τραπέζες, now the facts just recited I gathered from a conversation at Philias's bank. Cf. also ι. η. xiv. 10-20, where, to meet the charge that his shop is the resort of evil minded persons without visible means of support, the defendant says: ταύτα λέγων οὔτε εἴριθεν καταφερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἐλα- λων δεν τύχοντες ἔκσωσε (κἀ' οὖσα τραδές), οὔτε τῶν ἐς ἐμὶ εἰσελθόντων (μυ κατοικία) μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἐς τὸν ἐλα- λόν παρακεραυνόν (tradesmen). Εἰσαγω τὸ τίρᾳ ἐθνίδου προσπισίπα (frequent, lounge in) ἢ μὲν πρὸς μαροτειχίσ (perfumer's), ἢ δὲ πρὸς κουρείω (barber- shop), ἢ δὲ πρὸς εὐκοστομίων (coffeiner's), ἢ οὗ οὐκ ἐν τύχῃ, καὶ πλείον μὲν ἢ τῶν ἐγγύτατα τῆς ἀγορᾶς κατακεφα- σμένους (keening shop), ἀλλάζοντα δὲ ὡς τῶν πλείον ἀνωτέρας αὐτός. On the last point, cf. Xem. Δεκ. λ. 2. 1, where Socrates alabosμασε αὐτὸν (οὖ- τον ἐξομολογόμενον τῇ τῷ ὁμο- πάλω ξεισυνά, εἰ δὲ τὰ ὑπόλοιπα διαπρά- βουσα, καθίσοντα εἰς ἄνευς σεισμοῦ τι διά μεικτυρίμοις τὸ ἀγόρας, τῶν τῶν καὶ αὐτός γεῖ- των.

25. ὅρνεια: ὀρνεία and ὀρνεῖο describe noisy demonstrations whether of approval or disapproval, and are used esp. of large assemblies. Cf. I. Rep. vi. 402 b, διὸν μιαναστάτας εἰς δέντρας εἰς ἑκάστηρας ἡ διατερα ἡ διατερα ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἀναβάσσας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστηρας ἡ ἐκάστη-
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30 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν ἄστερ ἐπεθράμμην. 18

10 καὶ οὕτω μὴ τούτο ὡμᾶς δεομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γέ μοι δοκῶ,
τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔσται ἵνα μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων,
ἐστὶ δὲ βελτίων ἄν εἰσὶν — αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ
τὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ; δικαστοῦ μὲν
35 γὰρ αὕτη ἄρετὴ, βρήτορος δὲ τάληθρη λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμί ἀπολογησάσθαι, ὧν
ἀνδρὸς Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρώτα μοῦ ψευδὴ κατηγορήματα
καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὑστέρα καὶ
touς ὑστέρους. ἔμοι γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦν γεγοναί πρὸς

17 and repetition of ἄστερ, see G.M.T. 223;
d G. 1312; Η. 984.

30. φωνῇ; dialect, with esp. reference to pronunciation, while τρόπῳ, style of speech, describes more generally any unusual choice and combination of words.

18 ἐπεθράμμην: had been brought up, belongs to the supposed case. See on δὲ ἡμέρα, 20 a. Foreigners were allowed to appear in court only in exceptional cases. Ordinarily their εἴροι, guest-friend, or their ἐπίστευσαν, resident consul, represented them in court and was surety for them.

31. καὶ δὲ καί: takes the place of ὅτως καὶ ἄστερ δὲ: it calls attention to the case in point here cited.— νῦν: not now in contrast to οὖν, but as it is contrasted with as it would have been. “Now that I am not a stranger in Athens, but only a stranger in courts.” Lat. nunc is used in the same way. Cf. Liv. ii. 12.

14. — ὡς γε μοι δοκῶ: rather than ὡς γάρ ἐστίν, the reading of inferior Mss. adopted by many editors. The important word is ὡς, not μόν, which is the least emphatic form in which the pron. could be introduced. Here the pers. pron. is used instead of the

ref. H. 084. For the analogous use a of the oblique cases of advēs instead of the ind. ref., see G. 902; H. 084 a.

32. τοῦτο, τοῦτο: the reason urged is a general one. The influence of style, if felt at all, will be felt just in those cases where the style of the plea is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it interferes with true judgment. For similar phraseology, cf. Xen. Cyr. iv. 3.

2, τοῦτο μὲν ἄστερ ἔσται, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ παύσασα ἄστερ τῇ ἄκρῃ χαρίζεται (for their own satisfaction). Ἑυαγ. of Τερ. i. 1.

If happily won perhaps a happier gain would have been, why then a grievous labor won.

35. εἴροι: in place of τοῦτο, by assimilation to the gender of the prod. ἄστερ. It refers to the preceding clause advē... μό." III. 1. δίκαιος εἰμι κτῆι: for certain adj.s. used pers. with the inf., see G.M.T. 702; G. 1527; H. 902.

2. φανδὴ κατηγορήματα: not φανεῖν, because in the act. the idiom is κατηγοροῦν τις τούς.

4. ἐμὸς γὰρ κτῆι: introducing the reason why Socrates is to speak first πρὸς τὸ πρῶτο... κατηγορὸν.

πρὸς ἐμὸς: with κατηγοροῦ γεγοναί,
60

πάλας καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἦν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλως ἔλε.

gontes, οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ό τούς ἄμφι Ἀντωνος,

καίτερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι,

& ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἐκ παιδῶν παραλαμβά-

νότες ἄκριβώς τε καὶ κατηγόρους ἡμοῦ, ὡς ἑστὶ τὶς Σω-

10 κράτης, σοφὸς ἄνδρες, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ

8 which is equiv. to κατηγορέας. Cf. Εσχ. 2 en, ἔργα τις κατηγορέαν μοῦ

πρὸς τὴν πάλα, where πρὸς relates to those to whom the accusation is ad-

dressed.

4. καὶ καί: the first καὶ emphasi-

sizes πάλαι, the second requires no com-

ment.—παλλὰ πολλᾶ ἤδη ἦν· see on εἰς ἄντι, 17 c. παλλὰ goes back to the

beginning of the accusations while παλλὰ νῦν follows out their long con-

tinuance. This has been going on more than twenty years at the very

least, for the Clouds was first put upon the stage in 422, and Socrates was

tried in 399.

6. τοὺς ἀφίλ Ἀντωνος: when fol-

lowed by the acc. of a person's name, αὶ παπὶ and αἱ ἀμφὶ mean the person

and those connected with him (sub-

jects, followers, companions, adher-

ents) G. 952, 2; H. 701, 3 fr. Anytus was the most influential ac-

cuser. See Introd. 30.

8. τὸν πολλὸν: most of you. The

art. is not used here (as in 17 a above,

τῶν πολλῶν) to call up something familiar; it contrasts most of them,

who were caught young and taught to

abhor Socrates, with the few, implied in the part. gen. ἐνός, to whom this

may not have happened. G. 965, 607; H. 696 and 678 b.

παραλαμβάνοντες: this word often

is used of one who takes charge of

a child and educates it. Cf. Alc. I.

121 a, ὧς ἑνεκαὶ ἂ νευμαντόν ὅτων τῶν

παλάς παραλαμβάνοντι σοι δεινότις

βασιλεύοις παῖδευομενοι ἰομάδεως.

Buy this sense is too narrow for the

present context. More to the point is Gorg. 183 c, where λαμβάνεις is used

in a wider sense, which is analogous

to that of παραλαμβάνεις here, τοὺς

Βελείτονως καὶ ἱρμυμενετάκτοι ἡμῶν

αὐτῶς, ἐν νῦν λαμβάνοντες, ἐντὸς

λέοντας κατενάντος ἐλιῷ, taking the

best and most rigorous of our number in

our earliest youth, and by incantations

subduing us as if we were young lions.

7. Ἔνθαντες τοὺς καὶ κατηγόρους: preju-

diced you against me by uncasing

accusations. Strictly speaking κατ-

ηγοφυτεύεις ξένοις is required, but co-

ordination here idiomatically takes

the place of subordination.—τῆς

Σωκράτης: τῆς with prop. names

conveys an indefiniteness and uncer-

tainty which are always incomplimen-

tary and which in this case amount

to scorn, an individual (somebody or

other) named Socrates. Cf. what d' you

call him? used colloquially in Eng.

10. σοφὸς ἄνδρες: these words are

practically intended to mean a Sophist.

"The title σοφὸς ἄνδρες would at once be

understood as a class-appellation, cf.

28 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and

associations of Philosopher are up-

permost, yet not so distinctly as to

exclude those of Sophist." X. —

τά τα μετέχα... αὐθημένως: pop-

ular prejudice coined this phrase, or

something like it, to stigmatize all
With such investigation began and ended the earliest Greek philosophy (Introd. 2-12), and even Socrates’ contemporaries, the Sophists, — notably Hippias, — were much addicted to it. See Introd. 14. Cf. Prot. 315e, ἐφαρμοσάντες δὲ περὶ φανέρως τοι καὶ τὸν μετέφερον ἀστρονομικῶς ἄκτα διηρυμένων τῶν ἑορτῶν, and they (Eryximachus, Thaeodrus, and Andron) appeared to be plying Hippias with astronomical questions about nature and the heavenly bodies. The phrase τὰ ὅσα γὰρ (where οὗδε has the very unusual sense of beneath and covered by) does not refer to definite matters searched into, but is part and parcel of a sweeping assertion that nothing either high or low, nothing “in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth” is safe from their fatuous and futile curiosity. This popular view is amusingly exaggerated and dramatized by Aristophanes in the Clouds, 181-234. Here the word οὖν adds a final touch of exaggeration. — Φροντιστέω: used trans. here like φρονίζω with acc. For a dat. similarly governed, cf. τε τῆς τῷ ὄνειρος, 30a, where see note. See also App. — “This ‘accusation,’ adds the court. Both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality in 19b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist; the μετέφερον φανέρως points to the Philosopher, the τοῦτο ... τοῦτο to the Sophist.” R.

11. τὸν ἄθρων καὶ.: any teaching of rhetoric, as such, must contain hints as to the most effective means for making the best of a bad case by presenting it skillfully. How far this must be condemned should not be decided without reference to circumstances and facts. To-day it is equally impossible to assert that a lawyer in all cases is bound not to defend a client whose cause he knows to be unjust. Popular opinion at Athens seems to have been convinced that the Sophist’s single aim in teaching rhetoric was to communicate the art of proving that black was white. Cf. the Clouds, 880-1104, where Aristophanes introduces the ἱδρυες ἄγες and the ἱδρυες ἄγες respectively. They have an argument in which the ἱδρυες ἄγες wins. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8, where the excellent Claudius says of the Sophists: docere se profitebantur quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset. His opposuit esse Socrates, qui subtilitate quadam disputandi resellere eorum instituta solebat verbi. 13. τοῦτο: in the pred. The accusators just mentioned as καὶ ὅτι εἶχον διασκεδάσαντες o. o. o. and. 14. οὐκ θεώς καὶ.: the investigations alluded to above were, it was charged, not only a foolish waste of
18 ἕστατά εἰσιν οὖν οἱ κατηγοροί πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπὸ κατηγορημάτων, εἰς ἐμὴν ἀναγκαία λύγην, πρὸς οὓς ἦσα, ἐν ᾧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστήναι, καὶ δέ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνώ έρημοι κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογούμενοι οἴδεικα. ὁ δὲ πάνως ἀλογώτατος, ὃς οὐδὲ 20 τὰ ὄνομα τινός τέι αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ γὰρ καὶ
κωμιδοφοιτεῖ τυγχάνει ὃν. ὡσοι δὲ φθόνοι καὶ διαβόλη

useful time, but actually (hence the
eidos, not eis, in the text) led to athe-
ism. See Introd. 10, 13, and 33. fia.
16. ἐν τῇ ὅμηλα: with ὅμηλα.
17. ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐπιστήναι: for the poten
tial ind. with ἂν denoting what
may have happened and perhaps did
happen, see G.1337. See the examples
in L. and S. e. 6 b. L. e.
18. ἐρημωνικοὶ κατηγοροῦντες: supply
ἐναν. The fem. termination is used
in this idiom, though ἐρημως is more
commonly of two terminations, and
κατηγορῶν ἐρημων, in exactly the sense
required here, occurs in Dem. xxi.
87. The acc. is cognate with κατηγο-
ροῦντες. G. 1051 ; H. 718 b. Cf. also
the common law phrases, διδακει γραφέν,
προκάσαται ἀνδρικα, ἠθοποιεῖ γραφίκον,
ἀδίκητος αἰτέω, ἀλαβάσαντας καὶ
ἀδίκητος συμβολαῖς. See also
James B. R. 9. 4. 14. 21. 32. 53. 5
 pastorías. The clause of 5, the correlative of ἐν, is sup-
pressed for brevity’s sake. τὸν ἄνω
must be read between the lines.
The clause with ἐν stands in appos.
to this suppressed antec. Often a
further step toward brevity is taken,
and in place of such a clause as this
one with ἐν we have an independent
clause, sometimes even introduced by
γέφρα. C. F. 1. 11. 3. 5, δὲ πάνως
εὐκαλυφτάτος, ἢ γάρ ἐμπλουσαμένου ἕν
πολυτάτους εἶναι τῶν πολυτάτων
πολυτάτους φύλαξα ἡγεμόνει τῆς
πολυτατος εἴναι, but, what is of all things most
grievous? we are wont to consider those
the commonwealth’s most trustworthy
guardians whom we should count as
the meanest of our citizens.
21. κωμιδοφοιτεῖ: the Clouds of d
Aristophanes (see Introd. 25) is here
more exp. alluded to, since it contains
the specific charges just mentioned.
Cratinus, Ameipsias, and Eupolis also
ridiculed Socrates.
19. δὲ ἐν τῷ κτήτῳ: the clause of ἐν καὶ
αὐτὸς πεντερίμων enlarges the scope of
φήνη καὶ διαβολή χρόνοιν. As it is ap-
pended as an after-thought, the sense
of the leading verb is casually reiter-
ated in ἐπεισοδεῖς, it is
spreading πεντερίμου is subordinated to
ἐπεισοδεῖς. Logically the sense re-
quires: δέν, εἰ μὲν φθόνοι . . . πεν-
τερίμου, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πεντερίμου, ὅπως
δονταί. The first ὅ δέ goes back to the
main statement of the preceding sent. about the anonymous accusers, &c. &c. 
... είην. On the loose conversational structure of such acts, see Introd. 55.

25. ἄρασι σκιαμαχεῖν επὶ: τὰ καὶ used here to connect, not two different ideas, but two different ways of putting the same idea. Socrates would be sure always to use his favorite method of question and answer, and therefore σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον for him would be practically διέγειραι μεθανίᾳ ἀποκρυμμένον. By thus saying one and the same thing twice over, the speaker expresses his idea all the more effectively.

27. διήθεναι: the two notions of δίσω, worth (price) and right, are as usual blended in this word, δίσω γραμ. Notice the persistent recurrence in various forms of the idea conveyed by ἄνευ ἐν δίσω. See Introd. 55.

29. ἀν λέγει: refers to b above.
... ἄλλητε επί: it was common for a speaker to ask the court to approve of some other order of topics which he proposed to follow. For a fuller description of εκτίνας, see b above; notice that it refers to ἐπερί ἐν τῶ ἐπάλῳ. These old-time accusers, though the last-mentioned, were the most remote in thought, for Anytius and his crew were actually present as τῶτο shows. H. 606 b.

32. ἐξεῖ: recit, pointing to what has just been said, and implying that the whole must be accepted by his hearers as a matter of course. It is like "So far, so good!" ἐξεῖ often has the same force. Grammatical arguments are used to prove that this ἐξεῖ is nothing more nor less than the alternative form used not infrequently in place of the opt. ἐφάνει. The force of ἐφάνει is very much that of ἐξεῖ, for it indicates that the duty of making some plea must be taken for granted.

33. τὴν διαβολὴν: the prejudice produced by the slanders just described.

34. ἐκχύνει: acquired. See on ἐκχύνει, 20 d, and cf. Hdt. i. 14, τὴν ἐκχύνει
o̱ṭo̱s διλιγόν χρόνιν. Βουλούμην μὲν οὖν ἀν τοῦτο οὗτος 19
γενόθηαι, εἰ τι ἀμείων καὶ υἱῶν καὶ ἑμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τι μὲ
προϊναὶ ἀπολογούμενον: οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ γαλατῶν εἶναι, καὶ
οὐ πάντα με λανθάνει οὖν ἑστω. (ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲτ' ἐμοῖ)
ὄμη τῷ θεῷ φιλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβομεν οὖν ἐκ ἀρχής, τὸς ἡ κατηγορία ἑστων
ἐκ ής ἡ ἡμί διαβολή γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ καὶ πιστεύων Μήλητος 5
μὲ εγράφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἰνεν τί δὲ λέγοντες
dιαβάλλον οὐ διαβάλλοντες; (ὕστερον οὖν κατηγορών) τὴν
ἀντικειμένα δεὶ ἀναγνώσαι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἄδικεν καὶ
περιφραζέατη ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν

19 οὕτως εἰς οἷον εἰς περιφράσισας. When εἰς means, be in possession, εἰς εἰς means, come into possession. G. 1200; H. 841. — ταύτην: resumptively after the interrupting clause of explanation introduced by ἥ.

36. οἷς τι: if at all. — ἀρκεὸν: used without an expressed standard of comparison because the opposite inevitably suggests itself, “better in any way than that I should not accomplish anything.”

ἠλιον τοῦτο: proflèce re.

38. οὐ βέβαιον: not at all. Here certainly hardly would not be adequate. Cf. μὴν βέβαιον, 21 b.

39. τῇ θεῷ: the divine will or God.

The art is not used because any particular god is referred to, but with a generic or collective force. Cf. Crit. 43 d, and see on τῷ θεῷ, 36 d and 42 a, and ἀ θεῖ, Crit. 54 c.

III. 2. παντοσύνων: not as above, 181 e, sódem habens, but rather confused on rectus. Cf. Alc. I. 123 e, τι ἄλγε σώστο ἔννοιαν ἐπιλέγει τῇ μετα-
πλήρει: Come now, on what does the youth rely? — Μηλητος; see Introd.

b 30, and for γραφήν, ibid. 67.

4. οὕσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν: a freq.

idiom in comparisons; the leading and dependent clauses are briefly blended in one; ἀναγνώσαν as well as ἀντικειμένα are involved in this consolidation. The reference is to the formal reading of the documents in a suit before the full court. On ἀντικειμένα, see Introd. 69.

5. ἄδικον: very commonly, as here, ἄδικον has almost the force of a pf. One of its obvious meanings is ἄδικος ἦν, which practically signifies, I have done wrong or I am guilty. GMT. 27; Η. 827.

6. περιφραζόμενα: is a buzzword. A buzzword either mind other people's business or makes too much of his own. Socrates is accused of the first; for a good case of the second, cf. Nep. Arist. 1. 4, sibi non placere quod tam cupide elaborasset, ut praeter ceteros Iustus appellaretur. Cf. 20 c, προτέτερον προγ-

μετεκπρέτουσα, and see on τα μετεπρέτα in 18 b. — οὐράνιον: the art is omitted because ἡ γῆ καὶ οὐράνιον form one conception. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 19. Ἀναφέρεται εἰς πάντα ἡ κατηγορία τούτου, τὸ τε λεγόμενα καὶ προτέτερα καὶ τα στηφαβολεύματα (the omitted
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥ. 65

ηττο λόγον κραίτω ποιών καὶ ἄλλους τά αὐτά ταύτα δι-
δάσκον. τοιαύτη τίς ἔστι· ταύτα γὰρ ἐσώτερα καὶ αὐτοὶ ε
ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοτέλεις καθορθία. Σωκράτη τυλί έκεῖ περι-

19 φερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀρεσκομένων καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν
φλωρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ἄνω, ἐγὼ οὖν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε
μικρὸν περὶ ἐπιτάξιμον. καὶ οὔχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοι-
αύτην ἐπιτιθέμην, εἰ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἐστι·
μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαίας δίκας φύγομι·

8 τοιαύτη τίς: Socrates alone is
responsible for the exact words; the
accusation itself is vague.—ταύτα
γὰρ ἐσώτερα: in the Clouds, Aristoph-
anes put before the Athenians their
own feelings against Socrates, he dra-
matized a prejudice already existing.

9 Σωκράτης τυλί κτ.: in appos.
with ταύτα. For the force of τυλί,
see on τις Σωκράτης, 18 b; it implies
that Socrates in the Clouds bears no
close resemblance to the real Socrates.
Cf. Clouds, 218-226, where Strepsi-
des on entering Socrates’s thinking-
shop says: Who is this man up there in
the basket? Hearing it is Socrates,
he asks him what he’s about.
Socrates answers ἀρρενεύω καὶ περ-
φρονῶ τῶν ἄλλων, on air I tread and
over the sum.

10 φύγομι κτ.: subordinated
to τοιαύτη τίς.

11 τε: referring to all statements
of the sort above mentioned.—οὖν
μέγα οὔτε μικρόν: a reinforcement
of the οὖν stated disjunctly.
Cf. 21 b and 24 a; also for a similar loca-
tion, cf. Dem. ix. 5, οὔτε μικρόν οὔτε
μέγα οὖν τῶν ἰδεῶν (that you ought
to do) τοιούτοις ἡμῶν καθότι τὰ πρά-
γματα έχουν. See on δὲ τις οὖν, 17 b.

12 οὖν οὐ εἰρημένων: cf. in a below,
καὶ ταύτα γάρ μειον πολλῶν εἶναι.
"Such knowledge is a fine thing, if
any one has it." Socrates ironically
hints that no one has it. Cf. Xen.
Dem. i. 1. 11, οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῶν
πάντων φαινών, βὰρ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ πλῆ-
στα, διελεύσατο, καθὼς εἰς τὸ καλόν
ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιτῶν αὐτῶν ἐφα, καὶ
tίνων ἀδικίας (by what necessary laws)
ἐπεκτείνεται τῷ φανερών· ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὸ φαύλοντας τὰ τοιούτα μιμούτα
ταύτα ἀνεξαίτητον. Those who pursued
these studies were crazy, he thought,
because man ought first to know him-
selv (cf. id. i. 1. 12, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν
ἀυτόν ένσώζων, τετελειωμένον
ἐλπίζω ἐλπίζων εἰδέ-
ναι ἐρευνήτα τῇ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
φαύλοντος, καὶ ταυτές μειον
πολλῶν, τῇ προσεύχονται πρά-
nτται), and therefore arrived at
impotent conclusions (cf. id. iv. 7. 6-7).
See on τις τοιαύτης, 20 a, and Introd. 16.

14 μη...φέρωμ: Schanz bracket-
ests these words: "qui a sanam
interpretationem sperant.
Stallbaum punctuates "μη...φύγομι!"
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὥς ἀνδρὲς λαθρεύοι, οὐδὲν μετεστὶ
μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῦς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ
ἀξίω ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, δοσοὶ ἐμοῦ
πάσον ἀκήκοατε διαλεγομένου. πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιού-
τοι εἰς· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώσοτε ἥ μικρὸν ἢ
20 μὲγά λῆκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγο-
μένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστί καὶ τάλλα
περὶ ἐμοῦ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ λέγοσιν.

IV. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὖν τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ γ' ἔτι τινος
ἀκήκοατε ὡς ἐγώ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρή-
ματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς. ἔστι καὶ τούτῳ γέ ὅ
μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος τ' εἰς παιδεύειν ἀνθρώ-
5 πους ὁσπέρ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κέως
καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἱλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἑκατοστος, ὥς ἀνδρὲς,
ironical surprise of Socrates is reproduced by the anacoluthon in this sent.

With ἂν ἐστι the speaker apparently leads up to νεῖθα, but the emphatic τοὺς (in which the clause τοὺς νεῖθα ἂ... βούλονται is summed up) is followed by νεῖθανοι instead. (The pl. after ἄνετος is not uncommon. H. 600 a.) Then comes the statement of a fact which is surprising, they pay these men, and finally the climax is capped by their giving them thanks to boot. To give this last point προσεκίνησε, which should be a partic. like δικαίωσε, is put on a par with νεῖθανοι. For a fuller account of these teachers, see Prot. 316 c ff.

11. ἐνεπικαλεῖτο: "the men just named are not the only ones, for also, etc."

12. ζημένη: see on ζημένη σινικεῖν, 22 e.

14. Καλλία: at Callias’s house foreigners, and particularly foreign Sophists, were welcomed. Callias’s fondness for Sophists is humorously brought out in the Protagoras, where he is almost crowded out of house and home by them. The indulgence of this and of other tastes exhausted his resources, and he died in poverty. His father Hipponicus fell in the battle at Delium (424 B.C.).

17. ἄρρητα: for ἄρρητον and the inf., without -ς, expressing a past likelihood which was not realized, see GMT. 428 a. Here is a present likelihood (see ἄρρητον for an anal. use of ἄρρητος) which is not realized, who would, in the case supposed (ὁ... μαθητεύσασθαι), proceed to make them, etc.

21. τῆς ἀκούσας κτλ. sc. the b boys must be civilized and humanized. Civilization involves the existence of the family and the state, and these require education. Cf. Arist. Pol. 1. 2. 9, ἀνθρώποι φύειν νόμον ζευκω, man is by nature a political animal.
πολιτικής, ευστήμων ἐστιν; οὐμα γὰρ σὲ ἵσκεββαι διὰ 20
τὴν τῶν νιεῶν κτῆσιν. ἐστὶ τις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνω
γε, ἢ δὲ ὁ, καὶ ποιανός, καὶ πόσον δι.
25 δᾶσκει; Ἐὔρνος, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών·
καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔρνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἔχω ταύτην
τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ ἐ
αὐτός ἐκάλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρωνόμην ἀν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην
ταῦτα ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι.

V. Τιολάβοι ἐν ὑμῖν ἴσως ἀλλ', ὃ Σώκρατες,
το σῶν τι ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐταῖ γε.

20 25. Εὔρνος κτ. : not a word is wasted. In
this answer, upon the brevity of
which largely depends the humor
of the story. Eunus is elsewhere
mentioned as a teacher of oratory
and a writer of elegies. A few such
poems attributed to him still exist.
Here he is introduced as a Sophist
and a teacher of virtue. The small-
lessness of his charge for instruction
proved, measures accurately the value
attached to it by his contemporaries,
and places him and his teaching in
the second rank. Protagoras charged
100 minas. There have been attempts
to distinguish between a younger and
an elder Eunus, both of whom came
from Paros and wrote elegies. If
there were two, allusion is here made
to the elder.

28. εἰ γὰρ καὶ δηλώσῃ: In the
original statement which Socrates
may be supposed to have in mind,
both of these were in the indico. Both
might change to the opt. (GMT. 100;
H. 937) after δηλώσῃ. The change
to the opt. from εἰγάραθεν εἰ γάραθεν, as
it were, into the background, leaving
ὁμοιομελῶς διδάσκει, which contains
a very pointed insinuation, in the
more vivid indico. See App.

27. ἐμμελῶς: synonymous with ἐ
ἀλῆς. Its opposite is ἐμμελέται (diss-
cordantly or falsely, of a false note).
The word also conveys by innuendo
the notion that the teaching of Eue-
nus is showy, and this is the point here
made. In Crit. 100 b, μετέχει and
παρὸ καλοί, ἐμμελετάς and ἐμμελέται are
used as contradictories.

V. All error is distorted truth; until
a man sees the truth which a particu-
lar error caricatures, he will not re-
nounce his error; to denounce error
as such is therefore not enough.
Thus far Socrates has argued against
the grossly erroneous popular opinion
of himself; now he proceeds to exhibit
the truth. His upright conduct has
been exasperating, for obedience to
God has led him to defy men.

1. ἀλλ', ὃ Σώκρατες ετε.: objections
dramatized and put in the form of
questions. The argument is: "there
must be some cause." Hence the γέρο
in εἴ γάραθεν.

2. το σῶν πράγμα: What is that you
have been about? or better, What is this
about you? Accordingly πράγμα is used
either in the sense of pursuit, study, or
plan of life; or it has no independent
meaning, but is joined with the art.
APOLOGIA SOKRATOUΣ.

20. oδ, the whole being a paraphrase for Ἀναλόγως. See on τό τει λακρατόνον πράγμα, Crit. 53 a.

3. παραπόθεμα: what overpowers the limit restraining common men, and hence provokes suspicion. See on παράποθεσις, 19 b, and cf. Soph. Ant. 68, to γὰρ περισσάς πράσας εἰς ξένοις νόμους. Eur. Bacch. 427 Π, σοφία δ’ ἀνέχειν πραξίβις φήμα τε περισσῶν παρὰ φωτάν: τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τὸ παράλληλόν ἐσχάμα χρήσει τε (whate'er the multitude of lower men puts faith in and practices) τὸν δὲ δειχνόμεν. That oδ... παραπόθεμα is (although as you say you have been doing nothing) conveys a statement of fact, not a supposition, is shown by oδ. The σοφία points the contrast between two statements of fact, (1) σοφ. (gen. after φήμα) παραπόθεμα, and (2) τοσαίτη σφμα γέγονεν. The words εἰ μή τε... εἰ σολαί (see App.) re-state (1) more mildly and as a supposition. "The evil report did not arise about you while you were doing nothing out of the way, unless your behaviour was eccentric." A man may be eccentric and yet keep within bounds; cf. below δ and e, also e 20 a.

8. τὸ σοφία καὶ τὶν διαφορὰν: αὐτοίς. To be distinguished from φήμα τε καὶ λόγος only as bringing out the bad repute which was their result. Cf. the Lat. nomen. The words τὴν διαφορὰν show that σοφία is not to be taken in its usual sense of good name or fame, but closely with διαφορὰν, both the name and the blame.

11. ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ: this collocation with ἀνείπος indicates that ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ arose from the use of ἀλλος. For a case where ἀλλος precedes it, cf. 34 b.

12. ἡμερία: I have become possessed of and still have. See on ἡμερίαν, 19 a, and Phae. 241 b, τῶν τῶν ἡμεριῶν αὐτοῦ ἀναφθορύπως, after he had come to full understanding and gained self-control.

νόμις... ταύτην: this question tends upon the heels of the preceding sent. so closely that ἑαν is not repeated. νόμις is in the pred.; we might expand to ἐν τῷ σοφῷ ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπο τῷ τῆς ἡμερίας. H. 618.

13. ἡμερία: αὐτὸ περί ἀνείπος τοῦτο τῷ ἡμερία, ἡμερία, ἡμερία χρόνου, just that which.
κυδωνεύον ταύτην ελείοις σοφοῖς. οὗτοι δὲ τάξιν ἄν οὔς ἁπτήτως ἔλεγον μείζῳ τινὰ ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοῦ εἶν, ὥποτε ἔχω τὶ λέγων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγγυς αὐτῶν ἐπισταμαί, ἀλλ᾿ ὀστίς φιλις ψυχεταὶ τα καὶ ἐπὶ διαβόλῃ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγειν. καὶ μοι, ὁ ἄνδρες ἅθυματοι, μὴ θρονήσῃτε, μὴδὲ ἡν ὅδε τι ὑμῖὶ μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὅν ἄν λέγων, ἂλλ᾽ εἰς ἀξίωματα ὑμῖν τῶν λέγοντα ἄνωτος. τῆς γὰρ

18. ὁ ὅμως ἐν τῇ ὁκλ. ἡ χειρὸς ἀνεγέρθη: ironical. Such wisdom is one of two things, either superhuman or no wisdom at all. 18. θεραπεύετε: do not interrupt me with noise, strictly referring to the moment fixed by λέγων τῇ ὁκλ. In 21 a, and 30 c, the pres. is used (μὴ θεραπεύετε) because the request is less precise, make no disturbance. GMT. 269; B. 614 a. 19. μέγα λέγειν: not of course in the sense of speaking out loud (cf. Eph. v. 410 b, ἀλλὰ λέγοντες μέγα τις λέγων, beginning to speak above his level), but in that of μεγάλα λόγοι, as μέγα φρόνημα is used in the sense of μεγαλοφρονία. Cf. Ili. II. i. 2,

boyες with women's voices strive to speak big, and clasping their female joints in still unwieldy arms against thy crown.

— οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐν τῇ: a compressed form of statement, made effective with the audience by the allusion to certain Euripidean strains. (cf. Eur. Frag. 488, καίν πάντες ἀλλὰ ἐμὸν μεγάλον καὶ οὔ τις μεγάλον, not mine the word, I heard it from my mother. This line is parodied in Symp. 177 a, ὥποτε μὲν ἡ ἄρχη τοῦ λόγου ἐστιν τῆς Ἐρεμίας Ἁλέκασον παρ᾽ ὧν γὰρ ἐμὸν καὶ νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δίκαιον τοῦ. The same sentiment is found in Eur. Hec. 513, λέγον γάρ των οὐκ ἔμοι, σοφὸς ἐστε, not mine the word; by clerics men twice spoken. Hor. Sat. II. 2, 2, nec mens est sed quae praecipit Ocellus.) For a similarly compressed statement, cf. Ixion τοῦ τὸν μακρότα, 31 e. "A pred. adj. or subst. is often a brief equiv. for one clause of a compound sent." II. 618. ἐμὸν and μεγάλου are both pres., and special point is given them by their position. This sent. is far more telling than what might be spun out of it, ας λέγων γάρ λέγων καὶ λέγων δι᾽ ἐμὸν ὃν ἔμοι ἄφην ὅτι ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόλλων. (cf. τοῦ λέγοντας ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόλλων τῶν λέγοντας καὶ μεγάλους λόγους, though it is formally a hypothetical rel. clause with indef. antec., "the word I shall utter, whatever the word may be, that I say, will not be mine, etc." Cf. Crit. 44 e.

20. ἄνωτος: in the sense of shifting responsibility. For ἀναφερόν in that sense, cf. Eur. Orest. 414 ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόλλων ἡμῖν ἀναφερόν τὴν ἐμφάνισιν ... ἐκτὸς κάθεσαν μετὰ ἑκάστην φύσιν. τῆς γὰρ ἐμὸς, et τῃ: it required skill as well as modesty to avoid blaming out here with τῆς ἀλλὰ σοφίας. The et ἐστιν ἐκεῖνοι interrupts just in time. Cf. Isocr. xv. 50, καὶ μὴ πλὴν ὅπως τῆς ἡμῶς εἶναι βούλευε μελετήσω διούλουμεν, αὕτης φιλοσοφίας, αὕτης διαμάζεται, ἀπεκτάσεως τῶν ἀλλίων, now you have heard all the truth about my talent or methodical study or pursuit, whichever you like to call it.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΞΙΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

21. οἷς: goes back to οἷς in d. above.

22. Χαρεφώντα: certainly, if the Athenians did not know Charephon, many a joke of Aristophanes at Charephon’s expense was lost on them; see below on line 25. He is mentioned by Xen. (Mem. 1. 2. 48) as one of those friends of Socrates of whom ἄχριν αὐθέντων ὑμῖν ἐν μεγαρικόν φίλοι τους, δι’ ὑμᾶς οἴει το αἰχμαλωτά γενήσεται καὶ οἶκον καὶ ἀλήθειας καὶ φίλοι καὶ τέλειοι καὶ τόλμηται ἄφαντω χρήσειν.

23. οἷς τὰ πλήθη: the ἄλλατα here taken as representing the whole people; and here, as often, πλῆθος is equiv. to ἄλλατα, and means democratic party. Cf. Lyd. passim.—εἰναλος: partisan. Cf. Gorg. 510 a, τοὺς δεμπέρσας πολεμείωσι ζήτησον εῇς, to be a partition of the government in power.

24. τὴν βαρύν ταύτην: an allusion, which no one present could fail of understanding, to the exile from which all conspicuous democrats had only four years before returned (in 403 B.C.). The Thirty Tyrants were the authors of this banishment; cf. Xen. Hell. II. 4. 1, εγὼ δὲ πάντα τῶν τῶν καταλήψεων (not registered on their catalogue of 300 oligarchical sympathizers) μὴ συνεστώς εἰς τὰ δημοτικὰ γένοις εἰς τὸν Πολεμαρχόν, καὶ ἐπιτίθεντα πολέμου δύναται ἐντελείως καὶ τὴν Μήδαρα καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἰθάκης τῶν ἀντιγόνων. All these allusions had the effect of influencing the court in favor of what they were about to hear.

25. φιλόδρομος: Charephon was a born enthusiast. Cf. Charm. 163 b, Χαρεφών ἰδε, ἵνα τα κακά ὥστε, ἀνευθύνεται ἐν μέσῳ τῆς ἄριστης. Aristophanes calls Charephon “a rat” (Birds, 1554); Charephon and Socrates belong to the jocularized barefoot brotherhood (Clouds, 104). Browning, Aristophane’s Apology.

In me twas equal balanced fresh rebuked Excess alike in stair-gate Glauber On starveling Charephon; I challenge both.

26. καὶ δὲ νῦν καλ ὡντι: well then really once. Cf. 18 a. The regular way of introducing a particular instance of what has been stated generally. What Charephon did at Delphi was an instance of his φιλόδρομος.


27. δὲ μένος: I repeat, lit. just what I am aying. Cf. 17 a and 20 a.

28. δειλί βίοι τὰ Πάσχα: σὰς closes an explanatory digression and leads back to μερισμα ἐν τῷ πλῆθῳ. The
VI. Ἡ Πνεία μυθένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτων πέρι ὁ ἄλλος υἱῶν αὐτῶν οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρῆσει, ἐπειδὴ ἔκεινος τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὡς ἐνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξεω ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὗτοσι· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὕτω μέγα οὕτω σημαίνου 5 ζυνοὶδα ἔμαυμα σοφός ὡς· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκον οἷς οὖσα σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου ψευδητά γε· οὐ γὰρ

21 oracle in question is lost, but we have a very fair substitute in Σφήκα Σοφολίου σοφώτερος ἐκ Ερυνίτη | άμφοτέρον ὧν ἐν τοῖς (οὐ κανένας) Σωκράτης σοφώτερος. See the Schol. on Arist. Clouds, 144.

29. ο ἄλλος: ac. Chrysocrates. We are told that once, when the two were at variance, Socrates intervened as peacemaker. Cf. Xen. Mem. II. 3. 1.

VI. 3. τί ποτε αἰνίττεται: through modesty Socrates takes it for granted that this is “a dark saying.” For a genuinely enigmatic oracle, cf. Paus.

v. 3. ο, γένεσθαι δὲ τὰς βασιλείας (Temenius and Creso) σφήκα ζυνοὶδα ἐν τῷ ναῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς προφανείᾳ, that they should make “the three-eyed” leader of their return. The “three-eyed” turned out to be Oxylus, son of Andraemon, whom they met riding on a one-eyed mule; acc. to Apollodorus, Oxylus was one-eyed and bestrode a two-eyed horse. See an essay on Greek Oracles by F. W. H. Myers, in his volume entitled Essays Classical (London, 1883).

5. αἰτήσεως: see on ἀπεισοδήμο, 22 c.

—κύριος φάσκως: κύριοι here refers to the meaning and φάσκως to the words in which it was conveyed.

6. οἱ δὲ βεβαιο: of course I do not suppose. ὁδεῖ ἄλλος a shade of uncertainty to the stress of ὁδεῖ. Notice that Socrates' long struggle (μέχρι τῶν) is dramatized in these short, quick stanzas, which suggest a man talking to himself.—οὐ γὰρ δήμου: it would be against his nature. God, being by nature truthful, could not lie; cf. Rep. II. 383 B, ἄνδρα γὰρ ἀκούειν τοῦ διαμαύρου τὸ καὶ τοῦ δήμου, the nature of divinity and of God is absolutely void of falsehood. The implicit faith of pious Greeks in oracles, esp. in those of Apollo, is proved directly by such words as Pindar’s ψιλόν κυρία, ἡ (Apollo) sets not his hand to falsehood (Pyth. III. 9), τὸ τοῦ ἄνδρα ψιλόν δέχεται, he is unmeaning for him to have part in a lie (Pyth. Ix. 42). It is also shown indirectly by the horror, expressed so often by the tragedians, at finding Phoebus' speech untrue. Against all blasphe- mous attribution of falsehood to the gods, Plato defends the faith in Rep. II. 383 B, where he reprobates the following lines of Aeschylus (spoken by Thetis in a lost play), εἰ μὲν τὸ φωλιὸν θείον ἀκούεις στᾶναι ἢ καλόν οὔ προσέρχεσθαι (with the prophetic fraud) ἢ καὶ οὖσα δήμου, καὶ τὸν τινα τὸν (marriage-feast) αὐτὸς τὰς αἰτήσεως, αὐτὸς ἄνειμα ἐπιθυμοῦν τὸν παῖς τοῦ ἱμᾶν. The hesitating tone adopted by
θέμισ αὐτῷ. καὶ τολῶν μὲν χρόνον ἦπόρων τῷ ποτε λέγει, 11 ἐπειτα μόνης πάνυ ἐπὶ θητήσω αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τώα ἐτραπόμην. ήθελων εἰπ τώ τῶν δοκιμῶν τοφῶν εἶναι, ὥς ἐτοιαθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγχω τῷ ματεῖον καὶ ἀποφάσω· τῷ χρησιμῷ ὅτι οὕτωι ἐμὸν σοφότερός ἦστι, σὺ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐφεσθα. διεκκοπῶν ὅν τοῦτον — ἀνόματα γὰρ οὖν δέομαί λέγειν, ἣν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὑμὶμ ἐγώ σκοτῶν τοιαύτων τῷ ἐπαθον, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι — καὶ διαλέγει. 15 μενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξεῖ μοι οὕτως ὃ ἄνηρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός

Socrates in mentioning this oracle (21 a), and his interpretation here, suggest that he himself would never have asked Chaerephon's question; the question could be settled by human means and in such cases Socrates' practice agreed with the sentiment in Eur. Hel. 765 ff.

The gods why question? Nay, we rather should With sacrifice approach them, and a prayer For what is good, disclaiming prophecy… What prophecy will lead the sluggard man to toil? Of prophets best good counsel is and sense.

Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 1. 9, δαιμονίω (κατε κραζει) ἔρξε δὲ καὶ τοῖς ματενεμβόλοις καὶ τοῖς ἀθανάτοις Κλεανος ἀ θεα βαθῶς διακρίνειν (to learn and know thoroughly).

8. μόρια παντε: after a long struggle, a qualification of ἐντερα τραπέζων which repeats parenthetically the idea of πῶν χρόνον. For a similar parenthetical qualification, see on ὅτι τῶν, 17 b. For the position of τῶν, see on ὦ πάν, 10 a. — τοιαυτῆν των: αὐτος ἆριστος, purposely vague, "which I began in some such way as this." See on τοιαυτῆς τις, 19 c.

10. ἀποφάσω τῷ χρησιμῷ: the oracle is personified.

11. ἐρα: introducing direct quotation, GMT. 711; H. 928 b. — λεγεί: really

in. This whole clause was spoken with special emphasis.

13. πρὸς ὅν ἔσωσιν: cf. Corp. 485 b, ἡμαῖραντον πλαχὺ πρὸς τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα διασκεδαστής πρὸς τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ παλιβάντα, in the case of philosophers I feel just as I do about people who lie and are childish. Contrast the use of πρὸς in such expressions as πρὸς θραυστον σκοτῶν, pondering in my mind; πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοτῶν, we consider among ourselves (cf. πρὸς θραυστὸν ἀλγηθείς in d below).

14. καὶ διαλέγομενας αὐτῷ: strictly speaking, this covers the same ground as διακοπών τούτων. Socrates has no test except by conversing with his man.

15. ἰδοὺ μοι: idiomatically substituted before δοκεῖν (to seem) to avoid ἰδοὺ in the unusual but possible sense, I came to the opinion. The same anacolouthon occurs both when the nominative precedes (cf. Xen. An. Ill. 2. 12, καὶ εὐεξεῖ ὑμῖν ἀντικεῖν ἀντικεῖται ὑμῖν τῶν εὐεξεῖν τῶν λαοῖς ἀντικεῖται; καὶ ἄκομος ἀντικεῖ οἶδεν, ῥᾳδίναν αὐτὸς καὶ ἀντικεῖν τοῖς εὐεξεῖς τοῖς λαοῖς καὶ τοῖς) and when it follows (cf. Th. III. 36, καὶ ὦν ἄργος ἰδοὺ γὰρ ὁ τῶν ναρκῶν μᾶν ἀποκαλεῖται ἄλλο καὶ τῶν ἐκείνων ἀντικεῖται ὑμῖν ἵνα ὑπολογίζως ὑμῖν πλῆθος, ἥν
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

άλλως τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' 21
ο全力以 τῇ στίχῳ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτῷ δεικνύει ὅτι οἰκίστ' μὲν εἶναι
σοφός, εἴς δ' οὐ. ἔντευξον οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ ἄ
πολλοὶ τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτόν δ' οὖν ἀπώλοι ἐλο.
20 γι' κακόκλημα μὲν τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφότερος εἰμι. 
κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάθαρον
εἰδότα, αλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἰκίστ' εἶναι οὐκ εἰδός, ἐγὼ δέ, 
ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι. οὖν καὶ γ' οὖν τούτῳ ἐκ
συμφώνων των αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφότερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μη οἶδα
25 οὖν οἶμαι εἰδότα. ἔντευξον ἔπειτ' ἄλλον ἕα τῶν ἐκείνων
δοκοῦντων σοφότερον εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτα τοῦτο ἐδοξάζο
καὶ ἐνταῦθα κακεῖνον καὶ ἄλλας πολλοὺς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ηὗτος ἐφεξῆς ἕα λατρεύομενος καὶ 
καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδικός ὅτι ἀπηχθόμην, ὅρμω δὲ

21 ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὰ πολλὰ τὰ πεποίητα, ταξινομοῖ τὰ
καθ' τὴν δοκιμήν, ταξινομοῖ τὰ

20 ὑπ' ἐμαυτόν ... ἀπηχθόμην: 

25 ἔπειτ' ἄλλον ἕα τῶν ἐκείνων
δοκοῦντων σοφότερον εἶναι, 
καὶ μοι τοῦτα τοῦτο ἐδοξάζο
καὶ ἐνταῦθα κακεῖνον καὶ 

5 ἀπηχθόμην: this gives the 

1. ἀπηχθόμην: pointing back to the 

2. ἀπηχθόμην: this gives the 

6 ἀπηχθόμην: here in something like 

11 ἀπηχθόμην: here in something like 

14 ἀπηχθόμην: here in something like 

18 ἀπηχθόμην: here in something like 

22 ἀπηχθόμην: here in something like 

26 ἀπηχθόμην: here in something like 


gives a detailed specification of what 

is indefinitely stated in συμφωνῶ τοι 

VII. 1. ἀπηχθόμην: this gives the 

fact of which Socrates says he was al-
ways conscious (ἀλληλούμενος), so that 
had he been constantly tormented (ἀλλη-
λούμενος) and terrified (ἐξορθοί). 

With ἀλληλούμενος and ἐξορθοί, ἂν we would 
because; these two parts should there-
fore be attached to ἀλληλούμενος. No-
tice, however, that ἀλληλούμενος fol-
lowed by ἅτις (that) is a very uncom-
mon const. ἀπηχθόμην in δ' above with 

ἀπηχθόμην, here in something like the 
sense of the colloquial “was get-
ing myself disliked.” 

ὁρμῶ δὲ ἔσκαλε: correcl. with ἀλληλο-
λούμενος μὲν, breaks out of the parie.

const. Socrates, in stating his deter-
mination to do his duty, adopts a con-
versational style. See on ἔσκαλα μὲν in
ἀναγκαῖον ἐδοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περί πλείστων τοιεί
σθαι. Ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγεις ἐπὶ ἀπαγορευθέντες τὰς τοὺς τής δοκοῦντας εἶδέναι. καὶ νῦν τὸν κυρία, ὁ ἀνδρείας Ἀθηναίων — δέ γε γὰρ ὑπὸ τὰ διδυμῷ[μ] — ἦ μὲν 22 ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼς τὸ τιμῶν· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκοῦντες ἐδοξάζαν μαθητὰς διόν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδείκτης εἶναι ἵνα ἤρωται κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦντες φανερὸν ἐπικείστηκα

21 τὸ ἀνείκο: and on ἀνείκο μὲν in 34 o below. Cf. also Lach. 106 a. τοῦτο λέγω οὐ παρήγαγα ἀνείκο οὐκ εἰμί εἰς τὸ γεγονός, ἵνα σημαντεί τὸ γεγο

3. τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: the interest of the god, which required of Socrates that he should refuse or confirm the oracle.

4. Ἰτέον οὖν: a change to the direct discourse strikingly introduced by the narrator. Such a transition is often resorted to for the sake of vividness. Cf. Xen. An. v. 5. 24, παραλαβὼν δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐποίην οτι σὲ ἰδίως παραλαβὼν ἔργα ἄλλωστε ἔργα διὰ τὸν θεόν χρησμὸν τί λέγεις, ἤν πλατέων (plane-tree) ἢ ἀργόν (ram) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τοιούτων ὅ τι ἐν μέγιστοι ἄριστοι ἔργα ἐπαναλαμβάνει, ἔσωντα ἔτη τοῖς ἔργοις ἐγραφέντοις τοιούτων ἐν καλῶ ἀργόν, ὡς μὲν ἑλλάδι κτῆσε. Ἰδ. vii. 1. 30, where the transition is the reverse, μάλα μέλος, ἥπα, διαπράβαζον διὰ τὸν θεόν γῆρας, ἔπευξας τοῖς ἄλλωστε χρήσεις, διὸ εὐρύχωραν. 22 Ἰτέον οὖν: a change to the direct discourse strikingly introduced by the narrator. Such a transition is often resorted to for the sake of vividness. Cf. Xen. An. v. 5. 24, παραλαβὼν δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐποίην οτι σὲ ἰδίως παραλαβὼν ἔργα ἄλλωστε ἔργα διὰ τὸν θεόν χρησμὸν τί λέγεις, ἤν πλατέων (plane-tree) ἢ ἀργόν (ram) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τοιούτων ὅ τι ἐν μέγιστοι ἄριστοι ἔργα ἐπαναλαμβάνει, ἔσωντα ἔτη τοῖς ἔργοις ἐγραφέντοις τοιούτων ἐν καλῶ ἀργόν, ὡς μὲν ἑλλάδι κτῆσε. Ἰδ. vii. 1. 30, where the transition is the reverse, μάλα μέλος, ἥπα, διαπράβαζον διὰ τὸν θεόν γῆρας, ἔπευξας τοῖς ἄλλωστε χρήσεις, διὸ εὐρύχωραν. Still more striking is Id. Περὶ τῆς τέσσαρος ἐποίησιν ἑνώθη ἐκεῖ, μεμοιχόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῶν ἠρειστέλησε, τόπων αὐτῶν ἐγκαλεῖhai. Μεμοιχόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῶν ἠρειστέλησε, τόπων αὐτῶν ἐγκαλεῖhai.
him in thinking that he understood it.

11. ἔρευν τῶν τιαν πνεύματας: my Heracles labors, as I may call them; the gen. agrees with ἔρευν implied in its equiv. ἀφιέρ. G. 1001; H. 601. The words τῶν τιαν πνεύματας were sure to remind his hearers of several passages in the tragedians, where Heracles, a character endeared to them chiefly by his heroic struggles, recounts his labors. Socrates compares his own intellectual encounters with the physical ones endured by Heracles, and recounts in a half-tragic vein these “labors” imposed of God. Cf. Soph. Trach. 1040 ff. and 1080 ff.

In many a beat, by fearful odds hard pressed, With arms and straining back are now I strove . . .

Hands, hands, my back, my breast, O arms of mine,
Still, still, ye are the same whose sometime strength
In haunts Nemean note the shepherd’s bane,
And tamed the lion whom none dared approach,
Or look on, etc.

Cf. Eur. H. II. 1255–1280, and esp. the chorus, 348–450; Browning in Aristophanes’ Apology translates the whole of this play.— ίπτα μέν καὶ σηκ.: Socrates, assuming for the sake of his point an attitude of opposition, says that he thought he was refusing the oracle (cf. 22 c) while really he was proving it to be irresistible. This achievement is ironically stated as his real purpose. Cf. ίπτα used by Hom. in indignant or ironical questions, e.g. ίπτα διὰ τὸν θεούς, ἤσπερ ἢ μόνον ἔρημος ἔπεμψαν Προμηθέα τῷ θεῷ παθήματα τῆς Δέλτης γιὰ τὴν ἰμικτὰν τοῦ τῆς τουρανίδος καὶ τούς τῶν διδυμῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐπετείνημεν ἑπ’ ἑ. a. author, καὶ τοῦτον ἀμπελέτερον ἐκείνων ὁ πεπραγμένων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, αὐτοὶ οἱ δήκοντες.
AΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΜΙΚΑΤΟΥ. 77

μάλιστα πεπραγμενέσθαι αυτοῖς, διηρώτων ἐν αὐτοῖς τι ἡ
λέγοιν, ἣν ἂν τι καὶ μανθάνομε παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσθησί-μα
μαὶ οὕν ὑπὲρ εἰσεῖν, ὡς ἄνδρες, τάλαθη· ὁμοὶ δὲ ρήτων.
20 ὡς ἐποίης γὰρ εἰπέν ὁ λέγων αὐτῶν ἀπαίτεις ὁ παροίτης ἐν
βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοί ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἦργον οὖν
ἐλέος καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὁλίγω τούτῳ, ὡς οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῦν ὁ
tα ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνδουαίοιτες οὕτως οἱ
θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμοῦδει· καὶ γὰρ οὐδεὶς λέγοντας μὲν
25 πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἱσασὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ὁ λέγοντας. τοιοῦτον τι
μοι ἑφάνησαι πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἂμα

17. πεπραγμενέσθαι: used here as a past, as is made evident by

18. ἡ ἐγί γαί: mentioned as a subordinate end to be reached by the

19. διηρώτων: this discovery was dis-
creditable to the poets, and Socrates
hesitates to mention it. For this same
borrowing of shame from another's
actions, see Crit. 45 d and e.

20. τι παρόντα: those who were
present, i.e. the bystanders.

22. φύσει: by (grace of) nature. Here
used to express what Plato elsewhere
means by τῆς φύσεως, by the grace of
heaven. Acts done φύσει are done un-
consciously, are inspired by something
below the surface of our every-day
selves, whereas conscious acts are, if
right, guided by τύχη and σοφία, art
and wisdom. Cf. Ion, 506 e–508 a, ἁπά-

23. φύσις τινι καὶ ἐνδουαίοιτες: the dat. φύσις and nom. partic.
characterize the same subj. in two parallel
ways. Hence they are appropriately
coupled by means of καὶ. Cf. 18 b.,

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used to express what Plato elsewhere
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and wisdom. Cf. Ion, 506 e–508 a, ἁπά-

VIII. Teleutaiov oiv eva tov xeiropetxnavav pa. ~mavpi 
yar exynveden oudenv exiostamenvw yw evpos eipete, toutous de a 
y' yevew 0ti eurixousi tollav kai kalav exiostamenvov. kai 
toutov men ouv exefusden, alx' hpiostato a egw ouk hpi-
5 stamhav, kai mon tauti sophoteiroi xagav. alx', 0 andres 
'Athenaios, taivon moi edoexan exev amartiama, 0pet kai oi 
toivetai, kai oi agadoi demourogoi. diala tie tekhnon 
alw xepiraxevai ekastos theti kai talla tae megistot 
sophotatos eina, kai auton auti 0i plmmedeia ekeinv

4. hpiostato: they know, without any implication that they have ceased 
to know at the time when he speaks.

6. dvep kai, kai o iti: this repetition 
of it is idiomatic in correl. 
sents, and may be represented by one 
Eng. word also. With of central it 
is easy to supply eixos from the 
eixos of the leading clause; similar 
cases are very frequent in Greek.

7. dia tae iti: here begins the ex-
planation which the preceding clause 
demands. yap might have been added, 
i.e. dia yap 0i eixogxev, ou, tie 
yap tekhno xepiraxevae iti.

8. tolla tae mepwta: adj. used 
sub. take the art. after o elles quite as 
commonly as subs. do. tae mepwta 
refers to affairs of state and of the 
common weal, as in Rep. iv. 426c, 
sofor tae mepwta and Corg. 484c, 
gyven, de evi ti mepwta, idai 
0ta xepi xina, you shall know if once 
you proceed to affairs of larger concern 
and give up philosophy once for all.
Cf. also Xen. An. ii. 6. 16, and in
10 τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὡστε μὲ έμαυτῷ ἀνεργῶς ὑπέρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, τότερα δεξαίμην ἄν οὖτος ωσπορ ἐξει ἐξειν μήτε τι σοφὸς ἄν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκείνοι ἐξονοῦν ἐξειν. ἀπεκρύμενον οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὸ χρησμὸν ὅτι μοι λυσιτέλοι ωσπορ ἐξειν
15 ἐξειν.

IX. Ἕκ ταύτης δὴ τῆς ἔξετάσεως, δὲ άνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχειθαι μοι γεγοναί καὶ οἱαὶ χαλεπώταται
καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγόνε-
ναι, ὅνομα δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴοινται γάρ

22 Hesych. 234 a, ἐν τὰ μάθημα ἔσωσαν κρι-
τεσθαι καὶ ἀρχῆς ἥμας ἐπιχειρεῖν.
9. ὑπομένων: see on ἐμαυτῶν,
20 c.
10. ὡστε με: not δὴ τι, which
would be too emphatic. It repre-
sents ἀπεκρύμενον εἰς τὸν χρη-
σμόν without ὑπὲρ.
G. C. below, and see App. — ὑπὲρ τοῦ
χρησμοῦ: in the name of and, as it
were, on behalf of the oracle.
11. δεξαίμην ἐσ: that is "if it were
mine to choose." εἰ μεῖναν ἡ ἀρχὴ
εἰσ is implied. Notice the idioms
ὑπὲρ ἐκα ἔξειν and ἣ τούτῳ ἔγγος
ἐξειν. In both the order is just the
reverse of the natural Eng. one. In
Lat., the corresponding idioms follow
the same order with the Greek.
12. μήτε τι: τι strengthens the
negation μήτε. G. εἰς, μήτε.
IX. 1. δὴ: here used by way of
closing and summing up the previous
line of argument. On δὲ ἄδρες Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, see Introd. p. 49, ν. 4.
22 2. οἷα χαλεπώτατα: sc. εἰς εἰς,
explained by places where the same
idiom is expanded, e.g. Χειροπ. iv.
8. 11, ἐνω μὲν δὴ ἡ ἐκκα [Σωκράτης]
τοῦτο πλὴν εἰς εἰς εἰς εἰς αὐτῶν τι καὶ
οἴκειοντες τοῖς.
4. ἐνομεί δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι: instead
of ἔνομει δὲ τούτο ἅγγεος. Although
a ᾨτοί co-ordinates the whole with πολλὰς
μὲν στι. and the two form the leading
clause, yet the inf. λέγεσθαι half in-
corporates these words with the στι.
clause. This irregular const. is per-
fectly clear in a conversational style
like that of Socrates. It has the
effect of stating more distinctly the
fact that this epithet σοφῆς, as ap-
plicated to Socrates, is the capital
instance of πολλὰς διαβολὰς and results
from them.—σοφῆς: introduced to
explain precisely what is meant by
ὁνομα τούτω. The nom. σοφῆς leads
back to the main statement πολλὰς
ἀντικθεια με γεγονεῖ, which, how-
ever, dwells in the speaker's mind as
ἀντικθεια. σοφῆς agrees acc. to rule
with the nom. subj. of this ἀντικθεια.
G. 927; H. 940. If τι, the acc.
subj. of λέγεσθαι, had been expressed
instead of understood, this nom. would
not have been possible.—ἐνομεῖ: the
inf. εἰς is idiomatically used with
pred. nouns or adjm. after ἄντικθειας,
ἀντικθεῖσθαι, and the like. Cfr.
Rep. iv. 438 α, ἀντικθεῖσθαι τοις εἰς,
are called by certain names. Prot. 311 c, σοφῶν
ἀντικθεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰς. Lact. 192 a,
δ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ λέγειν τοῦτο δὲ ἀναφο

5 με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἢ ἄν 23 ἄλλον ἐξελέγω· τὸ δὲ κυδωνεύει, ὅ ἄνδρες, τὸ ὑπὶ τὸ θέος σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρήσῳ τοῦτο τοῦτο λέγεμ. ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ἅλγου τιμὸς ἁξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς· καὶ ἐν ἥμερες ὑπὸ τουτού λέγει τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεκχωρηθαί δὲ τῷ 10 ἐμφ οὔνατε ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὡστε ἄν ἐν ἕποι ὅτι οὔτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, σοφίστατος ἐστιν, ὡστε ἄν ὡστε Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἁξίου ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' ὅσων ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ καὶ νῦν περιου ἐγὼ ἔθνω

23 ἐνομάζεις ταυτάτα εἶναι, Socrates, what do you mean by (how do you define) this common quality which in all these expressions you call quickness?

5. ταῦτα: see on ἦν ἄλλον, 22c.

—ο: cf. Ethikul. 235a, ἦσαν ταύτα ζηληχώμα, I am most pleased to be self-centered of this. Change ζηληχώμα from pass. to act., and the acc. of the person reparses: ταῦτα in the quoted passage, like ἄ in the text, is a cognate acc., which, in such collocations, is almost invariably a pron. of some sort. G. 1051, 1070; H. 725 c.

6. τὸ δὲ κυδωνεύει: τὸ δὲ, in fact, is adv., meaning practically the same as τέθανε, for it introduces an assertion which, being true, necessarily contradicts the previous false statement. Plato is particularly fond of this use of τὸ δὲ. See, for the adv. use of the art. in Attic, G. 982; H. 694 b.—τὸ δὲν: serves to point the contrast between this true statement and the false one which people believe (σωφρον).

8. καὶ οὐδενὸς: brought in as a climax after ἅλγου. Cf. Thetet. 173e, ἢ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα ταῦτα ἡγεσίμονε συνερχαὶ καὶ οὐδὲν, but his (the philosopher’s) mind regarding all this as little or nothing at all. The Lat. idiom is much the same as the Greek. Cic. Or. 16. 52, rem difficillem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimarum, a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.

9. τοῦτο λέγων: sc. ὃ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ἄν. The argument runs as follows: “People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wisest of men is simply that ‘human wisdom is vanity.’ He does not mean that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the name ‘Socrates’ because he needs a particular instance.” The double acc. with λέγων closely resembles the idiom καθ' ἄλγου τοῦ. Cf. Crit. 48a. See App.

10. ὡστε ἄν ζην: in this compressed idiom & alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 483 f.; H. 906. 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, cf. Xen. Cyr. 1. 3. 2, ἰδοῖ ὑπὸ τοῦτο ἐπερ ὁ ζῆν (sc. ἄλγου) ἐτέρων διαφοράς καὶ νομίμων νομίμων ἀντανακλάντων.

13. ταῦτ' οὖν: cf. Prot. 316c, ἢ λ' ἢ ἄλλα ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἔσσω πάρθενο τοι, that's
καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀστρῶν καὶ ἔτειναν ἄν 23
15 τινα οἰωνιᾶς σοφῶν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπεξείχαν μου μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ
βοηθῶν εἰδείκτευμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὡς ταύτης
τῆς ἀσχολίας οὕτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξει μοι σχολῆ
γέγονε σοφῶν λόγον οὕτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πεντάμερον εἰμὶ
diá τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.
Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νεότεροι ὑποκολούθωντες οἱ
μᾶλλον σοφῆς εἶναι, οἱ τῶν πλουσιώτατῶν, αὐτόματοι

just why I have come to you. G. 1000 f.;
H. 719 c. The object is omitted
as in Gorg. 503 d, ἐν τῇ τῇ καλῇ,
εἰρήνῃ, if you search in the right way,
you shall find. Cf. εἰκόνα below in d.
14. καὶ ἔτεινα: notice the not un-
usual grouping under one art. of two
words connected by ψήλλα.
15. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: cf. on ὑπὲρ τοῦ
χρησμοῦ, 25 a.
18. ἐν πεντάμερον: cf. Legg. iii.
676e, μαραλεῖ τῷ φίλῳ καὶ ἐρωτῶ; Rep.
vii. 520 c, μαραλεῖ βίον. Cf. Xcn.
Oecas. ii. 1-4, where Critobulus and
Socrates converse substantially as fol-
lows: "C. I have gained reasonable
self-control; therefore, Socrates, give
me any hints you can: tell me the best
way to manage my property. But
perhaps you think me already quite
rich enough. S. That is my own
case, not yours. I am sure that I am
a rich man, but I consider you pov-
erty-stricken, and sometimes I am
quite worried about you. C. I like
that, Socrates! For heaven's sake
do be good enough to tell me what
price you imagine that your property
would fetch, if sold, and what mine
would sell for. S. I am sure a fair
buyer would be glad of the chance of
getting my house and all my property
for five minas (about eighty-five
dollars). I am sure you are worth
more than a hundred times that sum.
C. How comes it then that you are
so rich and I so poor? S. My
income provides amply for all my
wants, but for your wants you need
three times as much as you have.
The possession of five minas must have
placed Socrates in the lowest of the
four classes established by Solon, that
of the δῆμος. Originally this lowest
class had few political duties and
no political rights; later on, a law
proposed by Aristides gave them the
same rights as the others.
244 e, ἡ μαραλεῖ εἰρήνῃ καὶ
προφητεύουσα οἷς παύει, ἀπαλλάξας ἐφήμα
τα, καταφωνὺς πρὸς θεῶν εἰσέλθα τι καὶ
λατρείας, μακρότης interceded and by
proposing to those who were in straits
found relief by recourse to prayer unto
the gods and the observance of their rites.
The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with ver-
bal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns
such as λατρεία and εἰρήνη, which ex-
press the abstract idea of the act
denoted by the verb; but Plato uses
both the gen. and dat. with ὑπερήφανος,
and the gen. with ἐνεμπορεύεται; while the
dat. with βοηθῶν is familiar in many
Greek authors. In the const. with
ὑπερήφανα below, 50 a, the dat. τῷ θεῷ
takes the place of the gen. here.
Χ. 2. αὐτόματος: of their own motion,
χαίροντες ἀκούοντες ἑξετάζομενοι τῶν ἄνθρώπων, καὶ 23 αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἰτε ἐπιχειροῦν ἄλλους ἑξετάζειν. καί τοι, ἐμαυ, εὑρίσκοντι πολλὴν ἄφθονιν, οἰομένον μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἄνθρωπον, εἰδότων δὲ δὴ δίλγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντείθεν ὅτι, ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἑξετάζομεν οἷοί ἄργο- λοιταῖ, ἀλλ' ὅβροι, αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τῆς σοφία, ἕτερη μιμοωτάτης. καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴ 10 τις αὐτῶν ἔφεξεν ὡς τι πολὺ καὶ τὼν διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οἷον εἰπὼν, ἄλλ' ἀγγοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόξειρα ταῦτα λέ- γουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέφερα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοῦ μὴ φημί.

23 to be construed with ἑκατομπετάντες.

3. χαίροντες κτλ.: Plato compares the disconcerting effect of Socrates' homely method with the charm exercised by the smooth discourse of men like Protagoras and Gorgias. Compare the ironical account of the persuasive charms of Gorgias, Prodi- cles, and Hippias in 19 e above, where especially the implication of νοῦς πληθυντων should be noticed. Cf. Prot. 317 e-319 a, where Protagoras is represented as giving a very taking account of his own teaching for the benefit of young Hippocrates.

4. μιμοῦσιν, εἰτέ ἑπιχείρομενοι κτλ.: they are for imitating me, and then they undertake, etc. No strict sequence in time is here marked by εἰτε, although their readiness to imitate must logically have preceded the acts in which their imitation consisted. For a most lively description of the early symptoms of such imitators, cf. Rep. vii. 530 b. In other editions μιμοῦνται is substituted for μιμοῦσιν, needlessly, since this use of εἰτε, where καί would seem more natural, is quite common. Cf. 31 a, and also Xen. Mem. ii. 2, 16, τὰς ἀκούοντας φοιλᾷ μὴν εἰσεχεῖν τῶν γεγονός διαλογῖται τὰς ἀκούοντας ἀγνώστους εἰς εἰμι, εἰτε ἐπὶ φοιλῶν φαθοῦντας.

6. δίλγα ἢ οὐδέν.: see on ἢ τι οὐδέν., 17 b. and on δίλγα καὶ οὐδένα, 23 a.

8. ἄλλ' οὐ: instead of. Cf. Xen. An. ii. 1, 10, where καὶ οὐ is used with the same meaning. See App. — Σωκράτης τι: see on τὸν Σωκράτην, 18 b.

11. ἀλλ' ἀγγοῦσι: see App.

12. τὰ κατὰ πάντων κτλ.: τὰτα means the familiar well-worn commonplaces. These may be found in the Clouds of Aristophanes. Xenophon, referring specifically to the δίλγα νύχτα, which is not lost sight of here, uses almost the words of our text in Mem. i. 2. 31, τὸ κατὰ τὰς φιλοσοφοὺς ἐν τῶν πολλῶν ἑπεξερευνῶν τηρήσεις φιλοσοφήν, (Critias) making against him the charge made by the many against philosophers in general. Cf. 18 b e, 19 b, and see on ὁ γὰρ ἀρέτης, Crito, 44 a. 13. τὰ τὰ μετέφερα κτλ.: the sense requires that from line 10 δίδασκον should be understood, or rather δίδακτον διαφθείρει τὸς νόμον. On this implied δίδασκον depend (1) the two acca. τὰ μετέφερα, τὰ δὲ γῆς, and (2) the two inflected νομίζεις and ποιεῖς. Cf. 26 b and 19 b.
14. τα αθηναί: the truth, namely η καταθηκα αετι. Eng. idiom requires a
sing. or an abstract noun more frequently than the Greek, e.g. ταύτα
often means this. II. 633. Cf. Phaed.,
62 d, ἀλλ' ἀνήκε μὲν ἀνήκεσ πάχ'
εἰς ἑαυτήν ταύτην, φανερῶν εἰνάν διό
τοι διενότω, but a fool might perhaps
think this, that he ought to run away
from his master.
16. εἰσέλθον: one man claims knowl-
cedge of this, and another, knowledge
of that; the absurdity is in all cases
the same, i.e. their claiming knowl-
cedge at all.
17. ἠττοναγόμενοι: either (1) in
phrases well combined, or (2) with their
forces drawn up, or (3) = εἰς τὸ ἠττο-
nάγομενον, i.e. according to a concerted
plan. (2) and (3) make it refer to
the united efforts of those represented
by the three accusers. ἠττοναγόμενος,
the reading adopted by Schanz, means
about the same as αφορόμενοι below, i.e.
contente, with might and main. This
would really amount to the same as
(2), and suits the context far better
than (1) or (3).
19. ἐκ ντότως: "it is upon this foot-
ing,—namely that of an old general
prejudice, aggravated by supervening
personal animosity,—that I am now
attacked by, etc." R. In spite of
19 a, δὲ ἦν καὶ πνεύμων Μέλητος, which
states the fact here alluded to, "in
consequence of" would here be an
inappropriate translation for δὲ. On
the accusers, see Introd. 30.
21. ὑπὲρ τῶν τιμητῶν, δημιουργῶν,
πολιτικῶν, ἰθηρῶν: we must not press
the word ὑπὲρ. The accusers merely
represented the feelings of their respec-
tive classes. The ἰθηρὲς have not been
explicitly mentioned before. For the
νομισματικός, cf. 42 a; for the πολιτικός, cf.
21 a; for the δημιουργός, cf. 23 c.
Prob. the ἰθηρὲς were thought of
under the general designation of νομι-
sματικοῦ. This is the more likely because
the line between men who habitually
spoke on public questions, and what
we may call professional speakers,
was not yet clearly drawn at Athens.
All this lends weight to the sugges-
tion that the words καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν
are a later addition, for which Plato
is not responsible. See App. In
favor of keeping the words, however,
is the fact that Anytus, who, like
Cleon, was a ἄρωσιφθηκας, tanner, came
into collision with the views of Socrates
rather as a πολιτικός than as a
ΠΛΑΤΙΝΟΧ

ζωή αν ει δος τ’ ειδη εγ’ δου μα ταυτην την διαβολην εξε- 24
λεθαι ει ουτος διαγροις ουτω ιελλη γεγονυαν. 
ταυτ’ εστιν μα, οι ανδρες ‘λημναιοι, ταληθη, και μας 
ουτε μεγα ουτε μικρον αποκρυψαμενος εγου λεγω ουδ’ υπο-
στελλαμενος. καιτοι οιδ’ σχεδον οτι ταυτα δε ανεχα-

νοικα. ει δε τελεσθαι οτι αληθη λεγω και οτι αυτη εστι

30 η διαβολη ει ευ’ και τα αυτη ταυτα εστι και εαν τε

ειν τε αυτης εχεσθε ταυτα, ουτος ενεργετε.

XI. Περι μεν ουν οι πρωτοι μου καθυγορι καθυγ-

ρουν αυτη εστιν ικανη απολογια προς μας. προς δε Με-

λητου τον αγαθον τε και φιλοπολιν, ου φης, και

τους υστερους μετα ταυτα πειρασομει απολογεισθαι. αυτοις

γιαρ δη, ωσπερ ετερων τουτων καθυγρων, λαββομεν

δημογραφη. It may be that Socrates had aristocratic views about the do-

basin effect of manual labor similar to those of Plato and Aristotle. Cf.

Xen. Oecom. iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates is represented as saying that the

mechanical arts enervate men’s bodies and womanize their souls. Also (ibid.

vi. 7) where Socrates again is made to say that in case of an invasion the

τευχετα will prove coward.

26. ταυτ’ εστιν μα: there you have, 

etc., "just what I promised to tell

you at the beginning of my speech."

27. ἄστελλομεν: the meaning

here is illustrated by many places in

Dem., e.g., xxxvii. 43, καλ τος μικρων

ανετελλομενος μικρα λυγγυρωμα κα-

φασι καλ δορετα, by his readiness
to resort to absolutely undignified and

shameless railing and lamentation. See

also xix. 237, άπειραν 86, και

αρρηνω, μετα παρασαλαρετα μικρων

ανετελλομενον.

28. τοις αυτοις: sc. by just such un-
disguised and unmitigated statements.

29. αυτη, ταυτη: both pred.

31. ουτως ερρεθεται: supply ξεσκεται.

The finite verb is also left out in such

cases, cf. Rep. li. 300 d, ταυτα μεν ουδ’

βη ουτως, sc. εξεσκεται.

XI. 2. προς ους, προς Μελητον: οι

188, απολογεσθαι προς το δευτερο

(sc. κατηγοροντα) και τον δευτερον(sc.

κατηγοροντα); the Greek idiom is απολο-

γεσθαι προς (1) τον δικαστην, (2) τους

κατηγορους, (3) τα κατηγορηματα. In

Eng. the idiom is to plead (1) before

the court, (2) against the accusers,

(3) against (to) the accusations.

3. τον ευχαριον τε και φιλοπολιν:

that upright and patriotic man. The

addition of δε φησιν suggests that few or

none encourage Meletus in “laying

this flattering union to his soul.”

4. αυτοι: γαρ: once more . . . in

turn. A strong distinction is made

between the serious accusation of the

first accusers, those who have prej-
diced the public mind, and that of

Meletus.

5. δευτερο ετερων τουτων ουτων κα-

τηγρων: as if these were a second set

of accusers. Cf. 19 b, δευτερον ουδ’ κατηγ
αὐ τὴν τούτων ἀντιμοσιάν. ἔχει δὲ πως φθέγγονται ἡ Σωκράτης 24
φησὶν ἀνακρίνει τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ
θεοῦς οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει ὑπὸ νομίζοντα, ἐτέρα
ἐν διαμόνα καίνα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλῆμα τούτων ἐστὶν.
10 τούτοι δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκαστῶν ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ
γάρ ὑπὸ τοὺς νέους ἀνακρίνει με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὡς
ἀνδρὶ Ἀθηναίοι, ἀνακρίνει φησὶ Μέλητος, οἴ τι στοιχή χα-
ριντζέται ῥαδίως εἰς ἄγνωσι καθος ἀνδρόμους, περὶ
πραγμάτων προσποιομένους στοιχεῖως καὶ κριτοῦμεν ὑν
15 οὐδὲν τούτω πάοτε ἐμελήσων. ὡς δὲ τούτο ἐνδεές ἔχει
περάσομαι καὶ ἕως ἐπιδείξαι.

ΧΙ. Καὶ μοι δέλφο, ὡς Μέλητε, εἶπεν ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ τοῦτοι τοιοῦτοι ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεανίσκοι ἐν ὑπογραφῇ τῆς ἀλήθείας. 24

Socrates distinguishes between two sets of accusers, but maintains that the charges preferred by his actual accusers (Lysis, Meletus, and Lycon) are based upon those of his real accusers (public prejudice and misrepresentation).

6. ἐν ὑπὲρ ἐνων ὑπ᾽ αὐτός, substantially, implies that the quotation is not literal. See Introd. 31 and 56. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21. ἐν ὑπὲρ ... περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀνακρίνεται ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. 7. ἐν ὑπὸ: Meletus, already named as the chief accuser.

9. ὑπὲρ ἐνογραφῆ: see Introd. 58.

11. ἐν υπὸ: see on 22d.

12. στοιχεῖα χαριντζέται: this is an ἐξέμορφος, for χαριντζέται is akin to παίζειν, the subst. to which, ἀποδίδει is the contradictory of ἐξέμορφος. “Meletus treats a serious business (an accusation involving life and death) as playfully as though the whole matter were a joke.” Cf. 27a.

13. ἐν ὑπὸ καθος: ἐν ὑπὸ is the usual word for a suit at law; hence the phrase ἐν ὑπὸς ἐνογραφῆ, entend in a law-suit. The sing. is used distributively, involving men in a law-suit. Cf. Xen. Rep. Lec. 3. 4, ἐγὼ ... ἐπὶς ἐν ὑπὸς ... ἐκπονθὰ ... ἀποδίδει τὴν ἐπομενὴν καὶ ἐφεξῆ ἐν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐφίλης εἰς ἄγνωσιν καταθένθησαν, the ephebi had power both to supersede and to imprison the magistrates and to bring them to trial for their lives.

14. ὑπὸ: not dependent upon ὑπὸδω καὶ ὑπὸδω, which is an adv. acc. See on ὑπὸδω, 26b.

15. τοῦτ᾽: gives greater vividness than ἐν ὑπὸ would give.

16. καὶ ὑπὸ: “so that you can see it as plainly as I can.”

XIII. 1. ἐπὶ, εἶπε: come and tell me. Cf. below, ὡς δὲ νῦν εἶπεν. ἐπὶ is freq. found instead of ἐπι, ὡς δὲ νῦν εἶπεν. Cf. Theocr. 144 d, ἐπὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπὶ, come here, Theocritus, and sit by Socrates. Homer has a similar idiom. Cf. Od. xvii. 629, ἐπὶ, ἐπὶ καλοῦσαι τῷ κρίνειν ἅπαν ἄνθρωπον, come, summon him hither, that face to face he may tell me himself. On the cross-examination, see Introd. 71.—ἐν ὑπὸ τῇ.
"Εγὼ γαρ τὸν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς βελτίων ποιεῖ; \(\text{ἐδῷ καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς βελτίων ποιεῖ.} \)" THEOCR. 6 ρούτα ἐξερήμων, ὡς φής, ἐπὶ εἰσάγεις τούτοις καὶ κατηγορεῖς. \(\text{Τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίων ποιεῖται.} \) Ψ. "Εγὼ γαρ τὸν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς βελτίων ποιεῖ. \(\text{Τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίων ποιεῖται.} \)

10  ὧν τούτου ἐρωτῶ, ὡς βελτίωτερος, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ἀστικὸς ἔρωτος καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδε, τοὺς καὶ τοὺς νόμους. \(\text{Οὐ̂ς, ὡς Σω̄κρατες, ὃς δὲ καταστα.} \) Πῶς λέγεις, δὲ Μέλῃς; οἴδας τοὺς νόμους παρεδώκεις; \(\text{Πῶς λέγεις, δὲ Μέλῃς; οἴδας τοὺς νόμους παρεδώκες;} \)

15  ὁ λατρ. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἣ οὐ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἴ δ' οὐ; \(\text{Ἀπαντ.} \)

4. \(\text{ἐκδέχεσθαι: having discovered their corrupter in me, you bring me before this court and make your accusation.} \) In Eng. clearness requires a repetition of the \(\text{ἐδώ} \), which in Greek goes only with \(\text{ἐκδέχεσθαι.} \)

5. \(\text{ἐκδέχεσθαι: you summon into court, commonly with ἐς ἔκτος ἐκτὸς or ἐς τοὺς ἔκτος, instead of which} \) \(\text{συναντ.} \) \(\text{is used. Sometimes also} \) \(\text{ἐκδέχεσθαι} \) \(\text{is found with the gen. of the charge.} \)

Cf. 26 a. The word, strictly speaking, should be used only of the magistrates (Introd. 7), but not infrequently it is said of the plaintiff, whose charge occasions the magistrate \(\text{ἐκδέχεσθαι, to bring into court, the suit.} \)

6. \(\text{τὸν καταστατικοῦ καὶ κατηγοροῦντων: for the acc. after μεταφέρειν, cf. Andoc. 1.} \) \(\text{τὸν δέδωκεν ἵκτοράς ἤρθε.} \)

7. \(\text{ἐς ἔκτος: of. King Lear, i. 1, where Cordelia says to her sister:} \) \(\text{I know you what you are.} \)

9. \(\text{ἀλῆς: the pres. because Socrates is only maintaining what he has just asserted. The ellipsis with} \) \(\text{μεταφέρει} \) \(\text{is readily supplied from the context.} \)

12. \(\text{ὁ ὁδότας: these men, the judges. The ὁδότας is isolated by the} \) \(\text{οὐ̂ς, from of ἔκτος ἐκτὸς. The} \) \(\text{οὐ̂ς} \) \(\text{which follows includes, strictly speaking, only the ἔκτος who were present at the trial; but they are evidently taken as representing all} \) \(\text{ἔκτος.} \)

17. \(\text{ὁ δεσπότης: the audience, all except the} \) \(\text{ἔκτος, who have been mentioned. See on 27 b.} \)
25 ἀλλ’ ἄρα, δὲ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ 26 ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεινοι βελτίων ποιούσιν ἀπάντητες; Κακεύνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἐμνεῖς Ἀθηναίοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ μόνον διαφθείρω, οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα τάύτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ’ ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυνατίκαιν, καὶ μα 25 ἀπόκριναι ἢ καὶ περὶ ἢππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· ὥς 26 βελτίων ποιούσες αὐτούς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, εἰς 27 δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ὡς τοιναυσίων τούτων τῶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίων οἶος τε ἄν ποιεῖ ἢ πάν ἄλγοι, οἱ ἵπποι· εἰ 28 δὲ πόλλοι, εἶτεπερ ξυνώσαι καὶ χρώναι ἢππους, διαφθείρων. 30 σιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχεις, δὲ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἢππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζων; πάντως δῆτον, εάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἀτυ- 29 τος οὐ φύτε εάν τε φύτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἐν τις εὐδαιμονίᾳ εἰς

25 ἀλλ’ ἄρα εἰτ.: cf. Euclid. 200 ε. ἡ. ἀλλ’ ἄρα, δὲ πρὸς Δίκαιον, μὴ δὲ Κρήτην- τος ἐν τῇ ταύτῃ εἰσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μὴν εἰσιν; ΚΡ. τοῖς Κρήτησις; S. ὥστε τοις εἰσιν. Questions with μὴ take a negative answer for granted. The use of ἄρα here marks the last stage in Socrates's exhaustive enumeration. Only the ἀπόκρισις are left. “Somebody in Athens is corrupting the youth. We have seen that it is nobody else, hence possibly it is these gentlemen.” But this is absurd, hence πάντες ἄρα Ἀθηναίοι εἰτ.: cf. ἅπασα ἄνωτέρω: this has probably crept into the text, and by way of giving a word parallel to ἀπόκρισις and ἀπόκριναι. There was good reason for varying the sameness of discourse by saying ἄρα τῇ ἐκκλη- σίᾳ. There seems less reason for putting this last idea in two ways. All Athenians twenty years of age in full standing (ἵτισμος) were members of the public assembly (ἐκκλησία) at Athens.

27. τοιναυσίων τῶν: quite the re- verse, an adv. acc. perhaps of measure or content. Cf. Gorg. 516 ε. ἀλλ’ ἄρα μὲ τοῖς εἰτι τοῦτο, οἱ ἄξιοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοι 30 ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀτηναίων διαφθείρων ἐν’ ἐκλογῇ. In Crit. 47 b c d, Socrates appeals from the many and ignorant to the few, or to the one who has special knowledge.

28. διαφθείρων: by its emanation from the government of Ἀθηναίοι this statement is made especially vigor- ous. The transition has already been half made by σὺ μὴ να, where instinctively we supply τοῖς in spite of ἀπόκρισις.

31. πάντως δὴτο: before this Socrates waits a moment, to give Meletus opportunity to answer.

32. οὗ φύτε: the answer no is made prominent by the order of clauses. ἀλλ’ οὗ φύτε, ἢ σὺ μὴ να, ἢ σὺ μὴ φύτε,
περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνον αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δὲ ἀλλοι ἀφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃς Μέλητε, ἰκανῶς ἐπιλείπει.

κινεῖται ὁ οὐδεποτὸτε ἐφρονίτισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμειλήκῃ περὶ ὧν ἔμε εἰσέγαγες.

XIII. Ἡτα δὲ ἡμῶν εἶπε, ὃ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πότερον ἐστών οἰκεῖν ἁμεινὸν ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ ποιητοῖς; ὃ τάν, ἀπόκρυνα: οὐδὲν γὰρ τοιαύτην ἐρωτᾶ. οὔχ οἱ μὲν ποιητοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς δὲν ἐγγυτάτω ειστῶν.

if you do not say yes. οὐ γὰρ must be taken closely together as equiv. to a verb of denying. See GMT. 384.

Cf. Λυσ. xiii. 76, ἐκ μὲν φύσεως φάρον, ἀνακάκην, τοὺς μὲν μηκηθεὶς... ἐν μὲν φύσεως, ἐκπείθει κτλ. For the use of μῆ, cf. Dem. xli. 205, ἐν γὰρ φῶς, ἐν τῷ μὴ φῶς. — πολλῆ... εἰς ἐκπαίδευσιν: here ὑπε ἀpplied to an abstraction particularly. Thus the εἰς ἐκπαίδευσιν is represented as of some sort; this makes the form of statement more specific though vague.

33. εἰ διαφθείρει, ἀφελοῦσιν: the pres. indic. here is not used in the prot. that immediately belongs to the apod. πολλῆ... ἐν αὐτῇ. See GMT. 503. The connexion of thought requires an intervening prot., or some qualifying adv. like εἰς ἐκπαίδευσιν. This implied prot., with its apod. goes with εἰ διαφθείρει, ἀφελοῦσιν. Cf. 30 b and, for a case where ἐκπαίδευσιν represents the prot. required by the sense, Xen. An. viii. 6. 1b, εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῇ πάσης μᾶλλον φίλοι ἦν, τῶν τῶντων διαφοράτων (most at variance) εἴμι, πᾶς δὲ εἰς δικαίως... ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ αἴρεται ἐκεῖν; primary ἐκπαίδευσιν εἰς ἐκπαίδευσιν.

34. ἐνεκτελεῖται: the mid. perhaps implies criticism of Meletus's bearing, since ἐνεκτελεῖται and ἐντελεῖται are used of pretentious performances. Here, however, ἐνεκτελεῖται means primarily ἐνεκτελεῖται εἰς ἐκπαίδευσιν. O. 1243; c.

II. 812. For the added εἰς clause, see the next note, and on τέλος, 24 d.

36. ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμήθη: appended to explain τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν. Here at last is the pun upon Meletus's name (cf. also 20 b), for which the constant recurrence of the idea of μηδὲν (variously expressed, μηδεμαδεν and περὶ πολλοῦ νοεῖ in 24 e, μηδαμὴν καὶ μηδαμὴν in 24 d) has already paved the way. For similar plays upon words, cf. Soph. O. T. 306, δ μηδὲν εἰς ὕδωρ Οἰμωνιόν, Symp. 186 e, Παν- σαλφός δι' ἔνεκτελεῖται, and the obvious play upon Αγαθόν's name, ib. 174 b; Rich. II. ii. 1. Old Gaunt indeed, and gaunt in being old,... Within me grief hath kept a tedious fast; Gaunt sa1 I for the grave; gaunt as a grave.

XIII. 1. Ἡτα δὲ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε: for the same order, cf. Men. 71 d, εἰ δὲ ἐκπαίδευσιν εἰς τε καὶ ἕναν ἀνθρώπον κτλ. For a different order, see 20 b, Crit. 46 a. In 20 e the voc. is not expressed.

3. Ἡ τὰς: my friend, or my good friend. Cf. Dem. 1. 20, ἡ λάξ ἡ τὰς ὁ, οὐχὶ βουλεύσαται. The orthography is much disputed, and we find ἡ τὰς, ἡτας, and ἡ τας.

4. τὸν ἤγγισαν εἰστὶν ὑπάρξει: i.e. those who were most unavoidably influenced by them.
8 ὡντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἄγαθον τι; Πάνω γε. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις ἀποµελεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωντῶν βλάπτεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὑφελεῖ; οὐ σαθα; ἀποκρίνου, δ' ἀγαθὸ καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόµος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐσθ' ὅστις ἀποµελεῖται βλάπτεται; Οὐ δήτα. Φέρε δή, πάτερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεύρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηρεῖρος ποιούτα ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκοῦτα;

10 Ἐκόντα ἔγγυε. Τι δήτα, δ' Μέλητε; τοσούτων σὺ ἐνοῦ σοφότερος εἰ, τηλικοῦτον ὑπὸ τηλικόδει ὅν, ὅπτε σὺ μὲν εἰσέβαλεν ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μᾶλλον πληγοῖς ἐναυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἄγαθον· ἔγω δὲ δή εἰς εἰς 15 τοσοῦτον ἀμαθαί ήκω, ὅπτε καὶ τούτο ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτα, εάν των μοχθρῶν ποιημῶν τῶν ἐξωντῶν, κυδυνεύων κακῶν τι λαβέω ἐκ' αὐτῶν, ὅπτε τούτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκῶν ποιεῖν, ὡς φης σὺ; ταῦτα ἔγω σοι ὃς πείθομαι, δ' Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἦ τι οὐ διαφθείρον ὅ τι 20 εἰ διαφθείρον, ἄκως, ὡπτε σὺ γε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἴσθε· εἰ δὲ ἀκῶν διαφθείρον, τῶν τοσοῦτον τοῖς τοῖς ἀμαθεῖς.
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μάτων οὖ δεύρο νόμος εἰσάγεις ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἰδία λαβόντας 26
didáskēs kai νοηθέτων. δὴ λογία ὅτι εὰν μᾶθω παύσο-
μαι ὁ γε ἀκώς ποιῶ. οὐ δὲ ἐγγυσθῶμα μὲν μοι καὶ δι-
25 δῆσαι ἐφ' χειρὶς καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλησας, δεύσθα εἰς εἰσάγεις, οἱ
νόμος ἐς εἰσάγεις τοὺς κολάσεως δεκέμνους, ἀλλ' οὖ
μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν ὄντι
δὲ ἔγει ἔλεγον, ἃτι τῆς Μελήτης τοῦτον οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἔ
πότερον ἔμελησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φήσι δια-
φθείρεις, δὲ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεοτέρους; ὡς δὴ λογία ὅτι, κατὰ
5 τὴν γραφὴν ἄν ἑγράφωσ, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεις οὖν
ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἑτέρα δὲ δαίμονα κανά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις

20

the necessary meaning from its rela-
tion to δίκη. Here is another case of
Socrates's homely fashion of repeating
himself. See Introd. 55.—For the
gen. of the charge after εἰσάγεις, see
on εἰσάγεις, 24 d.

23. παύσωμαι κτλ.: from τοῦ we
must supply τῶν with παύσωμαι. Such
an ellipsis as this is obvious, and
therefore not uncommon. See App.

25. ἐφ' χειρὶς κτλ.: you declined.
Socrates offered Melcitus every op-
pportunity for such an effort. See
Introd. 25. The compound διαφθεῖρεν
in this sense is more common, but cf.
Eur. Hercl. 506 f., abet καὶ προαίρ-
εῖται (implying) ἄλλως νόμου, πα-
ρος εἰσάγεσθαι (when they might be wholly
spared), φεύγεισθαι μὴ διαφθεῖσθαι.
From this quotation it appears that
ἡμί might have been used before ἐγγυ-
σθείης καὶ διδάξας. See Arnold's edit.
of Madvig's Syntax, 150, Rem. 3.

For cases of ἐφ' χειρὶς qualified by a
neg. and followed by τὸ μὴ οὗ and οὐκ
ἡμί, cf. Soph. 225 b, οὐκέτ' ἐφ' χειρὶς
(ἐκ. ἐν σωφρίτη) ... τὸ μὴ οὗ τῶν
χίσων (kinds) εἶναι τοῦ τῶν δαίμων-

26
ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα ἔτω
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῦν, ὃς Ἔμμητος, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐν
νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστιν, εἰπὲ ἐτί σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς
ἀνδράσι τούτοις. ἦγο γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν τότερον ὁ
λέγεις διδάσκεων μὲ νομίζει εἰναὶ τις θεός, καὶ αὐτὸς
ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεός, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος
οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ, οὐ μέντοι οὔπερ γε ἢ τόλμε, ἀλλ’ ἔτε-
ρον, καὶ τοῦτ ἐστιν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἔτερον: ἦ ταῦτα
ὁπερί μὲν φής οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζεις θεοῦς τοὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς ταῦτα
didáskheus. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν νομί-
ζεις θεοῦς. Ὡς θαμάσως Ἔμμητος, ἧν ταῦτα λέγεις;

7. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτ.: Meletus agrees
and asserts with all his might and
main, I assure you exactly that is what
I do mean. ταῦτα and σφόδρα give
strength to the assertion ταῦτα λέγω
(cf. 25 a), οὖν signifies agreement with
Socrates, and μιν (a weakened μοι)
gives him the assurance of it.
8. ὃς δὲ λέγει: that is, ὃς λέγεις.
A prep. is more usual, but compare
Thuc. i. 139: τὸ Μεγαρῶν ἣσσαμα,
with id. i. 139: τὸ περὶ Μεγαρῶν ἣσ-
σαμα. There are many cases where
the gen. is used without a prep. (esp.
where περὶ would seem appropriate).
Kr. Spr. 47, 7, 6. Stallbaum, however,
insists that περὶ is not implied here,
and distinguishes between περὶ ὃς ὁ
λέγεις and ὃς ὁ λέγεις, just as between
λέγεις (here in mind) περὶ and λέ-
γεις περὶ τῶν. That such a distinc-
tion sometimes holds good is plain
from other passages in Plato. Cf.
Stallb. in loc. and Soph. 200 a, εὖ
ἔργον ὁ πρῶτος περὶ ἡ' ἑκατών καὶ ἑκα-
τέρων (Ὁ ὁ λέγεις.

10 ff. πάντων λέγεις κτ.: the two
horns of this dilemma are, I. πάντων
. . . . ὅτι ἔτερον, and II. ὃ . . . διδάσκεως.
In I. there are two subdivisions:

(a) διδάσκεως . . . νῦν θεὸς and (b) καὶ
ἄρα οὖν ἢ . . . ὅτι ἔτερον, — which is
described as the inevitable result of
(a). In II. there are two subdivisions:
(c) ὃς . . . θεὸς, — which contradicts
(b), — and (d) ἦν τὸ . . . διδάσκεως, —
which contradicts (a), but is not stated
as the result of (c). After making
his first point (a), Socrates, carried
away by the minute seal of explanation,
states (b) independently of λέγεις.
Therefore it would be clearer to print
καὶ οὖν οὖν ἢ . . . ὅτι ἔτερον in a paren-
thesis if it were not for ἐγκαλεῖς, which
in sense reinforces λέγεις καὶ οὖν
ὁρίζω, being strongly affirmative, is fol-
lowed by καὶ οὖν (rather than οὖν)
eιπά. This, in turn, being strongly
neg., is followed by οὐκ οὖν (rather than
καὶ οὖν) ἀδικεῖ. Although the sense
connects ὁ μόνος . . . ὅτι ἔτερον with
ῥημαῖς . . . θεοῦ preceding, the syntax
connects it with ὁ ἔτερον ὑπὸ θεοῦ.
From this we supply the ellipsis with
ὅτι ἔτερον, ac. ὑπὸ θεοῦ.

14. ταύτα λέγω: ταῦτα and ὁ μοι
ἐγκαλεῖς are not corrol. See on ταῦτα
καὶ οὖν, 27 d.

17. ἦν τὸ κτ.: ac. γένοιτο, what makes
you talk like that? See on ἦν τὸ κτ., 23 a.
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οὐδὲ ᾗιν οὐδὲ σελήνην ἢρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι; Μᾶ Δί, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ᾗιν λίθον φησιν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. 'Ἀναγάγοις οἷς καταφρονεῖς τοῦ ὁ πάντως καὶ οἷς αὐτοῖς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὡστε οὐκ

18. οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ: not even ... nor yet. — ἀρα: the insinuation of Mecitus was both startling and unwelcome to Socrates, who nevertheless meets it in a tone of playful irony. Every religious-minded Greek revered the sun. No appeal was more solemn and sincere than that to ἄλος πνεύματος. Accordingly this appeal is constantly met with in the most moving situations created by tragedy. Ajax, when in despair he falls upon his sword, and outraged Uromothous from his rock, both cry out to the sun. Ion, before entering upon his peaceful duties in the temple, looks first with gladness toward the sun. Both Hercules and Agave are saved from madness when they once more can clearly recognize the sun. That Socrates habitually paid reverence with exemplary punctiliousness to this divinity not made by human hands is here suggested and is still more plainly shown in Symp. 220 d, where, after some account of a brown study into which Socrates had fallen, we read: ὃ οὐ [Ἀκράτης] εἴσηκεν μέχρι ἕως ἐγκεκριμένος καὶ ἄλος ἀνέχετο εὐθαλείαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος προεξέγερσαν τῇ ἁλίῳ, then, after a prayer to the sun, he took his departure. On Socrates’s religion, see Introd. 32.

19. ἃ ἀρά κατασταί: Mecitus uses this form of address, which Plato is careful not to put into the mouth of Socrates. See on ἃ ἀρά κατασταί, 17 a.

20. 'Ἀναγάγοις: see Introd. 10. Diog. Lact. ii. 3. 4, reports that Anaxagoras declared τὸν ἄλον μέθρει (a red hot mass of stone or iron) καὶ μείζω τὸν ἄλον ἀργότερον ... τὴν δὲ σελήνην διαφωτίζειν σὲ ἱς καὶ λάβειν καὶ φύσανας (parerines). From this last apparently the public inferred that Anaxagoras held the belief which Mecitus attributes so wrongfully to Socrates, i.e. τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. The real view of Socrates in regard to such an account of the “all-seeing sun,” as was attributed to Anaxagoras, is perhaps represented by the parenthetical refutation introduced by Xenophon in Mem. iv. 7. 7. For a criticism of Anaxagoras which is more worthy of Socrates himself, see the one attributed to him in the Phaedo, 97 e–90 d. The capital objection there made to Anaxagoras is that he unfolds his dogmatic views ἀμαθῶς τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας λέγεις. The argument here is: “apparently you take me for Anaxagoras, and forget that it is Socrates whom you are prosecuting.” Diogenes Laertius, ii. 3. 5, gives a startling story about Anaxagoras: φαιν᾽ ἄντων προεικήν (prophecy) τὴν νυκτὶ ἄλος προηγούτο τοῖς οἰκοταχοῖς τοῦ λίθου τόσον (the fall of the stone), ὅτι εἶναι ἐκ τῶν φθονῶν πιστεύων. 21. οὕτως: qualifying ἀνέχετο below as well as κατασταί.

22. γραμμάτων: in literature. γράμματα stand in the same relation to μαθήματα as litterae to disciplinae. Plato meant to be outspoken in dealing with the stupidity which led the court to pronounce Socrates guilty.
26. ὡς εἰθέμενα: ὡς because Socrates wishes to suggest the most positive form of statement: ἄθετος ἐκεῖνος γραμμάτων εἰς δὲντα αὐτὰ ταύτα ἦν ἄθετος ἀνδρόν. This vivid use of ὡς for ὥς in inf. clauses after δὲντα is not uncommon where it is indifferent whether the indic. or infin. is used; thus here δὲντα ὡς ταύτα or δὲντα ὡς εἰθέμενα would be equally regular and δὲντα ὡς εἰθέμενα is a mixture of the two. See GMT. 594; H. 1023 b.

23. βιβλία: cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 3, 8, πρῶτος (κ. o. of the philosophers) δι᾽ Ἀναφαγής καὶ βιβλίων ἐξισσεῖ (published) συγγραφῇ.

24. καὶ δὴ καὶ: and now you expect people to believe that it is from me, etc.

25. δὲ... ἐκ τῆς ἀρχής τραπεζῆς πραξικοῦν: sc. the doctrines, not the books.

26. ἄθετος: that when, as they often might, they chanced to see a play in which these doctrines were pronounced, as in Eur. Orest. 968, Where hangs a centre-stone of heaven and earth

With linked chains of gold aloft suspended,
Wherewhiles the cloud erew from Olympos swung.

There I would go.

It is said that, in the lost play of Phaedon, Euripides called the sun ἑξωθεν βάλλει, a clot of gold. Such utterances could be heard by any who paid the price of admission and listened to this poet's choral odes, which were sung ἐν τῇ ἀρχῆς. The price of admission to the theatre of Dionysus thus appears to have been at most (ἢ πάνω οἰκοῦ) one drachma.

27. ὡς εἰθέμενα: the more so because of their singularity. *With-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀλλ’ ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτως μοι δοκῇ οὐδὲν νομίζων θεόν εἶναι; Ὁ μὲν τοι μὴν Δί τοι ὀπωσδήμων. Ἀποστός γ’ εἶ,

30 ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ ταύτα μέντοι, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτως, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντα εἶναι ὄμορφοτέρας καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνώς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκρασία καὶ γεωτὴ γράφομαι. ἔσωκε γὰρ ὁ σωτὴρ αὐνγέρα ἐξωτερικῇ διαπερισσομένῳ γράμμῳ.

35 ταῖς Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς θ’ ἐμοὶ χαριντυζόμενον καὶ ἔναν-

out taking even that into account, the youth must know well enough that these are not my doctrines.” Etymologically known suggests not absurd, but uncommon, eccentric. See the preceding note.

28. ἀλλ’ ὦ πρὸς Διός: see on ὦ πρὸς κτ., 25c, and cf. Dem. XII. 16, ἀλλ’ ἄτον, ὦ πρὸς τοῦ Δᾶμος, διότι ὁ φυσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ὑπό ἑαυτὸν. This marks the transition to a second argument against the charge of atheism, and hence Meleton repeats the charge. Socrates has already shown the absurdity of the charge viewed as a statement of fact. Now he considers it as a statement of opinion (σωτῆτοι τοι δοκεῖ), and urges that Meleton is not entitled to hold such an opinion because it conflicts with another of Meleton’s own views. See App.

29. ἀνέντος δ’... σαυτῷ: you are disincrediting... your own (proper) self. Cf. the use of ἀνέντως in the contrary sense, e.g. Phaed. 67c, εἰ τι ἢ ἐν ὑπάρχων ἑμνέν ὑπ’ ἑαυτῆς ἡ ἑαυτῆς ἀνέντως, ὃ ἐν ὑπ’ ἑαυτῆς.

32. ἀρετὴ τινὸς καὶ ἀκαλλάσσει καὶ ἄνθρωπος: in a spirit of mere contentment and youthful bravado. — ἀρετὴ βουλάζει: there are three possible constrs. with ἀρετῆς: (1) it may be followed by the dat. part. as here, (2) it may take the nom. part., (3) it may take the inf. With the partic. nom. or dat. ἀρετῆς means to offer the appearance of (to seem like unto one) being; with the infinitive it means to seem, on consideration, to be. For the inf. const. cf. 21d above; for the rarer nom. partic. cf. Cratyl. 408 b, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἔρωτι (an old-fashioned word meaning tell) ἔσωκε καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, and Xen. Hell. VI. 3. 3, ἐσωκεὶ ταύτῃ πάλλειν ἡ πολιτεία ἡ ἐσωκεὶ.
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τ' ἐπανηγέρχοντος, ἢ ἔκαπτασθον αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιότητας; ἡ ὁπλική ἐκ οὐκ ἠντάγνωσάν τα ἐπανιή καθιστάντα ἢ ἔγγειν αὐτός ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ εἰς εἰπότεν ἀνὰκαὶ Ἀριστάκης θεοῦ υἱὸς ὁ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ νομίζων, καίτοις 40 τούτῳ ἔστιν παντοτός. Ὁ γελάως γελήζω — ἀνθίζω.

ΧV. Ξειωσκαμάσαι δὴ, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται πάλιν ταῦτα λέγεις: σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Μέλης· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅσπερ καὶ ἀρχικECH ἡμᾶς παραθέσκομεν, μέμησθε μοι μὴ πρὸς θορυβεῖν, εὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσαύθη τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιώμεθα. 5 ἐστὶν δοτὸς ἀνθρώπων, ὁ Μέλης, ἀνθρώπων μὲν νομίζει πράγματι εἶναι, ἀνθρώπων δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὁ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτο· ἐσθ' δοτὸς ἢ πρὸς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἢ πρὸς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἰς, 10 ἀληθικά δὲ πράγματα; η ἀληθικά μὲν οὐ νομίζεις, ἀληθικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστω, ὁ ἄνδρες· ἐι μὴ σὺν βούλιτ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοι

27 ενθρομοῦν: for the gen. of noun and partic. with γένοσται, see examples cited in note on ἄνθρωπος, 22c.

36. τοὺς άλλους: see on τοῖς ἄλλοις, 2 below.

b below.

37. τὰ πράγματα λέγεις αὐτὸς ἐναρχῇ et al.: to contradict himself in so many words. A more positive phrase than ἐναρχῇ ἐναρχῇ λέγεις ἀρχῆς.

ΧV. 2. ταῦτα λέγεις: sc. Ἀριστάκης Ἀριστάκης...θεοῦ νομίζων et al.

b 4. τοὺς λόγους: the art. has nearly the force of the art. of a poss. here. See G. 940; H. 658. In many such cases as here the art., strictly speaking, points out something which the context has already suggested. To all such suggestions a Greek audience was very sensitive. Hence the freq. and deliberate use of the dem. art. in Greek.


7. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτο: de al-
Plato

λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τούτους. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπὸ· 27
καὶ· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαίμονα μὲν νομίζει πράγματι· εὖ, ἐπὶ
δαίμονας δὲ οὔ νομίζει; Οὕτω εἶσαι. Ὅσ' ἐπίσης ὅτι μὴ
πάντως ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὖκ οὖν δαίμον.
15 καὶ μᾶν φής μὲ καὶ νομίζει διδάσκαι, εἰ· οὖν καὶ
ἐκεῖ παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαίμονα γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν ὅν
λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ
δαίμονα νομίζω καὶ δαίμονας δῆτον πολλ' ἀνάγκη νομί-
ζεις μὲ ἐστὶν· οὖν οὗτος ἔχει; ἔχει δ'· τίθημι γάρ σε
20 ὁμολογούντα, ἐπειδὴ οὔκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας

27 Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adj. use, θεῖο τι καὶ δαίμονας, 31c." R.

17. τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ: elsewhere and in its stricter use this means the written affidavit put in as a rejoinder by the accused; rarely as here, the accusation or the written affidavit of the accuser. So in Hyper. Exr. §§ 4, 33 (Col. 20, 40). Harpocrate on the word ἀντιγραφή says, evidently referring to this passage: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἁπατεῖ τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ διδάσκει τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. See Introd. 69 and n. 1 and 2.

18. ἐξα.: repeated by way of answering with after σὺν ἔχει; similarly the simple verb is often repeated after a compound form. See on Crit. 44 d. — ἐξα.: certainly. Such an affirmation is not only self-evident (justified by common sense), but also follows from the admission which Meletus already has made.

20. τοὺς δαίμονας ἔνα· the definition here given is consistent with
οὖς ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν παῖδας; φής ἢ οὖ; τὸ Πάννυ γε. Οὖκοιν εἰπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τυνὲς εἰσίν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ ἂν εἰ ὁ ἐγὼ φημὶ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὖς ἡγούμενων

ψηλὰς εἴμεθα θεοῦς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ περ ἡ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δὲ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσὶ νόθοι τυνὲς ἡ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ των ἄλλων, ἦν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἄν ἄνθρωπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγούμενοι εἰμί, θεοὺς δὲ μη; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥστερ ἂν εἰ τὸς τυπὸν μὲν παῖς

27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato.
30 δας ἦγοτο [ἡ] καὶ ὅνων, τοὺς ἡμίονους, ἵπτους δὲ καὶ ὅνως μὴ ἦγοτο εἶναι. ἀλλ' ὁ Μελήτης, οὐκ εστὶν οὗτος σὺν ταύτα ἄλλην ἀποστειρώμενος ἢ μὴν γράφω τὴν γραφήν ταύτην ἢ ἄπορον ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀλῆθες ἀδικήματι ὁποῖος δὲ σύ μην πείθους ἂν καὶ συμβρέχω νοῦν ἔχουσα ἄλλῃβάτῳ ὑπάτῳ ὡς [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεία ἤγεσθαν, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαιμόνια μήτε θεοῦ μήτε ἦρωας, οὐδεμιά μικανή ἐστιν.

XVI. Ἄλλα γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄδικω κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλὴς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταύτα. δὲ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν εἰλεγον, ὅτι πολλῆς μοι ἀπεξεθεία γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὐ ἰστε ὅτι ἀλῆθες ἐστι. καὶ τούτῳ ἐστιν ὃ ἐμε αἰρήσει, ἑαυτῷ αἱρῇ, οὗ Μελήτου οὐδὲ Ἀταντώ, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆ τε καὶ φθόνους. ἀ δὴ πολλοὶς καὶ

30. νῦν ἡμέρας: these words do not interfere with the grammar, although they make sad havoc with the sense, unless § disappears.

33. ἡ ἄμφος ὧ τι, κτλ.: this no doubt was Socrates's real view of the case of Melatus (cf. 23 d), whereas all that precedes is only to bring home to the court how foolish and self-contradictory the charge is. ἄμφος and ἄντικριμιῶμα, in connexion with ἄμφος, refer to continued action in past time. — ἄγεσθαι: the opt. represents Melatus's original reflection τι ἄγεσθαι. The subj. might have been retained. GMT. 617.

34. δεῦ κιν ὧ τι, κτλ.: here Socrates closes his argument to the effect that it is a contradiction in terms to say of one and the same man (1) that he is a complete atheist, and (2) that he believes in ἄγεσθαι. The second τοῦ εἴτε must be regarded as redundant, a simple repetition of the first one which might be dispensed with. See App.—πάθος δὲ ὡς [ἡ]: is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational, and can hardly be right. ὡς means how or by which after μικανή. A similar use of ὡς is explained GMT. 329, 2.

XVI. 1. Ἄλλα γὰρ...ταύτα: this phrase dismisses one topic to make room for the next one.

5. ἢ ἐὰν αἱρήης, ἑαυτῷ αἱρῇ: will be the condemnation of me, if condemnation it is to be. αἱρήθης and ἁλλοθές are technical terms of the law, as is the case with φέργης and ἅλλος.

7. δή: certainly. The allusion is to facts generally known and acknowledged, cf. 31 b. — πολλοῖς καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ ἁγιόθοις: instead of καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ ἁγιοίς. The first καὶ is the klismatic καί of comparisons. Cf. 22 d, ὡς τῇ τοῖς τις καὶ, and the idiom of τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ. The second καὶ is
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

ἀλλοις καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἄνδρας ἱρήκει, οὐμαὶ δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεων: 28
ουδέν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ίσως δὲ ἐν οἷον εἰπόν τις: ἐνε ὁ
10 οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σωκράτης, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτίθεμαι ἐπιτίθεμαι,
ἐξ ὡς κυνικείς τινι ἀποθανεῖς; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντέισόμη, ὅτι οὐν καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ ἀνθρωπε, εἴ οἷς
dein κυνικόν ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ἤν ή τεθνάσαι ἄνδρα
ἐν τι (καὶ σμικρῶς) ὄφελος ἔστω, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον
15 σκοπεῖς, ὅταν πραττεῖ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ
ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἐργά ἢ κακοῦ. φαινόμαι γὰρ ὅτι τῷ γε σῷ
λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθεῶν ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τροίᾳ τετελευτηκασιν οἱ το
ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος ύδός, ὅ τουτοι τοῦ κυνικῶν
8 a equally idiomatic, and joins καλλός with a second adj. Cf. καλλός καὶ
sofor ἄδρας.
9. oúdeν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν... στή: the rule is in no danger of breaking down in
my case. Cf. Phaed. 84 δ, oúdeν δεινὸν μὴ φοβησῃ, we need not apprehend that
the soul will have to fear. Gorg. 620 δ, and Rep. v. 405 β. There is a touch
of irony in this way of saying "I do not think." Socrates as it were en
lists on the side of the rule. This
idiom throws no light on oúden with
subj. or fut. indec. GMT. 294,
295. For the quasi-impersonal use
of στή, come to a standstill, cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. vi. 9. 9, στάσεις γὰρ ἔκεις
Theoc. 153 δ, ἐν τοῖς ἔν τοῦ περιφορῇ ἡ
κυνικείς καὶ ἡ ζωή, πάντα ἄγιον καὶ
σάντα... ἐν τῇ στάσει τοῦτον ἄνω
δεξαί (tethered), πάντα χρήσθην ἐν ὑπ
φορῇ. In such contexts the aor.
στήνυ denotes the entrance into a
state of quiet or collapse. GMT. 55,
b 56. — ἐν oúden αἰσχύνει: a question
indicating surprise. The perversity of Socrates, in view of the fact just
recited, is unreasonable. When such
a question is accompanied by an
urgent statement of the reason for
surprise (here τοιοῦτον... εἴ oúden, adv.), it
may be introduced by στή or στήνυ,
otherwise not.
11. ἐν τῇ κατ. : cf. Crit. 48 δ for
the same thought, and Xen. An. Ill. τ.
43, for its application to the risks of
war. In the Ajax of Sophocles, 478—
480, the same idea is brought to the
following climax: —
Honor in life or honorable death
The risky born and bred must have.
13. κυνικόν τοῦ ἢ τῷ ἠθῶνων: the question of life or death. Cf. for
the use and omission of the art., Rep.
l. 334 ε, κυνικόν (perhaps we, etc.)
οὐκ ἢθῶν καὶ φίλων καὶ ἡθῶν
οἰκείων (hence defined). Cf. for the
thought, Aj. 475—476: —
τι γὰρ τισ' ἢν ἥκει τόπος ἐν ἔχει
ὑποκείναι αἰσχρῶν τοῖς ἐν κυνικῶν
15. ὅταν προτέλει: whenever he does
anything. GMT. 532. See App.
17. τῶν ἡμιθεῶν: i.e. τῶν ἡμιθεῶν.
Hesiod, W. and D. 158, calls the
fourth race, ἡμιθεῶν ἡμιθεῶν γένος ἐν
καλλωταῖς ἡμιθεῶν ἐκτελεῖ, and he counts
among their number the heroes that
faded siege to Thebes and to Troy.
18. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος ύδός: any appeal e.
to the example of Achilles was always
100

ΠΑΛΤΟΝΟΣ

κατεφρόνησε παρά το αισχρόν τι υπομείναι, ὅστε ἐπεδή
cataphronese para to aischron ti upomeinai, hosote epeedh
10 εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομένη Ἐκτορά ἀποκτείναι,
eipen he mhter auti prothymomeni Ektora apokteinai,
θεὸς οὖν, οὕτως ποις, ὡς ἐγώ οὖναί: ὃ πάτι, εἰ τιμωρή-
theos oun, outhos pois, wos egw oumai: ho pati, ei timorhe-
σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐσαρφῷ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτορά ἀποκτε-
ses Patroklo tu esarphi tonon phono kai Ektora apokte-
νεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεί: αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ.
nves autos apothanei: autika gar toi, phesis, met.
"Ἐκτορά πότις ἔτοιμος; ὁ δὲ ταύτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν
"Ektora potis etoimos; o de tauta akousas tou men
25 θανάτῳ καὶ τοῦ κυνδύνου ἀλλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον
destas to zhn kados oin kai tois filous mi tawroew, a
25 aligorige, polu de mallo
αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπίθεις τὸ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα
autika, phesis, thnaien dikhen epitheis to adikounti, hina
μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγελαστὸς παρὰ νυσί κορώνισιν ἀνθρώ
mhe enthade meno ktagelasatos para nysi koronisin anthr
ος ἀφοῦρης. μη αὐτῶν οἰεὶ προτιτίσαι θανάτῳ καὶ
oos aphonres. mh auton oiei protitisa thanato kai
κυνδύνῳ; οὔτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τῷ ἄληθείᾳ
kundyino; outo gar echai, ho andres Athinaioi, tu alithiai
οὐχί τοις ἕαυτον ταύτῃ ἡ ἡγησάμενος βελτιστον ἦν αὐτῇ
ouchi tois eautoi tauti he egasamenos belitiston ena auti

very telling. The enthusiasm with
very telling. The enthusiasm with
which all Greeks regarded this hero
which all Greeks regarded this hero
was shown by temples raised in his
was shown by temples raised in his
honor and by countless works of art
honor and by countless works of art
in which he appeared. Homer, Od.
in which he appeared. Homer, Od.
xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his
xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his
favored condition in the lower world
favored condition in the lower world
hardly to be endured. The post-
hardly to be endured. The post-
homeric story-tellers said that he was
homeric story-tellers said that he was
living in the islands of the blest.
living in the islands of the blest.
Cf. 
Cf.
Epymp. 179 e, where this same scene be-
Epymp. 179 e, where this same scene be-
tween Thetis and Achilles is quoted,
tween Thetis and Achilles is quoted,
and the schollion (Bergk 10) to Harmo-
and the schollion (Bergk 10) to Harmo-
dius:—
dius:—
No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
Where Bres swift-foot Achilles far away,
Where Bres swift-foot Achilles far away,
And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.
And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.
We hear that Ibycus, and after him
We hear that Ibycus, and after him
Simonides, wishing no doubt to make
Simonides, wishing no doubt to make
Achilles' happiness complete, represented
Achilles' happiness complete, represented
him as married to Medea in
him as married to Medea in
Elysium.
Elysium.
21. ἡ δέ ἡδη: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance
21. de he: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance
of Thetis was not only prompted by
of Thetis was not only prompted by
the natural anxiety of a mother for
the natural anxiety of a mother for
her son, but also was inspired by the
her son, but also was inspired by the
unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf.
unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf.
Hom. Od. iv. 379 and 408, ἀλλὰς ἐκ
Hom. Od. iv. 379 and 408, allas ek
πάντας θεσσά τεν. The passage from Hom.
pantas thessas ten. The passage from Hom.
II. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely
II. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely
in part (σφετερεῖ τοι), and partly word
in part (spheterei toi), and partly word
for word.
for word.
24. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀκούοντα τρὶς: at this point ἀκούει is forgotten. The
24. alla ta akounonta tri: at this point akoei is forgotten. The
long speech and explanation given to
long speech and explanation given to
Thetis makes this break in the const.
Thetis makes this break in the const.
very natural. In fact, this clause is as
very natural. In fact, this clause is as
independent as if a co-ord. clause
independent as if a co-ord. clause
(with or without με) had preceded
(with or without me) had preceded
it.— ὅτι θάνατος: notice the excep-
hoti thanatos: notice the excep-
tional use of the art., which is usually
ntional use of the art., which is usually
omitted with θάνατος as an abstract
omitted with thanatos as an abstract
noun. Cf. 28 a, 29 a, 32 c, 35 c, 39 a b,
noun. Cf. 28 a, 29 a, 32 c, 35 c, 39 a b,
Crit. 62 e. For the art. used as here,
Crit. 62 e. For the art. used as here,
cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.
cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.
29. μη...οἷς: see on ἄλλα ἔρια, 25 a. ἀ
29. me...ois: see on alla eria, 25 a. a
31. ἢ ὥσπερ ἔρχοντας καλομοῖς or even
31. h oisper erkontas kalomois or even
tοικήσις. Some such expression is
toikisis. Some such expression is
called for grammatically by the form
called for grammatically by the form
of the first alternative ἡ ἡγησάμενος
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

ἀλλος καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἄρας ἦρηκεν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεως. 28
οὐχὶ δὲ δεινὸν μη ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἵστως ὦ ἃ ὡν εἴποι τις, εἰ τοῦτο οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὅ Σώκρατες, τουτοῦτον ἐπιτυθέμενα ἐπιτυθέντος,
ἐξ ὧν κυνικείης νυν ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἄν δίκαιον
λόγον ἀντείπομι, ὅτι ὧν καλὸς λέγεις, ὁ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οὐκ
dεώς κυνικῶν ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ Ἰππὸν ἢ τεθανάτα ἄνδρα
ὅντων τι (καὶ σμικρὸ) ὥρας ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνος μόνον
σκοτεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, ποτέ πάντα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ
Ἀνδρός ἀγαθὸν ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. οὐ καὶ οἶκοι γὰρ ἀν αὐτῇ ἡ
λόγῳ εἰς τῶν ἡμεθῶν οὐσίν ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οὐ τοῖς
ἄλλοι καὶ ὣς Ἡθελός ὑός, ὃς τοιοῦτον του κυνικῶν

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28 equally idiomatic, and joins καλῶς with a second adj. Cf. καλλίς καὶ σοφῶς ἄνθρωπος.
9. συναυξάνεται ἐν τῇ τῇ: the rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case. Cf. Ιθάκη. 84 b, συναυξάνεται ἐν τῇ φαύσει, we need not apprehend that the soul will have to suffer. Gorg. 529 d, and Rep. v. 405 b. There is a touch of irony in this way of saying “I do not think.” Socrates as it were enlists on the side of the rule. This idiom throws no light on ὃ μὲ with subj. or fut. indic. GM. 294, 295. For the quasi-imperative use of συναυξάνεται, come to a standstill, cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 9. 9, στασάται γὰρ ἐκείνος Theoct. 153 d, τὸν ἔννοιν ἐν τῇ πνευματικῇ καὶ ἔννοιᾳ, ῥάντα λέγει καὶ σαφέστατα... ἐλ ἐσταί τοῦτο δεινὸν δεδομένων (tethered), τὰν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἐν ψυχοφρένῳ. In such contexts the συναυξάνεται denotes the entrance into a state of quiet or collapse. GM. 55, b 56. εἰ ν' ὃς αἰσχύνει a question indicating surprise. The perversity of Socrates, in view of the fact just recited, is unreasonable. When such a question is accompanied by an urgent statement of the reason for surprise (here τοιοῦτον... εἰ δὲ, etc.), it may be introduced by εἰς τὰ ἐν τῇ, otherwise not.
11. ἤγα καὶ οἶκοι: cf. Crit. 48 d for the same thought, and Xen. An. III. i. 43, for its application to the risks of war. In the Ajax of Sophocles, 473-480, the same idea is brought to the following climax: —

Piise in life or honorable death.

The boldy born and bred must bear.

13. κυνικῶν τοῦ ὧν ἔθνεται: the question of life or death. Cf. for the use and omissions of the art., Rep. L 344 a, κυνικόν (perhaps we, etc.) ἄν ἔθηκα τῷ πάθει καὶ ἐν πάθει θείον (here defined). Cf. for the thought, Aj. 476-476: —

τὸ πᾶ τῷ ἐν τῇ ἀνάγει τῆν ἄν

πρόθεσιν ἐσκεύασθαι τοῦ γὰρ ἀνέπάθην.

15. ὅταν πράττῃ: whenever he does anything. GM. 572. See App.

17. τῶν ἡμεθῶν: i.e. τῶν ἱερῶν.

Heriod. W. and D. 168, calls the fourth race, ἰδιών ἱερῶν ἡμεθῶν γενός οἱ καλλιτεχνοὶ ἡμεθῶν, and he counts among their number the heroes that laid siege to Thebes and to Troy.

18. ὃ ὅτι Ἡθελός ὑός: any appeal to the example of Achilles was always
κατεφανής παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομείναι, ὡστε ἐπειδὴ ἐ]

οὴν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομενή Ἐκτορά ἀποκεῖναι, 

θεὸς οὐσα, οὐσώσι ποιε, ὡς ἐγὼ ὁμοι' ἐν ταῖς ἐτιμωρη-

σεις. Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἔταρχῷ τοῦ ἐφίλον καὶ Ἐκτορᾶ ἀποκτε-

νεύς, αὐτὸς ἀποθαναῖ: αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορᾶ πότος ἐτοίμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν 

θανάτον καὶ τοῦ κυβέρνον ἀλλιγώρφησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον 

deìσας τὸ ἔννοια ἀν καὶ τοὺς φίλους μὴ τιμωρεῖ, οὐκ 

αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην δικὴν ἐπίθεσις τῷ ἄδικοντι, ἵνα 

μὴ ἑνόδηρε μένῳ καταγέλαστος, παρὰ νυσί' κορωνώσιν 

ἀθέτον ἀροῦρης. μὴ αὕτων οἴει διαφιλτεῖ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ 

κυβέρνον· οὐτὸ γὰρ ἔχει, ὡς ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀλήθειᾳ. 

οὐ γὰρ ᾠδὴ ταύτων τίμη ἢ ἡγισάμενος διδασκαλιών εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' 


very telling. The enthusiasm with 

which all Greeks regarded this hero 

was shown by temples raised in his 

honor and by countless works of art 

in which he appeared. Homer, Od. 

xi. 489, tells how Achilles found 

his favored condition in the lower world 

hardly to be endured. The post-

homeric story-tellers said that he was 

living in the islands of the biez. Cf. 

Smp. 179 e, where this same scene 

between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, 

and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmo-

nides:—

No, sweet Harmonides, thou art not dead. 

But in the Islands of the Blest men say, 

Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away, 

And Tydessa's son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him 

Simonides, wishing no doubt to make 

Achilles' happiness complete, repre-

sented him as married toMedea in 

Elysium.

21. ὕδωρ ὄρος: added in a very un-

usual way, because the circumstance 

has unusual weight. The utterance 

of Thetis was not only prompted by 

the natural anxiety of a mother for 

her son, but also was inspired by the 

unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf. 

Hom. Od. iv. 378 and 408, οὐδὲ 

ἐν ἡμῖν θεά. The passage from Hom. 

II. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely 

in part (ὑπερελευσι), and partly word 

for word.

24. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα δεινὸν φθάνει: at 

this point δεινός is forgotten. The 

long speech and explanation given 

to Thetis makes this break in the const. 

very natural. In fact, this clause is 

as independent as if a co-ord. clause 

(with or without μέν) had preceded it.—

τῷ θεά divisive: notice the excep-

tional use of the art., which is usually 

omitted with δεινός as an abstract 

noun. Cf. 28 e, 29 a, 52 e, 53 c, 59 a, 

Crit. 52 c. For the art. used as here, 

cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 e. 

29. μὲν...οἷς: see on ἀλλ' ἄρα, 25 a. 

31. ἢ ἐν ἐρυθροῖς ταῦτα: instead 

of ἢ ἐν ἐρυθροῖς κολοκυθίων or even 

ταῦτα. Some such expression is 

called for grammatically by the form 

of the first alternative ἢ ἐρυθροῖς
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

...οὖν λόγον καθιστά ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸς τόν ζωτοῦν αἰτίας ὑπολογύζομενον μήτε τάνατον μήτε ἄλλο
μήδεν πρὸ τοῦ αἰτίου.

XVII. Ἐγώ οὖν δεινὰ δέ εἰπὼν εἰργασμένος, ὅ ἄνδρες

28 This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts better. The commander's order, if given at all, was peremptory, and requires a more positive statement than the less urgent ἐρωτάμενον εἰτε. In the sense ἐν ἐρωτάμενον ταχεῖα is the alternative of ἔσθιν τίνι. See App.

33. ὑπολογύζομεν: as in above, ἔνολογιζομένων means take into account, i.e. in striking a balance. Cf. Crit. 48 d, where nearly the same idea is expressed. For a detailed description of the process of striking a balance involved in ἔνολογιζομενως, cf. Phaedr. 231 b, οἷς ἐρωτᾶς εὐκο

τοῦσκε, ὅ τε καὶ τί σημαντεῖ ἀλλὰ...καὶ ἐν τοῖς καὶ τοῖς περιλαμβάνεται καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἑπεφάσσας εἰ, καί τῶν τῶν προστίθεντος ἑρωτήματι τὸν τῆς άλλαν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τῶν ἑπεφάσσας εἰ, καί τῶν τῶν περιλαμβάνεται καὶ τῶν τῶν ἑπεφάσσας εἰ, τοῦ τοῦ τῶν περιλαμβάνεται καὶ τῶν ἑπεφάσσας εἰ. The force of εἰτε here is very near to that of εἴτε, and, so far from primarily indicating a process of subtraction, it involves first of all an addition.

34. πρὸ τοῦ κράτους: moral turpitude (τυρπ), not death, was the harm which Socrates struggled to avoid at any and every price. Cf. 29 b and Soph. Ant. 95 ff.

Nay, leave me and my heart's untoward plan To suffer all thou fear'st; naught will I suffer That shall entice me to a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the proposition that disgrace is more frightful than death, Socrates can now answer the question of 26 b, if he can prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo.

1. ξέφθαντί...λατρεία τῆς νόμων: much here depends upon disen
tangling past, pres., and fut. See GMT. 509. The protasis (limiting the apod.) ξέφθαντί... λατρεία τῆς νόμων, lit. I should prove to have done a dreadful thing) includes various acts in the past which are looked upon from a supposed time in the fut. It falls into two parts: one, marked off by μὲν, states (in the form of a supposition) well-known facts in the past; the other, distinguished by δὲ, states a supposed future case in connexion with certain present circumstances. See on &. The outrageous conduct for him would be with this combination of facts and convictions, after his past fidelity to human trusts, at some fut. time to desert his divinely appointed post of duty: if while then I stood firm I should now desert my post. The repetition of μὲν and δὲ respectively is for the sake of clearness. For the same repetition cf. Isocr. vii. 18, παρ' εἷς μὲν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ κράτους, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ κράτους μὲν καθιστάτοις καὶ τοῖς τοῖς τῶν φύσεων, ήτοι δὲ μὲν λαθέων γεῖς ἡμῖν ἢ πάντως ἢ πάντως διδόντα διδότα μὲν φαθομίς γενομένων συγκράτησα τοῖς.
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

"Αθηναίοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν μει ἀρχώντες έστατον, οἷς ὑμεῖς εἴδοσθε ἀρχέων μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ

28 ἔντεκα ὡς πλῆθος γέγονε τὰς ἀνατιθέσιας, for (they knew) that while among those who have neither established safeguards nor penalties for such crimes nor any strict organization of justice, that while among these, I say, even righteous characters are corrupted; at the same time, where wrong-doers find it easy neither to conceal their transgressions nor to secure condemnation when detected, there I say (they knew that) evil dispositions end by dying out. Cf. also Gorg. 512 a. Notice that the μέσος clause is important only with reference to the ήδε clause, upon which the main stress is laid; the ήδε clause is made prominent through the contrast afforded by the logically subordinate μέσος clause. This same relation is indicated in the Eng., French, and German idiom by the use of some word like "while" in the μέσος clause.

2. ἀρχόντες: not the nine archons, but, as the context shows, the generals in command upon the field of battle. — έντεκα ἀρχόντες: the decurions are here taken as representing the whole demos, from which they were selected by lot. See Introd. 66. Perhaps Socrates has also in mind the other Athenians present at the trial. See on 24 ε and 25 α. The generals were elected by show of hands (χειροτονία) and their electors were the ἑθελοντες. Cf. 25 a.

3. ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ...Δηλώς: Ποτίδαια, a Corinthian colony on the peninsula Chalcidice, which became a tributary ally of Athens without wholly abandoning its earlier connexion with Corinth. Peloponnesians, king of Macedonia, took advantage of this divided allegiance to persuade the Potidæans to revolt from Athens, which they did in 432 B.C. The Potidæans, with the reinforcements sent them by the Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenian force under Callias. For two whole years the town was invested by land and blockaded by sea, and finally made favorable terms with the bellicose force. In the engagement before the siege of Potidæa, Socrates saved Alcibiades's life. Cf. Symp. 210 ε—220 ε, where Alcibiades gives a most enthusiastic and witty account of the bravery and self-denial of Socrates during the whole Potidæan campaign, and says of the battle in question: ὅτε γὰρ ὁ μάχη τὰς έτέκας (after) ήταν καὶ τριστερών (the prize for gallantry in action) θέκος αἱ στρατηγαὶ, οἷοὶ δὲς ἀλλος ἦσσον ἄλλος καὶ πολλοὶ έμπροσθόν ἃν άκοῦ, τριστερών (when I was wounded) οὐκ έλέους ἀνάπτυξα, ἀλλὰ συνθελοντες καὶ τὰ πολλα καὶ αὐτῶν ἔμε. Alcibiades says that Socrates ought to have had the prize which was given to himself by favoritism. Cf. Charm. 155 δ c. — The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated, and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life. — Delium, was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. ill. 5, 4, ἱπποτίκος τὸν Ταύμαθα τοῦ χιλοῦν ἐν Αβ-
\textit{Apologetica Sophocles.} 103

ἐπὶ Δήλω, τότε μὲν οὐ ἕκαστον ἔστατον ἔμφον ὁσπέρ καὶ ἀλλὸς τις καὶ ἐκείνους ἐποδανεῖς, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ ταττονοῦ, ὃς ἔγω φήθην τε καὶ ὑπελαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δειν ζην καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖσιν ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅπως πράγμα λήπτωμι τὴν τάξιν. 29 δεινὸν τὰν εἰς, καὶ ὁ ὅληθῶς τὸν ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι 10 τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζεισθαι εἰναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδωθεῖσθαι θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸν εἰναι οὐκ ἄν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατος δεδεναι, οἱ ἀνδρεῖς, οἴδειν ἀλλο ἐστιν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἰναι μη ὅντα. Δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδεῖν εἰστὶν ἂν οὐκ οἴδειν. οἴδε μὲν γὰρ οἴδεις τὸν θάνα-

28 οἷς ἐπηρρέσχον ἔχοντο καὶ ἢ μεθ' ἐπ' ἡμερίαν ἐπηρρέσχον ἐπὶ θεοῦ ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων. Notice that both Plato and Xen. say ἢ (not ἂν) ἄλλως, because at the time there was no extended settlement at or near the place. For the gallantry of Socrates in the retreat, cf. Symposium 221 a b. Alcibiades was mounted, and therefore could observe better than at Potidaea how Socrates behaved, and he says: ἱππὸν ἐν τὸν Ἰάσσην Σωκράτην, ὅπως ἦν ἄλλως ἐπηρρέσχον τῶν δικαστηρίων. 29 notice τὸν <πρὸς> οἴδειν. 30 ὅτι ἔστιν δοκεῖν σοφὸν, as I thought and understood, etc., when I heard the oracle which was given to Charesphon. — 55: depends on the force of commanding in δικαστήριον. Apollo gives him an injunction, to the effect that he must live, etc.

8. Λήμαρχος τῇ τἀντη: so worked as a to suggest λατεραγός γραφεῖ, a technical phrase of criminal law. Any one convicted of λατεραγία forfeited his civil rights, i.e. suffered ἀμίλλα. 9. τὸν: τὸν, truly, emphasizes this repetition of the strong statement which begins the chapter.

4. ἔρμον καὶ ἐκείνους ἐποδανεῖς: The repeated allusions which are scattered through Plato's dialogues to the brave conduct of Socrates in these battles show that it was well known at Athens. — ἄλλως ταὐτά: just like many another man. He is careful not to make too much of the facts. The indef. τι here means some, i.e. any indefinite person, because many persons are thought of under ἄλλοις.

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάντα: i.e. now that my post is assigned me by the god, a circumstance of the supposition of λήμαρχος, which is repeated in δικαστήριον.

8. ἀλλοί νῦν τοῦτον: as I thought and understood, etc., when I heard the oracle which was given to Charesphon. — 55: depends on the force of commanding in δικαστήριον. Apollo gives him an injunction, to the effect that he must live, etc.

8. Λήμαρχος τῇ τἀντη: so worked as a to suggest λατεραγός γραφεῖ, a technical phrase of criminal law. Any one convicted of λατεραγία forfeited his civil rights, i.e. suffered ἀμίλλα. 9. τὸν: τὸν, truly, emphasizes this repetition of the strong statement which begins the chapter.

14. ἀν οἴδεις: or, ἀν οἴδεις εἰτέκνει, i.e. the same indef. subj., which is to be thought of with the preceding inf. Cf. below b, and 39 d. As a rule, the third person, when it means vaguely any one (the French on) or anything, in
15 τον οὐδ’ εἰ τυχάναι τοῦ αὐθαίρων τάντας μέγιστον ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγαθῶν, δεδικτήσασθαι δ’ ὡς εὖ εἰσοδεῦσαι οἳ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτο πώς οὐκ ἁμαθία ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ τοῦ ἐπομήνιον ὑπομνήματος ἡ του ὀφείλομεν εἰδέναι δ’ οὐκ οἴδατε; ἐγὼ δ’, ὁ ἀληθῶς ἀδρές, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκταίθα ἵσσος διαφέρει τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῇ σοφότερος τοῦ φαίνεται ὧν, τούτῳ ἀν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδώς ἱκανός περὶ τῶν ἔν λαίδου οὔτω καὶ οἷομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ ἄδικως καὶ ἄπειθεῖς τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ αὐθαίρῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔστω οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ἄν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἔστω, ἡ μὴ οἶδα εἰ 25 ἀγαθὰ ὅταν τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδ’ φεύξομαι ὁστε οὐδ’ εἰ με νῦν ὑμείς ἀφίετε Ἀυτώτι ἀπιστήσατε, ὃσον 20. εἰ δ᾿ ἐσθι: if really, i.e. if, as the oracle suggests.

15. οὐδ’: here, as usual, in the gender of ἁγαθοῦ, which is implied in the pred. μέγιστον τῶν ἁγαθῶν.

17. τοῦτο: not in the gender of ἁμαθία. This makes a smoother sent. than αὕτη τῶν ἁμαθία ἔστιν αὐτὴ ὁ πρὸς τινὰ, which was the alternative. — Ἕ αὕτη τοῦτο ἑνοπληθυντός: that very same reprehensible, limiting ἁμαθία and recalling the whole statement made above, 21 b–23 a.

19. τοῦτο, τοῦτο ὡς: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, i.e. τις καθ’ ἑαυτόν. Notice the cleverness of the ellipsis after ὡς. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of himself. For the ellipsis in the leading clause, see on ὥς... ἐμοί, 25 a. — καὶ ἑνεκάθετο: here too.
εφη ἣ τῶν ἀρχὴν οὗ ἐνεῖ ἔμε δεύο εἰσελθὼν ἡ ἐπείδη εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷον τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναι με, λέγομεν πρὸς υἱόν ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφορώσης, ἢ γάρ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖσι. 30 ἔπιθεδοντες ἡ Σοκράτης διεδάκει πάντες παντάσσας διαφοράτωσαίτοις — εἰ μοι πρὸς τούτα εἴπο με. 30 Σοκράτης, νῦν μὲν 'Αντώνι οὐ πειράζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀφίσθησαν, εἰ τούτω μπόρεσθε ὑπερμικῆς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρέβω μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν, εάν δὲ ἀλὸς εἰ τούτω πράττων,

29 of ἐστιν is not uncommon in Plato. Cf. Laws, 911 e, τι οὖν οὖν τις εἴρητος ἢ μὲν τῇ λέγῃν ὑπερθείν τοι καὶ εἰς χρῆ

27. οὐδὲ, οὖν τε εἴπον, in the original form this would be οὐδὲ εἴπον, and οὐδὲ οὐδὲ τι εἰσὶν. GMT. 119; H. 853 a. — ἔστιν: on this use of ἔστιν, see Intro. 70 with the note. Anytus probably argues: "If Socrates had not been prosecuted, his evil communications might have been ignored; once in court, his case allows but one verdict. To acquit him is to sanction all his heresies."

33. with inf., see GMT. 610; H. 999 a.

35. after a digression.
πλατύνοι

ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος οὖν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ 29 εὐδοκιματίτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ἀιχμόνει ἐπιμελούμενοι ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα καὶ δόξας καὶ τιμῆς, ὑφόνυσες δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος ὅπως ἐπελευθερωθῆναι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω τούτων ὑμῶν ἀπεμαί, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἤστασα καὶ ἠλέγξω, καὶ εἶναι μοι μή δοκήνες ἀρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὑπεννόω ὅτι τὰ πλείστον ἄξια περὶ ἔλαιον καὶ οἰκετέρω καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτι ἂν ὤνημα των θεοῦ, καὶ ζεῦγο καὶ ἀστήρι, χαλλον δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅσον μοι ἐγγὺς.
APOLOGEIA SOKRATOS

τέρω ἐστὶ γένος. ταύτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεὸς, εὖ ἵπτε, καὶ 30 ἐγὼ οἴμοι τοι ὑμῖν μείζον ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ 55 πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οἴδαν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέχομαι ἢ πεῖθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεβυτέρους μὴ σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴ τρει
cπόροις προτέρων μὴν ὄντων σφόδρα ὡς τῆς φυσῆς ὅπως ὁ ἀριστή ἐσται, λέγων: οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετῆ γίνεται.

60 ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ ἁγάθα τοὺς ἀνθρώ
pους ἀπαντά καὶ ἰδιὰ καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτα

30 of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The cor
errelative of ἢ διὰ readily suggests itself with μᾶλλον. Cf. the same case, 30 d. Cf. Euthyphro. 12 c, καὶ μὴ νικηφόρος γε

μου εἰς τὴν Διὸς ἐπιφανείαν. 30 of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The cor
nerrelative of ἢ διὰ readily suggests itself with μᾶλλον. Cf. the same case, 30 d. Cf. Euthyphro. 12 c, καὶ μὴ νικηφόρος γε

μου εἰς τὴν Διὸς ἐπιφανείαν. 55. τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν: see on ἅγιος, Crit. 55 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνεπελεῖ, 23 c; cf. also τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνεπελεῖ, 23 c; cf. also on τὰ μετὰ προστάσεις. 58. πρότερον: see τὰ τῆς φυσῆς, which has to be supplied out of τῶ ἡ τῆς φυ
cχῆς. μῆδε is not a third specification with μᾶθε...μῆθε. It serves only to connect ὁτὶ σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

b 60. εἰ δὲ ἁρμάν: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by
xperience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and the memling of his fortunes; this is

διὰ (skill in the art of right living), i.e.
λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταύτ' ἄν εἰς βλαβερά· ἐν δὲ 30
τις μὲ φρονίν ἀλλὰ λέγεις ἢ ταύτα, οὔδεν λέγει πρὸς
ταύτα, φαίνει ἂν, ἢ 'Ἀθηναίοι, ἢ πειθείσθη 'Αντίγονος ἢ μὴ
85 καὶ ἢ αἵρετε ἢ μὴ αἵρετε, ἢς ἐμοί οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἄλλα, οὐδὲ εἰ μὲλῶν πολλάκις τεθνάει.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμπείριοι μοι οἷς ἐσθίον ύμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' ὅς ἂν λέγων, τι
ἀλλ' ἀκόνως· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, δινήγατε ἀκόνωτες.
μὲλῶν γὰρ οἷς ἄττα ύμῖν ἔρειν καὶ ἀλλὰ, ἐφ' ὅς ἐοὺς

common sense as we have, Euthyphrod. 15 a, Rep. ii. 306 c, 375 c-e, 370 b c; we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, Rep. x. 613, 617 a.
62. ταύτ' ἄν εἰς βλαβερά: this ταύτα, all this, covers more ground than the ταύτα above. The first means what Socrates says, the second means that and also the fact that he says it. "If this corrupts the youth, my practice in saying it would do harm; but the truth cannot corrupt them, therefore my speaking it can do no harm. To prove that I am a corrupter of the youth, you must prove that I have said something else; that cannot be proved, for it is not true." With εἰ διαφθείρω, ταύτ' ἄν εἰς, cf. εἰ ἐφίλουσιν, 26 b, where see note.
63. τρέφε ταύτα: wherefore.
65. δὲ ἄκοντι εἰ: knowing that I should never alter my ways. τοιούτους ἐν represents τοιούτου ἐν, GMT. 210; H. 845 and 801. Cf. Dem. xix. 342, τούτω περὶ τινῶν μεταξύ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ πάθους ἔσχεται. See on διαφθοράς, 29 c. For an important question of Ms. reading here, see App. For the εἰ μέλλω used as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 73; H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjv. pres. in prot. depending upon the opt. in apod. with ἂν, see GMT. 503; 3 b. H. 901 a.
66. πολλάκις: many times or many deaths. The Eng. idiom like the Greek requires no definite specification such as "to die a hundred deaths." In certain cases in Greek as in Eng. a large number is specified. Cf. ἄθροισα μυρίδες ἐγὼ βολλυμα, Λευκ. 738; ἄθροισα (for περισσότερον); βασιλεῖς, μυρίδες ἐν τῷ βίῳ, Ran. 93. Cf. προσπέρασον, quoted from Xen. An. iii. 2. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes not unnaturally uses μυρίδες where he exclamates (τι. 65), ταύταναι ἄλλα μυρίδειν κρίνεται ἐν πολλίς τις πολέμου φιλίστω. ταύταναι: the absolute contradictory of ἄλλα, here used rather than the somewhat weaker ἀκόνωτες.
This distinction is, however, not strictly maintained. Cf. 39 c, 43 d, and the similar use of τοιούτοις and καταλύω, μετακόμισαν τοίς καταλύω, καταλύω, κατασχέσας κατασχέσας. XVIII. 2. ἐν διαφθοράς ὅπως: he asked them μὴ θορυβεῖτε. See above on θορυβεῖτε, 17, and on μὴ θορυβεῖτε, 20 a. 3. καὶ γὰρ, μὲλλον γὰρ, εἰ γὰρ λοιπόν: the first γὰρ is closely connected with ἄκοντιν, the second goes back to the leading clause μὴ θορυβεῖν and accounts for the renewal of a request which the speaker has made three
5 \[\text{of aekteuthe: allā μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τούτο. εὐ γὰρ ἵστε, σο-}
\[\text{eān ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τουοῦτον οὖν οὐν εὐν ὑγά λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ}
\[\text{μείζω βλάψιτε ἥ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλά-}
\[\text{ψεις οὖτε λέητος οὖτε ἀνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ὑμῶιν ὑμῶιν ὁ-}
\[\text{λον ὁμοῖοι θεοῦν εἶναι ἀμεῖνοι, ἄνδρα ἑνὶ χεῖρονοι. \}]

10 \[\text{βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνεα μεντάν ἵστε ἡ ἐξελάσσει ἡ}
\[\text{ἀμισσεις; ἀλλὰ ταύτα οὗτοι μὲν ἵστε οἰεῖαι καὶ ἄλλος}
\[\text{τίς τινι μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἴομι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλ-}
\[\text{λον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτοι νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖ}
\[\text{ἀποκτείνωι. νῦν οὖν, ὡς ἄνδρες ἄθροιοι, πολλοὶ δέω}

15 \[\text{ἐγὼ ἐπέρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ἃς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἄλλα}
\[\text{ὑπὲρ ὑμῶι, μὴ τις ἑξαμάρτητος (περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ὑστὸν ὑμῶι}
\[\text{ἐμὸν καταφησάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε.}

30 times already. The third γὰρ, now, c
erly points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of γὰρ after prons. and advs., e.g. 31 b after ἐγὼ, and in general after any pref-
atory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in τῆς γὰρ ὴμί, 20 a. γὰρ with this force is esp. freq. after ἡ κε (τι κε) μέγιστος, δευτεροτάτος, also after ἡμέρι παντά, τετρά-
ποι παντά and other favorite idiomes of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1050, 4 a.

5. βοηθήσαν: this is more than a disturbance (θοροθρέα); it is an outcry.

9. δευτέρο γενέα ἄνδρας βλάπτε-
σθαι: cf. 21 b. δευτέρα takes the dat.,
and, after the analogy of δευτέρα, an
inf. (βλάπτεσθαι) is added. The pass.
βλάπτεσθαι makes this const. appear
more unusual than e.g. in Phaedo, 67 b,
μὴ καθαρῶς (νεκτον) γὰρ καθαρὸν ἐφα-
πτομαι μὴ ὁ δευτέρας. For the im-
port of the words δέως and δευτέρα, see on ὡ γὰρ δέως, 21 b.

10. ἀποκτείνα τιναὶ, ἢ ἀπομάχωι: d
ἀποκτείνα is used here secondarily of
the θεοῖ and the whole people, and
primarily of the accusers whose
prosecution aims at compassing Soc-
rate's death. ἀπομάχωι involved the fore-
fear of some or of all the rights of
citizenship. In the latter case the
ἀπομάχωι was looked upon by the state
as dead, i.e. he had suffered "civil
death" (in morte civilis), and his
property, having no recognized owner,
was confiscated. Cf. Rep. viii. 653 b,
eis ἐπιστρέφει ἀποκτείνα ὡς συμφαι-
tον τον ἀπόκτων τον ἐπιστρέφει τον ἐπι-
μαθῆτα καὶ τὴν ἀδίκων ἀπεστάλ-
σταν. See Appr. 11. ἄλλοι γε τοῦ: many another. See on ἄλλος, 28 a.

15. άλλο ὑπὲρ ὑμῶι: cf. Euthyphro's
remark just before the trial, Euthyph.
δὲ εἰ δὲ ἔμε ἐπικεφαλής (ὁ Μά
τας), εἰρωνεῖ ἄν, ὡς εἰρωνεῖ, ἐν τοῖς τυχεῖ
(totis) ἢν, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πρό-
τον ὑπὲρ τεικίνων λόγως γίνο-
το ὡς τῷ ἀποκτέρα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶι.
18. ἀντικρούσει, προσκεκλήσας: added instead of a clause with δέ to explain τοῦτον. See on ἀναστάσις 31 a. — ἀν καὶ γελοῦντερον εἰσεύθυρα: though it sounds rather absurd to say so, or better, “if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech.” This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. προσκεκλήσεις is the regular pass. of προσκεκλήσῃ. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading ἀν τοῦ θεοῦ, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. αὐτὸ τινῶν τινος: by a metathesis. For this word, cf. Æsch. Suppl. 307, 330, ἀνάλειψις (ad-dancing) ὁμοια γελοῦντερον (wringing on), ἀλετρόν (goddify) ἐκοινώνω εὕτεν αἱ ὕδατα νόσου ἡλείας. Also in the Prometheus Ia's tormentor is called ἀλετρόν (507) and ἐβίωσεν μῦρον (673 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a ἡλεῖα ἀναλείψις. Notice how humorously (γελοῦντερον) the situation is met. First the Athenians are met by a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the μῦρον is ingeniously elaborated as follows: “Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (προσκεκλήσας), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they are drowsing (αἱ ὑπέρδεκται). Then they make an impatient dash (προσκεκλήσας) at him which deprives them forever of his company.” For similar irony, cf. Verg. Aen. vi 90, nec temp. addita Juno usquam abest. μῦρον is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of spur. See App. — τίνος: like the Lat. qui-dam used to qualify an expression which is startling. — ὁμοια καὶ γελοῦντερον ἀν θεοῦ . . . προσκεκλήσας: lit. in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state, — such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc., a repetition of προσκεκλήσας [καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ]. Avoid the awkwardness of too literal translation. Notice that αὐτὸ really refers not to the μῦρον simply but to the μῦρον engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by τοῦτον τινα and the explanatory clause with δέ.

23. ἀνάλειψις ἀναλείπτων ἀναλεῖπτως alone requires the dat. Cf. II. 254, τῷ τὸν Ἀττικὴν Ἀγαμέμνονα πνεύματι λαβὼν δεῦρο ἀναλείπτως, and below 41 b. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of νεῖλον; both νεῖλον and ἀναλεῖπτως are however introduced simply to explain ἀναλείπτως, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions persuasive in part and partly reprehensile.

24. τῆς μῆλος . . . προσκεκλήσας: 31 a this specifies the means by which the
stoν οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅπιν πανταχοῦ προσκαθί·
25 ξων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ βαδισμὸν ὡς γενήσεται, ὅ ἄν-
δρες, ἀλλ’ εὖν ἐμοί πείθησον, φείδεσθε μου· ὑμεῖς δ’ ἵσως
tάχ’ ἐν’ ἁδρόμενοι, ὅσπερ οἱ νυστατῶντες ἐγειρόμενοι,
κρούσαντες ἀν με, πείθόμενοι. Ἀνύφο, βαδίσας ἂν ἀποκτε-
ναίτε, ἐπὶ τὸν λουτόν βιῶν καθεύσοντες διατελοῦν ἂν, εἰ
30 μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἐπιτέμεψεν κρούσαντες ὡμοῖοι.
ὁτι δ’ ἐγὼ τυχαίρω ἄν τοιοῦτος, οὗτος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐς
τολείς δεδοθήκας, εὐθείᾳ ἀν κατανοῆσαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀνδρεὶς
tύποι ἐοικεῖο̣τ’ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἠμεληκέναι’
καὶ ἀνάχειοσθαί των οἰκείων ἀμέλουμενων τοσαῦτα ἡδή ἑτη,
35 τὸ δὲ ψέφον πράττειν αὐτό, ἵδα ἕκαστο προσιόντα
ὅσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἄδελφον προσβυτερόν, πείθοντα ἐπιμε-
λείσθαι ἁρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπελάθων
καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταύτα παρεκκλεινόμεν, ἔχον ἐν τω̣
λόγῳ νῦν δὲ ὁράτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὃτι οἱ κατηγοροῖ τάκ-
λα πάντα ἀναίσχυντος οὐτῶν κατηγοροῦντες τούτῳ γε

31 process of awakening, indicated by
the three preceding particles, was made
possible. Prea. and aor. particles ex-
press the means, as the fut. partic. ex-
presses purpose. GMT. 832 f.; H. 909.
26. ἕως τάχ’ ἐστι: may be perhaps,
a combination which is by no means
infrequent. The importance of ἔνδοτος
is well indicated by the repetition of
the ἐστίν, which has already served to em-
phasise ἐρωταίτε. Notice, however,
that grammatically it is required only
once and goes with the verb of the
apod. ἄναρκτε. See on ἄναρκτος ἐστίν
ἀρ. 17 d.
27. ἀνέπηρ οἱ νυστατῶντες κτλ.: like
men disturbed in their nap. This sar-
casm could not fail to raise a laugh
at Athens where the ἄναρκτος νυστα-
τως was a common sight. Cf. Rep.
405 c, μὴν δὲ ἡδίκοι νυστατῶντες
διηκετήσθαι. Cf. Quint. Inst. iv. 1. 73.
29. ἰσθαντε: see on ἰσθανειν εἰκ., 23 ε.
For the inf. without the art., limiting
certain adjs. and advs., see GMT. 769;
H. 1000.
32. οἱ γὰρ: see on καὶ γὰρ, 30 c.— ἐς
ἀνεπίθυμον: the neut. used subst. Cf.
Phaed. 62 d, οὕτω τῶν ἀτέγονον. Com-
monly the neut. is used predicatively,
e. g. οὕτω τῶν ἀτέγονον ἵνα.
34. ἀνέχονται διαλυόμενως: for the
acc. or gen. allowed with this verb,
and for the added partic. see GMT.
879; H. 963.
37. ὅτι ἔστιν: if; to be sure. rela-
influences the apod. (ὁς ὁς κτλ.) as
well, then at least I should have some
reason, i.e. there would be an obvious
explanation of my conduct. Cf. 34 d,
ἀνέπηρ τάχ’ ἐστιν νῦν εἰκος κτλ.
οὐχ οἷον τε ἐγένοτο ἀπαναληθήσαται, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ των ἑπεξεργαζόμενων μισθοῦν ἡ γηγοῦσα ἢκαίον γὰρ, οἷς ἐγὼ παρέχωμαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πειθαρχικήν.

XIX. Ἰσως δὲν οὖν δόξειν ἀτόπον εἶναι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἑιδα μὲν ταῦτα ξιμουβολεῖσθαι περιμόν καὶ πολυπραγμόν, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὔ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ύπερτέρα.

41. σοὶ οὖν τε: "They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d; but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it." R. The leading idea of the clause ἀπαναληθήσαται ... μάρτυρα is expressed in the participle, not in ἀπανα-

43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχωμαι μάρ-

τυρα καὶ ἐσεὶς ἐκ παράγομος λαλῆσθαι. Cf. 20 a. λαλέω is used proli-

catively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἰσως δὲν οὖν δόξειν ἀτο-

πον: Socrates has two good reasons: (1) his divine mission, (2) the per-

sonal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really in-

cludes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7). He points out that the people to whom the people (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῶν πολέων προγραμμάτων ἐπιμέλειας. He pointedly asks Charmides: εἰ τε καὶ ἀνυπαντήτω τῶν τῶν πολέων προγραμ-

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εἰ τε καὶ ἀνυπαντήτω τῶν τῶν πολέων προγραμ-

43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχωμαι μάρ-

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cludes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7). Ἀδικήσων μὲν ἄθικον ἄθικον αὐτούς ἐκ προεκτικῆς τῆς ἀθητοῦ διὰ τοῦτο διαγράφοντα τὸ τοῖχον (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῶν πολέων προγραμ-

43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχωμαι μάρ-

tυρα καὶ ἐσεὶς ἐκ παράγομος λαλῆσ-

ται. Cf. 20 a. λαλέω is used proli-

catively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἰσως δὲν οὖν δόξειν ἀτο-

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process of awakening, indicated by the three preceding parts, was made possible. Pres. and aor. parts. express the means, as the fut. partic. expresses purpose. GMT. 832 f.; H. 909.

26. ἐς τὰξ ἢς: may be perhaps, a combination which is by no means infrequent. The importance of ἔπωμεν is well indicated by the repetition of the ἢς, which has already served to emphasize ἀποκεφαλέω. Notice, however, that grammatically it is required only once and goes with the verb of the apod. ἀνατείνων. See on ἐς τὰξ ἢς, 17 d.

27. ἀντιπ. of νισταζόμενον κτλ.: like men disturbed in their nap. This sarcasm could not fail to raise a laugh at Athens where the δικαστής νισταζόμενος was a common sight. Cf. Rep. 405 c, μηδὲν ἔσεσθαι νισταζόμενος δικαστής. Cf. Quint. Inst. iv. 1, 73 a.

29. ἐς: see on μεσίταιν ἢς, 23 c.

31. ἔπωμεν ἢς: cf. Crit. 46 b. For the inf. without the art., limiting certain adj. and adv., see GMT. 769; H. 1000.

32. μὴ γὰρ: see on καὶ γὰρ, 30 c. — ἀναποκεφαλέω: the neut. used subst. Cf. Phaed. 62 d, ὅπως τοῦτο ἄντι ἢς. Commonly the neut. is used predicatively, e.g. ὅπως τοῦτο κτλ. ἢς ἐστιν.

34. ἀνέκεσθαι ἀμελεμένωρ: for the acc. or gen. allowed with this verb, and for the added partic. see GMT. 879; H. 963.

37. εἰ μένοι: if, to be sure. ταῦτα influences the apod. (στολής κτλ.) as well, then at least I should have some reason, i.e. there would be an obvious explanation of my conduct. Cf. 34 b, στολής ἢς λάθος ἢς κτλ.
οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναβραχυνθῆσαι, παρασκήμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἤγος ποτέ τινα ἡ ἐπράξιν ποτὸν ἡ γηγορία. ἰκανὸν γὰρ, οἷμα, ἔγον παρέχοιμα τοῦ μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν περίαν.

XIX. Ἱσως ἂν ὁν δοξείην ἀποτον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἴδια μὲν ταῦτα ἐμβουλεύω περιμένω καὶ πολυνεργουμένω δημοσία δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον.

31. 41. οὐχ ὠλθεὶ: "They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 δ; but what they did not find is practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it."

The leading idea of the clause ἀπαναβραχυνθῆσαι... μάρτυρα is expressed in the participle, not in ἀπαναβραχυνθῆσαι. For cases where αἰσχρῶν, used with a participle, does not contain the main idea, cf. 28 b, 20 d, ὄροι 53 c. — τοῦτο ἀπαναβραχυνθῆσαι: π. τὸν τῆς ἀπαναβραχυνθῆσαι ἀναμφιτεκτῆσαι. And in this compound contributes the idea of completion, which in the case of shamelessness involves going to an extreme, to go to such an extreme with their shamelessness, or, to be so absolutely shameless as this. The kindred notion of fulfilling a task undertaken is also involved. Cf. Xen. An. ill. 2. 18, ἀκολουθεῖν, meaning pay off the arrears of a promised sacrifice.

43. τοῦ μάρτυρα: σ. παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὃ μάρτυρε παρέχομαι λέων ἄνως. Cf. 20 a. λέων is used predicatively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἰσως ἂν οὖν δοξείην ἀποτον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἴδια μὲν ταῦτα ἐμβουλεύω περιμένω (1) his divine mission, (2) the personal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really includes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. Mem. ill. 7), ἔμλησον μὲν ἔθει διὰ τοῦ ἀναμφιτεκτῆσαι τοῦτον καὶ τὸν τῆς πολλῆς προγόνων ἐπειμηλέουσαν. He pointedly asks Charmides: εἰ δὲ τις, ἔσκοτο διὸ τῶν τῆς πολλῆς προγόνων ἐπειμηλέουσαν τὴν τὰ πολλὰ ἀβίδες (advancing the common view) καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ τούτο γυμνᾶτα, ἐκεῖ χώραν ἐκεῖ τούτο κράτειν τὸν οὖν ἐκεῖνον καὶ λαλεῖν νομίζει; Cfr. 33 a, b.

2. πολυνεργοῦμαι: om a body. See on προπερασθείς, 19 b. Nothing short of a divine mission could justify this. Plato invariably uses the word in an unfavorable sense. Cf. Gorg. 536 c, ἀρδεύσας θεολόγοι τα ἄνυπο πράξεις καὶ οὐ πολυνεργοῦσας ὑπὲρ τῆς βίου. There is a subtle irony in πολυνεργοῦμαι as here used by Socrates. It was his business to mind other people's business, therefore he was far from being really πολυνεργούμαι. Cf. Xen. Mem. ill. 11. 18, καὶ ἰδιότητα ἐνεχάριν (ridiculing) τὴν ἀντίλογον (abstention from business). "ἈΛΛΑ, ἢ Θεολόγε, ἢρ, ἢ οὐ πάντα μια ἄνηκὴν ἐντενεκαίνοι (be at leisure), καὶ γαρ τὰ πρῶτα πολλὰ καὶ θηµίσια παρέξει μια διπλάς (keep me busy)." Cfr. 33 a, b.

3. ἀομβαίναι εἰς τὸ πλῆθος: there is no implication, as in 17 c, on ὃς τὸ δῆμον. The πλῆθος commonly assembled in the Πνύξι, to which Socrates
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ρον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ εἰσὶ ἐστὶν ὅ μεῖς 31
5 ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκριβῶς πολλάξου λέγωντος, ὅτι μοι θείον
τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνῇ], δὴ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἡ
ἐπικωμοδών Μέλητος ἑγράφατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἢκ
παῦσις ἀρξάμενον φωνῇ τις γιγνομένη, ἡ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ
ἀποτρέπει με τούτῳ ὅ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐ-
10 ποτε· τούτῳ ἐστὶν ὅ μοι ἐναντίοντα τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν,
καὶ παγκόσμιος γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσαί· εὖ γὰρ ἰστο, δὲ
ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπέχειρον πράττειν τὰ
πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολλῆν καὶ οὕτῳ ἄν νῦς
ὀφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτὶ ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄθετοσθε·
15 λέγωντι τάλθη· οὖ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτις ἀνθρώπων σωθῆσαι
οὕτω μὲν ὀλίγων πλῆθει οὐδὲν γνησίως ἐναντιοῦμεν 
καὶ διακωλῶν πολλὰ ἀδίκα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν τὸν τῷ ὀντὶ μαχούμενον
31 thus would, like every one else, be obliged to ascend. Cf. Dem. xvii.
160, ὁμοία δὲ εἰς τὸν ἐκλειστὸν ἐκτέκτονα καὶ τὰ ἐκφύλια ἐκ
κόλαστο. — τὰ πλήθους τὸ στράτευμα: see on τὸ πλῆθος, 21 a.
5. θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται,
[φωνῇ]: see Intro. 27, with first π. on p. 21, and 32. φωνῇ is explanatory of
the vague θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, and
is in the pred.: a something divine and
from God manifests itself to me, a voice.
This thought is earnestly reiterated
below in nearly the same words. See
App.
12. πολίω...πολίω: the rights and
duties of Athenian citizenship began
as soon as a man was twenty.
13. ἀνθρωπίνης, ἀφολήτη: the earlier
Att. writers rarely use the plp. in
this. G. 777, 4; H. 458 a.
15. οὐ, οὔτε, οὐκ, οὐδεποτέ: a re-
markable repetition of the neg. Cf.
34 a.
16. γυναικὶ: uprightly or openly.
πλατονος

υπ’ τοις δικαιοι (καὶ εἰ μὲλεῖ διάγον χρόνον σωθήσεται. 22
σοθά) ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοτικῶς.

XX. Μεγάλα δ’ ἔγγυε μᾶλτι σεμπόρια παρέξομαι
tούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκου-
σάτε δὴ μοι τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ὑπὸ εἰδήτε ὑπὸ ωὸν
δὲ ἐν ἑνὶ ἵστασθομι παρὰ τὸ δικαίων δεύτερας θάνατον, (μη
δ’ ἰδιωτικῶς) δὲ ἁμα ἀπολογητικ. ἐρῶ δὲ μᾶλτι φορτικά μὲν καὶ

19. καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐξ οὗτος ἠλέγοντο (raising side
issues) ἐντοί θεράποντες, μοὶ ἀπο-
δικνύοντες δὲ στρατιώται ἀγω-
νοι ἐκεῖνοι κτῆσιν. For another instance
of this practice indulged in, cf. 29 ε—
29 a.

3. οὐκ ἐν ισότητι: stronger than οὐκότι
ἐν. Cf. Cor. 512 a, τὸν ἐγκαταλείποντα (fate) οὐκ ἐν ἐκ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἐν
521 ε, δὲ μεν ὁμοίως, δὲ ἑκατέρας, ὑπεκ-
ειν μέν ἐν τοῖς τινάδις... How
confident you seem, Socrates, that you
never will suffer any of these things!
G. 378; H. 290 a.

4. ἐνευκαλέομαι: second nor. opt. from
σωθήσεται with ἀπέδεικτο to the stem,
ἐν. See G. 779; H. 494 and a.
The present ἐνευκαλέομαι, like ἐνευκαλέο-
μαι, ἐνευκαλέον (ἱστος) and σχι-
θεύον (σχευ), is prob. a fiction. It is
hard to prove that this θ adds strength
to the meaning of ἐνευκαλέομαι. In
certain cases this θ is appended in the pres.

5. ἦν ἁπαλομέτροι: if this, as Schanz
maintains, is what Plato really wrote,
the necessary ἐν gets itself supplied
from 29 ε to 29 a above. Cron, fol-
lowing Stallbaum, writes ἦν καὶ ἦν
ὅτι; Riddell defends Ast’s conjecture,
ἣν ἀκο. The text here still remains
hard to establish. See App.—σφα-
τερα καὶ διακαια: cheap and tedious
commonplaces, a collocation which
suggests the words of Callicles, who,
by way of reproof, says to Socrates (Gorg. 482 e) "εγὼ γὰρ, ὦ Ἀθηναίων, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμιαν πώς τε ἥρξα εν τῇ πόλει, ἐξουσίας δὲ... καὶ ἔτους ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή 'Αντιοχίς πρωταρχεύουσα, ὥστε..."

... Or reproof is the word to use to the Athenians, to make them see that they have been the cause of this disaster to the city, and to give them the right to make the laws for the city. For δημοτοπιος refers to the city, and δημοσία λεγεται, μετατρέφεται αυτῶν τὴν δόμων φορτικα. Δὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖ. For δημοτοπιος, which has the sense of in bad taste, cf. Gorg. 494 e, where Callicles, shocked at Socrates's remarks, says ἐς ἄνευς εἰ, ὥστε... καὶ διεξαγοράς δημοτοποιεῖται. See also on ἀκελαστικόν, 117 c. It was common in the courts and assemblies at Athens for the speakers to call a spade a spade. Of course they always declared that they must speak the truth, and the whole truth. This duty was often made the pretext for utterances not strictly in good taste.

b 7. ἐξουσίας δὲ: but I was chosen to the senate, i.e. the senate of five hundred, chosen by lot. One of this senate's chief duties was to act as a committee, so to speak, before whom came, in the first instance, the questions to be dealt with by the ἑκάστρον (assembly). A preliminary decree (προ-βολεύω) from this senate was the regular form in which matters came before the assembly.

8. ἔτευξε... πρωταρχεύοντα: the fifty representatives in the senate of each of the ten tribes (each ἀρχή taking its turn in an order yearly determined by lot) had the general charge of the business of the senate, and directed the meetings both of the senate and of the popular assembly, for 35 or 30 days, i.e. one tenth of the lunar year of 354 days, or in leap years, for 38 or 30 days. Of this board of fifty (whose members were called πρωταρχεύοντα) during its term of office one member was chosen every day by lot, as ἔτευξε, or president. The ἔτευξε held the keys of the public treasury and of the public repository of records, also the seal of the commonwealth, and, further, presided at all meetings of the senate and of the assembly. Later (prob. in 378 B.C.), the archonship of Nausinicus, when the board of nine πρόδειχνον, whom the ἔτευξε chose every morning by lot from the non-prytaneis tribes, was established) a new officer, the ἔτευξεν τῶν προδειχιων, relieved him of this last duty. In Socrates's time, the φαλή πρωταρχεύοντα, and the ἔτευξεσ of the day, had the responsibility of putting to the vote (ἐνφα-σις) any question that arose or of refusing to allow a vote. Socrates belonged to the ἕκαστρο 'Ἀλεξανδρέων, in the ὕπερ 'Ἀρτεμίς. Notice the addition of 'Ἀρτεμίς here without the art. and as an afterthought; ἕκαστρο ἢ φαλή would have been sufficient, though less circumstantial. — ἄν ἐρῶστον: after the Athenian success off the islands called Arginaeae, in 400 B.C. This battle is also spoken of as ἔνεπα ὅλον ἴσναι, Xen. Hell. II. 3. 33-38. The victorious generals were promptly prosecuted for remissness in the performance of their duty. Accused of having shown criminal neglect in falling to gather up the dead and save those who, at the end of the engagement, were floating about on wrecks, they pleaded "not guilty." The squad-
The text appears to be in Ancient Greek. It is a philosophical work, possibly discussing a duty or an action that had been hindered by stress of weather. The main focus is on the illegal procedure by which people were condemned, and the illegal nature of the procedure is emphasized. The text also mentions the general practice at Athens, the decree of Cannonus, and the provision of ships (apart) for the war. The full text reads as follows:

"τῆς ναυμαχίας ἔσωδεσθε ἀθρόον κρίνει, παρανόμος, ὡς (ἐν τῷ υστέρῳ χρόνῳ) πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐδοξέ. τὸν ἐγὼ μόνον

..."
12. ἀφαίρεσθαι: used absolutely as often.—μὴ δὲν πουέι: after the neg. idea in ἀφαίρεσθαι. GMT. 807, c; H. 903 and 1029. But cf. 31 d a.

13. καὶ ἐναύτια ἄφθισθαι: and I voted against it, i.e. allowing the question to be put. See App. Socrates was ἐναύτια τῶν πρωτάνων on this day and followed up this opposition,—manifested when in consultation with the other πρωτάνων,—by absolutely refusing to put the question to vote. Cf. Gorg. 474 α; Xen. Mem. I. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2. For a different account of the facts, see Grote’s Greece, c. 04, fin. Connect ἐναύτια ἄφθισθαι with μὴν τῶν πρωτάνων. — ἐνδεκατέραυς, ἄφθιας: ἐνδεκατέραυς and ἄφθιας were two summary methods of procedure in making prosecutions. Both dispensed with the usual delay, and allowed the magistrates (in ἐνδεκατέραυς, it was the board of the Themothetæ; in ἄφθιας, it was usually the board called of ἐνδεκατεραύῳ) to deal summarily with certain charges. ἐνδεκατεραύῳ was a form of summary indictment, laying information usually against one who discharged functions or exercised rights for which he was legally disqualified, as when an ἀρχαῖς entered public places in Athens; ἄφθιας was the summary arrest and giving in charge of a man caught in actual crime. Cf. Poll. v. 8. 49. ἦλθεν ἄφθιας, ἦλθεν ἀρχαῖς ἐν ὑποθήκῃ χειρὸς τῶν πρῶτων ἀρχαίων ἐν ἀρχαῖαις λαθῶν ἀρχαῖαις. The two processes might therefore be used in the same case.

14. τῶν ἄρρητων: these professional speakers had no class privileges; only their more frequent speaking distinguished them from ordinary citizens.


16. μὴν ἐστὶν γεγονόσιν: to place oneself on your side.

19. εἰ τριάκοντα: they were called the Thirty rather than the Thirty Tyrants.—οἷς: in turn. Both democracy and oligarchy, however opposed in other respects, agreed in attempting to interfere with the independence of Socrates.

20. ἐν τῷ δήλῳ: the Revenge. The name ἀυτός was also applied to it from its resemblance to a parasol. Cf. Harp. (i.e. ἀυτός) who further says it was the place ἀνακοινώνωσ
ALEONTA TOW SAMALIMEION-IXA APOTHARO. ODA OI KAI ALLON SAE
SKEINEI POLLOI POLLA PROSEFEANTOU (BOULÔMEI NOI PLÊI-
STOYES ANAPLHTAI AIÔTAN) TOTE MÉNTOI EJÔU OI LÖPHY ALI'A
ERPHOS OI ENEIDEAMHN, ŒTI EYÔI THANATÔN MÊN MELEI, EI MHI
25 ΔΡΟΝΩΠΕΤΗΡΟΝ HN EIPÊV, OÛN OPIAV, TOUDE MÊDÉN AÔKIOU
MÊD ANOSION ERHAGÔSHTAI, TOUÒU XETO TÔN ÏÔN MELEI. EIMI
GÁR EKEINH H ARKH OÝK EKEÎLHEIEN OUTOS IZHUPR ÔDÔS,
OÔTE AÔKION TÔ EKÔSASBEI, ALL' ETEIDI EK TÔS ÓLôn
EKÎLHEMEN, OI MÊN TÊTARES ĖXÔTON EIS SAMALIMÔA KAI ÊH-

(rim: die) oi perádes. Cf. also Poll.
yll. 155, ἢ θάλας εἰ ναυαίνουσιν ἵκατει θυλᾶς πρὸς ταῖς ἐν τῶι
πτερυγίων θυλᾶς, ἢ πτερυγιο-
θάλας ἔφηκε εἰς περὶ οἰκοδομητικάν, εἰς θυλᾶς, ἢ τῇ ἀλλα
αιοδομήτων. The Thirty used the θάλας as their official
residence.

21. ALEONTA: Leon of Salamis was an
Athenian general. He, like Ly-
sias' brother Polemarchus and many
others (Xen. Hell. ii. 39), fell a vic-
tim of the rapacity of the Thirty. —
-policy: i.e. toaîta ydr. Cf. Cic. Cat.
nii. 10. 25, quae bellum nullam...
barbaria... gessit.—âiâ: in
speaking of an incontrovertible fact,
indeed. Notice the order of words.

22. οὐκαλήμενοι: implicate, the Lat.
implere, or contaminate. οὐκ-
αιλεῖμα is used similarly. Cf. Phaed.
67α, ὅτι δὲ μᾶλλα μᾶλλ' ἐμιλα-
ίμερ τῶι σώματι μᾶλλ' κοινωνεῖ,
ὅτι μὴ ἐστὶν ἀκαθαρσία τῶ;
σώματι ἄνεγκα, μᾶλλ' ἐνακτιμολογεῖσθαι τῶι τοῦτος
φύσεως. With this passage cf.
especially Antipho, ii. 10, συγεπι-
vελαμεν τοὺς ἀνωτάτους. For the facts,
cf. Lyse. xii. 33, συμφελισθέντας μὲν γὰρ
ἐναὶ ἅγιον, συνεδιδίδεισθαι τῇ ἁγίασθαι.
See also Critias' speech in the Odeum, Xen. Hell. ii. 4.

23: δὲ ὁτι ἐκλειπνεῖ, διαπερ καὶ τὰμά μὲς ἔστε
ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶι κινδύνῳ μετῆχεν,
τῶι νῦν καταλημμένων ἐλεφθοῦντων κα-
tαμφυβόλως ἑτεῖν, ἵνα ταῦτα ἁμι
καὶ θρηστεύο καὶ ροθήσει.

24. εἰ μὴ ἰθυκοπέτηρὸν ἂν ἡπάνιν: a
supposition contrary to fact with
suppressed apod. used by way of show-
ing hesitation. Cf. the same const.
in Euthyd. 283 ε, ὃ ἑλθ' ἄρα, εἰ μὴ
ἀροικοπέτηρόν ἂν ἐπείτην, εἶπον
καὶ "καὶ εἰς θηράν" δ' τι μᾶλλον 
καὶ τῶι ὅλων ἄποφεξάκει κτῆ.
The usages of gentle speech at Athens
adopted this formula to soften and
excuse a strong expression. Cf. Coryn.
500α, ταῦτα... κατέκεισθα καὶ δίδονα,
kai εἰ ἰθυκοπέτῆρόν ἂν ἑπάνιν, εἰ ἐπη-
ροῦσι καὶ δαμανττικός λαύοσι.
The ἰθυκοπέτηρόν ς, for which Soc-
rates apologizes, is undoubtedly the
curt and blunt colloquialism of μέλει
μεν εὖ ἄνω. Such an apology per-
haps would prepare the less sensitive
modern for language not less curt and
blunt, but far more "colloquial."

25. τῷοτῷ δέ: pointedly summa-
rizes the preceding clause.

26. θοτι: not the correlative of
οὖτις, but to be connected immedi-
ately with ἐξήλθε. The idiom ἐ-
πλήττειν τιν ὑπὲρ τι is similar.

27. εἰς, εἰς: went straight
AΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

30 γον λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾄχόμην ἀπίων οἰκαδε. καὶ ὅσως ἂν 32
διά ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἄρχη διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη.
καὶ τούτων ύμῶν ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

32 [XXI] 'Αρ' οὖν ἂν με οἰσθής τοσάδε ἑτ' ἰδαγενέσθαι,
εἰ ἐπραττόν τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων ἀξίων ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ
ἐβοηθοῦν τοῖς δικαίως καὶ, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείον
του ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι· οὐδὲ
5 γὰρ ἂν ἀλλὸς ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἐπραξα, τοιοῦτοι φανοῦμαι, καὶ
διὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅτι, οὐδεὶς πάσοτε ἐγγιώργησας οὐδὲν παρὰ
τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὖδει, οὐσ οἱ διαβόλοι
λοντες ἐμὲ φασών ἐμὸν μαθητᾶς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος

10 μὲν οὐδεὶς πάσοτε ἐγγούμην· εἰ δὲ τῖς μου λέγοντος
καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθύμει ἀκούεις, εἰπεῖ νεώτε-

32 cf. The recurrence of the same
word only makes more plain the dif-
cidence of the courses pursued.
31. διὰ ταχέων: a common ex-
pression with Thucydides and Xenophon,
equiv. to διὰ τάχος. Cf. διὰ βραχίων,
Prot. 330 a.; Gorg. 449 a. The Thirty
were only eight months (June 404-
Fbr. 403) in power, for they ceased
to rule when Critias fell at Munychia
in the engagement with Thrasybulus
and the returned exiles. In the in-
terim before the restoration of the
democracy, ten men, doublets one for
each φιλή, were put in their place.
Cf. Xen. Hell. II. 4. 23.
32. μάρτυρες: possibly proceedings
were here interrupted for these wit-
nesses, though it seems quite as likely
that Socrates is appealing to the ἀσ-
νατοι themselves to be his witnesses.
Hermann, who thus understands it,
reads ἐσὼν instead of ἐσών, an unneces-
sary change.
XXI. 1. ἐσὼ: by ἐσώ we are
referred to what immediately pre-
cedes for our answer to this question.
2. ἐπραττόν: distinctly refers to a
continued course, a line of action.
3. τοῖς δικαίως: whatsoever was just,
neut., a concrete way of expressing an
abstraction.
5. ἀλλ' ἐγώ: i. e., "however it may
32 a be with others, as for me, I, etc."
6. τοιοῦτος: explained by ἐγγιώ-
ρησα. This amounts to a very di-
rect appeal to the facts, and may be
regarded as a shorter substitute for
tοιοῦτον φανοῦμαι δοτε (or 01ει) μεθα
ἐγκαθισσόμεν, καὶ γὰρ φανοῦμαι μεθα
ἐγκαθισσόμεν. For the commoner but
more vague idioms, cf. Crit. 46 b.
9. ἐσὼ δὲ στ.: see Introd. 25, fn.
11. τα ἐμαυτῷ πράττοντος: see on
κολαστήριον. 31 e. ἐπιθύμει does not
exclude either ἐπιθύμει οτι ἐπιθύμει,
but rather implies them. Cf. ταχέων
in 18 d. The notion of habitual action
is conveyed in the form of the same
single act indefinitely repeated.
ΠΑΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

ροσ είτε προσβήτερος, οιδείνε πάσοτε ἐφόδυμησα, οιδεὶ χρή. 33
ματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι (μὴ λαμβάνων) δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ‘ θ
ὀμοίως καὶ πλούσιως καὶ πόρωτι παρ’ εῶρι πάντων ἐρωτῶν, ἴ
αλγεὶς ηὐς ὡς πάντως ἐρωτήσας; τά δέ ἔργα τὰ ἀνθρώποι
καὶ εἰς τις θυβήται ἀποκρύφαμεν ἀκούειν ἀν αὐξένας. 35
καὶ τούτων ἐνῷ εἶτε τις ὁσιότος γύρναται εἶτε μη, οὐκ ἀν
δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπεξομι, ἐν μητο ὑπεχώρην μηδενὶ "σύλε
μηδὲν πάσοτε μάθημα μῆτε ἑνδαξάζα. ἐπὶ δὲ τις φησι παρ’
ἐμοῦ πάσοτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μη καὶ ἀλλοι
20 πάντες, εἴ ἵστη ὅτι ὁὐκ ἀληθὴς λέγει.

33 a 12. οὐδὲ: applies neither to the
μήν nor to the ἃς clause separately,
but to their combination. See on
ἐν οὐκ τίς, 28 d.

b 15. ἀπεκρύβαμεν ἀκούειν: charac-
teristic of the Socratic ὑπεξομι. See
Introd. 19.—ἀκούειν εὐδ.: first ἀκο-
εῖν is to be construed with θυβήται
(see on τοῦτο, 31 d), then παράχω
ἐρωτήσας ἀκούειν is to be supplied from
the preceding. After παράχω, ἀκο-
εῖν, like ἐρωτῶν above, expresses pur-
pose. See G. 1532 and H. 901; also,
for the use of the act. voice, see
G. 1629; H. 952 a. Socrates means:
I am ready for questions, but if any
so wishes he may answer and hear
what I then have to say.

16. τοῦτων ἐνώ εὐδ.: ἐνό is placed
next to τοῦτος for the sake of con-
trast, while τοῦτον, though it is gov-
erned by τοῦτον, inevitably adheres to
τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπεξομι. This last cor-
responds as a pass. to τὴν ἐρωτήσαι
or προσβῆναι. The notion of respon-
sibility is colored, like the Eng. "have
to answer for," with the implication
of blame. For an account of those
whom Socrates had chiefly in mind,
see Introd. 24 and 33.

17. ἐπικριθήναι: is meant probably
as a side thrust at imposing prom-
lises like the one attributed to Pro-
tagoras about his own teaching in

33 b Prot. 319 a. Socrates himself fol-
lowed no profession strictly so called,
had no ready-made art, or rules of
art, to communicate. His field of
instruction was so wide that he can
true in that, in the accepted sense
of ἀλλαξάν καὶ μαθηματικά at Athens,
his pupils got no learning from him.
They learned no μάθημα, acquired no
useful (professional) knowledge. He
put them in the way of getting it
for themselves. Plato makes Soc-
rates decline to become the tutor of
Nicias’s son (Lach. 207 d). He taught
nothing positive, but removed by his
searching questions the self-deception
which prevented men from acquiring
the knowledge of which they were
able. See his successful treatment of
the conceited ἐφόδυμησα ὅ καθέτε.

19. ἀλλοι οὕτε: not very dif-
ferent in meaning from ἄλλος τίς, 28 a.
It differs from of ἄλλοι οὕτε, the
common reading here, just as παράχω
ἐρωτήσεις (all conceivable men) differs
from παρὰς ἐρωτήσεις. In such
cases if the noun alone would not
have taken the art, it does not take
it when qualified by τίς and the like.
Compare all others and all the others.
Here we have a complete antithesis.
XXII. 'Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ᾽ ἐμοὶ χαίροντι τυγεῖς, τολὴν χρόνον διατριβοῦτες; ἀκριότατα, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. πάσον ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, οτι ἀκούοντες χαίροντες εξετάζομενοι τοὺς οἰκίους μεν εἰναι σοφοῖς, οὐδὲ οὐν ἂντι γὰρ οὐκ ἀπέδειξί ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὅσ ἐγὼ φημι, προστετακταί ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντεῖων καὶ ἐξ ἑνυπνίων καὶ παιντὶ τρόπῳ, οὗτος τίς ποτε καὶ ἀλλὰ θεία μοιρὰ ἀνθρώπῳ (καὶ οὕτων προστατάζει) πράττειν. ταύτα, οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἀλήθεια ἅπτει καὶ εὐδελεύτα.

10 εἰ γάρ δὴ ἐγών τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρεφταρκα, χρὴν δὴσαι, εἰτε τυγεῖς αὐτῶν προσβύτεροι.

33 to ἕσει, which takes the place of the more usual ἔσολος; Socrates calls attention to the publicity of the places where he talks (cf. 17 c) and to the opportunity of conversing with him offered to all alike.

c XXII. 3. ἔσει: the first clause really answers διὰ τί... διατριβοῦτες; but grammatically it is an appended explanation of τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and is governed by ἔσει. — ἐμοῦ... ἐξετάζομενοι: both are in close relation with χαίροντι; contrast the const. of the same particles. in 23 a.

5. οὐκ ἀπέδειξόν: i.e. ἔσολον, a case of λιτεύσι (simplicity), or μείωσι (diminution), quite like the Eng. not at all unpleasant. Such are the common ὅσ ἡστατα (ὑπὲρ παρὰ μείωσι) and οὐ πάνω (cf. not quite). Socrates perhaps agreed with La Rochefoucauld, Maximes, 31. Si nous n'avions point de défauts, nous ne prendrions pas tant de plaisir à en remarquer dans les autres.— ὃς ἐγὼ φημι: as I maintain, implying not so much that he makes his assertion now as that he now emphatically calls attention to the assertion already made and substantiated. For the analogous use of the pres. express-
γενόμενοι ἐγὼναν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πότε τι ἐνεβελευσα, νυὲ αὐτοῖς ἀναβάλλοντας ἐμοῦ καθηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον, τῶν 15 οἰκείων τις τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τί κακὸν ἐπε- πόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνησθαί [καὶ τιμωρε- σθαι]. Πάντως δὲ πάρεσων αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταύθαι οὖς ἐγὼ ὅρα, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὕτως, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ 20 δημότης, Κριτοβοῦλος τούδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Αὐσάνας ὃ ἐ συμφωνεῖ in an unfulfilled obligation. H. 807. All the prots. here expressed, including el διαφέλουν and el ἐνεβελεύ- 
θεσα, belong to the first class (GMT. 415; H. 803), and the apod. χρῆ πορ- 
volves its own unfulfilled condition. 
But see GMT. 417. χρῆ together with this implied prot. forms the 
σφόδρο which goes with el διαφελέω κτλ. GMT. 510. This prot. is dis-
junctively elaborated in two parallel 
clauses, (1) ἐνεβελευσα, (2) el δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον. 
See on εἰπερ κτλ. 27 ὃ. 
Instead of εἰπερ ... εἰπερ we have εἰπερ ... el δὲ (like ὁποῖο ... ὁποῖο), which gives a certain independence to the 
second member. Hence it is treated as a condition by itself, and the lead-
ning protasis, el διαφέλου, is sub-
stantially repeated in εἰπερ ἐνεβελεύσαν. 
If (as Meletus urges) I am corrupting 
some young men, and have corrupted 
others, then (if they were doing their 
duty) they would, supposing some of 
them convinced on growing older that 
in their youth ἰ, etc., now stand forth, 
etc. 
13. ἀναβάλλοντας: see on χρῆ δια-
θέεσα, 17 ὃ. 
15. τῶν ἐκείνων: on the repetition 
of the art. here, see G. 605, 2; II. 608. 
16. τῶν προσήκοντας: Eng. idiom 
suggests either τῶν προσήκοντων or τῶν προσήκοντων without the art. After 
the detailed enumeration, κατέρα ... 
δημότης, τούδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Αὐσάνας ὃ ἐ 
sympathy states an unfulfilled obligation. 
After the detailed enumeration, κατέρα ... 
δημότης, τούδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Αὐσάνας ὃ ἐ 

17. ἐνεβελεύσαν: combine with 
μεμνησθαί, and the idea is that of μη-
σικέω, a word which had lately been 
much used in the political turmoil at 
Athens. Cf. the final agreement be-
tween oligarchs and democrats, Xen. 
Hell. ii. 4, 43, ἡ μὲν μὴ μησικεφ-
σικέω. 
18. τάντας: as in answers, cer-
tainly.—ἐνταύθα: connect with νά-
ρωσις, which thus denotes the result 
of νάρωμα. We might call it here 
2. 2, καὶ λαβίτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄρρητα ὡς 
Σφάλη. For the converse, cf. 30 ὃ, 
ἐνταύθα σὺ ἀπέβαλε. 
19. Κρίτων: it is he whose name 
is given to the well-known dialogue of 
Plato. See Intro. 62. 
20. δημότης: see on ἠτικες κατονέ-
σσα, 32 ὃ.—Κριτοβοῦλος: although 
his father Crito modestly declares 
(Euthyd. 271 b) that he is thin (εὐλε-
ρος) in comparison with his exquisite 
playmate Clinias (cousin of Alcibiades), 
Critoebolus was famous for 
his beauty. See Xen. Symp. 4. 13 ὃ.
He was one of Socrates' most constant companions. The Economicus of Xenophon is a conversation between Socrates and Critobulus. The affection between Socrates and Crito is best shown by the pains taken by the former in furthering Critobulus' education. In the Memorabilia (i. 3. 8 ff.) Socrates indirectly reproves Critobulus by a conversation in his presence held with Xenophon. The same lesson he reinforces (ii. 6. esp. 31 and 32). That it was needed appears from the impetuous character shown by Critobulus in Xenophon's Symposium. Cf. 3. 7, τι γὰρ αὐτῷ, ἢ μή, ἢ ἔρημον, ἢ δὴ ἔρημον, τίνι τινί μεγίστον φρονίς (of what are you prudent?); τίνι αὐξάνω, ἢ μή. That Critobulus perplexed his father is shown in Euthyd. 300 d, where, speaking of his son, Crito says: ἐὰν ἀπῆλθεν ἡ γυνὴ ἡμῶν ἔχει (is getting on) καὶ δεῖ τινα γίνεσαι, δεῖ τινι ἀρσενικόν ἕσσελθαι. — οὗτος ὁ Σφήττιος: of the ἢμεροῖ φρετῆ καθ' ἐσοχάθειαν.

21. Σφήττιος: like Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes, Aeschines (surnamed ὁ Εὐρυπρόδετος) carefully wrote down the sayings of Socrates after the master's death. Three dialogues preserved among the writings of Plato have been attributed to Aeschines the Socratic. The Eryxias possibly is by him, but hardly either the Aischylos or the treatise εἰς ἄρτης. Aeschines was unpractical, if we can trust the amusing account given by Lysias (fr. 3) of his attempt to establish, with borrowed money, a ἱππαρχία (mule-shoer). His failure in this venture may have led him to visit Syracuse, where, according to Lucian (Par. 32), he won the favor of Dionysius. — Ἄντιφων: Aeschines and Antiphon here present should not be confused with their more celebrated namesakes, the orators. This Antiphon was of the ὄνομα Κυριακός in the φανή Ἐφεσίων, but nothing further is known of him.

22. Ἔρυξιος: the same whom Socrates saw (Xen. Mem. iii. 12) νῦν τε ἔκτη καὶ τὸν ὅσιον τε καὶ ἤξυντο. Socrates reproached him then and there for not doing his duty to himself and to his country by taking rational exercise. — τοῖς: moreover, a transition. The fathers of some have been named, now he passes on to the case of brothers.

23. τοῖς: i.e. the one in question. 25. ἄντιφων ὡς: he at least, i.e. ὡς ἄντιφων ὡς ἄλλος, ἄλλος, named last but the more remote. Cf. Euthyd. 271 b, where ἀντιφων refers to Critobulus just named. — ἄντιφων: Νικοστράτω, of whom he is speaking. Since his brother is dead, Nicostratus will give an absolutely unbiased opinion. — κατατεθέντως: lit. deprecari, but really it means here overpersuade, i.e. persuade a man against his better judgment. Cf. κατατεθέντως, 35 e.
ПЛАТОНОΣ

"Δικαίως οἱ Ἀρίστωνοι οὐ δὲ δὲ ἄδελφος οὐκοῦτοι. Πλάτων, καὶ Λιαντόδωρος οὐδόπολόδωρος οὐδεὶς ἄδελφος. καὶ ἀλλοι παλλοῦσι ἡγοῦ ἕξο ὑμᾶς ἐστίν, διὸ τις ἕχριμν μᾶ.

λοιπα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα: εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο, ἐν παρασχέσθω, ἔγδο παραγωρῷ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἐξεῖ τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτον πᾶν τούτων εὑρίστητε, ὁ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἔτοιμος τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐγγαζομένῳ τούς οἴκειοι οὐκ ἀυτῶν, ὅσοι φασιν Μέλητος καὶ Ἀντωνος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔστ

lus is known through Rep vi. 406 b, where Plato uses the now proverbial expression, ἐν τῷ ἁγάγει χαλέπια, the bridle of Thesages, i.e. ill health. Such was the providential restraint which made Thesages, in spite of political temptations, faithful to philosophy; otherwise, like Democritus, his father, he would have gone into politics. Democritus is one of the speakers in the Thesages, a dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato.

27. 'Αδίμαντος: son of Aristo and a brother of Plato and of Glaucon (Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 1); both of Plato's brothers were friends of Socrates. Glaucon and Adimantus are introduced in the Republic; Adimantus is older, and is represented as not so familiar a footing with Socrates as his younger brother.

28. Ἀτελλόδωρος: surnamed ὁ μάρτυρα because of his intense excitability. Cf. Symposium. 173 d. This is nowhere better shown than in the Phaedo, 117 c, where he gives way to uncontrollable grief as soon as Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock. In the Symposium, 172 e, he describes his first association with Socrates with almost religious fervor. In the 'Aσσαν-λεγέα Χειρόττονος (28), attributed to Xenophon, he is mentioned as τον αὐτῷ τον ἄνθρωπον.

30. μια μὲν ἐχεῖς αὐτῷ (Χειρόττονος), ἄλλας δὲ σέβεσθαι (a simile). Of the persons here mentioned, Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Acanthodorus, are not elsewhere mentioned; and of the eleven here named as certainly present at the trial (there is doubt about Epigonous) only four (or five with Epigenes), Apollocharus, Crito, Critobulus, and Aeschines, are named in the Phaedo as present afterwards in the prison.

29. μια μὲν ἔσται: by all means. In the clause beginning with εἰ ὅτι, ὡς τῷ εὐτείετο is referred to by τότε and contrasted with τῶν παρασχέσθων.

31. εἰν παρασχέσθαι: parenthetical. "The full expression occurs Aeschin. iii. 106, παρασχέσθαι τοι τῷ βῆτατῳ, ὡς τον στήριν." R. The time used for introducing evidence was not counted as a part of the time allotted for the pleadings, but the water-clock (τὸ δορρί) was stopped while a witness was giving account of his evidence. Cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15, καὶ μὲν ἐκλήθη (addressed to an officer of the court) τὸ δορρί. See App.

35. γὰρ: calls upon us to draw a b conclusion suggested by the preceding clause. Socrates means: this fact (πῶς βοηθεῖ, etc.) proves my inno-
οἱ διεθματικοὶ τάξι πῶν λόγων ἔχουσιν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ εἰς ἀδιάφορην προφοράν ὑδ άνδρες, οἱ τῶν προφητικόντων, τίνα άλλον ἔχουσιν λόγων βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ γίνοντι ἂν τὸν ὁμοῦ τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅπι ἤνωσαν. Μελήτω μὲν
ψευδομένῳ, ἔματι δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶδον δὴ, άνδρες· ἡ μὲν ἕγω ἔχουμι ἂν ἀπο- λογεῖον ὑπακοὴν, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἀλλα ἱσως τοιαύτα. τάχα δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοιοι ἀνακατηγορεῖται ἀναμνησθεὶς ἕαυτον, εἰ δὲ μὲν καὶ ἐλάτων τοιοῦτος τοῦ ἀγώνος ἀγώνων ἀγωνίζεν ἐκ νομικῆς ἐπικύρωσις τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβαζόμενον, ὡς ἢ ἁμαρτία ἐξήλεθη, καὶ άλλος τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὕδεν ἀρά τοιοῦτον τοστάτο, καὶ ταῦτα κυνωσίμων, εἴτε

4. el ἤδης εἰπό: see, esp. for the force of μῖον and as, on οὐδεν ἃν νεωτερός. 34 d. — ἐκ γένους: the μηγέτες ἄγων was one involving a man's franchise and his life. Cf. Dem. xxii. 99, ἡπία τίς παρατηθῶσι καὶ σφαγεῖ καὶ τοῦτο τινὸς ἐξανάγκηται, καὶ ἑνήθε τοῖς τίς ταύτα ἡπία δια- ρεῖται (the defendant will bring his children and beasts into lamentations) καὶ ταῦται λέγων καὶ ταπεινῶς ἐμπε- ρῳζον καὶ ἀπόεις πιστῶν τοῦτον αὐτόν. For another appeal which was customary in Athenian courts, see on ὡς λέγων and φασικαί καὶ δικαιόν, 89. 6. ταύτη αὐτῶν: see App. 8. ἔγερσι γὰρ: and then finds that L. To be sure Socrates had enough friends and to spare who were present in court, but he refused to make such wrongful use of their presence and sympathy. ἐμπερῳζον implies that any one who knew Socrates of course would be surprised at such unseemliness where he was concerned.
(ός ἂν δόξαμι) τὸν ἐσχατὸν κόσμον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐπιτίθεται καὶ ὁ ὅργισθεὶς αὐτοῦ τούτοις. τείτο ἂν μετ' ὄργῃς τὴν ψυχήν. εἰ δὴ τις ὑπὸν ἔχει—οὐκ ἄξιον μὲν γὰρ ἔγγει—εἰ δ' ὄν, αὐτὸν ἐπείγεται ἢ μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγει λέγων ὅτι ἐμοὶ, ἡ ἁριστε ἐνίδαν μὲν ποι τνέα καὶ οἰκεῖον· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ

15 ἄνδρα τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐσ' ἀπὸ πέτρας πέρακα, ἀλλ' ἐς ἀνθρώπους, ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσι καὶ οἰκεῖοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τρεῖς, ἐς μὲν μειράκιον ὁδηγοῖ, δύο δὲ παιδιά· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεύτερο ἀναβιασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποφημίσασθαι. τῇ δ' οὖν ὁ παῖς

20 οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζομένοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὐδ' ἴμασι ἀντιμαζόμενοι. Αλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀρραβώνως ἔγνω ἔχω (with the gen. of the proper name) is common in quotations. No verb is expressed, and the quotation is in apposition with τούτοις, etc. Cf. Theoc. 183 ε', Παμφίλος ἔδε μια παιδία, τοῦ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰθεῖτ' τ' ὅτι ημ' ἔστησαν τα. This const. is not confined to quotations. Cf. the freq. use of ἔγνω ἔχω as in Phaed. 66 ε', ἐνείρθε ὁ τερέν, ἢ οἶδαμεν ὅτι καθορίσηται τ' ἑσθήνη καὶ τελευτήσωμεν. The quotation is from Hom. Od. xix. 163, ὡς γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυῶν ἐπὶ παιδιάν οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρας.

16. καί, καί: not correlative. The first καί means also, while the second introduces a particular case under ἐκεῖνοι and means indeed or even.

17. ἔτεις: not added attrib. but appositively, three of them. Their names were Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 1), Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. Diog. Laert. ii. 20; Phadr. 116 b.

20. αὐθαδιζομένοι: it is not in a vein of self-will or stubbornness. See on ε above.

21. ε' μὲν ἀρραβώνως ἔχω ἔχω τ' τοῦ Ὀμήρου: this idiom
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥ. 127

πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δὲ οὖν δόξαν καὶ 34 ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὗ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων ὑδέλευσαι καὶ τηλικοῦντα ὅτα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦτο 25 νομα ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἄλληθες εἰτ' οὖν ψεύδοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδομένως γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειμενύς τῶν τολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν οἱ δοκοῦται διάφερες εἰτε σοφίας ἐτι ἄνδρεις εἰτε ἄλλη ἡμών ἄρετή τοὐτοῦ ἔσονται, αἰσχρῶν ἀν εἰτε· οἴονετε ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἔσθακα τως, ὅταν κρίνοντα, δοκοῦται μὲ τι εἶναι, θαμάσαντο δὲ ἐργαζόμενος, ὧν δεινοντι οἰομένους πέτεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὡσπερ ἄθανάτως ἐσομένως, ἣν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ

34 whether I can look death in the face or not. At this point the grammatical consistency breaks down. αἰτία ought to be followed by a partic. (ηὐθέως perhaps), but οὐδὲ μόνον is the only trace of it. See on ὑμεῖς ἔλθειν, 21 a. The anacolouthon (II. 1003) is resorted to because Socrates wishes to mention his real motive, and yet to avoid saying bluntly "I am too brave to do anything so humiliating." Having said εἰ μὲν δοκοῦσιν κτλ. the next clause (πρὸς δ' οὖν κτλ.) shapes itself accordingly.

22. ἄλλος λόγος: another question or matter. Cf. Dem. ix. 16, εἰ μὲν γὰρ μεῖρα ταῦτα ἢ μᾶλλον ἢδ' αὐτῶν ἢμεῖσθαι, ἄλλος ἔν ἑκέν τούποις .—εἰ οὖν: but at all events or at any rate, like certe after sive—sive. See on ὑμεῖς, 17 a.

24. οὐδέν: see on ἀνατρέπει, 31 d. —τοῦτο τοῦτον: as. σοφῖα. See on σοφίας § 21 κτλ., 23 a. Socrates purposely avoids using the word σοφία either here or below.

25. ἄλληθες: used as the contrary of the adj. ἄλληθη. Cf. Eurip. 272 κτλ., ἀδ' τ' ἄλληθη, ἀδ' τ' ἄλληθη. Sometimes it is even used attrib. with a noun. Cf. Polit. 261 b, παραβίωσα τέ καὶ πρόθετο ἅμα. Cf. Hom. II. ix. 116, ἂ γέχος, ὅτι τ' ζήσοις ἐπὶ κατακεῖσαι.—ἄλλ' οὖν δοκοῦσιν γέ ἐστι: however that may be, people here arrived at the opinion. Cf. Prot. 237 κτλ., ἀλλ' οὖν αὐθαυτας γενο ἑτέρον ἂν οὐκ ἔρχατο ἄκρις τότε οἱ ἔνδικοι (non-professionals).

26. τε: used here to indicate that what follows is quoted. G. 966, 2.

27. οἱ δοκοῦντες: those generally as reputed. Here Socrates may have had Pericles in mind, if Plutarch's gossip is truth. Cf. Peric. 32, 3. 'Ἀπαντάν μὲν οὖν ἐξήγησεν, πολλά πάντα πρὸ τὴν ἡγεμ. οὖν Ἀθηναίοις σφαγέ, ἀρδέσει αὐτῆς ἑπεμπόλεμο καὶ σφαγής τῶν ἰσαριστῶν, he boasted Athenians off, though Aeschines says it was by a flagrant disregard of justice, by wearying for her and breaching the jurymen.

28. ἄπαντας δοκοῦσιν: the subj. of this gen. abs. is the same as that of ἀποθανοῦσιν. This is not the regular const., for usually the gen. abs. expresses a subord. limitation, and clearness demands an independent subj. Here, and in many cases where it introduces an independent idea, it depends
on the leading clause for its subj. Cf. Xen. An. i. 4. 12, καὶ ὅπερ ἔφασεν ἦδρα, ἵνα μὴ τις αὐτοῖς χρήσατα διήρ, διότι καὶ ταῖς προτέρου μετὰ Κόρον ἀναβαίν. ... καὶ πρὸ ταῦτα ὁπὸ ἐπὶ μαχῆ ἢν των. G. 1152 and 1158; II. 972 a. d. 36. οὖν: a very pointed iteration. 39. ἡμιδικαῖος: the defendant and the dikastai. Cf. e below. 40. τοῦ εὐαγγέλου: the one who, etc., or 'him who,' here conveying the notion of quality, the man so shameless as to. G. 1500; II. 908. The phrase is borrowed from the stage. Cf. Lys. viii. 838 c, ἐστι θύσιάς τις Οἰδίπους εὐάγγελος. 

XXIV. 1. χρῆς γε τῆς δόξης, οὗτοι δικαίοι: after the unseemly practice has been condemned by reference to τὸ κἀκεῖν (ὅτα), it is found still more inconsistent with τὸ δίκαιον, and this is conclusive against it. The second οὖν (with ἀναφοράς) is merely the idiomatic correlative of the first one. On the argument involved, see b. Introd. 71, a. 3. διδάσκαις καὶ πείθεις: perhaps e the full idea would be, διδάσκαις καὶ διδάσκατο (or διδάσκατο) πείθεις. For, strictly speaking, πείθεις may be the result of mere entreaties, but this Socrates would probably have called διδασκαλία rather than πείθεις. Cf. a below. 4. ἀπ' τῆς καταχρήσεως: this explains εἰς τοὺς καταχρηστόν τὸ δίκαιον, "make a present of justice." Notice the evil implication of κατά in composition. 5. διψάσαις: part of the oath taken by the dikastai was, καὶ ἀπροσάριτο τοῦ τοῦ καταγγέλλων ἄμελος ἄμφος. The orators were always referring to this oath. Cf. Lyschin. iii. 6 ff.; Dem. xviii. 6, etc. See Introd. p. 49, note 2. Cf. also the sentiment, grateful to Athenian hearers, with which Iolas be-
οἰς ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὕκως 35 χρὴ οὖν ἡμᾶς ἐδίδωμεν ὑμᾶς ἐπιρροές οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς ἐδίδομεν. 10 οὐδὲροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβείαν. μὴ οὖν αἰσθούτε με, ὁ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖος, τοιαῦτα δεῖ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ 10 μὴ ἡγοῦμαι καλά εἶναι μὴς δίκαια μὴς ὅσια, ἀλλὰ ἂν τε μένοι νη Δία [πάντως] καὶ ἁσβείαις φέγγοντα ὑπὸ Με- ἅ λήτου τουτοῦ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἐκ πείθομεν ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ 35 δεῖον Βιαλόμην ὀμηρωκότας, θεός ἂν διδάσκομαι μὴ μὴν ὑμῖν ἡγεῖσαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀγενός ἀπολογούμενος κατήγγ. See App. There is an intended humor in this accumulated agony of emphases which leads up to what Socrates has called Meletus’ practical joke. Cf. 20 ε, δεκετὶ κύτταρος ἔφασεν, and 27 α, τοῦτο ἐνεπέκτειν. Cf. also the ironical allusions to this charge throughout the Euthyphro, particularly (3 b) φιλοι γε μὲ πάντα (almost, manufacturer) ὑμῖν θέου, and (10 a) ὁμοίως ἀντιστάθηκε (deal at random) ὡς κατανοήσας (have new-fangled notions) τῆς ἀνάμνησις (mention a now). 15. καθαρὰ καὶ τῷ δικήθεν βιαλόμην: a double opposition which forcibly brings out (1) the absurdity of doing any real violence (βιαλόμην is a strong word) by simple entreaties, (2) the incompatibility between νέος and βιαλόμην. All this gives in a nutshell the drift of Socrates’ earnest objection to the practice of irrelevant appeals for pity and mercy. For the full force of βιαλόμην, cf. Rep. vi. 488 d, ἄνω ἄνωτερος ἄνω βιαλόμην, by persuasion or by violence) τῆς ἀνάμνησις. 13. ἀλλὰ ... καὶ: the hyperbaton (H. 1602) consists in interrupting the familiar phrase ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν to make room for μήτε τῇ Δίᾳ, after which ἀλλὰ is forgotten and καλὸν is brought in with καλὸν, ten thousand times less so too because I actually, etc.
XXV. To μη δαγαναξειν, δ' ανδρεις Ἀθηναίοι, "epsilon; τοιτω τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσατε, ἀλλὰ τέ σε

ant in reply, (3) a vote on the defendant's guilt or innocence. This would end the matter if the defendant were acquitted. But the judges found a verdict of guilt against Socrates. After such a verdict there remained always (4) a speech from the prosecution urging the penalty already proposed or a compromise, and (5) a speech on behalf of the defendant in which he actually proposed some penalty to be inflicted (λεγομένης) in place of his opponent's. Cf. Aeschyn. H. 197 f. After c. xxiv comes the verdict of the δικαιώτης, which is followed by the νίκης of Meletus. Then with c. xxy begins the κατεψήφισμα of Socrates. Then comes the final vote fixing the penalty. See Introd. 74. 

1. τοιτω τῷ γεγονότι: the inf. with the art. is placed at the beginning of the clause, and depends upon a word of prevention expected instead of ἐπι

διάλεκτα. "Many things contribute toward my not grieving," i.e. prevent me from grieving. G. 1551 and 1558; H. 901. The fact that I feel no disposition to make an outcry, results from many causes, etc. Cf. Rep. l. 331 b, τά μάλι ἐκεῖνά τινα ἔστιν ἐπι

τατάσεις... μέγα μέρος εἰς τὸν τότε ἀνθρώπων στάσις συμβάλλει, where the parallel is complete except that, because of the long and intricate specifications (omitted in quot.
The whole idea of a small majority is qualified by οὔτως. The διάγων was thirty votes. Cf. Dem. xiii. 138, φιλήσας τον φιλήσας τον μαθητήν τον μικρότερον (almost) προ διατελείναι, χρείαν δὲ πολλον αυτόν διέλθειν ἀντιπροφέρεται παρ' ἰδίᾳ ψήφους (within a small majority) δημοκρατεῖ. The subj. of ἤκθος is of course to be supplied from τῶν γυναικῶν ἄνδρας. — οὔτως: used freq. (like the Eng. “as it appears”) in cases even of the greatest certainty.

7. ἐν τραχύνων αὐτ.: strictly speaking 31, Diog. L. ii. 5, 41, says: ἐκείνη, διακοίνως ἀνασθένησα μὴ πλησίον τῶν ἀπολογοῦντων (sc. φθόνος). The total number of votes against him was therefore 281, so that 220 of the 501 senators (see Introd. 66) must have voted in his favor. Socrates probably counted the numbers roughly, as he heard them, and said that thirty votes would have turned the scale. When Aeschines was acquitted of the charge of ἀναπροφέρειν, betrayal of trust when on an embassy, brought by Demosthenes, his majority is said to have been also thirty votes. For Demosthenes, as here for Socrates, such defeat was, under the circumstances, victory. See Introd. 72.

8. ἐν τραχύνων: i.e. alone. Meletus could not have got 100 votes, since with two helpers he failed to get 300.
10 toútō ge, ὃτι, el μὴ ἄνεβη Ἀντως καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσας σωτεὶ ἐμώ, κἀν ὁδεῖς χιλιάδας δραχμὰς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ δέρμα τῶν ψίδων.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἄνηρ Θανάτου. εἰπέν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνες ἦσαν ἀντιτιμήσουμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθήναιοι; ἦ δὲννον ὑμῖν ἡ ἡμέρας; τί οὖν; τί αξίως εἰμὶ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποστείλω, τί τι μαθοῦν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἠγανίκι σοι ζωήν, ἀλλ' ἠμελήσας ἄντερ οἱ πολλοὶ, ἀρχαιοτιμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκον.

36. 10. el μὴ ἄνεβη: for the accusers and their respective importance, see Intro. 30. Notice ἀνίας...κατηγορήσατε. 11. χιλιάδας δραχμὰς: see Intro. 72.

b — τὸ δέρμα τῶν ψίδων: (cf. Dem. xviii. 103, τὸ μέρος τῶν ψίδων σὺν ἁλάβον) the indispensable fifth part, not a fifth part. The acc. is used because the whole fifth is meant. Cf. Pro. 329 c, μεταλαβώσατε...τῶν τῆς ἁγίας μαρίας οἱ μὴ ἄλλοι οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι. Xen. An. iv. § 5, οἱ πρωτέων πρὸς τῷ τῆς ἁγίας, εἰ μὴ μεταλαβὼν αὐτῶν κυρίοτερον ἡτανατί ὑπὲρ τῆς...ἀλλ' ἠμελήσας ἄντερ οἱ πολλοὶ.

XXVI. 1. τιμᾶται θανάτου: fixes my penalty at death. See Intro. 73. For the omission of the art. when θάνατος means the penalty of death, see 37 b, and see on τοῦ θανάτου, 28 c.

2. οὖν: ethical dat. G. 1171; H. 770.

3. εἷς δὲν χώρᾳ: with ἐν (a n) is appended the interrogative answer to the first question, which is merely rhetorical.—τῆς ἡμέρας: αἰώνιος. This elliptis is so common that it is treated as a noun; here τιμᾶται may easily be supplied from the verb. On παθεῖν ἡ ἄνωσις, see Intro. 74.

4. δὲ τὴν μαθέω: strictly speaking, this is the indir. form of τι μαθὼν, which hardly differs from τι παθεῖν. See GMT. 880; H. 908 c. Both idioms ask, with astonishment or dis-

approval, for the reason of an act...Sc. They resemble two English ways of asking, "whistle?" "what possessed (μαθέω) you?" "what came over (μαθέω) you?" So δὲ τὴν μαθέω = an emphatic i.e., "I ask you, what sort of a penalty do I deserve to pay since the question involved is what possessed me," etc. This is more striking than the regular phrase εἷς ἄνωσις ἐγών or ἄνωσις.

Cf. Euthyd. 290 a, ἦσαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄγαντε πάντα τότε οἱ πολλοὶ συνήθεις ὡς ἄνωσις ἐκείνης ὡς ἄνωσις. —ἀλλ' ἠμελήσας: this is more fully explained below by ἄνωσις κεῖνη, for which see on 9 below.

b. συνέρ οἱ πολλοὶ: ἡ ἡμέρας, supplied from ἡμέρας. Cf. Ild. viii. 103, ἄνωσις ἐν τῷ ἄγαντε ἐκεῖνης ὡς ἄνωσις ἔχειν δημοτικὴν ὡς μάχην, ἄλλα μέροντες ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀποτελεῖσθαι ἡ ἄνωσις (αἰώνιος). Πάντως is often to be supplied from ἡμέρας. For a similar elliptis, see Hom. Od. vii. 103, ὡς τὸ ἀλώον; ὡς ἐκείνης ὡς ἄνωσις τῷ ἄλωον ἐκεῖνης ἄνωσις (αἰώνιος). Socrates's specifications cover both public and private life.
APOLLOPA SΩKRAPTOUS

mías kai στρατηγικῶν kai δημηγορίων kai tónn állwn 30
ἀρχῶν kai ἕνωσισίων kai στάσεων tónn en tῆ tóllē

gynnoménon, ἡγησάμενος ἔμαυτον tój ònti ἐπεικέστερον

ἐναι ὡστε εἰς ταυτί ὑστα σάζεσθαι ἐντάθα μὲν οὐκ ὁ
10 ζα, διὰ ἑλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλὼν μὴν ὁφε-

λοντος εἶναι, ἕπι δὲ τῷ ἰδίᾳ ἐκαστον [ἰών] εἰργατεύων τῆν μεγά-

λην εὐρεγεϊαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐντάθα ἃ, εὑρηκόν ἐκα-

στον ὑμῶν πείθει μή πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἵναν μηδένος

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὸν εἶναι ἐπιμελῆθη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος

καὶ φρονιμότατος ἐσοιτι, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς

tῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἀλλῶν ὑστα κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων

36 b 6 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῆς ἑτερουσία προσληπτικῶν καὶ στάσεων. Ἐλλάνισσις προστείρα καὶ τοις ἀλλοίσις ἐξαιτίας ταχεῖα καὶ προσελπίζων τῶν νομίμων τῶν πρώτων ἐν τοῖς ἑνεχθέντι στοιχεῖοι. Πολεμικός οργάνων καὶ στάσεων: τὸν τάξον συνεργάζεται, ὁ καθορισμός καὶ τὸ πεπλεγμένον τοῖς καλλιτεχνοῖς και τοῖς μαθηταῖς τῶν πρῶτων καὶ τῶν τε κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων.

const. is different. Cf. Xen. An. v. 36 b 4. 20, ἔστει ἠγοράσασθαι τῶν ταυτόν ἐκαστῶν ἑτερουσίας. Like the present case is Ἀρκετ. 234 a, ἔστει ἐν ταυτόν εἰς εἴτε τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρχιστήριας ἔστει.

9. τῶν ταυτόν: the reading ὅσα can hardly be defended. See App. 11. εἴτε τῶν εἰς ἑτερον: but toward privately benefiting individuals. This is strictly the completion of the thought introduced by ἀλλ' ἀπόθεσις, which, though ἀπόθεσις μὲν εἰγὼ μὲν ἔστει that it furnishes its verb, still requires a positive expression to explain ἀπὸ ἄνω αὐτὸν ἐκαστον ἑτερουσίας, as is often the case with ἀπόθεσις, is resumptive, and restates εἴτε τῶν ἐν ταυτόν εἰς εἴτε. The whole period is full of repetitions, but ὅσα comes in most unaccountably. See App. See on τῶν ταυτόν ἐκαστόν, 19 a.

13. μὲν ἑπεξεργάζεται: cf. 30 a b.

14. ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας: ὡρικό ταῖς ὑποδόταις ὡθεῖ τῷ προτεινόμενον τῆς ὑπονομίας, ὥς ὁ τῶν ἐνεργειάς τῆς ὑπονομίας. Since the sense of the leading verb (ἦς) is secondary. G. M. 844; H. 994.

15. ἥταν ἔστει ἐκαστον: GMT. 339; H. 885 a.

16. τῶν ταυτόν ἐκαστών: not a third specification in line with μῆνα... μῆνα, but connected with the whole ἔχειν.
παρεκτος ωσπερ πληθυνων / τι ουν ειμι αξιος παθειν τοιοιτος ουν; αγα. 
θον τι, αι άνδρες Αθηναίοι, ει δει γε κατα την αξιαν την 
αληθεια τυμασθαι· και ταυτα γε και αγαθον τοιοιτον, ο τι 
πρεποι εμοι. άδει αυν πρεπει ανδρι πεινητι ευηρηγητη, δεσ. 
μεναι εγων συνολον επι τη ιμετορα παρακελουσει; ουκ ους 
εσθη σοι η κενωση αυται, αυτοιοι ο τη μαλλον, αι άνδρες 
Αθηνασι, πρεπει ουτοι, οι τον τοιοιτον ανδρα ει προταχειω συνενθαι, πολυ γε μαλ. 

tον η ει τις υμων ιππω τη ζυνωριντη η κενης 

25 Ολυμπιασιων, ο μεν γαρ ημας ποιει ευδαιμονις δοκει 
ειναι, εγω δε ειναι. και ο μεν τροφης ουδεν δειται, εγω 

ελευθερίας; the senatorial Prytanes dined in 

the δαλος, and in later times also 

those called διδυμοι, certain Eleus. 

inian priests, scribes, heralds, etc. 

See on εις την δαλος, 32 ε. The public 

guests sat at table in the Πρωτανηον, 

which was at the foot of the north-

easter corner of the Acropolis. Some 

of them earned the distinction by 

winning prizes in the national games, 

some received it on account of their 

forefathers’ benefactions to the state, 

e.g. the oldest living descendants of 

Harmodius and of Aristogiton re-

spectively were thus honored. The 

most ancient Πρωτανηον on the Acrop. 

olis was in historic times used only 

for certain religious ceremonies. 

24. Ιππος εις εις εις εις εις εις εις εις 

απελευθερον, a pair; 7ερευερ, four horses 

ahead. Since a victory in the great 

panhellenic festivals was glorious for 

the country from which the victor 

came, he received on his return the 

greatest honors, and even substantial 

rewards. Cf. Rep. v. 405 δ, where 

Plato speaks of the μεγαρης βλες εν 

e λυμανωμενα καις, the blissful life 

Olympian victors lead. 

26. οδηγω διαναι: only rich men 

could afford to compete.
De deo. Ei oyn de me (kata to dikaios) tis aitia tuma. 35

The art. is omitted, since this is

XXVII. 3. ἀπανθηδημένος: in the

spirit of philanthropy. This serves to

explain paraphrases but. For the

facts, see on το δύσια διάσωο, 35 c.
—το δι, to the act which has

been only incidentally touched upon

(των περὶ λέγειν δὲ τοι αὐτὸν, δὲ τις τοῦ ποιῆσαι διοῦς πλεονέκται ἡμῖν οἱ γέροντες προσεῖναι, πολλαῖς, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν προσεῖσθαι, δὲ τις περὶ διαφοράς τοῖς δικαιώμενοι

(whence go completely wrong) as if proto

metathesis had (to reconsider). The

cyclides also says in his account of

Pausania, I. 132, ἐρώτατο τούτων ἡμῶν ἐκδοχῆς ἡμῶν ἐκδοχῆς (their own countries), έμε τις ἡμῖν ἐπὶ ἀρχικῶς ἡμῶν ἐκκριβωθήσατο τοὺς δικαιοῦντας τοῖς δικαιοῦντας.

4. ὡς οὖν ἡμᾶς: an apparently

superfluous inf. G. 1635; H. 956 a. For

the facts, see on ἡ δέων, 25 c.

7. ἀπερκ καὶ ἄλογος: for instance

the Lacedaemonians. Cf. Pseudo

Plut. Ar. hip. 7. 5. Αμαξοδήθου, τοιοῦτοι τοιούτω ἢ πλεονέκται οἱ γέροντες προσεῖναι, πολλαῖς, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν προσεῖσθαι, δὲ τις περὶ διαφοράς τοῖς δικαιωμένοις (those who go completely wrong) as if proto

metathesis had (to reconsider). The

cyclides also says in his account of

Pausania, I. 132, ἐρώτατο τούτων ἡμῶν ἐκδοχῆς ἡμῶν ἐκδοχῆς (their own countries), έμε τις ἡμῖν ἐπὶ ἀρχικῶς ἡμῶν ἐκκριβωθήσατο τοὺς δικαιοῦντας τοῖς δικαιοῦντας.

11. ἀπερκ, ἅτις, προφήτας: the

fut. is used to disclaim the fut. (GME

113; H. 845) intention.

13. τι θλίβα: what fear is there to be

induced by? Supply verbs from the

three infs. above.

14. φρεν: see above 28 a–30 b.
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πλατώνος

delitavit

15 εστίν; αντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλομαι ὡς εὖ οὖδὲ ὃι κακῶν οἴνων, τούτου τυμησάμενοι; πότερον δεσμοὺς καὶ τί με δει ζην εἴν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ αἱ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἐνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρησάμεν, καὶ δεδεόμεν ἐως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταύτοι μοι ἐστίν ὅπερ νῦν ὑμᾶς ἕλεγον· οὐ γὰρ 20 ἐστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τυμη- σώματι; ἰσως γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τυμησάται. πολλή μεν- τὸν με διολογία ἢκο, εἰ οὕτως ἄλογοσ εἰμι ἀπό τῇ δύνασθαι λογιζόμεθα, ὅτι ἱμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολιταὶ μοι οὐκ οἷον τε ἐγένεσθε ἄνεγείως τάς ἔμας διατρίβας καὶ τοὺς 37 ἄλλους τινας ἡμᾶς. δὲ εἰς τό νυν μοι ἐκεῖνον αὐτοχωρεῖ. 0 19. νῦν δὲ: just now.

20. ἔκτισιν: for the fut. with rel. denoting purpose, see GMT. 505; H. 911. — ἀλλὰ δὲ: but then. See on ἀλλὰ § 46, Crit. 54 a. The ἀλλὰ points to the impossibility just asserted of Socra- tes paying a fine himself, while δὲ introduces the one possible alternative.

22. φιλοσοφεῖ: clinging to life, which is opposed to εὐφυεῖα (courage). Cf. Eur. Pisc. 315, νότορα μακροχειόν ἢ, φιλοσοφοῦμεν; ibid. 348, εὐτίκειας καὶ φιλόφιλος γὰρ; also the speech where Macaria chooses to die, Herac. 510 ff., καὶ ἀληθεῖς τὸν εἰς, ἐὰν δὲ τά λέγη ἃ τι δειδίδεις ἄκουεις καὶ οὔτω φιλοσοφεῖ: ἢ ἄλλα, ὅμως:” with the admiring words of Iolaus, ibid. 567 ff., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐντεῦθεν εὐφύεις [ις], παῦσι γυναικι, . . . εἰ . . . ἔκει: cf. 30 b, and see on δισφιλεισσεῖν, 25 b.

23. δὲ οὕτως μὲν: that (if) you, my fellow-citizens, proved unable to bear my company. After this we look for something like this: “then others will prove still less able to bear it.” But instead, we find a question with ὡς, will others then, etc., answered by πολ-
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25 λόγους, ἀλλ' ἐμ' βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθανότεραι, 37 ὡστε ἐξετείνει αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγήναι. Ἀλλ' δὲ ἀρα ἀυτὰς οἴσοντι ἑβδόμοις; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὡς Ἀθηναίοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἰς ἐξελθόντι τηλικῇ διὰ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον ἐκ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀριστομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζήν. εὖ 30 γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι, ἄν ἐλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσωται οἱ νέοι ὀσπερ ἑνθάδε. κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτὸν ἐξελωσὶ πείθοντες τοὺς προσβυτέρους; εάν δὲ μη ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δὲ αὐτῶν τούτων.

XXVIII. ἵσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι: στίγμώ δὲ καὶ ἄσκο-

χιαν ἁγιων, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδ' ὁδὸς τ' ἐσει ἢμὼν ἐξελθόν 

ζήν; τούτ' ἐντοπίσω τῶν χαλεπότατων πειστώ τινας τούτων. εὰν τ' ἑγὼ λέγω ὅτι τοῦ βούλομεν τούτων ἐστιν ἡ 

καὶ διὰ τούτων ῥυματων ἄσκοχιαν αἰγεῖο, οὐ πείσθε δὲ ἑως 

— ἀλλ' ἐκ Ἀθήνην ἐκ.: τ. β. 31, ἀποβλέπων ἀλλάξθων βουλέων 

εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας πόλεως. Elsewhere we find the substantive repeated, e.g. τότε... τότε, 40 ε.

The whole expression suggests the restless life led by the so-called sophists. Cf. Soph. 224 b, where the typical sophist is described as ἀναθεματισμὸν ἀκομφότατω πολίτῃ τὸ καθ' ἄλλῳ πολεμέας ἐπικράτειαν, one who goes from town to town buying up and selling knowledge for coin. Cf. also Prot. 312 α—

314 b.

33. ἐκ αὐτῶν τούτων: to describe οἱ the involuntary cause in contrast to ἀναθεματισμὸν τὸν αὐτόν.

XXVIII. 2. ἀκομφότατω πολίτῃ: to live an ἔξω in exile. This forms a unit to which στίγμών and ἄσκοχιαν ἁγιῶν are added by way of indicating the manner of life he will lead. The meaning of ἄσκο-

χιαν ἁγιῶν is plain from 36 b.

3. τοῦτο δ' : that is the thing of which, etc.: cognate acc. after καὶν.—τοῦτο:
ὅς εἰρωνευομένως· ἵνα τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγι.

10 ἢ ἐπιμελῶς ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἄρετῆς τούς λόγους ποιεῖ· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ δὲ ὡς ἡμεῖς ἐμοὶ ἀκοῦετε διάλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζεται.

15 λοιπὸν, ἐὰν ἔνοχος ἢν ἐν χρήματι, ἐτιμησάμην ἀν χρημάτων οὐκ ἐμελ. 6. ἐν δὲ ἐκτίσεως οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν ἑλάσθην. νῦν β'—οὖ γὰρ

12. καὶ ἐγώ ἐπὶ τὰς αἰθήμας: after Socrates, in 28 c–30 e and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (cf. the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

13. οὖ γὰρ ἐν for κατ.; γὰρ is related to the thought which lies unuttered in the previous explanation: not from love of money do I refuse to make a proposition. The apod. includes ἕκαστος κατό. See on δ' ἔκκλησιν κατό. See on δ' ἔκκλησιν, 20 a.

15. νῦν δὲ—οὖ γὰρ: but as it is, ἢ (I name no sum of money,) for money I have none. The connexion is similar to ἀλλὰ γὰρ (19 d, 20 e), where the unexpressed thought alluded to by γὰρ is easily supplied. νῦν δὲ expresses forcibly the incompatibility of facts with the preceding supposition. Cf. Lach. 184 d, νῦν δὲ ἐὰν ἔχει ἀκοῦειν καὶ οὖ.

16. at ἐκ ἐπαν.: see on at ἐκ ἐπαν., 17 b.
APOLLOEIA SOKRATOUX

...muon an arxurion: tosoutoi oin tuxoumai. Plataw de oie, o anbres 'Atheiavoi, kai Kritov kai Kritoboulos kai 20 'Apollodorous kelleouns me triakonta muon tuxiafoumai, autoi de 'egyvanave: tuxoumai oin tosoouto, 'egyvanave de 'uviw enontai tou arxurion outhe axoixwes.

XXIX. Oi polloi 7 eneka xronous, o anbres 'Atheiavoi, onoma eixe kai aitian upo ton boulomenvon ton poloion loidoreiv, ois Sokrathe aspektovnate, anbres sofoun filousu vop de sofou enai, ei kai me eimi, oi boulomevi 5 nou 'uviw aneidiexen. ei ouv perimevantei dilhov xronon, melhe axo tou automatai an 'uviw touto 'egyvanov. dorate vop de tivn xlikan oti toporh ydhe esti tou bion, tavan tou 10 'egyon. legw de touto ou prde xwvta 'uviw, alla prde

18. muon dregyros: about seventeen dollars. This is certainly small compared with the fines imposed in other cases, e.g. upon Miltiades, Pericles, Timotheus.

21. axolai 5 'egymastia: ac. pesus, to be supplied from kelleus. Their survey would relieve Socrates from imprisonment.

22. axoixwes: responsible, an assurance hardly needed in Crito's case.

XXIX. Here ends Socrates's aspetovn, and it was followed by the final vote of the court determining Socrates's penalty. With this the case ends. Socrates has only to be led away to prison. See note on c. xcv above, 35 a. See Introd. 35 and 30. In the address that follows, Socrates is out of order. He takes advantage of a slight delay to read a lesson to the court.

1. ois polloi 7 eneka xronous: a compressed expression. By condemning Socrates, his judges in order to rid themselves of him, have hastened his death by the few years which remained to him; thus, to gain a short respite, they have done a great wrong.

2. 'Urova enve kai aiain: the name and the blame. See on to 'urova kal tivn dabolh, 20 d, and 'Urova de touto avti, 23 a. — ois: as if with doulavfisvesi and autoufisvesi. See on evdoufes, 17 a. Some peripherals like 'Urova enve avti was often preferred by the Greeks to their somewhat cumbersome fut. pass. (of which there are only two examples in Hom.).

7. doppo tov bion: far on in life. For the gen. with adv. of place, see G. 1148; H. 767. — xwvta 6i 'egyvan: and near unto death. The contrast introduced by 6i is often so slight that it overtranslates it. Cf. Xen. Cyr. 1. 5. 2, at Ktaphi 6i tov 'Antpavou.
πάνω εμοί καταφημισμένους θάνατων/ λέγω δέ και τόδε
toûs èmou katafíhmisaménous thánatonL légo de kai tòde 38
dé kai tòde a
10 πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς τούτους. ἦσως με οὐσόθε, δὲ ἄνδρες, 39
ἀπορία λόγων εἰλακκέναι τοιούτων, οίς ἀν ὦμας ἐπισέισα, εἰ
όμην δὲν ἀπαντά ποικὶλ καὶ λέγεω ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν
díkène, τολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν εἶλακκα, οὐ μέν-
toι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ αναισχυντίας καὶ τού ἔθελεν
15 λέγεω πρὸς ὦμας τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἀν ὦμιν ἢπιστὰ ἢν ἀκούειν,
wép' ἥρωντος τέ μου καὶ ὄδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλά ποιούτος
καὶ λέγοντος τολλὰ καὶ ἀνὰξία ἐμοί, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ. οἷα γε
dη καὶ εἰδοθεὶ ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε
ὀτὲ 20 οὔτε τότε φηδὴν δει̂̂ νεκα τοῦ κυμάλου πρὰξαι οὐδὲν 
ἀνελεύθερον, θ' ἐξεζωλειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε
μᾶλλον αὑρὼν ὡς ἀπολογογήσαμεν τεθυόναι ἐκείνων ἵνα
οὔτε γάρ ἐν δικῇ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλων
οὐδένα δει τούτο μηχαναζθαι, ὑπὼς ἀποφεύγομαι τοῖς ποιεῖν.
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θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δήλων γε—
25 γρεται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγει καὶ ὅπλα
ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκτείαν τραπόμενος τῶν ἄσωκώντων καὶ
ἀλλαὶ μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἕκαστος τοῖς κυνδύνοις
ὡςτε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εάν τις τολμᾷ τὰν ποιεῖν καὶ
λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τούτο ἡ χαλεπόν, ἢ ἄνδρες, θάνατον
30 ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπότερον πονηρίαν. θάνατον γάρ
θανάτου θεί, καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀτε βραδὺς ἀν καὶ πρε
σβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐλαχ. οἱ δὲ ἐμὸι κατήγοροι
ἀτε δεὼν καὶ ἰδεῖς ὅτε ποῖ τοῦ θάνατος, τῆς κακίας,
καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπεμι [ὑπὸ ὑμῶν] θάνατον δίκην ὁφλῶν,
35 ὑπερ' ὑμῶν εἰσάγῃς ὀφληκτοῖς μοχθηρίας καὶ ὀδι
cιάν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τοῦ τιμήματι ἐμὲν καὶ οὕτω ταῦτα μὲν
ποῦ ἰσος ὅτε, καὶ ἐδίδω χρεῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἀυτὰ μετρίως ἔχων.

XXX. (Το δὲ δὴ) μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῶν χρησμοδή-

28. ἀντα.: cf. μικρότατον διὸς just above, and see on δέτε ἀνθωποῖς, 38 d.
29. μὴ . . . γ.: substituted rhetorically for a statement of fact. See on
μὴ σκέψασθαι γ., Crit. 48 c. For the
idea of fearing implied, see GMT.
366.
30. ἀλλὰ πολὺ κτ.: fully expressed
we should have ἀλλὰ μὴ πολὺ χαλεπό-
τερον γ. πονηρίαν ἐκφύγειν. — θάνατον
θανάτου δεῖ: flies faster than fate, to
preserve the alliteration, which here,
as often, is picturesque. For the
thought, cf. Henry V. iv. 1. "Now if
these men have defeated the law and
outlaw native punishment, though
they can outstrip men, they have no
wings to fly from God." In
the thought that wickedness flies faster
than fate, we have perhaps a remin-
ciscence of Homer's description of
"Αθη, 11. ix. 505 ff., ἢ ἃ 'Αθη σκορφ

36. καὶ ἐρῶ κτ.: i.e. they escape
their punishment just as little as I
escape mine. The καὶ before κτ.
makes a climax: "perhaps it was
necessary for the matter actually to
shape itself just as it really has.”
37. κτ.: on the meaning of κτ. and
κτ. respectively, see on κτ.,
19 a.

XXX. 1. τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο:
τὸ δὲ is used adverbially; see on
τὸ δὲ, 37 a. χρησμοδή, declare a
prophecy.
πατονος

σαί, δ' καταψηφισμένοι μου. καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ἥδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ὦ μᾶλλον ἀνθρωποι χρησμοῦσιν, όταν μελλόνων ἀποθανεῖται. φημὶ γὰρ, δὲ ἀνδρες, οἱ εἰμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τυμπάνων ἡμῶν ἔδωκε εὐδῶς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν βαθαντὸν πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῦν δίδῃ οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τούτῳ εἰργάσασθε οἴομεν ἀπαλάξεσθαι τὸν διδόναι ἐλέγχων τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμὸν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχωντες, οὐς νῦν ἐγὼ καταθυσί, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστανεῖτε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἀνεγείρατε, τοι ὑπὲρ νεώτεροι εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἄγανακτώτερες εἰς ἐσθανέσθαι ἀνθρώπους ἐπιχρησάμεθα· ὧν οὐκ ἐνεδίεξαν τινα ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὑπὸ δράσιν ἔγινεν οὐκ θάρσων δια,

3. ἄθρωτος χρησμοῦσιν κτλ.: prob. Socrates has in mind such cases as Homer mentions, I. xvi. 851 ff, where Patroclus as he dies prophesies truly to Hector, ὡς ὁμολογεῖ ἂντίστοιχα ὅταν ὁ τέως τοῖς περίτοις θανάσις καὶ μέγας κράτος, and xxii. 358 ff, where Hector's last words foretell the killing of Achilles by Paris and Thoebus Apollo. Cf. Verg. Aen. x. 739, —

II. autem exspecta: Nulla me, quicumque es, malo, Victor, non longum laetabere; in quoque fato Prospectant pars, sique eadem mea arma tenerebatur. Of. also Xen. Cyr. viii. 21, 4 δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπου φοιχῖ τότε (at the hour of death) ἥσσον θανάστην καταφέρεται καὶ τότε τοῖς μελλόνων προφητείᾳ τότε γὰρ, ὡς δέχεται, μᾶλλον ἐλαττοφρήτως. The same idea is found in many literatures. Cf. Brunhild in the song of Sigfrid (Edda), —

I pribehe, Gunther, sit thee here by me, For death is near and bids me prophecy. See also John of Gaunt's dying speech, Rich. II. II. —

Methinks I am a prophet new-inspired, And thus expiring do foretell of him: His rash fierce blaze of riot cannot last, For violent fires soon burn out themselves.

4. διευκοτώτα: sc. by their verdict, and by the penalty which they voted after Socrates had made his counter-proposition (of a penalty), ἀστερίζων. Cf. 6. οἷον ἡμεῖς διευκοτώτα· this is after the analogy of τυμπάνων τυμπάνωθαν νῦν, without some reminiscence of which it would hardly occur to any one to say διευκοτέων or τυμπάνων ἡμεῖς διευκοτέων. διευκοτέσθαι is substituted, as more vivid and concrete, for the expected τυμπάνωθαι. Similarly we have μάχον μᾶλλον ήττάσθαι as more specific equivalents of μάχον μᾶχον ἔρρα. — νῦν: expresses reality. This use of νῦν is akin to its very frequent use in contrast to a supposition contrary to fact (cf. 3B, Lach. 184 a and 200 e); but here it is connected with a false account of what will come to pass, in contrast with the true prophecy of Socrates. —

5. τὸ δὲ κτλ.: for a similar idiom, though more strongly put, cf. Soph.
XXXI. Tois de apophereinmenvous ήδεως ἀν διαλε-χειν υπ’ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος, ἐν ὧν ἡ ἄρχοντες ἀγχολίαν ἀγνοοῦσί καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἄθαντα με δεὶ τεθνάων. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον τον χρόνον· ὦδεν γὰρ κολέω διαμυθολογήσαι πρὸς ἄλλη-λους ἦσας ἔξετιν· ὑμῖν γὰρ ἕν τοὺς φίλους οὐσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐδέχθω τὸ υἱὸν μοι ξυμβεβηκός τὶ ποτὲ νοεῖ· ἔμοι γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὅρθος ἄν ἐν καλοῖν—θαυμαστοὶ τὸ γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰσθανία μοι ἀξίαν.

39 244 a, fr. ... τὸ δὲ τοῦτον γίγνεται πάντων τοποθετεῖται.

d 14. ἔσθ’ αὐτῷ: not os γὰρ ἔσθ’ κτλ., as Schanz has it. The position of ἔσθι near ό at the beginning of the clause justifies the accent. G. 144, 5; II. 488, 3.

15. μὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις καλοῖν: to oppress no man, corresponding to the preceding ἀποκεφαλίζετε ... διαμυθολογεῖτε κτλ. XXXI. 2. υπὲρ: has just the same meaning with ὑπὲρ. See L. and S. c.s. tach. f.in. Socrates speaks about what has befallen him, which he looks upon as for the best since it is in the will of Divine Providence.—οἱ ἄρχοντες: see Introd. 75, and cf. 37 e.

3. ἀγχολίαν ἄγνοιαν: are busy. They were occupied with the arrangements for conveying Socrates to prison. For τεθνάω, see on τεθνάω, 30 e.

4. ἄλλα: used freq., for the sake of greater vivacity, before the inv. or subj. of command. See on ἄλλα ἄν ἔσθ’ κτλ., Crit. 46 a.

5. οὔτε γὰρ κολέα: indicates the calm self-possession of Socrates, so strongly contrasted with the ordinary attitude of those under sentence of death.—διαμυθολογήσαμεν: more friendly and familiar than διακράτησαμεν. Thus Socrates prepares to open his heart upon matters not strictly relevant, which only those of whom he is fond and who care for him need hear. Cf. Phaed. 61 a, οὗτοι καὶ μάλιστα πρῶτο ἐπέλαβα δικαστὰς διακράτησαμεν καὶ μαθητέως ὁ πάντοτε ἐκείνοις τοις ἔδειξα σοὶ διδακτή νομιμον. Phaed. 59 a, ἔδειξα διδακτή καὶ γνῶσις τῶν ἐκείνων πρώτως τοις διδακτή ὁ πάντοτε ἐκεῖνοις.

8. ἔσθ’ κτλ.: see on 5 τι πλὴν τι ὀμηρεῖς, 17 a. ἔσθ’ κτλ.: see on 3 τι πλὴν a ὀμηρεῖς, 17 a. ἕν τι διδακτή κτλ.: notice how many short statements of fact crowd one upon the other. This serves to arrest the attention. The ὄντας δὲ τι is that now, when Socrates has such a face before him, the voice is silent, while previously, etc. See on δεῦρο ἐν ταῖς (lun.), 28 e.
10 μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαμονίου (ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ) πάνυ πυκνή ἂεὶ ἢν καὶ παντὶ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιομένη, εἰ τι μέλλομη μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν: νων δὲ ξυμβεβηκέ μοι, ἀπερ ὀρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταυτὶ α ἱδὲ οἰσθεὶν ἀν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοί δὲ ὤυτε ἐξίοντε ὠδέν ἦνοικον ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημείον, ὤυτε ἡνικά ἄνε. 15 βανον ἐναυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, ὤυτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ὑπερῴ. καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀλλοι λόγοις τολ- λαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσοχε λέγοντα μεταξύ νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξεων ὤυτὲ ἐν ἐργῷ οὐδεν ὤυτὲ ἐν λόγῳ 20 ἡναντιωταί μοι. τι ὄντι αἰτιών εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω: ἐγὼ ἤμιν ἐρῶ κινδυνεύω γὰρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκός τούτου αγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσοι οἴνομεν κακῶν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ ὡς οὐκ ἡναντιώθη, ἀν 25 μοι τὸ εἰσόδος σημείον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμέλλων ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξεων.

10. τοῦ δαμονίου: see on δαμ- 

11. τοῦ τοῦ σμικροῖς: see on οἴδο 

12. ὀρθῶς πράξειν: i.e. so that all 

13. ὡς δὲ καθ.: γαρ emphasizes 


17. τοινοῖς ή: in many situati 

18. λέγοντα μεταξ: for this and 

19. παρατητὴ τῆς πράξεως: in re 

20. υπολαμβάνω: not subjv., since 

22. ἡνικ: to be connected imme 

25. ἐμέλλων: referring definitely to e
XXXII. 'Evnoiostōmen δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀπόλυτης ἐλπίδος ἐπεε ἐστιν ἁγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι, δυνών γὰρ βάτερον ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι. Ἡ γὰρ αὐτῷ μὴν εἶναι τῆς μεταβολῆς μηδε-μέναν μηδένος εἶνη τοῦ τεθνέωτα, ἡ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυχανεῖ ὁμα καὶ μετοίκησις τῷ θεῷ τούτῳ τοῦ ἔθνους εἰς ἄλλον τόμον. καὶ εἰτε μηδεμία αἰσθησις ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὦν ὑπὸσ ἐπεέδω τις καθεῖν δὲ μηδὲ ὅναρ μηδέν ὀρᾶ, θαυμασίαν κέρδος ἂν εἰς ὁ πάνωτες ἑνώ καὶ μηδέν ὁμαί, εἰ τια ἐκλεξάμενον δεότα ταύτη τῇ

corporates into his descriptions of life after death Orphic and Pythagorean accounts of metempsychosis. Here and in the Πράξεως (70–72) Socrates appeals to a πανδώρι μέλες.

5. τῇ ἐφεί: a dat. of interest. G. 1165; H. 771. The gen. would express the subject of the action designated.—τοῦ τόμου: governed by μεταβολῆς καὶ μεταφάσεως. Of these two the latter repeats the former in more specific form. The gen. corresponds to the acc. with μεταβάλλειν and (rarely) μεταφέρειν. Cf. Thuc. 181 εἰ μὲν τα
c. χέρια ἐν χέρια μεταβάλλει.

6. τοῦ ἑθεῖα: see on τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν περαταχιῶν, 32 B. See also App. — καὶ ἀφί: the second member is introduced by ὦτι as in line 19.


8. κρίνει: not ἀκόλουθον, because Soc- rates does not consider such a condition as in itself a good.

9. ἐν οἷς: ἐν belongs to εἰρηνία, and on account of the length of the prot. is repeated first with οἷς in 14, and again just before the inf.; similarly ἔνω is twice used in the prot. See on ὑπὸ τόνος ἐν, 31 a. — ἐκλεξάμενον καὶ
10 νύκτα, εν η ὠντω κατεδαρθεν ὡστε μηδε ὦνα ρειω, καὶ τὸς ἀλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραβέτων ταυτη τῇ νυκτὶ δεοι σκεφάμενον εἰσεῖν, πόσας ἁμεων καὶ ὡνοι ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταυτῆς τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ βίῳ. οἷμαι δὲ μὴ ὦνι ἱδώ.

15 την τωδ, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέγαν βασιλεὺς εὐαριθμήτων ἀν εὑρεῖον αὐτὸν ταυτὰς πρὸς τὰς ἀλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ βανατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγγει λέγων, καὶ γὰρ οἶδεν πλεῖόν ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνετα, οὕτω δὴ εἰναι ἡ μία νίξ, εἰ δὲ ὁ ἄλλων ἀποδημησαί εἰστιν ὁ βανατός ἐνθάδε

20 εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἄληθε ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα ὅσ ἀρα ἐκεὶ εἰσὶν ἀπαντει τεθενεῖτε, τί μείζον ἁγαθὸν τοῦτον εἰς ἀν, ὁ ἄλλος δικασται; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀίδον, ἀπαλαγείς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἰναι, εὐρήσει τούς ἁλήθεως δικαστάς, οἴσερ καὶ λέγουσαν ἐκεὶ δικαίον

25 λειψ. Μίνως τε καὶ Ραδάμανθυ καὶ Αἰακός καὶ Τριπόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιδεόν δικαιο ἔγενοτο εν τῷ ἑαυτῶν

40 διεισαγαθέντα σκεφάμενον: the first two parts are coupled by καὶ are subordinated to σκεφάμενον, just as it is subordinated in turn to εἰσεῖν. See at ἀναχθοῦμεν. 210.

14. μὴ δὴ, ἄλλα εἰτ.: not to speak of any one in private station, no, not the Great King, etc. ἄλλα is used here to introduce a climax. See H. 1055 a.

15. αὕτω: this pron. gives a final touch of emphasis to βασιλεὺς. Socrates talks of the king of Persia in the strain which was common among Greeks in his day. Polus, in the Gorgias (470 e), is startled because Socrates refuses to take it for granted that the king of Persia is happy.

17. κέρδος λέγω: sc. αὕτω.—καὶ γὰρ εἰτ.: for thus the whole of time appears no more than a single night, etc.

20. αὕτω: a conclusion derived immediately from the admission that death is a migration from earth to some other place.

23. δικαστῶν: for case, see G. 931; a.

41. H. 940 a.

25. Μίνως ἐτ.: connected grammatically with the rel. sent. rather than with τῶν δικαστῶν. C. Pl. Per. 60 a, ἄρα λέγω λείποιν εἰς ἐπιθυμητὸν ἐν τῷ καὶ φαρσαλίσσαν ἐν τῷ. The three first mentioned, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, were sons of Zeus, and while living had earned great fame by their scrupulous observance of justice. They are also named in the Gorgias as the ministers of justice in the world below. In Dante's Inferno (v. 4-17) Minos, curi-
only transformed into a demon with a long tail, still fulfills the same duties,—

When the spirit evil-born
Cometh before him, wholly it confesses;
And this discriminating of transgressions
Seeth what place in Hell is meet for it;
Girds himself with his tail as many times
As grades he wishes it should be thrust down.

In Ar. Frogs, Aeschus is Pluto’s footman. For a painting representing the judges of the underworld, see Gerhard’s Vasenbilder, plate 239. — Τραντσάρους: a son of Eleusus, glorified in the traditions of Demeter the μεμορφότος. He was the disseminator of intelligent agriculture. Plato uses here the freedom which characterizes all his mythical digressions, and adapts the myth to the point which he desires to make. διδασκεῖν implies action in two capacities: (1) as judge, pronouncing upon the deeds and misdeeds of every soul that has lived and died (this is the account of Minos in the Gorgias), and (2) as king and legislator. Cf. Ilom. Od. xi. 508 ff., where Minos is shown χρίσεις σεβόμενος ἔχοντα, δικαιοσύνην Ὀμίλον. Probably here the prevailing idea is that of king and legislator. Homer (Od. iv. 504 ff.) places Rhadamantus among the blessed in the Elysian fields.

27. Ὑπέταξε τό: Orpheus and Musaeus with Homer and Hesiod were honored as the most ancient bards and seers of Greece.

28. ἐν τῶν τῶν: price stated in the form of a condition. — The repetition of ἐν has an effect comparable to the repeated neg. The first ἐν is connected with the most important word of the clause, while the second takes the place naturally belonging to ἐν in the sent. GMT. 223. Cf. 31 a.


30. ἵστρα καὶ οἰκότροφος: for me myself more particularly.

31. ἐφιτε: when (if at any time) I do met.

32. Παλαμῆδα: the son of Nauspilius, a king in Euboea. The wisdom of Palamedes provoked the jealousy of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Agamemnon, and was his ruin. Acc. to the post-homeric story Odysseus plotted so successfully, by forging a message to Palamedes from Priam, that Palamedes was suspected of treason and stoned by the Greeks. Cf. Verg. Aen. 83 ff. and Ov. Met. xiii. 56 ff. The title is preserved of a lost tragedy by Sophocles called Palamedes and of one by Euripides. The fate of Ajax is well known through Hom. Od. xi. 541 ff. See also Met. xiii. and the Ajax of Sophocles.

33. ἐντολαττομένος: a case of ἀπηθηκτὸν (II. 1039), which occurs not infrequently where as here a sent. is thrown in by way of explanation.
πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνα, οὐς ἐνώ οἷμαι, οὐκ ἄν
35 ἄνθες εἰπ. καὶ ἔτι τὸ μέγιστον τοῦτο ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ
ἐρευνῶντα ὦπερ τοὺς ἐπιαύρα διάγειν, τῖς αὐτῶν σοφῶς
ἐστι, καὶ τὰς οὐεῖ μέν, ἐστὶ δ᾽ ὡς. ἤμιχον δὲ ἄν τις, ὁ
ἀνδρεῖς δικασταὶ, δέξατο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἔπι Τροιάν ἄγοντα
τὴν πολλήν στρατιὰν ἣ Ὅδυσσεα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλον 40
μυρίων ὡς τὰς εἰπτο καὶ ἄνθρακα καὶ ἱματικά, οἶτε ἐκεῖ
, διαλέγονται καὶ ξυνεῖται καὶ ἐξετάζει ἀμύχανον ἣν εἴη
ἐξελείδομαι. πάντως ὀν δὴν τούτου γε ἐνεκα ὡς ἐκεῖ
, ἀποκτένοντο τὰ τε γὰρ ἅλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐσσόι ὡς
ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνβάδε, καὶ ἥδη τῶν λουπῶν χρόνον ἀδάνατοι εἰσόν.
45 εἰπτε γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλήθη.
XXXIII. 'Alla kai oima xhr, d andreis dikastai. 41

eudaptidas einai pros ton thnaton, kai en ti tou to dio

eisbai alithes, oti oue exe tim andreis, anybo kakon oude

ouj ou eisamxynontai, oude ametelai upo theon ta

5 tou pragma. oude ta ema vun apd tou automatos

geonou, alla mou dhlon esti tou, oti hned tenanai kai

apallakhaiv pragmaiv belton hnu mou. dia tou tou kai

eme oudamou apektrepsi to sthmeion, kai eugyge tois katafhi-

fisamienous mou kai tois kataorgous ou panoi xalepai

10 kaitoi ou tauyga tis dianoia Katafhiouonto mou kai kata-

orgous, alla oimoule blaptheis. tois autous aetis hnu.

feidai, tosoi mou didomai autous. tois vieis mou

voice was silent. Contrast the oppo-
site view expressed by Achilles (Homer. Od. xi. 480 ff.), and in Eur. f. A. 1249-

1253, where Iphigenia, pleading for

life, says, en stonmone uneta teo

dein. | to fain tov akthoun ax-

thos blathos. | to perde e oedhe-

rionan be de sketei. dein. exobh

en kopto. | oimou me

11. blathos: used abs. without

acc. of the person or of the thing,
because the abstract idea of doing

harm is alone required.—voi. .

. | oimou me

. | so far it is fair to

blame them. Contrast 17 B, voue

me theo en un, this...about them; and cf.

Syrm. 226 e, voue eti mou othe me

. | oimou me

. | they deserve blame for their

malicious intention and for the reason

given in 20 B. — oimou: it is fair. Cf.

Gorg. 405 e, oimou me deo eis

where oun.

12. vouthe mewna: "although they
certainly are far from wishing well,
yet I ask so much as a favor," i.e. so little that they can well afford
to grant it. Then follows an expla-
nation of vouthe.
13. ἱβάσκεται: see on ἐκείνος, 19 a.
16. ἀνέβηκαί: see on ἀνεμίζεσθαι, 30 a.
18. ἴχθυς εὐνόμος: to be understood in the light of cc. xviii. and xxvi. Socrates looks upon what is usually taken as the most grievous injury as the greatest possible blessing.
20. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ.: serves to close the speech, giving at the same time the reason for coming to an end.
22. πλῆθος: pleonastic like καὶ in 20 d. See App.—τὸ δῆφι: cf. the subtly ironical way in which the same thought is put in the Euthyphro (3 d e), where, speaking of his accusers, Socrates says, ἐξ ἄλλον ὁμιλίαν μου καταγελάω, ὅτερον ἐπὶ φόβος σαυτοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ ἄλλος διώκεται καὶ γινόμενος ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρατείας διηγάται· εἰ δὲ συνυπεράντοτε τούτων ἐξ ἐγὼ ἀποδίδομαι ἐξήνοι γλήν ἐμὲ τοῖς μάντεσιν. See on ἔρωσι, 35 d.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

1. ΣΩ. Τί τηρικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὥς Κρίτων; ἢ ὅπ πρὶ ἔτη ἔστιν;
      ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν ὁδὸν.
      ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
      5 ΚΡ. Ὡρθρὸς βαθύς.
      ΣΩ. Θεομάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησε σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμώτηριον
           φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι. [λ.] p. 216.
      ΚΡ. Ἐσωθῆς ήτο μοι ἔστω, ὥς Σωκράτης, διὰ τὸ πολ.
           λάκις δεύο φοιτάω, καὶ τι καὶ ἐνεργέτηται ἕπε ἕμου.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἦκες ἢ πάλαι;

43 1. Κρίτων: see Introd. 62. See on
      Apol. 33 d, f., and cf. 38 b, f.
      4. τηρικάδε μάλιστα, about what time
           is it? In Lat. maxime and ad-
           modum are so used, e.g. locus pa-
           tensus ducentos maxime pedos,
           Liv. x. 38. 5; locus in pedum
           mille admodum altitudinem
           abruptus, id. xii. 36. 2.
      5. ὡρθρὸς βαθύς: the adj. limits
           ὡρθρός, so that the whole expression
           means rather the end of night than
           the beginning of day. Cf. the time
           when the Protagoras begins (310 a),
           τῆς παρελθόντος μετὰ ταῦτα, ὡς
           βαθύτατος ὡρθρός. The description in
           the same dialogue of young Hippocrates
           feeling his way through the dark to
           Socrates's bedside shows that ὡρθρός
           means, just before daybreak. Cf.
           Xen. An. iv. 3. 8 ff., where Xenophanes
           dreams a dream, εἶτα ὡρθρός ὡς . . .
           ἤδειαν τε καὶ ἐκ τάχυτα ὡς δρόμωνων
           ἔδοχον. Here ὡρθρός means the dark
           before the dawn. Cf. also ἀργῶς
           ὅργε, Hom. II. vii. 433, ἦσαν ὡς σοφὶ ἄρ
           το πᾶν, ἦτο ὡς ἀργωλίζεται ὅργε, ὥς
           τέμνον ἄρῃ ἀργῆ ἐν οὐρανόις μικρὰς ἐγκατέλειψεν ἤτοι καὶ
           ἐκείνῃ ἄρῃ ἀργῶς κατέβη ἐν 
           Ἀχιλλέω.
      6. ὑπακούσας: did not re-
           fuse to let you in. Cf. Xen. An. i. 3. 8
           for ὡς ἤσθη, he refused. With ὑπα-
           i. 11, Φιλίππου δὲ γελαστοῦνδε προκείμενον
           τὸν θεμέλιον ἐπεὶ τῷ ὑπακούοντι (the pur-
           ter) εἰσεγείρει δοταὶ τε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

9. καλ. . . . καλ ἄριστο: and what is
      more, I've done a little something for him.
      ἦδειν ἦν ἐπικρατέστερον τρόπο (a tip).
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

ΣΩ. Ἐξα πῶς οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τῇ παρακάθρασις;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον
15 ἐν τοσαῦτῃ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ καὶ λύσῃ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἡδεὸς καθευδείς· καὶ ἐπιτηδείς σε οὐκ ἴμερον, ὡς ἡδιστὰ διάγγος· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ἐυδαιμ. Ἕλευθερία τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μαλλοῦ ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶτι ἠνεκτή·

20 ἕμφορά ὡς βαδίως αὐτῆς καὶ πρῶτος φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Κρίτων, πλημμέλες εἰς ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτοι ὄντα, εἰ δεὶ καθ’ ἀληθεῦν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοσαῦταις ἔμφοραις ἀλλοκοταί, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν αὐτούς ἐπικοιν. ἡ ἔλευθερία τῆς παροῦσθι τῇ παλαιᾷ τῇ παρεστῶτι τῇ

30 καὶ τῇ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παροῦσθι τῇ παρεστῶτι τῇ

ΣΩ. "Εστι ταύτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὖν πρὸ πρός ἄφιξαι;

ΚΡ. "Ἀγγελίαν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, φέρον χαλεπῆν, οὐ σοὶ, ὡς ἐμοί φαίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἑγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ τοῖς ἔνεμοι.

12. ἄντα: refers to ἐκεῖνος πάλαι in a vein of wonder or perhaps of gentle reproof.
14. οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία: the neg. belonging to the clause that follows is inserted by anticipation in the oath. The answer to Socrates’s question is implied clearly in the use of ὡς, and becomes categorical in καὶ ἐπιτηδεῖς πετ. 15. ἐν τοσαῦτῃ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῇ: τῇ is introduced after τοσαῦτῃ, which belongs to both subs. This position of τῇ is very common after the art. or a prep. — ἀλλὰ καὶ: but furthermore.
17. ἐν διάγγει: for the subj. after a secondary tense, see GMT. 318; b H. 831 a.
18. ἐκεῖνος τῷ πρότερον: for the gen. of cause, see G. 1120; H. 744. At the end of the sentence, a clause with ὡς (equiv. to τῇ ἐπαν.) is introduced in place of the gen. — For the facts, see Introd. 36 and note 6, p. 26.
21. ἐπιλθεῖται: cf. Ἀρ. 22 d and see on ἐπιλθεῖται, Ἀρ. 26 e.
25. τῇ μὴ σοὶ ἐγανακτεῖν: τοπλαστεῖ ε is here qualified by ἐδώκει, and is used in the sense of preventing. Hence the doubled neg. GMT. 96, 2, x.1 b; II.1034.
29. καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν: an effective and almost pathetic reitera-
KRITON.

Σ. Τών ταύτης ἡ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ ἐστὶν ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι μεῖ.;

ΚΡ. Οὔτοι δὲ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ζῆσαι τῆμε-ρον ἐπὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἦκοντες τινες ἀπὸ Σουλίου καὶ 35 καταλαμπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. Δήλου οὖν ἐκ τούτων [τῶν ἄγγε- λων] ὅτι ἦσαν τῆμερον, καὶ ἄναγκη δὴ εἰς αὐρων εἶσαι, δὲ Σόκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

II. Σ. Ἀλλὰ, ἐκ Κρίτων, τούτω ἁγαθῷ, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλοι, ταύτη ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἷοι ἦσαν αὐτῷ τῆμερον.

43 tion of the first χελεάν, made all the o stronger by the doubled καὶ.

30. ἐν τούτῳ βαρέστα ἐν ἔνσεια: in Hdt., Thuc., Plato, and later writers, ἐν τούτῳ, about, is idiomatically used to limit the super. Thus ἐν τούτῳ be- comes an adverb, which describes not absolute precedence but an average and comparative superiority. Cf. Thuc. iii. 17, ἐν τούτῳ πλείστως, among the most numerous (not 'the very most numerous,' since Thuc. adds that the number was exceeded once) where the gender of πλείστως is noticable. Cf. also id. 1. 6. 3, ἐν τούτῳ πρῶτοι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς παντὸς ἑτερων αὐτί. Here the position of ἐν shows that ἐν τούτῳ is taken almost as one word, i.e. πρῶτοι limited so as to mean prac- tically the first, or substantially the first of those who laid down, etc.

31. τῶν ταύτων: connect with φέρ- μεν above. For ἢ, see on ἦδον, Apol. 26 b. — τῶν πλοίων αὐτί: cf. Phaedo, 58 a: τῶν ἐστὶ τῶν πλοίων, διὰ φαν- ἐλποῦ, ἐν ἱδίονο μισθὸν εἰς Κρίτων τῶν ἵστα ἐπὶ διώκσῃ (the latter complex to be sacrificed to the Minoan) ἄρχειν ἐμόν κεφαλῆς τε καὶ αὐρων ἄναγκης, τῇ σφήνει ἄλλησθαι, διὰ λέγεται, τότε εἰ σωτῆτον ἔλεγον διώκσαι (a sol- emn embassy) ἄνδρον εἰς Δήλου τοῦ ἦ
KR. Πόθεν τούτο τεκμαίρει; ἵνα μιας μιᾶς μιὴς

5 ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἔρω. τῇ γαρ ποι οὐστεραία δεί, μὲ απο-

θησκεῖν ὑ ἢ ἢ ὥστε ὑπὸ τοῦ πλοίου. Φ. Ἱ. Λ. ἤ.

KR. Φαθύ γέ τοι δή οἱ τούτων κύριοι. γεγ. ἤ ἧνὶ ὁλιγεῖ

6 ΣΩ. Οὐ τοις τῶν ἑπούσης ἡμέρας ομαὶ αὐτὸ ἥξειν,

ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ των ένυπνιον

10 ἐόρακα ὄλγον πρότερον τοίχης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κυδυ-

νεότεστ ἐν καρό μεσύ ώς οὐκ ἐγείραί με.

KR. 'Ποτ ὅδε δὴ τι τοῦ ἐνυπνιον;

ΣΩ. 'Εδοκείς τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐε-

δής, λευκά ἰμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαν με καὶ εἴπειν; ὡς Σώ-

15 κρατεῖς, ἦματι κεν τριτάτω φθίνην ἐρίβωλων ἱκώσιον.

KR. 'Ἀτοπον τοῦ ἐνυπνιον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

Lat. quod bonum felix frons

tumque sit, or quod bene vor-
tat. Cf. Dem. iii. 18, ἔτερον λέγει πρὸ

5 βελτίων τούτω κατείχεν ἀγάθω τόχῳ. Cf.

also the comic perversion of it in Ar. Αι. 430, πρόκλατον τόχῳ σχῆσις τοῦ

ισῶν εἶναι ἐπὶ σώσεως τοῦποτόπτατο. For

the most formal use of this word, see

many inscriptions and the decree,

Thuc. iv. 118. 11, Ἀλέξανδρον τοῦ ἀγαθῷ τῷ Ἀθηναῖον πατοῦσιν τὸν ἡσυχα-

σίαν (armistice). In Xen. Hell. iv. 1. 14,

it is used of a betrothal: ἢδον μὲν τοῖς

ἐφί, ἵνα, ἰσαμεία, ἢς ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς μὲν,

ὁ ἱερατεύω, τόχῳ ἀγαθῷ διδάσκων ἦν

τοῦτ ἑκατοντάρχα. Cf. also Xen. Cyr.

iv. 5. 51, ἀλλά δὲχώρια ταύτα, ἢφι, καὶ

ἀγάθῳ τόχῳ διδάσκων τις ἡ ἐνείρη γενομένα

καὶ δεῖται διδάσκεται ταυτάρατα.

5. τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ κυρίου: this is the first

a premise that follows the conclusion

stated above in εἰ μέντοι ζήσω τῇ μο-

ρῳν, the second is contained in the

account of the dream.

7. τῶν τούτων κυρίων: see Introd.

75, and cf. Αποδ. 39 Ὠ.

8. τῆς ἑπούσης ἡμέρας: means the

same as τήμερος, for Socrates is now a
KRITON.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργείς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Λιαν γε, ὡς εἰσελθήτω. ἀλλ', ὁ δ' θαμβώνει Σόκρατες, ἄτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πεῖθον καὶ σώθητί ὡς ἔμοι, εἰών ὦ ἄρσην, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἔστω, ἀλλὰ χώρις μὲν τοῦ ἐστήσθαι τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδειον, ὅπως ἐν εὐδοκώ μη ποτὲ ἐνυφίσω, ἐν τῇ καὶ πολλοὶ δόξαι, οἴ εμὲ καὶ ὦ μῆ σαφῶς ἵσαις ὑπὸ ὅτι τὸ π ο ἐν σφέλει, εἰ ἡθελον ἀναλίσκειν ἑρμήματα, ἀμελεῖσαι, κατεὶ τᾶς ἄν αἰσχρίας εἰς τάντης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν ἑρμήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φιλοῦν; 44

καί δ' ἡμῶν ἀπεκείνεσθε, ἐνεὶ διακριόμεθα πρὸς ἀνδρὰς, καὶ ἰθίδ. ν. 403, σχεῖται, ἡμιμερίζεται, ὠ σιν ἐρέ (recked not) αὐτοληπίζεται. See App.

17. ἐναργεῖ μὲν οὖν: it is surely plain enough, immo evidens. The full meaning can hardly be understood without reading the context of the verse (363) which is quoted. Cf. Hom. H. ix., ν. 350-368. Socrates thinks of dying as going home, and Phthisia was the home of Achilles.

—γέ μοι: not γέ ἄριστος. The emphasis falls on the verb rather than on the pron. See on ὑπὸ γέ μοι δοκιμό, Ἀρ. 19.4 a.

III. 1. δ' ἄρα: most excellent, meaning something like as ἄρα διάβολος, or οὐ περιέχει, rather stronger than ὀχαλίτει. Of course no color of irony is given here. Cf. Symp. 210β, τουτέστιν ἥμαρτο ἡμῖν ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ φαβορίστῃ, and Gorg. 460 a, where Socrates is speaking of the scope (ῥητορική) of rhetoric: ἡμᾶς γὰρ τὰ ἔγγον καταρνάτησιν τα μέγατες ὑπὸ εὐκόσιον. The word ἄρα, which was used by Homer only in addressing persons, received from Pindar an enlarged meaning, so as to include whatever proceeds from the gods. This was adopted by Att. writers, and of course its adoption involved applying it to things. Plato still further enlarged the ground which it covers. In addressing persons, he gives it a flattering or an ironical implication; applied to things, he uses it for what is extraordinary, superhuman. See on ἐνέκειν ἐπελευσθε κτις, Ἀρ. 27.4 d.

2. ἐν τῇ καὶ νύν: this gives a hint as to what Crito has planned. It is developed later. See Introd. 62.

3. ξυμφορά ἔστω: more vivid and natural than ἔστω. —χωρίς μὲν... ἐν δὲ: quite apart from my loving, etc. ... I shall further, etc. See App.

4. ἀναλίσκεσθαι: the pl. inf. with χωρίς. —εὐδοκώ μη ποτὲ: equiv. to εἰ μὴ πέρι τούτων, and so here with the fut. indic., I shall certainly never, etc. GMT. 205; H. 1092.

6. οὐ οὖν τοῦτο: I shall seem to many to have neglected you whereas I was able to save you. οὐ δὲ τὸν σφέλθ μη καθιστά, I might have saved you, if I had wished. GMT. 421; H. 987.

8. ἐφικτὰ ... φανεῖ: explaining τῶν, which covers an idea already contained in what precedes. Cf. Gorg. 500 c, νεῖρα τοῖσι οἰσίν ἕως ἐκ λίπους, οὐ τι ἐν μιᾷ συνεπαρκεῖ τοι (than which what would a man be more inclined to pursue with diligence) ... τῶν, ὑπὸ χρῆ τρέχων ἰν τούτῳ. Where the gen. after a comp. is a dem. or
οὐ γὰρ πείσονταί οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς εἰ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡθέλησας 44
10 ἀπειδεύει ἥμισὺν προθυμομένων. ἦσσων.
ΣΠ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἦμι, ὁ μακάρε Κρίτων, οὐκ ἔτι τῶν
πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπικέκοστατοι, ὅν μᾶλλον
ἀξίων φροντίζειν, ἥγησονται αὕτα οὗτο πεπράξαι ὡσπερ
ἀν πραξθῇ. ...· oμελῆς λέει, ἐκείνη λέει.
15 ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὡς Σάκρατε, καὶ τῆς ἀ
τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλεων. αὐτὰ ὅτε δῆλα τὰ παρόντα
νῦν, ὅτι οἱ τε εἶσον οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμφόρτατα τῶν
κακῶν ἔσχερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδὸν, εάν τις ἐν
αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἐ. 20
ΣΠ. Εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐκ ὅτι εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ λέω
τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἱ τέ θεον καὶ ἁγαθῶς τ
μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἄν εἴχον· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἱ τε
οὗτε γὰρ φρονούμενοι οὗτε ἀφόρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦν
δὲ τούτο ὅ τι ἄν τέχωσιν.

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετον; τάδε δέ, ὡς Σάκ-
κρατες, εἰπὲ μοι· ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοὶ προμνῆει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

44 rel. pron., an explanatory clause (here with the inf., cf. Eur. Hec. 227) introduced by δὴ, may always be appended. Cf. 53 b c.
13. ἐνθαρ καὶ πράξῃ: see on δὲ ἐν
Lambda, Apol. 20 a. The cor. subj. has the force of the fut. pf. GMT. 90; II. 998 c.
15. ὁρᾶς δὲ: Crito means to point at
the case in hand. "The fact is that the
many are really in a position, etc." Crito has profited but little by what
Socrates has said in the court-room.
Cf. Apol. 30 d, 34 e, 40 a, etc.
20. εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον κτλ.: a wish
the object of which is not attained.
ἐν, εἰσὶν ἃς ἔχει expresses an unat-
tained purpose depending on the pre-
ceding unfulfilled wish. GMT. 338;
Kriton.

...ἐπιστημένων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνδέχετε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συκόφανται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχουσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθέδε ἐκκλησίασιν, καὶ ἢ ἄναγκασθομεν ἢ καὶ πάνω τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ λατρεύουσα φρονέματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτους παθέω; εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔσωσον αὐτό γαρ εἰμίς, ἆρα τοῦ δικαιοὶ ἠσμένοι σώαστες σε κυνικὴν τοῦ τῶν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦτον μεῖζον. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου ἢ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

Σὺ. Καὶ ταύτα προμηθύνει, δ' Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

Κρίτων. Μήτε τούς ταύτα φοβεῖς καὶ γαρ οὐδὲ τολμάς τάργυριν ἐστών, ἢ θελοῦς λαβίνεις τινός σώσαι σε καὶ ἢ ἐξαγαγεῖς ἐνθέδε. ἔπειτα δ' ὅπας τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς ἀειτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δεῖς ἐπὶ αὐτούς πολλοῦ

of the expected denial the facts really would justify an affirmative answer; you surely don't, though I imagine you do, is Critias' meaning. The μή which follows προμηθύνει is obviously connected with the notion of anxiety in that verb. The same idea is again presented in φοβεῖ (are fearful) below. The subj. παρέχουσιν conveys an idea of action indefinitely continued, whereas ἐξαγαγεῖς and ἀναγκασθομεν denote simply the occurrence of the action.

8. ἀνεμένων ἄρην αὐτ.: see on ἀνεμενείς εἰς, Apol. 18 a.

9. ἀλλ' ἢπείς πείθειν, μή ... τόλμειν: no, no! do as I say. ἀλλὰ with the inv. introduces a demand or a request made in opposition to an expressed refusal or to some unwillingness merely implied or feared. This vigorous request is reinforced by the neg. μὴ νοίες, do this and do not do that. Cf. 40 a.

13. μὴς: the second clause, which we miss here, appears below (b) in the resumptive statement ἄπερ λέγω, μὴν...
ἀργυρίου; σοί δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ δὲ ομαῖ, ἵκανα ἐπείτα καὶ εἰ τι εἷμοι κηδώμενος οὐκ ὅτι δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν ταῦτα, ξένους οὐ νοῦν ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλί.

20 σκέπως εἰς δὲ καὶ ἱεράλυκεν ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἀργυρίῳ ἵκα

νὸν. Συμμέλεια ὁ Θηβαῖος ἐτοιμοὶ δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. ὡστε, ὅτερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβοῦμεν καὶ πολλοὶ ἦσαν, μήτε οἱ ἑλεγχεῖν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερές σοι γενέσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔγος ἑξελθῶν ἃ τι χρησ.

25 σαυτός πολλαχοῦ μόνα γὰρ καὶ ἀλογίσθεν ὅποι ἰν ἀφική ἀπαύγουσι σε· ἓν δὲ βουλή εἰς Θετταλίαν ἔνεα, εἰς ὅποι ἰμοί ἑκεί ξένοι, οἱ σε περὶ πολλοὺ ποιῆσονται καὶ ἀσφαλεῖά σοι παρέξονται ὡστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

77 Ἡ μηδαμία?

V. Ἔτι δὲ, ὡς Ἐυρίδης, οὐδὲ ἄλλοι ὑπάρχοντες μοι δοκεῖς ἐπι-

χερεϊν πράγμα, σαῦτο τοῦτο προδομάναι, ἕτοις πολλοῖς καὶ τοιούτη σπεύδοντες σερί σαῦτων γενέσθαι, ἀπέρ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύδαντες καὶ ἐστεναθοὶ σε διαφθειραι

45 a 12. σοὶ δὲ: the argument is as follows: the amount required to settle with these sycophants, I should be
b 45 ready enough to expend for almost any one, but for you, etc. — ἵκανα: cf. Παρακεντ. ἕνεκεν τοῦ Κύρη,
45 φαλάξη αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἔπει, Χερ. Ἀμ. L. 1. 4; καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἐκεῖ οὐχ ἄλλη νόησιν ἐδεικνύεται γὰρ με καί
b 46 Ἐγώ οὖν ὁμαί: said with reference to the appositive θεοῦν.

18. ὃς οὖν: Crito recollects what Socrates had said (45 a, in connexion with 44 c). See on ὃς φίλης, Ἀπολ. 25 b.

19. ἕνον ὁμοῖον: cf. Ἀπολ. 33 c, ἔλλων τινος ἔνοικος στεν. The pron. calls up the ἕνον as present in Athens, and, for rhetorical purposes, within sight. The art. is omitted because ἕνον is a pred., these others who are ἕνον.

21. Κέβης: Cebes also was from Thebes, and the two play a very important part in the Phaedo.

23. ἀποκάρμην σαῦτο σῶμα: get tired of trying, etc. Here is no implication that Socrates has already tried to get away. Crito only hints that any other course is nothing short of moral cowardice. See App.—δ Ὀλυμπ. cf. Ἀπολ. 37 c d.

24. χρησ: the opt. representing the subj. of doubt. GMT. 186.

25. ἔλλων: for ἔλλως, which we expect after πολλαχοῦ on account of ἐνοῖν. This is attraction, or inverse assimilation. Cf. Soph. O. C. 1226, ἔλλως περίπτερ ἐλλήνειν.

V. 4. σε διαφθεῖραι: σε is accented c for emphasis and to disconnect it from ὑπάρχοντες.
5 bouleumenv. pro de totois kai tois vieis tois santoiv 45 emowe dokeis prodidonai, oui (souj exein kai ekdrupai kai a ekplaidewai) sychyemai katalipon, kai to swn meros, o to an toxwos, touto prakwusin: teuxonta de (lous to eikon) tou- ouvnon otiaper eiwthe gignesthai en tais borrhais peri tov d 10 orfanov. h yap ou chrh poiesthai paidas. h koukaitalai. eis povrein kai trefanta kai paidewonta. Isou ide oui dokeis tiv rhyamatai ariesthai. chrh de exaper en anfr aghasos dia kai andreioi eloi tota ariesthai, fakontai ge de aretis dia pawos tou bion emeleiwatai. ouf egw thn kai 15 uper sou kai uper hemon twv swn epistrefein aisonuvma, m h dukei anav to pragma to uper se anavoria twv hmetorw petrauchthai, kai eisodos tois dikaios twv dikai- meteiron eis tabhden exein mh eisellw, kai autos o agwn 45

V. 7. tv soi mpres: pro tuva parta or quod ad te attendit. — evi en toikwv: see on tv 61, 44. a. touto praxeouv: cf. el, kaq, and even epyk (used adv.) with praxe (Apol. 40 e). See on mh adhws praxein, Apol. 40 a.
10. h yap ev.: the yap is connected with an unexpressed reproof.
13. faperamtv ge 6i: se et, at all events you who maintain, etc., or particularly when you maintain. See on el ge 62, Apol. 40 a.
16. mh: see on ekm ge mh, 44 a.

The notion of fear is remotely implied. For this const., very common in Plato, see GMT 285; H. 887.  — a wzewtau tvl ev.: a certain sort of cowardice on our part. Notice the emphasis given to 6; hmetep, for which we are responsible. If Crito and the rest, by showing more energy, by using all possible influence against Meletus and his accusers, had carried the day, they would have been more genuinely edwes in the proper sense of the word. They failed 6wzwv tvl. Cf. Euthyphro's boast, evp, en tv enep ekato etv, Euthyph. 64.

17. kai elados ... kai o diph: in apposition with anav to pragma to per el. On the meaning of the technical terms, see introd. 70, with note 1, p. 65. Precisely how the trial of Socrates could have been avoided except by flight from Athens is not clear. There is a wholly untrustworthy tradition that Anytus offered him terms of compromise. Probably there were abundant means at hand for raising legal technicalities and for securing in this way an indefinite delay. All that Crito necessarily suggests is that flight was open to Socrates before proceedings began. At Athens, as at Rome, the law allowed a man to go into voluntary exile. See introd. 72.
18. o diph: the management of the case. See on el evwv eucwte, Apol. 24 a.
19. τοῦ ἐπανάστασις ἔργον: the scene of this act is laid in the prison.

20. ἀνεξάρτως: because, in Crito’s opinion, all who were involved made themselves a common laughing-stock by their weak-minded negligence and irreverence. Cf. Cymbeline, i.,

[Howard’s note, strange, or that the negligence may well be laughed at, yet it is true, etc.]

In the whole drift of Crito’s phraseology, the notion of acting a part on the stage before the Athenian public is prominent. — ἀνεξάρτως: this is really in Crito’s eyes the culmination of disgrace (connect with τὸ κακοῦ), in a matter that has been disgracefully maimed. Here is a return to the leading thought and a departure from the regular grammatical sequence. The anacoluthon is most obvious in the repetition of δεῦτε after ἄρκη.

21. Ἀνοιχτὰς ἡμέρας: people will think they allowed every advantage and every opportunity, especially the possibility of escape which now engrosses Crito’s thoughts, to pass unimproved. ἡμέρα is the object. Cf. Charm. 150 e, τοῖς ἄντον τοῖς διαφοράσιν νοῦς νόμων τοῖς ἑλπίδων ἦπορος τὸ καλλίᾳ νοσήματα, i.e. the reason why Greek doctors fail to cure most diseases.

22. καθιστάται at Socrates’ part, then recurs to his own. The insertion of such a clause in a relative sent. is irregular. — ὅπως τοῦ ὅσον: like ὅπως above. For the fact, cf. 43 b e.

24. ἦμα τοῦ οὐκοῦ: ἦμα is used as ὅπως freq. is. Cf. Symp. 195 ε, τὸν μὴν ἔχω τὸν ἄλλον, ὅπως τοῦ τῆς ἡμέρας, he is young and in addition to his youth he is tender. Cf. also Theat. 185 ε, καθιστάται τῆς ὅπως . . . ὅπως τῆς καθιστάται (in addition to your beauty) τῆς ἐφίδιος μὲν ἕτος — ἀλλὰ: cf. line 28 below, and note on ἀλλὰ ὅμως, 45 a. This speech has the dignity which genuine feeling alone can give. Cf. Rich. III. iv. 3. — Come, I have learned that fearful commenting is laudable service to dull delay: Delay tends imperious and small-paced bargain. Then fury expedition be my wing.

On ἑξευθυνεῖται, to have done with deliberation, cf. Dem. viii. 3, ἔξω τοῦ τεχνῶν συμφέρουσα βεβουλεύσαται καὶ αποτελεσθείσαι, and iv. 19, τοῦτο... τῶν ἐλευθέρων μαρτύρει. GMT 100; H. 851 a.

28. τῆς ἱματίας: cf. 44 a.

27. καθιστάται: this adv. use of τοῦ is developed out of the cognate acc. (kindred signification). Cf. the Eng. idiom, “to delay somewhat (a bit).” G. 1054; H. 715.
VI. ΣΩ. Ὅ φηλε Κρίτων, ἥ προβοήαν σου πολλοῦ ἐν ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τῶν ἀραθήτων εἰπ. εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσον μείζων, τοσοῦτον χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι σον χρή ἕρας εἰτε ταῦτα πράκτεν εἰτε μή· ἀς ἔγω οὐ μόνον νῦν ἄλλα καὶ ἀληθεύτως εἰς τῶν ἐμῶν μηδένι ἀλλω πειθεῖς ή τῷ λόγῳ, δε ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ μελετήτος φανεραί. τοὺς δὲ λογος οὗ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἐξελέγω οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβάλειν, ἑπειδὴ μοι ἦδεν τῇ τύχῃ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὁμοιος φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτόν προβεβοῦ καὶ τιμῶ οὔσπερ καὶ πρὸτερον. ὅ δὲ ἐν μὴ βελτίω ἐξομον λέγειν ἐν τῷ

VI. 2. ἀφία: sc. ἓστιν, in spite of the opt. in the protasis. GMT. 601; II. 601 b. sc. εἰπ: not if it should be, but if it should prove to be. Cf. δικαίως ἂν εἰπησίμην, ἀπόδεικτος. 29 a. For the present, Socrates does not decide whether Crito's zeal is right or wrong. 4. δέ μόνον τετ.: Socrates maintains that "truth is truth to th' end of reckoning" (Measure for Measure, v. 1). νῦν and ἀλ might almost change places, since the important point is that Socrates, after proclaiming the supremacy of reason (cf. ἀπόδεικτος) in prosperity, finds his belief still firm in adversity. Cf. 63 c and ἀ. Cf. As You Like It, ii. 1—

Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Socrates meets in his trial and death-sentence "the counsellors that feelingly persuade him what he is." For collocations similar to this combination of νῦν and ἄλ, cf. 49 e; Hom. II. ix. 105, ὅλον ἔγω νῦν, ἑλθεῖ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ὕμων. Cf. also Eur. Med. 292, ὅπ ποτε πρώτον ἄλλα καλλίστα, ἢ ἔργον ἢ ἐλεφατίαν.
paroínti, eis tōn ἐπί βελεκτόνιαν, καὶ ἑπί τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἀναφέρεται, ὡσπερ παίδας ἡμᾶς μορφολόγησε, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρησμάτων ἀφαίρεσις. τῶν οὖν ἃν μετριώτατα σκο-
15 ποίμεθα αὐτὰ; εἰ πρατοῦν μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοι-
μεν, ὅτι λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἡ οὖν, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχει τῶν
νῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὖν ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐξεῖ δεῖν ἀποθνησκεῖν καλῶς α
ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ καταθήλω ἀρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἔσκεκα
20 λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδία καὶ φιλοφρῶν ἠλθότως; ἔπι-

46 Supply καὶ πρότερον (from what fol-

46 lows) with βροχαν.

11. ὅπλα μορφολόγησεν: nunc more

holodiâs to scacà. mòrolástèthai has the
double acc. like διδασκεῖν τινὶ
την. Moraé, like ἢκμονον, was one of
the fictitious terror of the Greek
nursery. Cf. Corp. 871; Aet. Ar.
1244, κότρα Ἀδλί δὴ Ὑφήνα | τοιν
λέγωνα μορφολόγεσθαι δείκτην;
The Schol. there suggests that the alarm
began ἀπὸ τῶν προσωπων (mask) τῶν
ἐν ταῖς προφηθής ὑποτροφῶν, ἡ δὲπάλαι
μορφολογία. τονῦτοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ γυναῖκες
tὰ παιδὰ φιλοφρῶν. Cf. Phædr. 77 θ.

12. δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέ-

μεθενόντων κατ. by confronting us with bonds,
with death, with loss of worldly goods.
These are the usual punishments, to
the harhest of which Socrates has
been condemned. The plural is used
to put an abstract idea more vividly
and concretely, as it were, by a process
of multiplication. Cf. the use of
mortes, neces, and the common
poetical use of ἀποτέλει to describe a
violent and premature death, and in
general the free use of the plural by
the poets in phrases like πιτόν κλο-
μάθων προσμβήθοι, Eur. Phoën. 480,
and Bacch. 1213, ἡμῶν ἀντὶ προσμβή-

15. ἄλλως: not at all sincerely, as a
mere joke, i.e. in a sense other than
its proper one; the expression is a
strong one. Cf. Phædr. 70 θ, εἰ δὲ μὴ
ἐστιν ταῦτα, ἄλλως δὲ ἐδέ λέγετο δελιο-
KRITON.

βῆμα δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέφθονται, ὁ Κρίτων, κοινῆ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλούτερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδῆ ὑδὲ ἔχω, ἦ δὲ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομην χαῖρειν ἡ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ὰλέγετο δὲ ποις, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκομένων τί λέγειν, 25 ἄσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἂς ὃι ἄνθρωποι δοξάζωντι δει ὅστις τάς μέν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεών, ὁ Κρίτων, οὗ δοκεῖ καλὸς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, δόσα γε τὰ ἄνθρωπεα, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθη- σκειν αὐριοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούσῃ ἡ παροῦσα ἄρα 30 φορὰ. σκόπει δὴ, οὐκ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας ἁρι τῶν δοξῶν ἄνθρωπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δὲ οὐ; τί φησ; ταῦτα οὐχί καλὸς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τάς δὲ πονηρὰς 35 μῆ;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἄφρονῶν;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;

40 αἱρετικὸς ἐπω. ἐνεα λέγειν, for the form’s sake (dicta causa)—quite different from λέγειν χάριν (exempli causa)—is brought in ἐπὶ παράλληλον. See on in εἰγ' ἐν, Ἀρθ. 17 ε.

24. δι' λέγεις: the contradictory of σῶσι λέγειν. Cf. Ἀρθ. 30 ε. δ. It means, "to say something that can be depended upon, that amounts to something." Cf. Lock. 196 κ, η δι' λέγειν λέγειν, ἡ Ναί; λέγει μὲν λέγειν τι, to which Nicias humorously responds, καὶ γὰρ λέγει γε τι, ὃθεν πέφητι ἀληθῆ γε.

25. γὲν δὴ: just nec.

26. δὲ γα ἐν τοῦθ' οὖν: humanly speaking. Cf. Dem. xviii. 300, ἐν τοῦθ' δὲ ἀνθρώπων λογισμὸν δεικνύει, as far as human calculation could. For the adv. acc. δὲ, see G. 1000; H. 719. One who is but a man can be sure of his life for no single moment, though he may have a reasonable confidence. Cf. Henry V. iv. 1, "I think the king is but a man, as I am; the violet smells to him as doth to me; all his senses have but human conditions." Notice the force of γέ. Cf. 54 ε, δι' εγ' γα ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ παράλληλον. 47 λόγος: sufficiently, satisfactorily, and hence rightly or truly. λόγος very commonly appears in conjunction with μεταφράσει or καλῶς, to either one of which it is substantially equiv. Cf. Symp. 177 c and Phaed. 96 d.

32. For an omission here, see App.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

VII. ΣΩ. Φήρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τουαίτα Ἀλέγετο; γνι-47
μναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἄνδρός ὁ ἐπαίνω καὶ σύγιον καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνον ἐκείνου δὲ ἄν τυχανὴ ἱερὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβης ἄν;

5
ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ὅπως φοβεύσαι χρῆ τοὺς σύγιους καὶ ἀσπαζό-47.1
ζεθῶς τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν τολλών.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

VII. 1. τῶν αὖ Ἀλέγους: the impf., because the new question (ἀὖ) involves a matter which has already been discussed. GNT. 40; H. 833. — τὰ τουαίτα: refers to what follows. The definite instance given is only one of many possible illustrations of the kind. On the inductive method, see Introd. 18, and for further examples, cf. Apol. 25 b. Cf. also Lach. 184 c–185 b, where the same example is elaborated to establish the same principle that approval and instruction alike should, if we are to heed them, come from the one man who has made himself an authority, δ μαθών καὶ ἐπιπλήθος, while the praise and blame of the many is to be neglected. There also the importance of deciding aright in regard to gymnastic training is strongly insisted upon, as follows: ἢ περὶ σμηνοῦ ἄλοιπον τοῦ καθενὸς καὶ σῶμα καὶ ἄστιμα, ἀλλ' σωματικοῦ τοῦ ἄστιμος, τὸν ἄστιμον μέγατον δὲ τυχανὴν, ... τοιοῦ ἢ τοιοῦ τοῦτος γίνεται.

2. τοῦτο πράττων: a man who makes this his work, and hence is an expert in earnest about it. One whose opinion professionally given is worth more than any layman's would be. Cf. Menex. 244 c, ἡγεμόνις ἀκαδημείαν ... σφέτερον ζητούμεν ἐστὶν κατά-
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

10 Σ. Ταύτη ἀρα αὐτῷ πρακτέων καὶ γυμναστέων καὶ εἴ ἑστειούττι καὶ ποτέου, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἑν δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαύνητι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ ζύμπταστι τοῖς ἀλλοις;

Κ. "Εστι ταῦτα.

Σ. Ἐνε. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑν καὶ ἀτμάσας αὐτῷ σ ἐν τῷ δοξαζόν καὶ τοὺς ἑπάνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μὴν ἑπαύνοντων, ἀρα οὖν κακὸν πέοτεραί εἰς τῶν τῶν ἀπειθώντος;

Κ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σ. Τί δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τούτο καὶ ποι τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τῶν ἀπειθώντων;

20 Κ. Δὴ λοι τι εἰς τὸ σῶμα τούτο γὰρ διάλυτον.

Σ. Καλὸς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλα, ὁ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἤν μην πάντα διώκεις, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δυκαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ δὴ τούτων ἢ βούλῃ ἢ μὴν ἔστως, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δοξῆς δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἑπονίζαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ α ἐνός, εἰ τίς ἐστιν ἑπαύνοις, ἢ δεὶ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ζύμπτασται τοῖς ἀλλοις; ὃ εἰ μὴ ἀκο-

11 καὶ ἑπονίζω γα: γέ αυτες where various points are enumerated, to mark a new departure, i.e. a fact different in kind from the preceding ones and thus belonging to a new class. Cf. Grec. 450 δ., ἀρχικήκας καὶ λογιστική (calculation) καὶ γεωμετρική καὶ χρυστική (draughts-playing) γε καὶ ἀλλαὶ καλλά ἐνόμενα. Theor. 166 δ., ὁπικότα (rights) καὶ καὶ δικαίωμα καὶ δικαίωμα (chilles) καὶ κατάκασ (barrows) καὶ ἱππότα γε καὶ ἄλλα καὶ ἀλλὰ πλῆθος (desires) κτλ.

15. τοῖς λόγοις: states collectively what has been subdivided into ἀγαθά, φόβοι, φόβοι.

16. καὶ μὴν ἑπονίζουσαν: of those in fact who have no special knowledge whatsoever. See App.

18. εἰς τι κτλ.: see on τῶν ἀμών, 48 b.

22. καὶ ἐν κτλ.: and then also, of course. See on καὶ ἐν κτλ., 18 a. Here Socrates has at last reached his goal; his point has been established by induction. Notice the doubly chiasmatic arrangement.

ἐλευθερίας καὶ καλός.
λονθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ λοβησόμεθα, δ' τ' ἑτεροις ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ λοβησόμεθα, δ' τ' τὸ 47 μὲν δικάιον βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδικῷ ἄττωλυτο. ἢ 30 οἴδεν ἐστὶ τοῦτο γάρ;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε, ὡς Ὑώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγειευοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γεγονομένου τὸν νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον δισολέσιμον, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπιπέδων δόξῃ, ἢ ἀρα βιωτῶν ἡμῖν ἐστι διεφθαρμένον αὐτοῦ; ἢστι δὲ τον τούτον τ' 

5 τ' σῶμα: ἢ οὖχ ἔστι;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτῶν ἡμῖν ἐστιν μετὰ μονοθερίου καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδ' ἄσομεν.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνων ἀρα ἡμῖν βιωτῶν διεφθαρμένων, οὐ τὸ ἀδικοῦ μὲν λωβάται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὄνταγνω; ἢ φανερότερον ἡγούμεθα ἐναυ τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνῳ, τ' τι τοι'
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ η η τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη 88 ἐστὶν;

15 ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;
ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὥς βέλτιστον, πάνω ἢμῖν οὔτω φροντιστέων, τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ὁ ἐπίασον περὶ 20 τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων, ὃς, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὡστε πρῶτων μὲν ταύτης οὐκ ὦρθος εἰσηγεῖ, εἰςγγυμένος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δει ἡμᾶς φροντίζων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τε εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτενώναι.

25 ΚΡ. Δὴλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὧ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὡς βαμύστε, οὔτος τε ὁ λόγος ὅν διεληλύθαμεν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτί ὁρμοῦς εἶναι [τῷ] καὶ πρότερον καὶ τόνδε αὐτ' σκόπει εἰ ἐτί μένει ἡμῖν ἡ ὦ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἦν περὶ πλείοντος ποιητέων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ἦν

Γι

for arguing about its name (φωτή). here.

18. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν οὖν ἐστο: then we must not . . . at all . . . so much as all that, etc. οὖτος refers back to the drift of Crito's argument. Here again Socrates takes the last step in a long induction.

19. τι . . . τι: a not unusual combination of the dir. and indr. forms of question. Cf. Gorg. 500 a, ὡς σοῦ παράγω λογικῶς ἐτινα καταλάβαι τῶν ζῶντων τοιαύτα καὶ ψευδάκοι (specialize) δι' ἐς λέγεσιν; The double acc. as in each (σωτεί) λέγεσιν τινα.

20. αὐτῇ ἡ Δίκαια: i.e. Truth, speaking with the lips of ἡ ἔρως, or appearing as the result of strict and patient inquiry.

22. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὲ: again Socrates reproves Crito, this time for his appeal to the Athenian public (44 d). —μὲν δὲ: certainly, equiv. to μὲν or a nearly so.

25. δηλα δὲ εἰσίτ.: Crito eagerly catches at this objection and strengthens it with καί. Thus he implies that there is more than meets the eye, i.e. that there are many other valid objections. Cf. 45 a. See App.

26. οὔτε τι τὸ λόγος εἰσίτ.: τι corresponds to καὶ . . . καὶ following. For a similar καὶ . . . καὶ αὐτ, see Lach. 181 d, καὶ τῶν τῶν περὶ γραμματέων συμβουλεύειν ὡς τὸ δώσωμαι καὶ αὐτὸ προκαλεῖ πάντα πολλα. The connexion of thought would not hinder us from subordinating the first clause: "as our discussion just closed agrees with what we argued formerly (when dealing with the same matter), so, etc."

29. ἦν σωτεί ἐστὶν εἰσίτ.: cf. Apol. 28 b ff.
30. KR. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλὸς καὶ δικαίως ὅπι ταῦτα ἔστι, μένει ἡ οὐ μένει.

KR. Μένει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὗκοιν ὑκ τῶν ὄμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτόν, πότερον δίκαιον εἶμι ἐνενάδε περασθαι ἐξεναι μὴ ἀφεντων Ὀθρήναιων, ἡ οὐ δίκαιον καὶ εὖ μὲν φαινται σ δίκαιον, πεφομέθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἶομεν. ὃς δὲ οὐ λέγεις τὰς 5 σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παιδίων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὡς Κρίτων, σκέμματα τῶν μαθών ἀποκτενώντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γὰρ, εἰ οἷοι τ' ἦσαν, οὔθεν ἐξεν νῦν, τοῦτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἢμῶς δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρέτη, μὴ οὖν ἀλλο σκεπτόν ἢ ἢ 10 ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν, πότερον δίκαιον πράξομεν καὶ (χρη-) ματα τελούντες τοῦτος τοῖς ἑυ ἐνενάδε ἐξάριστοι καὶ λ

48. 31. τὴ δὲ εἰς εὐθ. : this is needed because of the confused ideas which many associate with εἰς εὐθ., e.g. (1) plain living and high thinking, or (2) high living and no thinking. For the latter meaning, cf. Rep. 1. 329 a, αἱ εἰς εὐθ. τῶν προερχομένων τὰς ἐν τῇ κεφαλήν ἑξωτικότερα ἀγαθοτειούντων εἰς μεγάλων ταύτων ἀνετορμήσεων, καὶ τότε μὲν εἰς εὐθ. ὡς τὰ πολλά εὐθ. τέρεται τοὺς εἰς οὐδὲ βουτεῖεν. On this whole subject consult the discussion in Prot. 351 b ff.

48. b 7. καὶ ἀναβιωσείς γὰρ ἐστὶν καὶ would bring them to life again too. The ὃς forms with this partic. the apod. ἀναβιωσείς is used here like ἀναβιωσείς in Phaed. 80 d. Usually it is intransitive, like ἀναβιωσείς.

9. δὴ λόγος οὗτος αἰσθητὸς : the argument has prevailed thus far. Cf. Hor. Sat. 1. 3, 115, nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque | qui teneros caules alieni fergerit horit i et qui nocturnus sacra divum legent. Ibid. ii. 3, 225, vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes, et 250, si puerillus his ratio esse erit amare. It is rare to find this idiom with an acc. of the persons discussing, as in Rep. x. 607 b, δὲ γὰρ λόγος ἄλλος ἔσται. — μὴ ... ἢ: as in 6 above.
KRITON.

χάριτος) καὶ αὐτὸς ἔξαγοντες τε καὶ ἔξαγομενοι, ἥ τῇ ἄληγε. 48 θείαι ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· καὶ φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἔργαζόμενοι, μη οὐ δέν ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτε εἴ ἀποθήκησες δεῖ παραμένοντα καὶ ἱστοῖς ἄγοντας οὔτε ἀλλο ὁτιον πάσχει πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικῶν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὅρα δὲ τε δρόμουν. 

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὡς ἀγαθε, κοφθ, καὶ εἰ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλε- 20 γεν ἐμοὶ λέγοντος, ἀντιλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μη, παῦσαι ἄν, ὃ μακάριος πολλακις μοι λέγων πάντας αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὡς χρή ἐνθεύε颌 ἀκούστων Ἄθηναιων εμὲ ἀπεναι- ὃς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσεις ταῦτα πράττεις, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἁκούστις. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τῆς ἀρχὴς, ἢν

12. καὶ αὐτὸς καθ. καὶ αὐτὸς, we ourselves too, stands for Crito and Socrates. Crito is responsible, in the supposed case, not only for his expenditure of money (χρῆμα τελόων), but also for instigating the act of Socrates, or rather for persuading him to allow various things to be done for him.— ξαφνίων: the pass. is especially strong, "we ourselves are both rescuers and reaeced." 15. οὐν πάσχειν: sc. εἰ δὲν, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

16. ἔστε γὰρ δυσμά: cf. Λυσ. 26 b d. The sense is, "there must be no question about submitting to the uttermost (ἐστὶν ἕκαστον) rather than committing unrighteousness." See also 54 b, where, as in this case, a choice is involved, and πείρα is used in the sense of in preference to or instead of.

23. ἄν: inasmuch as, equiv. to  εἰπε. Cf. quippe in Lat.

24. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούστις: opposed distinctly to σειαν ἀσ, with your approval. Cf. 49 a 8, and Xen. An. v. 6. 29, ἔβαλεν γὰρ τῷ λέγειν, ὡς ἔμοι ἐπέ- τεις ταῦται διακοῦσμα δὲν ἐν τεις ἕμας ἀναφορα. The vivid contrast of these two clauses makes the omission of οὐ, the subj. of ἀκούστις, the easier. Indeed, cases are common where a personal or a dem. pron. or some vague general notion of persons or things is the subj. implied. For a somewhat similar case, cf. Hom. Od. iv. 645 ff., ἔρρεν ὡς εἴδοτα καὶ οὐδὲν ἐμοί ἀκούστα ἄνφόρα μια μίλησεως, ὅδε ἀν κόλα. — ἔδει λέγεα: in case the statement shall notisfy you. ἔδει does not like εἴ (cf. 48 b) mean whether. GMT. 71, v. 1. Cf. Phaedo, 64 c, αἰτεῖν δὲ, ἐγὼ ἡμοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀκούστις. The subj. of the dependent sent. is made by anticipation (prolepsis) the object of ἔδει. Cf. Milton, Sonnet to Sir Henry Wase, xiv, "Besides to know | Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, | What severs each, thou hast learned, which few have done." Cf. below (49 d). Socrates is earnestly enforcing a principle.
25 σοι Ικανώς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτάμενιν 49
νον γὰρ μάλιστα οἶγ.  
Γ. Μ. Ψ.
ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶς τρόπῳ φανεῖν ἑκόντας ἄδικητέον εἶναι,
ἡ τιμὴ μὲν ἄδικητέον τρόπῳ, τιμὶ δὲ οὖ; ἡ οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε
ἀδικεῖν οὐτὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐτὲ καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν
τῷ ἐμπροσθὲν χρώμα ὁμολογηθῆ; [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγενοι]
5 ἡ πάσα ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρὸς ὑμεῖς ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖς ταῖς
ὁλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰςκαὶ, καὶ πολλαὶ, ὡς Κρίτων,
ἄρα τηλικοῖδε [γέρωντες] ἀνδρὲς πρὸς ἅλληνος σπουδὴ
dιαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς παιδῶν οὐδὲν διαφέ-
ροντες; ἡ παιτὸς μάλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὡσπερ τότε ἔλεγεν
10 ἡμῖν, εἰτε φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰτε δέ ἡμῖν ἐτὶ
tῶιδε χαλεποῦτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ προφέτηρα, ὅμως τὸ γε

26. ἡ οὖς: sc. κατὰ τὸ ἄδικον ἐν
ekανότητι τὸ ἐρωτάμενον, μάλιστα ἡ
in the question τῷ μάλιστα; Cf. Ἱππ. 
vii. 557 c, ὡς μάλιστα ταῦτα δει
tῶιδεν εἰς μείζους τοιαύτα ἐπιθέμα.
Χ. 1. ἑκόντας ἄδικητέον: sc. ήμι.
The const. with the acc. corresponds
to the equivalent δὴ with the acc.
and inf. GMT. 923; H. 011 a. For
the facts, see Introd. 66.

2. ἡ οὖς τῇ οὐδαιμονίᾳ τῇ:
here the first
member of the disjunctive question
is resumed, so that the questioner
gives notice to the questioned, as it
were, of his opinion. For the accent
of τῇ when (exceptionally) it begins
its clause, see G. 144, 1; H. 110 a.

4. ὡς καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγεν: prob. not
written by Plato. If genuine, it
cannot refer to anything here, but relates
to the drift of 46 b and 48 b. See
App.

5. ἡ πατὴρ τῇ: here in the
words ἡ πατὴρ μάλλον τῇ, below, we
see how hard Crito finds it to assent.

After each double question (1) οὖς τῇ
... ὁμολογηθῆ; (2) ἡ πατὴρ... τῷ τῇ τῇ
τρόπῳ; Socrates has looked at Crito
for an answer. Finally he extorts
the briefest assent by the pointed
φασιν ὃ εἴ; in line 13 below.

6. ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰς: thrown away.
Cf. Henry VIII. iii. 2. "Cromwell, I
charge thee, sing away ambition;"
and Soph. Phil. 13, μὴ καὶ μάθῃ μὴ
γενοτα πάσχω τῇ τῷ ἁμαρτῳ, τῇ μν
αὐτῷ αἴρεσιν ἐκατ. Similar is the
Lat. effundere gratiam, labo-
rem.—καὶ πατὴρ τῇ: one of the
two particles. forms the predicative
complement of ἐλάθομεν, the other
stands in opposition to the pred. By
the added τηλικοῖδε ἀνδρεῖς (see on νο
σοῦντων τῇ, Apol. 35 d), this opposition
is put still more strongly. ἡμῖν gives
point to the irony. See on ἡμῖν, 47 a.

11. ἡμῖν τῷ τρόπῳ: a more dis-
tinct reiteration of what ἡ πατὴρ μάλ-
lλον τῇ has already stated. There-
therefore one as much as the other belongs
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| αδικεῖν τε αδικοῦργει καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν τυγχάνει δὲ 49 παντὶ τρόπῳ: φαμέν ὡς ὦ; |

KR. Φαμέν.

15 Σ.Ο. Οὐδαμῶς ἁρὰ δεὶ αδικεῖν.

KR. Οὐ δήτα.

Σ.Ο. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἁρὰ ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ Κήλοι οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεὶ αδικεῖν.

to the twofold disjunctive prot. οἴονται μὲν ἡμᾶς, καὶ οἴονται δὲ αὐτοῖς. 17. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται: that ‘doing harm to one’s enemies’ was part and parcel of the popularly accepted rule of life is plain from many passages like that in Isocrates to Demonicus I, 20, ὁρῶς ἀδικῶν ὁμοίως τῶν ἱχθῶν παχύται ταῖς παπάντεσισι καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁτάθαι ταῖς ἐπιργονίαις. Compare the character of Cyrus the younger, Xen. An. i. 9. 11, φανερῶς τὶ ἐστὶ, καὶ εἴ τις τις ἐκεῖνοι οἷον παρέχειν αὐτῷ, καὶ ναῷ περιβαλλόμενι κτί. Cf. also Meno’s definition, Men. 71 c, αὐτό ἑν πολλαὶ δροθέων ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῶν πάλαι πράτειν, καὶ πράτοντα τοῖς μὲν φίλοις τῷ νοῦς, τοῖς δὲ ἱχθίοις κακῶς. Plato eloquently defends his more Christian view throughout the first book of the Republic, in the Gorgias, and elsewhere. That the many do assert this, Socrates might say is not only made probable by the known tendencies in human character, but it is proved by every-day experience in dealing with men. Many recognized authorities encouraged them in such a view. Cf. Archil. Frg. 65, ὥσ ἐν εἰσόμεθα μέγα, ὥσ κακῶς με δρομὰν δεινὸς αὐτομεθίζωσέν εἰμι. Solon, Frg. 13, 5, where he prays to the Muses that they would grant him εἰρτα δὲ γλυκὸν ὅπεις φίλοις, ἵππους δὲ ... 1... δικόν ἂν. In Soph. Aj. 79, it is Athena herself who asks, óκενων γάλας θάντας εἰς ἱχθίοντα γαλέως; Cont. trast Soph. Ant. 523 f.: KR. οἴονται τοῦ ἱχθοῦς, οἴονται τοῦ νομοῦ, φιλεῖ. | AN. οἴο- νται συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ συμφαίλοντο εὖν. Cf. Eur. Andr. 620 ff., where Menecles says it is folly to spare the offspring of one’s foes, ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης λείτου ἱχθών τοίχων, ἵππων τείνεις, and ibid. 1007, where Orestes says, ἵππῳ γὰρ ἄρ᾽ αὐτῶν μάρτυρις ἐκ ἄνθρωπος (for us to destroy it) δοσίσθαι δυνατόν. Cf. Eur. Hercul. 1049 ff., the grim humor of Alcmena, who says of Eurythecus, ἱχθόν μὲν ἀνθῆρ᾽, ἑρείπει δὲ ἀνθῶν. See also Bacch. 1344—1348, where Agave admits her guilt but asks for mercy, and Dionysus refuses mercy because he has been offended. Agave an- swers: ἐργὰ τέρνια θεόν τοῖς βραχω- σίσαις δροθέων. This shows an ideal of moral conduct for the gods, such as Plato preaches for men. Compare Soph. Aj. 670—682, ὥσ ἵπποι δεινῶς εἰ τοιᾶς ἱχθύοις, ἄσ τοι φίλος ἁλός, ἐκ τῆς φίλως ἑκατέρων ἱχθυόμενος φιλεῖ τούτους, with Perse VIII. III. 2, “Love thyself last, cherish those that hate thee; | still in thy right hand carry gentle peace | to silence envious tongues. Be just and fear not.” Shakespeare thus expresses the view of the Platonic Socrates and of Plato in contrast to that of the Greek public at large. That the historical (in con- trast to the Platonic) Socrates at least
KR. Οὐ φαίνεται.
20 Ἑ. Τί δέ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;
KR. Οὐ δεῖ δήπω, ὡς Σάκρατες.
Ἑ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ
πολλοὶ φασί, δίκαιοι ή οὐ δίκαιοι;
KR. Οὐδαμῶς.
25 Ἑ. Τὸ γὰρ ποὺ (κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους) τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
οὐδεν διαφέρει.
KR. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Ἑ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀντιδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα
ἀνθρώπων, οὔτε ἂν οτιοῦν πᾶσχῃ ὅπως αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα. δὲ
30 Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολο-
γῆς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος τοῦτο τοῖς δοκεῖ καὶ δοξεῖ.
οὐς οὖν οὕτω δεδοκεί καὶ οἷς μῇ, τούτοις οὐκ ἐστὶ κοινῇ
βουλῇ, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἄλληλοι καταφρονεῖν, ὄρων-
tας τὰ ἄλληλου βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σοὶ εὖ

19. ὃς φαίνεται: plainly not. As ὃς φιλόμενε I deny rather than I do not assert, so ὃς φαίνεται means not it does not appear, but it does appear not.
20. κακουργεῖν: this word, like κατιστεῖν, covers more cases than δίκαιος: it includes δίκαιος and also cases of harm done where there is little or no question of right and wrong involved. Apparently, it was more commonly used in every-day matters than δίκαιος. In Crito’s answer his uncertainty is indicated by ὅ-

31. 28. οὔτε ἄρα ἄντων τρί: the complete presentation of this precept must be sought in the teaching of Christ. Cf. Luke vi. 27, ἀλλὰ ἡμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἀδελ-

32. 20. καθομολογῶν: ὁμολογῆς: see on ὃς φαίνεται, 44 c.
35. 32. τούτους οὐκ ἄντων τρί: this is a strongly set forth in the Corgias, where the Sophist and the true Phil-

34. 35. βουλεύεσθαι: counsels, i.e. their manner of thinking and acting.
άλλα ἐμένωι τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

Σ. Λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ· τότερον δ' ἂν τις ὀμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὅντα ποιητέων ἡ Ἐκαταρτέων;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέων.

XI. Σ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄρει. ἀπόντες εὐθέως ἤμεις μὴ πείσατε τὴν πόλιν τότερον κακῶς τῶν ποιοῦν· μεν, καὶ ταύτα ὅσα ἤκοσα δει ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἔμμενομεν ὅσα ὀμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις ὅσων ἢ οὖν;

49. ὧς οὐδεὶς εἰς τι: a statement of what is involved in ἔστειλεν, which is equiv. to ἐν τούτῳ τοῦ λόγου (taking this principle for granted). ὦς with the gen. abs. is used in this same way also after λέγων. Cf. Μεν. 96 ε, ως δ' ἐν τούτῳ μὲν ὡς άδικτου τετελεῖ φησίν τις αὐτοῖς λέγεις;

39. τῆς ἀφίκης: cf. καὶ ἀρχάμεθα ἐντείνειν αὐτῶν. ἀφίκη is the starting-point of an investigation,—a principle, a a conviction,—καὶ πᾶλιν εἰς: see on τῷ μένων εἰς, 40 b.

41. τοῖς μετὰ τοῦτο: not what results, but what comes next. It may be taken adv. (like τοῖς ἄν τούτῳ and the like) and translated further. What is referred to is expressed in τότερον εἰς below.

43. μᾶλλον ὦδ': or rather. Cf. Lach. 100 ε, λέγε ὦδ' μὲν η Νᾶρα, μᾶλλον δ' ἦμων.
5 KR. Oiv óxw, kós Sókrates, ápokrínavthai próò d éreò - 50
táis' ou yágr ennoi.

ΣΩ. 'All' ódè stópei. eî melíounov ãhmw evéndè
eite ápodiadáskes, eivò òpòs diei ánomasai toútò, áldéun-
tes oî nómov kai to kouon tîs póleis épistánntes èropuó-
10 eivte moì, dî Sókrates, ti eî nói èxeis poieu; allò ti ÷
'áv'tòv tòv érgwv ð èpíxeirai diánoe toús te nómovs ãhmw d
ápoléres kai xúmiasan tìn pólon to són méres; ÷ dòkei

50 toûs. ápolugýchamov would require
the acc. as in 49 ε above.

5. oiv óxw k.t.l.: Crito seems afraid
of understanding what is meant; the in-
evitable consequences involved alarm
him. See on παπορτία, 49 ε. This
natural state of mind on his part
gives good and sufficient reason for a
reconsideration of the whole subject
from a new point of view.

7. melíounov ãhmw: for the dat., cf.
Eîmp. 102 ð, eî aútai... dòstas ò
'èrros... èrros. Prot. 321 ε, ápo-
xwvto iv aútò èrros prokèvno. See
on ð, 47 ε. The statement there given
covers a very large number of cases
where a participle, and a finite verb are
combined like ádòntes èrros.

8. eiv òpò k.t.l.; this softening
phrase is used purely out of consid-
eration for Crito. To use the word
applied to runaway slaves might give
offence. One of the annoying mis-
laps that befell a well-to-do Athenian
was to have to give chase when a
slave ran off to Megara or Oenoe.
Cf. Prot. 310 ε, where Hippocrates
nearly lost his dinner, µìa òv òph
áphýmavon ìz òrphá. òv yágr òv néa
ìz òtìmros ántira. Of course such
conduct on the slave’s part was con-
sidered despicable. Cf. 52 d, ðòlov
fáloýntos. The ðòlov xronás, who
appears in tragedy more frequently
than in real life, would not run away,
because of his attachment to his mas-
ter. Cf. Eur. Méd. lines 54 f., xhr-
óstovoi ðòlov ðemofó vè òstótoiv ð
kás xrtovà kai ðwv òrpháv ðoróntas, the
first of which recurs in the Bacchae
(1020), 1278-77; and cf. also Eur.
Andr. 56-59, where the slave says to
Andromache, αûntos ðd kai òv xuntv ÷
ìz òv xùs ðósa. In Xen. Oec. 7. 37
and 38, and 9. 11-13, is an interesting
account of the position of slaves in
the household.

8. tò kouòv tòv pòleiv: the com-
monwealth.

Cf. Xen. An. v. 7. 18, and
Hist. l. 67, xúroproton tòv kouò
dòmov, sent by the comnmon-
wealth of Sparta. So Cicero says com-
mune

Stielliae. The personification of
the state and the laws which here follows
is greatly admired and has been abun-
dantly imitated, e.g. by Cicero in his
first Catilinarian Oration (7. 18). The
somewhat abrupt transition from ãhmw
above to ð Sókrates suggests the fact
that Socrates considered himself alone
responsible to the laws in this matter.

10. ðòlov ÷ ï: see on ðòlov ÷ ï,
Apol. 24 ð.

11. tòv òv nómovs: notice the order
and cf. 53 ð, ãhmw òv nómov.

12. tòv òv nómov: see on tòv òv ÷
hérov, 55 ð. Here it is about the same
in sense with ðòlov xronás, 51 ð.
soi oǐn te ἐτὶ ἐκεῖνη τὴν πόλιν ἔδω καὶ μῆ ἀνατε- 
τράφθαι, ὡς καὶ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἵσχυσον, ἀλλ’
15 ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἔχουσι ταῖς γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; 
τῷ ἐροῦμεν, καὶ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; 
πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχω ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ εἰπὼν ὑπὲρ τούτου 
τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, δυὸ τὰς δίκας τὰς δικαιοδοσίας 
προστάτευσι κυρίας ἔδω. ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούν, ὡς 
20 ἡ δικεῖ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ἄρθρῳ τῇ δίκαιῃ ἐκ 
ταῦτα ἡ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 

XII. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ ἔχων ὡς εἰσποιοῖ εἰς νόμοις, ὁ Σώκρατες, 
ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἡ εἰμὲν τοῖς 
δίκας αἰς ἄν ἡ πόλις δικάς; εἰ ὡς τοὺς θαυμάζομεν 
λεγόντων, ἵνας ἴνα εἰποὺ ὁ, ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ 
δε λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκρίνον, εἰπών καὶ εἰσίας χρησάμην 
τῷ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 

Θέρε γὰρ, τὶ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν 
καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; ὑπὸ πρῶτον μὲν 
σε εἰκοσίσματε ἡμῖν καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν εἰλικρίνειον 
σοῦ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύσεσθε σε; 

13. ἐστὶν: the attention is drawn to 

60 this passage recalls the Athenian 

usage which required that a law, if 
any one proposed to change or repeal 
it, should be defended by regularly-
appointed state-advocates (σωγονίους). 
19. ἡ ἤδη γὰρ: ὡς followed by 
direct quotation, as in 21 c. Notice 
how spirited and quick the answer is 
made by γὰρ. "Yes (I certainly have 
this intention) for, etc." 

XII. 2. καὶ ταύτα: sc. that in cer-
tain cases the language of the laws 
may and should be set at nought. — 

ἡ ἀρετή: or (was the agreement be-
tween us) simply to abide by, etc. 
3. ὡς εἰς δυσάγας: cf. 60 b and 51 a. 
5. ἐστὶν et al.: see Intro. 19.
10 tois νόμοις τούτοις περὶ τούτο γίνεται, μεμφείς τι διός οὐ καλῶς ἐξουσιωθῆναι; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνω ἀν. ἀλλὰ τούτοις περὶ τήν τού γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ἧ καὶ σὺ ἐκπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὖ καλῶς προσέτατον ἡμῶν οἱ εἰπτότους τεταγμένου νόμοι, παραγγέλλωντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μονακίᾳ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδείᾳ; καλῶς, φαίνω ἀν. εἰς ἑπεδήν, δὲ ἐγνώς καὶ ἐξετάρθης καὶ ἐκπαιδεύθης, εἴχοις αὐτῶν πρὸςτόν μὲν ὦς οὕτως ἡμέτερος ἥστα, καὶ εἰκόνοι καὶ δοῦλοι, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τούθ' οὖτως

10. τοις περὶ τούτων νόμοις: probably Socrates was thinking particularly of the laws governing marriage which established the legitimacy of children (γυναικεία). See Schomann, Antiquities of Greece, p. 357.

11. ἀλλά: instead of ἴσας ἢ, which would have been written here to correspond to πρῶτον μὲν if Socrates's answer had not intervened.

14. ἐν μονακίᾳ καὶ γυμναστικῇ: these words cover the whole of education (παιδεία), as Plato, Rep. ii. 370 ε, says, ἐν τω μὲν εὖ ἐστι σῶμα: γυμναστική, ἃ ἐν φύσιν ῥουσάτη. "The education of the average Greek gentleman, like that of the average English gentleman, comprised a certain amount of mental cultivation and a certain amount of athletic exercise. The former, besides reading, writing, and some elementary mathematics, consisted mainly in the reciting and learning by heart of poetry, along with the elements of music, and sometimes of drawing. Perhaps because so much of the poetry was originally sung or accompanied, the word 'music' was sometimes applied to the education in literature as well as in music proper, and it is in this wider sense that Plato habitually uses it. Under the term 'gymnastic' was understood the whole system of diet and exercise which, varying with the customs of different states, had for its common object the production of bodily health and strength, and the preparation for military service." Hellenics, The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, by R. L. Nettleship, M.A., p. 88. See also Schomann, Greek Antiquities, pp. 350 ff.

17. δοῦλος: opposed to δικαντής. Cf. Ildt. vii. 104, where Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Lacedaemonians ἐλεύθεροι ἐστε οὐ δέσμη θεοῦ ἔστε. ἔστε γαῖς σου δικαντῆς νῦν. Elsewhere Plato uses δούλων of the obedience which the law requires, e.g. Legg. 702 α, δὲ δούλωσιν οὕτως διανοοῦντες γένος ἥκιν, καὶ καλλωπίζονται (cf. ἐνεργήματα, Apol. 20 ε) τὴν τὴν καλὸν δούλωσιν μᾶλαν τῇ τῆς καλῶς ἱκανή, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ἐν τῶν τῶν θεῶν σῶσαι δοῦλοι, ἑκάτοι τῶν πραιτερῶν πτελ. Cf. Apol. 23 b, 30 a, and also Eur. Orest. 418, where Orestes says in a very different spirit, δούλωσιν θεῖα, ὧς οὖν εἶναι οἱ θεῶν. Cf. 53 d. This high standard of obedience, unhesitating and unqualified, to the established law, was familiar to the Athenians before Plato wrote.
KRITON.

177

ēks, āpī ēk  ēsou  ēsai  ēsai  soī  tuō diākaiou  kai  ēmūn,  kai 50
20 āpī ānu ēmīēs  sē  ēpīkērōmēn  poiei,  kai  soī  tauta  ānti-
poieiōn  -chief  diākaiou  ēsai;  ē  pōsī  mēn  ērā  soī  tuōn  patēra
ōuk  ē  ēsou  ēh  tuō  diākaiou  kai  pōsī  tuōn  dekontōn,  ēī  soī
ēgōuchos,  ὅστη,  ἀπερ  πάσχοις,  tauta  kai  āntiπoieis,
oūte  kakos  ākōwōta  āntilēgyei  ouē  tuētōmenon  āntitēp.  61
25  teiw  ouē  allā  touaata  pōllā:  pōsī  sē  tēn  patērida  ērā
kai  toūs  νόμουs  ēstai  soi,  ὅστη,  ēaν  sē  ēpīkērōmēn
ēmīēs  āpolλūnai  diākaiou  ēgōumēnou  ēsai,  kai  sē  sē  ēmās.

Among many passages in the tragedi-
ans, cf. Soph. Ant. 603 ff., ἵνα τα

50

and particularly on ἤλθα τῶν  ἀνών,  50
40 d, where ὥρα occurs only in the
second clause. For the repetition,
see Prot. 325 b, ὥρα καὶ ὥρα καὶ

55

τιμήτωρ (ἐκ ἔρωτος) τὰ μὲν ἐλλα
ἀρα τόδε ὥρα τοῦτο ἔδεικται, ὅτι ὥρα

60

ἐνίκητο ἡ ὥρα, ὥσε ὥστη ἔνικηται,

65

Notice the position of ὥρα, which is
nevertheless not the emphatic word.

22. ὥρα: “when you were under
your father or perhaps your master.”
The past (ὕρα) is opposed to the fut.
(ἔστοι).—καὶ ὥρα τῶν δυσώντων: for
the ὅδελα χρηστά, see on ὅδελα in
17 above.

23. ἐπὶ τοῦτον: anything that was
(at any time) done to you. GMT. 655;
II. 914 B (2). Though subordinate
to δυσόν...ἀντιτιμήσαι, this clause is also
limited by the neg. statement ὅτε ὥρα ὧν ὥρα, which limits the clause δυσόν...

24. ὥρα...πολλά: an explanation of
dυσόν...ἀντιτιμήσαι, in which the
neg. of ὡς ὥρα ὧν ὥρα is repeated.
—καὶ ὥρα...πολλά: τοίον. 51

27. ὥρα καὶ ὥρα δὴ ἐπιμερήσωσι: so
that you in your own turn will, etc.
ὅτι, when expressed in Att., has
emphatic position. καὶ indicates equality,
toius νόμου καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δίνασαι ἐπιχειρή− 51
σεις ἀνταπολλόναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράτ−
τεν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεμον; ἦν οὖν ἐν
σοφὸς, ὥστε λεληθέν σε ὅτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν
ἀλλῶν προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιωτέρων ἦσθιν ἡ πατρίς καὶ
αὐτής γεννητήρων καὶ ἀγωνίστων καὶ ἐν μείζον μοῖρα καὶ παρὰ ἰ
θεώς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπως τοὺς νόμους ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι
35 δεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκεις καὶ δουλεύεις πατρίδα χαλεπαίνους
σαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθεις ἡ ποιεῖς ἢ ἄν κελεύῃ, καὶ
qui, familiares; sed omnes a
omnia caritatis patria una
complexa est, pro qua quis
bonus dubitet mortem oppo−
tere, si eis sit profutura? Cf.
also Hector's el olivae ἀρεταί, ἀλόνα−
σιμαι νηπίων καρπούς. Hom. II. xii. 243.
33. ἐν μείζον μοίρᾳ: after the
analogy of Homeric expressions like
that used by Poseidon of Zeus, II. xv.
105, μείζων τραχύν ἐν μοίρῃ, i.e. in
the one of the three parts of the
world allotted to him as one of the
1401, τῆς αφθηγμένης μοίρας ἐδιαμερί−
σεται, and Hdt. ii. 172, τά μὲν πράσια
tῶν ἀμαθῶν ἀγάπην ἐν ὀλίγῃ μοίρῃ
μεγάλη ἣν (considered of little or no
account, nullo magnopere loco
habebant).
34. σέβεσθαι εἰτί: the subj. of σέ−
βεσθαι is an implied τι, not ἐν πατρίς.
35. πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσα: the
acc. after σέβεσθαι, ἐκείνου, and
τιμοῦσι, though ἐκείνου should be
followed by the dat. See on ἐν, 47 a.
Cf. Liv. xxvii. 34. 14, ut paren−
tium saevitiam, sic patriae pa−
tiendi ac ferendo leniendam
e esse.
36. τοίνυν: used absolutely, as in
Apol. 35 e, to change her mind, to
concert to your way of thinking; some−
 KRITON.

πάσχειν, εάν τι προστάτηρ ταθεί ήμιχαν ὅγοντα, εάν εἰς τῇ τᾶτεθαί εάν τῇ δεισθαί, εάν τῇ εἰς πόλεμον ἀγγ γειπε

θησαμένον ἧς ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητῶν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δὲ

40 καίν οὔτε ἔχει τα, καὶ οὔχ ὑπεικέτεν οὔτε ἀναγορήτεν ὅμοι δημετέριον τῷ ταξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστήριῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητῶν ἀν κελεύῃ ή τῶς καὶ ἦς εἰ

σελε πατρίς, ἦς πεθεὶς αὐτὴν τῇ δικαιον πέφυκε, βασίζονται ἦς ἐν

οὔχ ὅσον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἦν

45 ἢττον τῷ πατριδα; τῇ φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ἦς Κρίτων; ἀληθὴ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἦ οὔ;

KR. Ἕμοιγο δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τούτων, ὥ Σῶκρατες, φαίνει δὲν ἴσως

οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἦμεῖς ταῦτα ἁληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δικαία

ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δραῖν αὐτόν μικρὰς ἐπιχειρείς ἃ ἦμεις γὰρ σὲ γεν.

51 times to propitiate, as in Hom. H. i. 1. 100, νέτω κότ' ἐν μὲ 'Απάλλωνα' ἱλασ.

σάμενσιν πιλοθείς. Cf. εἰ below.

The first two ἔεν ἔεν clauses (like εἰς... ἐν... εἰς... ἐν), with

προστάτητα understood, are explanatory of ἔεν τῇ προστάτῃ ταθεί, while the third

takes a new verb with a new apod. The two former are speci-

fications under πάσχειν, the third in-

stances analogous cases where un-

qualified obedience to the state is

necessary. The emergencies of war

are taken as typical of a host of

others, and then with ἀν δικαστήριῳ

the argument is brought to a head.

This elaboration of the period leaves

to its own devices ποιητῶν ταῦτα

(which, grammatically, is subordinate

to ἀληθῆ εἰς). 40. καὶ οὔχ ὑπεικέτων: a neg. re-

iteration of ποιητῶν ταῦτα. We must

not draw back, we must not retreat,

we must not leave the ranks. Corre-

sponding to these three duties, there

were three forms of indictment, ἀπεργ.

τολα, δικαίως, λανωταίως. On the last,

cf. Apol. 28 ε-29 α. ἀπεργα was the

penalty involved in all these cases.

43. ἢ τείνω: the inf. coming after an

impersonal verbal often depends

on an implied δε εἰ even when no δε

precedes.

GMT. 925; H. 991 a.

Cf. Corp. 492 α, τὰ δὲ παρθένα φίλ

οι σοικατίστων, εἰ μήλα τι εἰκὼν δὲν

τοῦτα ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ μητέραν ἢ μητέραν

᾿αὐτής ἢ τείνω ταῦτα ἤτο τεῖναι εἰς τοῖς

— δὲ τείνω: quomodo in tum comparatum sit, an explanation

of τείνων, which implies ἰδίω

σεις (cf. Apol. 35 ε, ἰδίωσεν καὶ

τείνεται).

XIII. 1. στάτω τούτων εἰ: an

application of the universal truth to

a particular instance.

2. ἦττον εἰ: the relation of ἦττον
to δε is the same in which ἠπ.

θή of the clause preceding stands
to ταῦτα. Supply an inf. govern-

ing ἦ.
7. εὐτέλες δοκιμασθῆ: there was strict examination (δοκιμασθῆ) into every youth's claim to be declared an Athenian citizen when he had completed his eighteenth year. If he proved of Athenian parentage, and otherwise qualified, he was declared of age, and registered in the ἄρημα 
χῶν τιμαμωτῶν of his deme. See Schömann, Antiq. of Greece, pp. 350 f.

9. λαβόντα: the dat. might stand here, but cf. Symp. 170 d, Rep. ill. 414 a, Ethik. 5 a, Eur. Herac. 603, Soph. El. 470 f., Aesch. Cho. 410 f., and Symp. 188 d, ὅπως ἡ μὲν εἰςδαμόμεναι παρασκευὴ καὶ ἀλάλως ἐνεματοῦσα ἡμῶν καὶ φίλους ἑτέρως καὶ τοῖς ἐρίττοισι ἡμῶν θείοις, here is what makes ready for us all happiness, what makes us capable of being friends and familiares of our fellow-men and also of the gods, who are mightier than we. See G. 928, 1; H. 941.
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fevσ, καὶ οἵ τινες ὁμολογήσας ἦμων πείθομαι οὔτε πείθεται 51
οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέμενον ἁμων καὶ οὐκ ἄγριως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἂν κελεύσωμεν, εἰ ἀλλὰ ἐφεύγω τῶν θάτερα, ἡ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τοὐ-
τών οὔτετέρα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταῦτας δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατε, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰπερ ποιήσεις ἡ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἡκιστα Ἀθη-

ναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα, εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἰπομή. διὰ τί δὴ; ἵσως οὗ μοῦ δικαίω καθάπτωτο λέγοντε, οὔτε ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθη-

ναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογήσω τυγχάνω ταῦτας τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίνει γὰρ ἂν οὗτ, ἦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἦμων τοῦτων τεκμήρια ἐστιν, οὔτε σοι καὶ ἡμῖν 10 διαφερόντως ἰσχύει καὶ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθη-

ναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτὴ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἰσχύει καὶ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθη-

ναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι

51 19. ὁμολογήσας πείθωμαι: not πεί-

σεμαι, although πείσεμαι would mean about the same. See GMT. 100.

52 a ὅλος ὅλος ὅλος ὅλοι must be supplied from what precedes. The same idea is then expressed negatively and once again positively. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα is also used, meaning to leave a man free to choose. Socrates can never repeat too often that the state is right, as against those who seek to evade the authority of its law. This fact accounts for the clause which follows: τοῦτων οὔτετέρα ποιήσομαι, a mere repetition of οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.

22. θάτερα: the notion of plurality has here practically disappeared, as is often true also in the case of ναῦτα.

XI. 2. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα: see on ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα, 43 ε. 25.

10. καὶ οὖν . . . οὖν: the promi-

nence of the hypothetical expression (ὁτα ὡς ἂν κῃ.) grows less here, and completely disappears with ἀλλ', as the contradictory ἀλλ' plainly shows. θαυμά means not only a state embassy to games and festivals (see the pass-

age from the Phaedo quoted on ναῦται, 43 ε) but also attendance at religious festivals, particularly at the great national games, on the part of private individuals. See on οὖτε ἐντοῦ ἄνθρωπου, 63 a.

12. εἰ μὴ τοῖς στρατευόμενοι: for
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μίαν ἑποιήσω πώποτε ὁπερ οἱ ἄλλοι άνθρωποι, οὐδὲ ἐπι-
θυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι,
15 ἀλλὰ ἤμεισ σοι ἰκανοὶ ἤμεν καὶ ἡ ἤμετέρα πόλις· οὐτω
σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤρου καὶ ὁμολογεῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσας
σοὶ ταῖς πόλεως. Ἐτι τοῖνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι
φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβοῦλου, καὶ ὅτερ νῦν ἄκούσης τῆς
20 πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκουσάς ποιήσατι· σοὶ δὲ τότε μὲν
ἐκαλλωσίζων ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δεότι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ
ἢροῦ, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὖν
ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέ-
πει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείρα, πράττεις τε ἄπερ ἄν δουλος 
25 φαυλότατος πράξεις, ἀποδιδράσκει ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ 
τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἂς ἡμῖν ξυνθῶν 
πολιτεύσας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἀπόκριμα, εἰ
ἀληθῇ λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύσασθαι
καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργα, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγος, οὐκ ἀληθῇ. τι φῶμεν
30 πρὸς ταύτα, ἢ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἡ ὁμολογώμεν;

b the campaigns of Socrates, see on
ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ, Ἀρ. 28 ο. Enunciation, per-
haps, prevented the addition of οὐδὲ-
πλων ἄφες αὐτοῖς. Cf. 52 ο and 54 ά.
14. εἰδέναι: added for the sake of
clarity and precision. The result is
that the preceding gen. seems to
be a case of prolepsis. Cf. Ημ. II.
ll. 720, τάδεν οὐ εἰδέναι ἐγὼ μάχεσθαι. 
Soph. Ἠ. 543 ι, ἡ τοῦ ἱπποῖ. καὶ τῷ
ἱππεύοντι τίχε συν ἐν οὐ 
καὶ οὐ 
καὶ ἐκλείσαθαν ψέδον. The subj. or obj. of
the inf. is often put by anticipation
as the obj. of its governing verb,
noun, or adj.
17. καλ... ἑποιήσω: it is freed from
its connexion with ὁμολογεῖς, to which,
however, τὰ ἄλλα is still attached.
See on καλ γέγονεν, Ἀρ. 30 ο. This
irregularity was hardly avoidable, e
since a participle would have been
clumsy, and the idea does not suit a
clause with ἔστω. Accordingly it was
hardly possible to subordinate it to
πολιτεύσασθαι.
18. Ἐτι τοῖνυν: transition to a new
point, which, however, remains closely
connected with the leading idea.
19. φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι: cf. Ἀρ. 37 ο
and see on νεάναι θανάτου, Ἀρ. 30 ο.
21. ἐκαλλωσίζων: cf. Ἀρ. 20 ο, ἐκ-
κλείσάθαι τε καὶ ἐξαφνόμεν οὖ.
22. ἐκεῖσον τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύ-
ναι: not ashamed of these words, but,
ashamed to face these words. H. 712.
The words are personified and con-
front him with his disgrace. Cf. 46 ά.
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ΚΡ. ἄναγγελος, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι ὅπων ἂν φαίητ' ἔσωθήσας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἄναγγελος ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπαθείας οὐδὲ ἐν ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἄναγκαιος οὖν ὁ λοιπός ὑπεντύσαται, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄτεσον ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπέναν, εἰ μὴ ἱρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μυρὶς δικαιῶς ἐφαινοντό σοι ὁμολογία ἐναυ. σὺ δὲ οὔτε ἡκαδει μονα προηγοῦσ' οὔτε Κρήτην, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐκάστοτε φύς εὐνοεῖ ταῖς, οὔτε ἀλλην συνείμαι τῶν Ἐλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν ἑπερατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐκάστω εἰς αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας η ἡ αὐτής τοι καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι οὔτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἅλλων Αθηναίων ἠρέσκετον ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡ ἁμεῖς ἵνα νόμοι δηλοῖν οὗτος τίνα γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἀνεν νόμοι;

29. ὄλλα ὅλον: not merely in your professions. That ἄναγγελος is the verb with which ἄγγελον is connected appears from the context. Cf. 51 e.

30. ἄλλο τι φής: see on ἄλλο τι φής, Apol. 21 c, and cf. Phaed. 79 e quoted below.

33. ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς: without any reflexive meaning. Cf. Phaed. 79 a, ἄλλο τι ἡμᾶς αὐτῷ ἢ τὰ μὲν σώμα τούτοι, τὸ δὲ προφήτη. But cf. 64 e.

35. ἂν ἐφέσυν ἐδημήσατο: cf. Apol. 17 d. Socrates here speaks less accurately than in 51 d.

38. εἰς ὅπου ἐδημήσατο: Plato, like many others, often praises those states, whose similar institutions were all of them based upon the common character due to their Dorian origin. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, himself the ardent admirer of Sparta, reports various conversations where Socrates praises Dorian institutions. See (Lem. iii. 5. and iv. 4) his commendation of the strict obedience to law at Sparta and of the education which prepares men for it. The education of Spartan women was less admired and less admirable. Cf. Eur. Andr. 595 ff., οὔτε ἂν εἰ βοώλοτα τὰ σύνθρον γένοστε Σπαρταίτην καὶ . . . ἐκάθεν πολιτείας τὸ νόμον ἀκατάλληλον ἡμῖν ἃνθρώπους ἵνα κανές ἔχομεν, κατὰ θεώμασιν χρῆνον οἷον τούς γυναῖκας σύνδρομοι ποιεῖν;

40. ἐπέτυχεν διδασκάλοις: cf. Phaedr. a 220 c, where Phaedrus says to Socrates as they are taking a walk in the country: εἴναι γὰρ, ἢ ἡμεῖς, ἀποκάλυπτε τινί φίλου, ἀπόκειν τὰ ἡμεῖς, ἄνθρωπον γὰρ ἐν υἱοικήμενον (a stranger come to the rights in town) τοῖς καὶ ὧν ἐν υἱοικήμενον εὐνοοῦσ' ἐσθοὺς ἐν τῷ κοιτεῖ ὡς εἰς τῷ ἐνῷ νομίζοι τῷ κοιτεῖν εὐνοοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ κοιτεῖ διδάσκοντο.

43. διὰν δὲ τὸ απευθεῖται: appended at the end of the sent. by way of emphasis without having any place in the const.
νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμένεις τῶν ὁμολογημένων; ἐάν ἦμιν γε ἃς
45 πείθῃ, ὁ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγγέλαστός γε ἂσει ἐκ τῆς
τόλεως ἐξελθὼν.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβάσας καὶ ἐξαμαρτά-
νον τι τούτων τί ἄγαθον ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτη-
δείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κωδυνεύουσαί γε σοῦ οὐ τι
ἐπιτεθεὶοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγων καὶ στερηθήσαι τῆς πόλεως ἢ
5 τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δήλου· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
μὲν εὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγχύτατα των πόλεως ἔληγ, ἢ Θῆβαις ἢ
Μέγαρας—ἐυνομοῦσαν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιος ἢς εἰς,
ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὁσιτερ κηθοῦνται
τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεως, ὑποβλέψασθαι σε διαφορεῖσα ἡγούμε

ἰὼνες, οὐ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετάθενες νῷομα. Αρ. Κλωνη, ἡ ἀκαλλατικά ἀναστήμεναι καὶ κατα
προς, ῶν ἐν. Its stress is given chiefly to καὶ ἢ καὶ οἱ νῷομα.
44. οἰκ ἐρμηνευο.: a more vivid form
of question than ἐρμηνευο. The laws
give answer to their own question in
ἐάν ἦμιν γε πείθῃ, which implies ἄλλι
ἐρμηνευο. Socrates might have said
ἄλλι ἐρμηνευο.
45. καταγγέλαστος: with reference to
his preceding operations. Cf. 52 a
above, ἐν τῇ τοῦτον μὲν κτῶν.

XV. 1. στόχως: prefixed to an
independent sent. just as ὤφε ὁφε often
is. Cf. 47 a and Prot. 330 b.—πα-
τεῖς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων: this = ἐὰν πα-
τεῖς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνως. The pres. marks
the continuance of the action.
5. σχεδον: τι: this adv. use of τι
is common with τὰν, κέρδη, πάντων,
μᾶλλον and τῶλλον. —πρῶτον μὲν: the
corresponding clause follows below
(d) in a different form. See on ἐλλά,
50 d.
7. Μέγαρας: see App. and also G.
01; Η. 219.—ἐυνομοῦσαν γὰρ: for the
facts, see on ἐν κτονιν, 52 a, and
53. Soph. O. C. 919 ff., καλου ἐν Θῆβαις
γὰρ ἀναστήμεναι καὶ καταπρο
ς, ῶν ἐν. In Thebes,
before and during the Peloponnesian
war, there was a moderate oligarchy
(ἀληθινή λεῖψαμα, different from the
ἰσαστία λεῖψαμα of the time of the
Persian wars) in political sympathy
with Sparta. Megara also had an
oligarchical form of government, and
had been, since the battle of Coroneia
(447 B.C.), on the Spartan side.
8. τούτων: referring either to the
cities (instead of ἐν τούτον) or to
xxiii. 319, ὣς ἐς Ἰησοῦν ἀντε-
προσικυφήμα τρίηνα, | οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐλασται καὶ
ἐναντικαθήμενοι τρίηνα.
9. ὑποβλέψασθαι: suggestive of the
Homerian ὑπεικαί ἢδικ. "They will look
upon you with suspicion." The im-
plication of suspicion is conveyed by
the ἐν in ἐφαρα, ἐφόθε, as in Xen.
Λύ. ii. 4. 10, ὁ ἡ ἐλπὶς ἀφεράσ-
τες τότενοι αὐτί νῦν ἐφαρὰ ἀκρο-
γράφους ἐξετάζει.
10 νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοὺς δικασταίς τήν δοξάν 53 ἀπετε δοκεῖν ὅρθος τί την δίκην δικάσαι· δοτις γὰρ νόμων ὁ διαφθορεις ἔστιν, σφόδρα πον δόξειν ἀν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοητῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφθορείς εἶναι. πότερον ὅπως φεύγα τάς τε εὐνομομένα τόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς κοσμήτας τους; καὶ τούτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα τοῦτον σοι ζῆν ἐστι; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτων καὶ ἀνασχυσθήσεις διαλεγόμονοι—τίνας λόγους, 20 ὁ Σώκρατες; ἢ ύστερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείοντοι ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἷος ἀξίχωμεν ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οἰσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τότων ἀπάρεις, ἥξις δὲ εἰς Θεσσαλίαν παρά τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνοι· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείοτη ἀγαθία καὶ ἀκολοχία, καὶ ἵστων ἄν ἡδίων ἐν τούτοις ὡς γελοῖος ἐκ τοῦ διασωμητηρίου ἀπεδιδρασκες σκευὴν τὲ τυχαν περιθέλη. 25 μενος, ἢ διθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰσώθασιν ἐνσκευα-53

were rich and hospitable, and bore the reputation of being violent and licentious. Some light is thrown upon the whole subject by the character of the Crito, given by Xenophon, Ex. 4. 3. 21 ff. C. J. also Dem. 1. 22, τὰ τοῦ Ἐκκλησίαν ἢ πέρας ὅπως καὶ οὐκ ἁπάντων. This chiefly relates to their political character. C. J. also the ironical words of Socrates on the Thessalians in Plato's Meno, 70 a. 53 24. ἐκεῖνος τοῦ ταῦτα κτῆτος: to this first clause the disjunctive ἢ δηοθέαμα ἢ ἄλλα is subordinated. The ἐφιέμε was, according to the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 73, a tenement or tenement. Schol. and Περὶ μὲν ἐπιταχύνων σκευής and ἐπεζεύχων refer to change of costume, and are also used of the costumes of actors. C. J. Ar. Achar. 383 b, where Diccopeolis, before beginning his defence, says: ὥστε ὅπως πρῶτον πρὸς λόγον ἔδειξε τον κατ' ἐπεζεύχων.
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ζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας: ὡς ὁ ἕρως ἀνήρ, συμκροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὦτος ὅπο τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμηςας ὡτός αὐχεῖς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζην, νόμον τοὺς μεγίστους παραβᾶς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἔρει; 30 ἰσως, ἢν μὴ τινα λυπης: εἰ δὲ μὴ ακούσης, ἐπὶ διάκρισης, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχομένοις δὴ βιωσεὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων: τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐυχούμενος ἦν Θεταλία, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ δείκτιον ἀποδιδημηκὼς εἰς Θεταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τα καὶ τῆς ἀλής ἄρετῆς 35 ποῦ ἡμῖν ἐσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἐνεκα βούλει 54 ζην, ὥστε αὐτῶν ἐκβρέχεις καὶ παιδεύετε; τί δὲ; εἰς Θεταλίαν αὐτῶν ἀγαγών θρέψεις τα καὶ παιδεύεσε, ξένους ποησάς, ὥστε καὶ τούτο ἀπολαύσωσι; ὡ τούτο μὲν οὖ, 58 ὑπὲρ τοῦ εἰκός: that is according to the law of nature.—ἐνθυμοῦμαι: see on τάξις, Apol. 38 d, and App. 29. τὸ δὲ σῶς: will there be nobody to say this? i.e. “absolutely every one,” expressed interrogatively. Here, as in many common idioms, the verb “to be” is omitted.

30. et si µā: otherwise. See GMT. 478; H. 99, 8. — ἀκούσαν... ἀνάξια: like ἀκούσαν κακόν (ἐκ τῶν) is the passive of λέγων κακόν. Cf. 50 a. The καὶ between κακόν and ἀνάξια should not be translated.

31. ὅτι: accordingly. He must make up his mind to it, he has no choice.

32. καὶ δουλεύων: better understood absolutely than with an implied dat. Here we have a blunt statement, of the fact which Socrates had in mind in saying ὑπερχομένοις. — τί ποιῶν δὲ εὐθ.: the particle, goes with the verb of the foregoing clause. This cannot be reproduced in Eng., “in fact how can you live there except in one continual round of revelry, as if you had come to Thessaly to eat and drink.” No ἀλλὰ is needed after τί.

35. ἀλλὰ δὲ: a new objection raised and answered by the laws themselves in respect of what Critio said, 45 e—46 a. — ἀλλὰ: relates to the preceding thought: of course these sayings are nowhere, “but are you actually willing!” etc. See on Apol. 87 e.

38. ἵνα καὶ τούτο εὐθ.: i.e. in addition to all other obligations. ἀπολαύσω is often used, as here, ironically. How a Greek looked upon exile is plain from passages like Eur. Ελ. 1311 ff., ὅταν ἔσθων πάντα Ἀργείους. Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλα στοιχεῖα μείζων ἢ γὰρ πατρίας ἄροι ἐκλίνεται; and Phæo. 388 ff., where Polyneices, answering Iocasta’s question, ἵνα στερεσθησαν πατρίδος; ἢ μένῳ μέγας; σῶς μέγιστον ἢ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ μείζων ἢ λαῖρ. Cf. Richard II. 1. 3. —
XVI. 'All', ὅ Σῶκρατες, πειθόμενοι ἡμῖν τοὺς σως τροφεύσω δῆτε παιδας περὶ πλευνος λοιπον μήτε τὸ ξῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδεν πρὸ τοῦ δικαιοῦ, ἦν εἰς 'Αδιον ἐλθὼν ἔχης πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογύσασθοι τοὺς εἰκα ἀρχουσων. 5 οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἁμενον εἶναι οὐδε δικαιότερον οὐδε σιωπώτερον, οὐδε ἀλλω των σων οὐδενι, οὔτε ικεῖσα αφικομένῳ ἁμενον ἐσται. ἄλλα νῦν μὲν ἦδικομένοι ἀπε, ἐὰν ἀπηκ, οὐχ ύπ' ἡμῖν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ υπὸ ἀνθρώπων εάν δὲ ἐξελθης οὕτως αὐτοχρώς ἀντα- 10 δικήσῃς τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσῃς, τᾶς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ἤμφηκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παράβας καὶ κακὰ ἔργα-

54 What is my sentence then but speechless death, Which robs my tongue from breathing native breath?

and Dante, Paradiso, xvn. —

Thou shalt abandon everything beloved Most tenderly, and this the arrow is Which first the bow of banishment shoots forth.

Cf. also many well-known passages in the Odyssey, e.g. Od. i. 58, ἱματιβι κατὰ καθαρὸν ἀνθρώπων μὴν τὰ βρέχῃ διὰ γεράς, ix. 27 f., ὅ τοι ἀγά μι ἐξ ἀγά μι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἠλθεί, xx. 99. 39. ἀρχουσι καὶ πλευνοσι: see on εὐπρεπε, 52 a.

44. τῶν... εἰσα: explanation of εὑρίσκε: οἰκ is not to be connected b with φασικόνωσι: — oieisai γε χρη: cf. 53 a.

XVI. 3. πρὸ: after πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, 48 d. See on πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, 48 d.

5. ἁμενον... δικαιότερον: see on ἁμενον, Apol. 19 a.

6. οὐδὲ ἀλλων σῶν: the laws add this for Critio's benefit. Cf. 46 e-48 a. 7. νῦν μὲν: assuming that Socrates has made up his mind not to take Critio's advice.

8. οὐχ ὡς ἡμῶν κτλ.: the laws add this in the vein of what has gone before.

9. ἐναρθρωσι: referring to the one fallible mortals who act as guardians and representatives of the blameless laws. See Intro. 30-35. Cf. Apol. 24 d, ἐφαρμοσε, δεῖ πρῶτον καὶ εὑρήκετο αὕτω τωτοτε, τοῦτο ἡμετε. 11. παράβας, ἐφαρμοσι: subordinated to the foregoing parts.
πάμενος τοῦτον ὅποι ἦκιστα ἔδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλοις 54 καὶ πατρέδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τε σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ἵνα, καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁι ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ ὁ ἦν Ἀδων νόμοι οὐκ εὑμὲ- 15 νός σε ὑποδέχεσαι, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐσχείρησας ἀπο- λέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἀ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

ΧVII. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἔταρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντίτες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦ- σιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡχὴ τοῦτον τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῦειν· ἀλλὰ 5 ἵσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκούντα, ἔλαν λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρέις. ὅμως μέντοι εἰ τι οὐκ πλέον ποιήσεω, λέγε. ΚΡ. 'Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

54 14. οἱ ἐν Ἀδων νόμοι: cf. Soph. Ant. 460π, εὖ γὰρ τι μοι δεῖν ἐν ἀνάγκαις τῆς, ὅσα ἴσον πολλῶν κατὰ θνῆν Δίας εὐτ. d XVII. 3. φίλε ἔταρε Κρίτων: Socrates speaks with great tenderness in order to make his final refusal the less hard to bear. The exceptional feature in this form of address lies in the mention of Crito's name at the end.

2. οἱ κορυβαντίταις: κορυβαντίς means act like the Corybantes. These were priests of Phrygian Cybele, whose orgiastic rites were accompanied by dances and deafening music. Here a species of madness seems to be indicated, under the influence of which men imagined that they heard the flutes that were used in Corybantic revels. Cf. Ion, 534α, ὅτεροι οἱ κορυβαντίταις οὐκ ἔφρουντο ἤτοι δρα- χεύσαν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔφ- ρουντο ἤτοι καὶ καλὸν τὰν ταύτα ποιή- σον, and the song of the bacchantes in Eur. Bacch. 114—129 and 156—161, — Soon shall the country rejoice in the dance; 54 Soon with his revelers Bacchus advance; Into the hills, the hills shall he fare, Joining the host of his women-folk there. Far from their homes and their weaving they came, Goaded by Bacchus and stung by his name. O wild Curetes' vaulted hair! O hallowed haunts of Crete! Where new-born Zeus found faithful care, And kind protection meet In caverns safe from every snare. Corybantes, wearing blemata three-ranked, Stretched skins to make my drum's full round; Then they, in hollowed caves, lithe-limbed, With drums, and, with the flute's shrill sound Full Phrygian, bacchic ditties hymned. Sing Dionysus, and praised let him be; Beat ye the deep-sounding drums as of old; Sing to the Etrian god ere we! Greet him with Phrygian cries, and let flutes Trill in your revels and ripple shrill joy; Instruments holy the holy employ.

5. ὅσα γε κτ.: a limitation added to soften the assertion. See on ὅσα γε τάφροντες, 46α. No obj. is needed with λέγει. Λέγει παρὰ κτ.: comes
KRITON.

ΣΩ. "Εα τοίνυν, ὡ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπει-
δὴ ταύτη ὅ θεὸς υψηγεῖται. ἔδει.

very near the meaning of ἀρνθνη.
Cf. 48 d. Cf. also the omission of the obj. ἐμε with the preceding νοεῖ
μὴ διάνοειν εὖ.
9. ἔα: used abs. with a following subj. or inv. to dismiss a matter under discussion. Cf. Charm. 1033a,
ἐά, ὡς ἔγελ· μὴ γὰρ τοῦ ἐμθ ἑαυτὸν ἀκατέργας, ἅλλα ἐν ἀλγείς τοῦ. Euthyd.
302 c, ἐά, διὰ παράδοσος, εἴρητι το
καὶ μὴ ἀληθεύει μὲ προδίδεισι. —ταύτη:
the repetition of the same word is effective.
9. ὅ θεὸς: see on τῆ θεῷ, Apol.
19a. Here, as at the end of his de-

fence proper, Apol. 35 d, and at the
end of his closing words in court,
Apol. 42 a, Socrates mentions ὅ θεὸς.
Dante closes each one of the three
parts of his great poem with a refer-
ce to the stars. This is no accident
in either case, though Plato had a
philosopher's reason which Plato
could not give, except for the closing
line of the Paradiso, which is ὅ θεὸς
translated into the language of the
poet, "L' Amor che muove il Sole e
l'altri stelle," The love which moves the
sun and the other stars.
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

Since all the extant Mss. of Plato follow or attempt to follow Thrasyllus in his subdivision into nine tetralogies or groups consisting of four members each, and since Thrasyllus was instructor to the emperor Tiberius, it follows that the origin of no Mss. of Plato now known to exist can be assigned to a date much earlier than the middle of the first century a.d. The following is a table exhibiting Thrasyllus' tetralogies, and also naming the best Mss. in which each tetralogy is preserved:

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<td>II</td>
<td>Cratylus.</td>
<td>Theaetetus.</td>
<td>Sophist.</td>
<td>Statesman.</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Alcibiades I</td>
<td>Alcibiades II</td>
<td>Hipparchus.</td>
<td>Antistates.</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Theages.</td>
<td>Charmides.</td>
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Of the three Mss., the most trustworthy is Clarkianus, and the least trustworthy is Venetus T. Schanz constructs the pedigree of the existing Mss. of Plato, and traces them all to an original or Archetype. This parent Mss. consisted of two volumes: Vol. I. contained the first seven tetralogies; Vol. II. contained the last two tetralogies, together with a number of works attributed with more or less confidence to Plato. The copies made of Vol. I. were of two kinds, (1) incomplete, omitting the seventh tetralogy, and (2) complete. The best Mss. now preserved represents an incomplete copy of Vol. I. of the Archetype; this is the codex Clarkianus, the capital authority for the first six tetralogies. The complete copy of Vol. I. is represented by the much less trustworthy codex Venetus T, the best authority for the seventh tetralogy.

The best representative of Vol. II. of the Archetype is codex Parisin- nus A.
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

The leading facts about these three Mss. are as follows:

I. CODEX CLARKIANUS, referred to by the single letter B for brevity's sake and because the Mss. is called also Bodleianus. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and is "the fairest specimen of Grecian calligraphy which has descended to modern times." Daniel Clarke found this Ms., in October, 1801, in the library of a monastery on the island of Patmos. It was beautifully written on parchment, in the year 896 A.D., by a skilful scribe, one Joannes, for the use of Arethas, who afterwards became archbishop of Caesarea. See M. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, pp. 105-118; and Daniel Clarke, Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

II. CODEX VENETUS T, Bekker's t. This Ms. is now in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice, and is chiefly valuable where the Clarkianus entirely fails, i.e. for the seventh tetralogy. For a more detailed account, see M. Schanz, Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig; also the preface to Vol. IX. of the same author's critical edition of Plato's works. The date of this Ms. is very uncertain.

III. PARISINUS A, No. 1807 (formerly 84 and 2087). This Ms. is now in the National Library at Paris; it was probably written early in the tenth century after Christ. It comprises the eighth and ninth tetralogies of Thrasyllus, together with seven spurious dialogues. The Clitophon, with which it begins, is numbered twenty-nine. See M. Schanz, Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes, and the general introduction to his critical edition of Plato's works. There are many other Ms. of Plato, for some account of which also see Schanz in his general introduction, and in Bursian's Jahresbericht (9, 5, 1, pp. 178-188), where he summarizes his results and defends them against Jordan and Wohlrab.

IMPORTANT EDITIONS OF PLATO'S COMPLETE WORKS.


In all modern editions of Plato, numbers and letters which refer to the pages of the edition of Stephanus are found in the margin. This is the most convenient mode of reference, and is now universally employed to the exclusion of the less well-established subdivision into chapters. The edition of Stephanus (Henri Estienne) is in three volumes, but to give the volume is superfluous, since the name of the dialogue is given in every reference. Each page is divided into five parts by the letters (a) b c d e placed down the margin.
192 MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

PLATONIS DIALOGI. (Gr. et Lat.) Ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 3 Partes. in 8 Voll. Commentaria crit. et schol. 2 Voll. Berolini, 1816-1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of MSS., and the result is a great improvement upon the Stephanus text.)


PLATONIS OPERA OMNIA. Rec. prolegomens et comment. illustr. Gdfr. Stallbaum. 10 Voll. Lipsiae, 1827-1877. (In the Bibliotheca Graeca of Jacobs and Rost.)


PLATONIS DIALOGI secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitiane Caroli Friderici Hermanni. 6 Voll. Lipsiae (1851, 1853), 1873, 1874.


IMPORTANT OR CONVENIENT EDITIONS OF THE APOLOGY AND OF THE CRITO.


PLATONIS APOLOGIA, CRITO ET PHAEDO. Accedit emendationis specimen in nonullis reliquorum dialogorum. Edidit R. B. Hirschig. Tracti ad Rhen, 1858.

PLATONIS APOLOGIA, SOC Ratis ET CRITO. Ed. V. aequanimo auct. et. emendat. quam cur. M. Wolfrab. Lipsiae (1827), 1877. (This is Vol. L, Section 1, of Teubner's ten-volume publication of Stallbaum's complete Plato mentioned above.)
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.


Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito, with notes. By W. Wagner. Cambridge, England, 1869. (Boston, 1877.)

Platons Verteidigungsrede des Socrates und Kriton. Erklärt von Dr. Christian Cron. Achte Auflage. Leipzig, 1882. (This edition is the basis of the present work, and is the first part of an edition of the selected works of Plato, edited for the use of schools by Dr. Cron and Dr. Julius Deuschle.)
CRITICAL NOTES.

These notes are Dr. Cron's necessary explanation of the text which he has adopted. Where departures have been made from Dr. Cron's text, they are in turn discussed. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (= Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz, W that adopted by Wohlrab. *Bem.* denotes Dr. Cron's "Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Apologie, Criton, und Laches. Separat Abdr. aus dem fünften Supplement-Band der Jahrh. für classische Philologie," pp. 64-132. Leipzig, 1864. Teubner.

APOLOGY.

17 b, p. 50 (13). γένον: with inferior Ms. and B (second hand). οὖν, B (first hand) and Cron following B.

17 b, p. 50 (14). ίμου: ιμω of SW with Helendorf.

17 c, p. 57 (17). *Δια* : with Bessarion's Ms. (Venetus E). *Διλλ*, Cron and S following B.

17 c, p. 57 (18). δισθανει: with B. δισθανειν, Cron and S with Bessarion's Ms. and Venetus 185 (Bekker's II).

17 d, p. 58 (27). *πάντως δισθανειν* : Cron with S following B omits the *πάλιν*, which is found only in inferior Ms. Hermann adopted *πάντως δισθανειν*.

18 a, p. 50 (31). ίμου: with S. *ίμω*, W.

18 a, p. 50 (2). *ψυχικικα* κατηγορεύει: *ψυχικικα* κατηγορεύει, S with Hirschlg.

18 a, p. 50 (4). *γεγονεσ* : with the best Ms. *γεγονεσ*, Cron following S. There are marks of correction in B and other Ms., but no Ms. cited by S reads *γεγονεσ*.

18 b, p. 50 (9). *ιμον* : the Ms. read *ιμον* μαλλον οὖν διλλεί. Hermann bracketed μαλλον... διλλεί as a gloss, while the Zürich edition lets the words stand. S writes *ιμον* μαλλον... διλλεί. Bekker and Stallbaum, following Ms. of slight value, read *ιμον* οὖν διλλεί. The suggestion of Schanz is the best unless these words are simply to be cut out. Riddell says "the rhythm would be intolerable without the three words μαλλον οὖν διλλεί."

18 b, p. 50 (10). *φροντισθει* : Albert von Bamberg (Flechsen's Jahrbücher,
113, 10) proposes to cut out φρονεῖται, because no exact parallel to this ace. of the dir. obj. has been found in prose. So far he is right, even against Krüger's citation of various adjs. joined with ἄνεμo, for such combinations are very closely akin to verbal forms. On the other hand, to make such a point of the distinction between the indir. (or remotr) obj. which Bamberg would allow, and the dir. obj. which he proposes to disallow, is to ignore the difference in this particular between Greek and Latin syntax. In the shifting of voice from act. to pass., for instance, the distinction between dir. and indir. obj. is far less scrupulously defined in Greek than in Latin. To be sure Xenophon twice uses the gen. with φρονεῖται (cf. Symp. 6. 6, τῶν μεταφορφ φρονεῖται and Mem. iv. 7. 6, τῶν εἰςφῆνων φρονεῖται). It should be remembered that consistency may be too much insisted upon. Furthermore ἥρετο εὐγενεία are not surprising in a speech, which, like the Apology, aims to give Socrates's personal hobbies in language as in thought.

18 c, p. 61 (12). οἱ ταύτης: Heindorf. ταύτης, W following the Mas.

18 c, p. 61 (13). ἄνεμονται: ἄνεμονται, S following B (first hand).


18 d, p. 62 (21). κυριοτερον: with S following B. Elsewhere κυριοτέρον (τραγυρεον) is found in the best Mas.


18 c, p. 63 (32). Uhlig quotes (Rhein. Mus. 19, 1, and Fleckelsen's Jahrb. 121, 10) the authority of several grammarians to prove that the exclamation ἄνεμον has no connexion with ἄνεμον. He maintains that it is and always was an interjection, and that there was originally an aspirate at the beginning of the second syllable, like εἰκώ, εἰκώ (bacchie interjections), and the Attic τεκά.

19 c, p. 65 (13). σοφάς ἐπταμίης: with Riddell. σοφές ἐπταμίης, μικρά φύγαμα, Cron.

19 d, p. 66 (19). μικρόν: with Cron and S following B. σμαράδιν, inferior Mas. Judging from other cases, cf. below (28 b) and in the Crito (46 a), σμαράδιν and μικρόν have about equal claims in any given place.

19 d, p. 66 (1). μικρά ἐπταμίης: with S. μικρά (ἐπταμίης), Cron. μικρά ἐπταμίης, W.

19 a, p. 67 (7). τοῦτος τούτος: τοῦτος τούτος, S.

19 e, p. 67 (9). τοῦτος: τοῦτος, S.

20 a, p. 67 (10). σφίκɛι: with B (second hand) and other Mas. σφίκɛι, Cron following S with B (first hand).

20 a, p. 67 (17). καλά καλέντες: following B with S W. Venetus T reads καλά καλέντες. In his preface to Vol. II., Schans very emphatically rejects the reading of B and defends T, but he has not the courage of his convictions, and finally retains the reading of B.

20 c, p. 68 (20). ἔκατος: B. ἔκατος, S W.

20 c, p. 69 (5). οἱ μικρά τοῦτο τοῦτο [οἱ μικρά τοῦτο τοῦτο], S and Cobet. Bobrik (Fleckelsen's Jahrb. 113, 5) argues against bracketing the words, "that the meaning of σμαράδιν is quantitative while that of σφίκτες is qualitative." S (Burkian's Jahresbericht, 9, 6, 1, p. 188) is not convinced.
CRITICAL NOTES.

20 d. p. 69 (8). ἐστι: ἐστιν, S W — "ἐστιν (τῷ εἰρην) B D," S.
20 d. p. 69 (8). πισταῖ: πιστῇσ, S W.
20 e. p. 70 (10). Ρωμὶς εἰς: with Hueske (Spec. crit. p. 11). Ρωμη ἑν, Cron following S with B.
20 e. p. 70 (20). τὸν ἄγνωστον: τὸν ἄγνωστον, Liebhold.
20 e. p. 71 (21). ἐστιν: ἐστιν, S W.
21 a. p. 71 (23). ἵππος τι καλ: [ἵππος τι καλ], S with Ludwig. Müller—Strübing gives at too great length (Fleckelsden's Jahrbi. 121, 2) his too ingenious account of Ar. Clouds, 1072 ff.; but in a note (pp. 90, 91) he very acutely suggests that Σφῆνας was a nickname bestowed by Aristophanes in the Clouds upon Chacarphon, "παιδὸς γὰρ Σφῆνας καλ κοινοφωνεῖ," Schol. on Ar. Plut. 720. Cf. Locke, 107 ε, ἴνα, with Stallbaum's note.
21 c. p. 73 (11). σοφίστασι ἐστιν: with S W. But the reading of B, as Gaisford specifically says, is ἐστιν.
21 c. p. 73 (14). καλ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: [καλ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ], S. Wex includes these words in the parenthesis and connects them with τρίσ ἐν καλ.
21 d. p. 74 (23). ήσυχ αὐτῷ: with Bäumlein. ήσυχ γενέ, S W.
21 e. p. 74 (2). καλ λοιπόν: [καλ] λοιπόν, S with Cobet.
22 b. p. 77 (17). μάλιστα: Schanz (Philol. 28, 3, p. 550) suggests κάλλωσιν without venturing to introduce it into the text. With this use of μάλιστα might be compared Hor. Sat. 1. 10, 68, Versiculos magis factos et euntes mollius.
22 c. p. 78 (29). τοῖς αὐτῷ: τοῖς αὐτῷ αὐτῶν, S with Bekker following inferior Mss. See, however, Heindorf's Annotatio criticus in Apologiaem Socratis, p. IX. Berolini MDCCCV.
22 d. p. 78 (7). καλ...δημοσφών: [καλ...δημοσφών], S with Hirschel.
23 c. p. 82 (8). οἷς αὐτῶσ: οἷς αὐτῶσ, W following inferior Mss. with H. Stephanus and Engelhardt, who refers αὐτῶσ, of course, to the young. But it is by no means natural that men who are found out should not be angry with their discoverers. Their natural anger is, however, turned against Socrates, the real instigator of their discomfiture. Socrates is not saying that they should not be angry with him, but rather urges that they should be angry with themselves, i.e. with their own conceit of knowledge. This is the meaning demanded by the context, see a below, ad fin. Further, νοεῖν would give the sense required by W far more clearly than αὐτῶσ.
CRITICAL NOTES.

punces the words ἀλλ' ἐγγονίσθη. There is, however, no sound objection either to the way in which the words are introduced or to the words themselves.

23 e, p. 83 (15). ὁμᾶς: with Stalbaum. ὁμᾶς, Cron following S and all good Mss. In this chapter B has ὁμᾶς twice, see lines 6 and 17. It looks like superscription to write ὁμᾶς here.

23 e, p. 83 (17). ξυνταγμάτω: ξυνταγμάτω, S with Hermann following Bessarion's Mss.

23 e, p. 83 (22). καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: [καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν], S with Cobet.

24 a, p. 84 (30). ἴτων: Cron and S write ἴτων because there are traces of erasure in B.

24 b, p. 84 (5). ἠσρή: ἠς, Rieckher.

24 d, p. 86 (5). τοντοε: το Τοντοε, S with Cobet. See Kr. Spr. 48, 11, 4.

24 e, p. 86 (14). ἴστων: Cron following S writes ἴστων because of traces of erasure in B; similar traces after ἴσω in this line do not lead them to write ἴσων.

25 a, p. 87 (10). οἱ ἡσσαναρεται: [οἱ ἡσσαναρεται], S with Hirschig and Cobet. See Rem. p. 93.

25 c, p. 88 (1). τοῦτον ἔστω: with the Mss. τὸ τοῦτον ἔστω, S W.

25 c, p. 88 (3). η ἔστω: with S, who deviates but little from ἔστω, the reading of B. Struck, Cron. W reads ἔστω. Krause explains it as meaning ἔστω ζωή. (5) ἠστρένω: ἠστρένω, W.

25 e, p. 89 (10). καὶ τὸν καθεύδω: ἴτων: καὶ τὸν καθεύδω ἴτων, S with Stephanie Naber reads καὶ τὸν καθεύδω, καθεύδω ἴτων.

26 a, p. 89 (21). καὶ ἄκουσαν: bracketed as a gloss by S with Cobet.

26 a, p. 90 (24). ἴτων: S, Heindorf reads ἴτων...

26 a, p. 90 (1). δύλω: with Cron's seventh edition following B. 

26 c, p. 91 (10). τοντοε: with B (second hand) and Vaticanus 1029 (Bekker's 7). Cron following S writes τοντοε with Venetus 185 (Bekker's 1). τοντοε, B.

26 c, p. 91 (13). ἀλλ': with Bessarion's Mss. Cron following S writes ἀλλ' with B and other Mss.

26 d, p. 92 (20). ἀναγράφων: [Ἀναγράφων], S. Balter requires Αναγράφων.

26 e, p. 93 (20). ἐν τῇ ἀρχικῇ πράξῃ: Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, Berlin, 1882, p. 434, Rem. 4) says, "The notion that these writings were themselves sold in τῇ ἀρχικῇ is not conveyed here, for, if so, why should ἀρχικῇ have been used? In fact, καὶ ἐν καὶ appends to the ἀρχικῇ something else which is sold for a drachma and which, therefore, cannot have been the ἀρχικῇ."

26 e, p. 94 (28). οὐ εἰς... νομίζων: οὐ [οὖο]... νομίζω, S who follows B in respect of νομίζω.
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27 b, p. 96 (10). ἤγουν: following B. ἤγουν ὡς, S W with Heindorf. As the emphasis is wholly on ἤγου, there seems to be no good reason for disregarding the reading of B.

27 c, p. 98 (30). [ὁ] καὶ δένῃ, τὸν δὲ φιλομένον: with S. ὡς [καὶ] δένῃ [τὸν δὲ φιλομένον], Cron. A change of some kind is unavoidable; the least possible change is to bracket ὡς with Forster, who is followed by Heindorf and Cobet. This yields perfectly good sense, better, in fact, than Cron obtains by bracketing καὶ and δὲ φιλομένον.

27 c, p. 98 (32). τὸν . . . τὸν γραφέαν ταῦτην: with S. ταῦτα . . . τὸν γραφέαν ταῦτην, Cron. S and Cron agree that both expressions cannot stand. S is probably right in saying that not τὸν γραφέαν ταῦτην but ταῦτα should be bracketed, as a gloss added to explain ἀπωφαίματος.

27 c, p. 98 (35). [εἰ] τὸν αὐτόν: εἰ τὸν αὐτόν, S W. Wecklein says (Rhein. Mus. 36, 1, p. 146), "Any one who grasps the argument summarized at this point in the Apology ought to agree to the following completion of it: δένῃ δὲ εἰ τὸν τεῖσθαι . . . δημοφίλει, εἰ εἰ τὸν αὐτόν ὀλιγον καὶ δειμάονα καὶ δίδα [καὶ δειμάονα καὶ δίδα] ἡσυχασθεί πᾶς τὸν ἀνθρώπον [μήτε δειμάονα μήτε δίδα] μήτε δειμάονα μήτε δίδα, συνάρμοι μηχανή ὀλιγον." Goebel, in the Programm of the Gymnasium at Fulda, first rejects all the interpretations made with a view to retaining εἰ before τὸν αὐτόν, and then proceeds to defend it by arguing that τεῖσθαι is used in an absolute sense, while the clause beginning with εἰ he takes as a causal parenthesis. The chief objection to this explanation is that it explains the whole sentence away, leaving it not a leg to stand on. It is better, therefore, to reject εἰ and to consider that μήτε δειμάονα was added along with the rest in Meletus's anxiety to make his charge of irreligion a sweeping one. A religious-minded Athenian certainly believed in gods and in heroes. The term δειμάονα, since the precise meaning of the word was hard to fix, might—so far as Meletus's immediate purpose went—have been omitted, but the preceding δειμάονα make its introduction here indispenable. On Meletus's ascription to Socrates of belief in δειμάονα is based Socrates's assertion that so far from being an atheist, he believes like any other Greek in gods and demi-gods, called δειμάονα or more commonly δειμάονα.

27 c, p. 98 (30). αἰ τὸν αὐτόν: αἰ [τὸν αὐτόν], S with Hirschlg.

27 c, p. 98 (30). μήτε δειμάονα: bracketed as a gloss by S.

27 a, p. 98 (7). καὶ ἀλλαξεν: καλεῖ, S with Hirschlg.

28 b, p. 99 (15). ἐστίν: ἐστιν ὡς, W following Mus.

28 c, p. 100 (21). τὸ γ: S omits these words which are added in the margin of B.

28 d, p. 100 (31). ᾧ ὡς ὅ: with B and other best Mus. Cron following S writes τὸ γ with Bessarion's Mus., strengthened by various authors who quote τὸ γ omitting the ὡς.

29 a, p. 103 (5). δεῖν τὸ γὰρ: δεῖν τὸ γ, S W.

29 b, p. 104 (22). δεῖν: Otto Erdmann proposes (Fleckelain's Jahrh. 118, 5, p. 412) to substitute δεῖν.
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29 c, p. 106 (31). ἀδφαργησώμενος: following B. ἀδφς, Hirschg following Bessarion’s Ms.
29 d, p. 105 (30). ἀδρέας: following B. ἀδρέας, inferior Ms.
29 d, p. 100 (43). ἀλέγχωμαι: B. ἀλέγγω, other Ms.
29 d, p. 100 (43). ἰμμαλέαρως: B. ἰμμαλέαρως, Bessarion’s Ms.
30 b, p. 107 (59). λύμων οἷς: λύμιν, ἐν οἷς, W.
30 c, p. 109 (6). ὀλον ἵνα λύμω: Wecklein (Rh. Mus. 33, 2, p. 307) requires ὀλον ἵνα λύμω, because these words are to be closely connected with the detailed statement that follows, ἐποκατοίκησε... μέσων, 30 c. But Socrates plainly has this thought in mind already, as is proved by his postponing its amplification until after another thought introduced with ἦμεν μίν γερέρει has been developed. The point is that ἦμεν μίν γερέρει and is also in the closest connexion with the leading idea τους τύχων ἄνω.
30 d, p. 100 (11). ἰμμαλέαρω: with Hermann. ἰμμαλέαρω, W following Ms.
30 e, p. 110 (10). [ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ]: S with Hirschg. ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ, Riddell.
30 e, p. 110 (21). ἔστι μᾶκρον τινος: unless ἔστιν τοῦ θεοῦ above is bracketed, this comes in very awkwardly.
30 e, p. 110 (21). ὄλον is taken by Goebel as a neuter, and he does not connect ἔστι with τους τύχων των, but with ἦμεν. He does not urge that the other way is ungrammatical, but apparently he thinks that the sense is in favor of his explanation. His argument is hardly convincing.
31 a, p. 111 (29). ἱδώροις: ἱδωροῖς, S, Cron following S with the best Ms.
31 a, p. 111 (30). ἱδώροι: with B and other Ms. Cron following S writes ἱδώροι: on the authority of Venetus 185 (Bekker’s Π) and of an erasure in B.
31 b, p. 111 (37). μᾶν: μῆν, S with Cobet and Hermann.
31 c, p. 112 (2). ταυροπηγοῦν: ταυροπηγοῦν, S following inferior Ms.
31 d, p. 113 (6). [ἐν]: bracketed by Forster, whom F. A. Wolf followed.
31 d, B. Cron omits the word.
32 a, p. 118 (18). ἄλλα: with S and Bessarion’s Ms. ἄλλα, Cron.
32 a, p. 114 (5). ἧμεν ἰμμαλέαρω: with S, who now appeals to Venetus T, ἧμεν καὶ ἢμα δέ, Cron following B. S, previously to his collation of Venetus T, argued as follows: “Plato scriptor ἦμεν, quo cum dittographia ἦμεν δέ conjuncta est; inde lectionem varietas nata; et ex antecedentibus posse suppleri notum.”
32 b, p. 115 (8). ἀντιθέα: bracketed by Hirschg and S. The preceding Λέον certainly makes it plausible that ἀντιθέα may have been introduced as a marginal gloss. See Bess. p. 104.
32 b, p. 117 (12). ἐφανείη: ἐφανείη, ἐφανείη, W. Düring (Fleckensiel's
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Jahrb. 119, 1, p. 15) supposes that Horace had this passage (chap. xx.) in his mind when he wrote the third ode of the third book of his Odes.

32 b, p. 117 (13). [καὶ ἐναντία ἑπιστροφή]: Hermann brackets these words but W believes them to be genuine. If they are retained, it follows either (1) that Socrates was not (in spite of reasonable evidence that he was) the ἐνεργής τῶν προετοιμασίων, and therefore voted against the unlawful proposition when it came up in the assembly as any member might have done, or (2) that Socrates voted alone in a preliminary meeting of the prytaneis against having the question put to the people in an unlawful form. (2) explains the context best. But when all is said and done, the whole wording is clumsy and repetitious, since προετοιμάσθη would do quite as well alone, and the cumulative effect of καὶ is tiresome.

33 b, p. 120 (14). ἔπειτα: Goebbels prefers ἔπειτα.

33 b, p. 120 (19). Ὀλος: following B. cf. Ὀλος, S W.

34 a, p. 123 (24). Ἰερόφορος: with Bassarian's Ms. Ἰερόφορος, Cron with S following B. Sauppe argues that the art. is not necessary here; it certainly is desirable.

34 a, p. 124 (32). νόεσα: Goebbels prefers νοεσεν.

34 c, p. 125 (3). ἀνωμορφότερα: ἀνωμορφότερα, Cron and S following B, where ἀνωμορφότερα is read.

34 c, p. 125 (6). αἰσχρός: B. αἰσχρός, W. Heller argues in favor of τὰ αἰσχρὰ. He is right in so far that the ordinary idiom would give us the art.; but after all the art. would be indispensable only if τὰ μακάρια (meaning all his children) had preceded.

34 d, p. 120 (14). ἐκεῖνος μὲν τούτοις: with S and Stallbaum. ἐκεῖνος μὲν τούτοις, Cron.

34 d, p. 120 (17). οἶκος: P. Foucart (Revue de Philologie, L 35) bases upon Attic inscriptions the following remarks as to the orthography of this word: "une série d'exemples depuis le cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère montre que au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme ἐκεῖνος... A partir de la conquête romaine, ἐκεῖνοι se rencontre dans les inscriptions attiques, ainsi que ὁικον; la forme de la langue commune fut par l'emporter, et c'est la seule qu'emploient les copistes." The Attic form without is preserved only in Parisinus (A). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.

34 e, p. 127 (26). τὰ Σαμπάρτα: τὰ Σαμπάρτα, S W with Riddell. This dat. was preferred by Bernhardy. Nevertheless, the analogy of προετοιμασία and ἀνωμορφότερα does not bear unqualified application to ὀικίας. The reading of B is τὰς Σαμπάρτα, which suggests that the interlinear correction may be the right reading. If the dat. be adopted here, then appeal would have to be made to Hdt. iv. 59, ἐν ἐνεείροις τοῖς προετοιμασίοις τῶν μακάριων αἰσχροί ἀνωμορφοί. 35 b, p. 128 (38). ὅμα: B. ὅμα, S W.

35 d, p. 129 (11). [ἀληθεία]: with S W. Stallbaum brackets νῦν ἄληθεν. ἀληθεία, Cron following B.
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36 a, p. 131 (4). τέ γεγονός τεύχε: [τέ γεγονός] τεύχε, S with Cobet, who, indeed, rejects these three words because he thinks they have come into the text from the margin. There is certainly room for doubt.

36 c, p. 133 (9). λένε: with S W following E. ὅνα, Cron following B. Cron defends ὅνα in his Dem. p. 100 f. The example quoted from Tac. Ann. vi. 22 (where see Nipperdey's note) is not convincing.

36 c, p. 133 (11). [ὁ]: with S W. ὅσιος, Cron. S says (Studien, p. 35) of the whole passage: "Hermann was for doing away with ἄνωθεν ὅσιος. But certainly ὅσιος requires a finite verb. Simply bracket ὅσιος and the whole difficulty is solved. The word was apparently added by an interpolator who constructed ἄνωθεν ὅσιος closely with ἔναγαρ, after the analogy of Phaedr. 200 b, ἔφαρμα γε ἔθηκε ἔναγαρ ὅσιος. Of course ἄνωθεν makes any such explanation absurd."

36 d, p. 134 (22). ἰδέων: Liechhold proposes, not to bracket ἰδέων, but to change it into γε ἰδέα.

37 b, p. 130 (16). τὸν: τὸν, S W with Meiser.
37 c, p. 130 (18). τοῦτο ἔσκεια: τοῦτο ἔσκεια, S with Heindorf.
37 c, p. 130 (22). προέρχῃ: προέρχῃ, W.
37 e, p. 137 (4). ἐν: Cron following S writes ἐν because of signs of erasure in B.

37 e, p. 137 (5). ἐν: with Bessarion's Ma. Cron following S writes ἐν with B.


39 b, p. 141 (30). μὲν ὅσιον: Heller proposes μὲν ὅσιον, which is added by a later (second) hand in the margin of B and is also the reading of some inferior Mss., which, however, also retain ὅσιον.

39 c, p. 142 (7). εἰργάσεται οἴσμον: εἰργάσεται οἴσμον, S with Winckelmann. εἰργάσεται οἴσμον, W. Hermann added μὲν after οἴσμον on the strength of signs of erasure in B, which were also detected by S.

39 d, p. 145 (14). ὅποτε ἦν: following B according to Gaisford. ὅποτε ἦν, S and W, who neither of them make any mention of Gaisford's report on the reading of B.

40 a, p. 144 (10). ὅ τοι διαμολάν: [ὁ τοῖς διαμολάν], S with Schleiermacher.
40 c, p. 145 (5). τοῦ τοῦτον τοῦ: bracketed as a gloss by S with Hirschig.

41 a, p. 147 (29). οἷος: with Bessarion's Ma. Cron following S writes οἷος with the best Mss. Here, and Phaedr. 240 b, we have the only two clear cases where the best Mss. credit Plato with using οἷος after a word ending in a consonant.

41 a, p. 147 (30). τεῦχαί ἔστω: following S with Bessarion's Ma. τεῦχαί ἔστω, Cron with best Mss.
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41 b, p. 147 (33). τίθησιν. ἀντιπαραβάλλειν: τίθησιν, ἀντιπαραβά-
λειν, S.
41 b, p. 148 (34). ἀκινον, ὃς: ἀκινον. ὃς, S.
41 b, p. 148 (35). διότι: B. διότι, W with several Mas.
41 b, p. 148 (36). τίς αὐτῶν: with W. The best Mas. read τίς ἐν αὐτῶν.
τίς δὲ αὐτῶν, Cron with S, who adds the δὲ as his own conjecture.
41 b, p. 148 (37). δει: with Mas. δει, Cron and S, because there are
signs of erasure in B, and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).
41 b, p. 148 (38). δύναται: B. δύναται, S W following other Mas.
41 c, p. 148 (40). διήθη: with all Mas. Cron following S writes διήθη
ἐπιτίθεν because it is added in the margin of B. S argues against admitting it
42 a, p. 150 (22). πάλιν η: πάλιν η, S following D. The reading of B can
not be made out, but Gaisford and S incline to think it πάλιν η.

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43 a, p. 151 (1). ἐπέλθει ἐν ἑτέρῳ: with B. ἐπέλθει ἑτέρῳ, S following Inferior
Mas. and the Zürich edition.
43 b, p. 152 (19). νῦν: νῦν, W.
43 b, p. 153 (20). ἐργάζομαι: ἐργάζομαι, S following the Mas. The subscript is
an essential part of the word. See Curtius, Grundzüge, No. 579. The Mas.
authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato ἐργάζεσθαι is the prevai-
lng orthography. ἐργάζεσθαι is always without τ. S has lately made up his mind
to write ἐργάζομαι even in Plato. See Vol. XII p. 6.
43 c, p. 153 (35). τὸν ἔργον [τὸν ἐργαλεῖον]: τὸν ἔργον τῶν ἐργαλείων, W.
44 b, p. 156 (3). ἐκκεφάλω ἑτέρῳ: ἐκκεφάλω ἑτέρῳ, S with Hirschig.
44 b, p. 156 (3). τοῦ ἐκτεταλεί: Saller. Hermann keeps the Mas. reading
τοῦ ἐκτεταλεῖ. Madvig (Adv. p. 308) finds reason for writing τοῦ ἐκτε-
tαλείσθαι in the strange combination of the inf. and fin. moods by μὲν and ἦ.
Rieckher reads τραῖν μὲν τοῦ ἐκτεταλείσθαι.
44 b, p. 155 (5). ἴσω δὲ: ἴσω δὲ, S. Rieckher strikes out ἴσω before ὧν τα.
45 b, p. 158 (19). δοστὶ ὑπευγόν ἑσθεν: δοστὶ [ὑπευγόν] ἑσθε, S. δοστὶ ἐν ἑ-
thέθη, W with the explanation praeterea, praeter me. See Fleekeisen's
Jahrh. 1877, pp. 222 ff. and Cron's Bem. p. 117. It certainly seems far more
natural to take ἑσθεν as a gloss explaining ὑπευγόν than to regard ὑπευγόν as a
gloss.
45 b, p. 158 (23). δοσκόμενος: δοσκόμενος, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to
his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary
emendation.
46 b, p. 161 (4). ἐκ μὲν νῦν: ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιφοροῦ, S with A. Nauck. See the
preface to the third edition of Cron's Apology and Crito (p. xiv. 1).
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46 d, p. 163 (19). ὰν ἐστίν; S (XII. p. xvit.) proposes to write ὰν ἐστιν following B. But see S, VIII. p. 162.

47 a, p. 163 (20). ὰν ἐστίν; S with Hirschig.

47 a, p. 163 (22). τὸν κατὰ τὸν τόπον μέσαν, ὀνομάζει οὖν τῷ ἐμπόρῳ, τῷ ἐμπόρῳ τῷ ἐμπόρῳ, οὖν τῷ ἐμπόρῳ, with S, τῷ ἐμπόρῳ τῷ ἐμπόρῳ, Cron with W. The words bracketed do not occur in B, and S rejects them as a confusing interpolation (Nov. Comm. p. 102). They occur in the margin of B and in inferior MSS.


47 c, p. 165 (18). ἔστω: ἔστω, all editions. But the emphasis should be carefully kept on τῷ, on καθ', and on ἐν, and not put on the verbs.

47 c, p. 165 (20). ὀσίλλωσι: so it stands corrected in B. ὀσίλλωσι, S following inferior MSS.

47 c d, p. 165 (24 ff.). The simpler punctuation of Cron's seventh edition has been preferred to that of the eighth. In the latter Cron follows Goebel.

48 b, p. 167 (25). δὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τοὺς, given to Socrates by P with Butt- man. S brackets φαίνει γὰρ ἐν and makes Critio's speech include ἀκριβίας λέγει. Goebel proposes δὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τοῖς, φαίνει γὰρ ἐν, δὲ ἀκριβίας λέγει. If anything is to be omitted, ἀκριβίας λέγει could best be spared.


48 d, p. 165 (23). τῷ ἐνεπερ: with Buttman. τῷ ἐνεπερ, W following the MSS. See Cron's preface to his first edition of the Apol. and Crito, p. xii, also Bess. p. 117 f. Meiser (Fleckelisen's Jahrb. 100, 1, p. 41) favors a change of order τῷ ἐνεπερ, δὲ γὰρ ἐνεπερ καθ' ἄλλης, τῷ ἐνεπερ. Goebel urges τῷ ἐνεπερ, which would, however, be intolerable after τῷ ἐνεπερ.

49 a, p. 170 (4). ἀντιλαθόμεθα [ἔργων]: Meiser proposes to find room for this between τῷ and νόσον.

49 b, p. 170 (7). τῆλεος [γρόνας]: with Jacobs. τῆλεος γρόνας, W. Some authority for not bracketing would perhaps be found in Leck 180 c.

50 c, p. 175 (2). ἄκριβως: ἄκριβως, S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (10). τοῖς νόσοις: [τοῖς νόσοις], S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (14). νόσοι: [νόσοι], S with Hirschig.

50 e, p. 177 (20). οὖν: οὖν is preferred by Buttman, Stalbaum, Hirschig, Goebel.

51 a, p. 177 (26). ἔνα: S. ἔνα, W following the MSS. ἔνα ἔνα, Hirschig.

51 a, p. 178 (30). ὥς: ὥς, W following the MSS. S says the first hand in B wrote ὥς. See on 53 c.


52 a, p. 181 (1). ὁ, ἀκριβείαν, τοίς: B. ὁ [ἀκριβείαν] τοῖς, S. ὁ, ἀκριβείαν, τοῖς, W.

52 b, p. 181 (11). ἀκριβεία, [ὅτι ... ἠρμόνει] ὀσίλα: ἀκριβεία, ὀσίλα, S: S gives
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reasons as follows: *Verba οὖ... Τοῦρδον, quae jam Athenaeus 5, 15, legisse videtur, in marg. add. be, inclusaret Turicenenses delevit MS [i.e. Schanz himself].* See his Nov. Comm. p. 162.

52 d, p. 182 (28). τολιτέσσερα: B. τολιτέσσερα, S with inferior Ms.

53 a, p. 183 (43). τόλον... οὕμων: bracketed by S with H. Stephanus and Hirschiug, who also both reject οὕμων.

53 a, p. 184 (44). ήμινέσις: B. ήμινετο, S W following the second hand in B.

53 b, p. 184 (7). Μεγάρδε: Megārde, W. Gaisford remarks on *Phaedr.* 227 d: "μεγάρδε Fuit μεγάρα 54 p. m." Is this the reading of B in this passage also?

53 c, p. 185 (17). ή: B. ή, S W. As in 51 a, p. 178 (30), where the reading of B is harder to make out, so here also S writes ή. The more vigorous ή (really) is better suited to the context than ή, which simply makes affirmation a matter of course.

53 c, p. 186 (28). αλεξρός: with S and W. Still γλαξχρός, which is added on the margin of B, deserves attention, and perhaps should be preferred. Cf. in the preceding line (27) the undoubtedly correct μετάλαξης, which is on the margin of B, while in the text we find καταλαξης, which both S and W reject.


54 a, p. 187 (41). ἢμιλησσόντα αὐτῶν, πάντων: [ἐνμελήσοντα] αὐτῶν πάντων, S.

54 b, p. 187 (1). πατομάνος ήμων: Moiser inserts after these words τοις οικ.

54 d, p. 188 (1). Κρίτην: [Kritis], B.
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