ot ey gos ee ss BS Boe geo | wake Soe Ecae: ae Spe eee Saat sige: Dae eo Soe oa : Sige ard HE ae 2 See 4 ALPROVED For KELEAEE DADE? ABR SS thd (14 (62 (3) No, OTS89/66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Tiirectorate of Intelligence & Hateh 1066 INTELLIGENCE KEMORANDUM Peking's Attitude Toward the Threat of US Attack SUMMARY Peking appears to be engaged in @ deterrent psychological warlare campaign, This is expressed in itg recent propaganda cencerning Chinese readi~ hess to repel a US assault, in private statements of concern oer the possibility of imminent US at- tack, and to some extent alao in curreat Iulmina~ tions about “imperialist encirclement," By por- traylag themgelves as “encircled,” fearful of ate tack, but ready to fight a bitter-end war in self- ‘defense, the Chinese probably hope to stimulate additional political pressure--within the UG as wel) ag anmoug Anerican allies and seutrale--ageaingst “rash? US escalation which might cause a minealenlation by apprehensive mon in Peking, In enphasiging that China will respond militarily only if directly at~ tacked by the US the Chinese may be attempting to establish ground rules which if tha US adhered to them would, Gver the longer term, prevent a war with the U8, The evidence availahie at this time does not support a conclusion that gatuine Chinese anxiety concerning 4 US attack has increased significantly during the past few months, In fact, examination of domestic propagandé and the pace of civil de fense preparations in China suggests that Peking was equally or more concerned over this possibility juet spring and during the summer Chan at present. Thus far no re-daploymont of Chinese military strength has been detected of the kind which might EIGN DISSEM be expected if Peking actually regarded an invesion-~ which recent Chinese statements imply is threatened—- as Likely in the near future, While their actions helie their protestations that they expect an early attack by the 08, the Chi- nese leaders, as orthodox Marxist-Leninists, prob- ably do believe that = war with the US ia "inevitable," in tha long historical sense. We de not believe, how- ever, that this will make them fatalistie and will lead them, any more than it did Lenin or Stalin, iste provocative acts or even lead them in the present circumstances to take actions mote risky than thoge they would have taken without this belief. There has not been, for example, any Indication of 4 change in Chinese policy regarding support for the Communist war effort in Vietnam--toward either a wore cautious Line or « more adventurous course. Peking continues to provide military assistance and political backing for North Vietnam, aimed at keeping Communist forces steadfast and in the field against the US in South Vietnam. The Chinese military presaneo in Nexvth Vietnam, made wp of service troops and air defense unite--first detected Last June--continues to grow at 2a moderate rate, It seems probable that a¢ the Chinese actually expected a U8 attack soon, Some pronounced change ia Poking's Vietnamese policy would be observed, i. From the outset, Feking probably recognized and accepted tha risk that Chinese supnert Tor North Vietoam's effort to subvert, the South might Lead tee a conflict with the U8. In January 4 yeer ago Chen Yi told the French ambassador that the Chinesa saw US "Tireworks" as a possibility betove the eventual Communist victory he claimad was certain, It scams tikely that rapid escalation of the US war effort during the winter and early spring of 1985 inoteased apprehensions in Peking. The Chincee press as carly as 26 March begah to take notevof “rabid threats of war against China" hy the U8 and a People’s Daily editorial three days later declared that The Chinese couLd see that after US “occupation” of South Vietnaw and ‘agereassion” against North Vietoam tha "next step will he aggression aghinst China." NO FOREIGN | 2, By May 1965, the increasing weight of US alrstivikes sgsinet the DRY as well as their steady progrese northward toward the Sino-V¥ietnamese border hed apparently further inereused Chinsse concern. On 10 Méy Peking broadcast the full text of a Lone Red Flag articie by Vice Minister of National De- Tense and Chief of Staff Lo Jul-ching in which the possibility of war with thea US.-{neluding nuclear attack seninst China--was raised, 3. Lo charged that the U8 had "spread the flames of way over North Vietnam and wis preparing to spread them further to China," He called for weadiness, stressing that political and ideological work to this end must be given First priority. The article closed with a dofiant statement thet China would go on helping the ¥ietnamese Communists ao matter what the US did to enlarge the war, adding to this the quulification--now a central theme in Peking's propaganda--that “wa will not attack un— lease we ate attacked; Lf we are attacked we will tertainly counterattack,” 4. Peking's cautery sgeinst alleged US plans for spreading the war to China was in part deter~ yent propaganda but it probably reflected genuine fear that the probability of UB aly attacks on China was growing. The war in South Vietnam was going very badly for Saigon forces, and the Chinese, perhaps tiken in ta some degree by their own propa- funda about “imperialist aggressiveness, may hare felt that the US might lash out in desperation. 5. They were, tereever, in the process of iniplementing contingency plans involving the de~ plorment. of Chinese service forces in North Vietnam to assist the Vietnamose with the tisk of keeping lugistics 1] channels to China open despite US air attacks against lines of commtiniedtion. The pres ence of Chinese military personnel in the northern part of North Vietnam began to be detected after mid- dune. These movenents were secret, but the Chinese must have taken inta consideration the possibility that their presence might be diecovorad aud provoke a violent US response. 6. On 32 May, Peking sent private warnings to the US, dovbthess intended te support deterrent wc PEE LGN DISSE Se propaganda, vin the British and the Finns. During a Gonversatiaon with the UK ehargé, Chen ¥i stated thet although.China did not desire a war with the US, it was ready for one if the US exeeeded the "limits" set by Peking, in this connection Chen relerred spocifically to aivetrikes. a¢ainet tar- fats in Chine, 7. There was, however, no apparent speedup in Peking's efforts to incvease its alr defense capa bility in either the border region or elsewhere in China, Peking had begun a program to build up air detenze aapabilities in Bouth. Chine shortly after the Tonkin Galf crisis in August. L964. . This has gone Torward at a steady pace ever since, with the peak effort to improve these air defenses coming in the period frem the fall of 1964 to the winter of 7 1965, 8. Starting in May, Peking also launched a heavy domestic propaganda compaigen on the theae that if had beceme the nation's foremost task bo prepare ayainst the possibility that the US might attack "at any time." The subject of "way prepara tions" was a frequent topie for neighborhood in~ doct¥ination meetings. One heavily publicised tyne of "preperation" bas been militia training, which was intensified last summer. 9, This deliberate fanning of popular war fears was probebly intended, in part, to stimulate compliance withithe faiely extensive, but rudi- nentary, civil defense measures which began to be undertaken late leat spring,. Buck programs were in evidence on a amali seale in the fall of iog4. Letters frominside China indicated that early last Bimmer local governnents«oprobably abl over China—- Started to draw up contingency evacuation planus. 1G, These plans have apparently not bean imple. mented on any significant scale, howaver, although there have been some actual movements of schools, « hospital, and swall factories from Canten,and of some scientific institutes out of Peking. Government em Bployees have been urged, but not forced, to send de~ pendente to live with relatives in the countryside, This policy has not been popular, and recent reports oe REIGN DISSEN NO FORKIGN indicate that sone dependents area quistly returning home. 11. By daet £411, the regime began to slack off on domestic propaganda concerning the imminonee of a porsible centiicet with the U8, perhaps because Peking believed it was necessary to calm down peopio who had been made jittery by the campaign during the spring and summer, There is evidence that Peking has been using the war preneration theme internally to justify long-standing domestic programe-~e.g., the dispersal to ¢he countryside of redundant urban dlaborers—-and to inersase the effectiveness of its home proparands by playing on the Chinese peaple’s patrictiam, While the necessity for “war preparations” continues ag an important theme, refugees and clandestine soureas re« port that. it is soy beiug presented in terme of a sontingency that a9 still a year or two in the future, 12, Agcerding te repoxte from refugees, & drive was igunched in September, pushed with special vigor in Bouth China, against rutior maigarse-people wha “exaggerate” the effect of a puclesr attack. In Dao conber, the acting goayernot of Kwangtung, speaking at the annual meeting of the CPPOXU--4 propaganda forum for united front organimations—-~said that a US attack was expected “by 1969," Twice during Jan- uiry L966, People's Inily underseorad the long-run aature of tie U8 Threat by noting that the contin- penmcy of a US attack was an important facter in long- term economic planning. é akin ats oon 14, Neanwhile, Chinese propaganda directed at external as well as domestic audiences throughout thea gummex and fall continued to accuse the TS of planning to attack China, and to trumpat that the- Chinese were "standing in battle array” ready to rapel any a&dventurcus theuste and to “utterly NO FORERIGH destroy" the agpressers.: There was, however, oo apeciai emphasis on the immadiacy of the U8 threet,. The enphasia throughout was that the U8 was moving Vetep by step" to impose war on China but as re- garda timing declared only that the US wanted a trial of strength "sooner or later,” 15, Chen ¥Yi's romarke during his presse confer- ence on 29 September put war in the standard candi- tional franework-.if the US took the initiative—- and projected the possibility into the indefinite future. He declared in an sagry outiarst thet China was ready Toy an assault by the US--aided by the Indians, British, Japunese, and ‘modern revisionists". which might come Was carly as tomorroy.’’ Chen wait on te say, haweyer, that the Chinese had been wait- ing for a US invasion for L6 years--while his hair had turned gray--gnd added that if by chance he did not live Long ewogh te see an invasion, his children would “regelutely carry on the fight, '* 49. «From time to time during October and November Chinese propaganda reiterated the charge that the "epearhead of 08 aggression" was pointing not only at Vietnam and Korea but also at China. The context, however, wig generally op the need for long-range atrengthening of defenses. The raport of a PLA Po. Lities] Work Conference broadcast on 18 January noted, for exanple, that the US has “always wanted to impose war on the Chinese people” end “for this reason, to strengthen combat readiness is by na mains just a temporary measure, but da a long-term strategic task," Li. Peking's recent propaganda statements re~- Harding “encirelement" of China are used ta bolater charges-of US aggroseive intent, but Lt is clear that they are also « key slement in the Chinese gtrug¢ie with the Soviet Unien--which received new impetus aa a result of Shelepin's frip to Hanoi in eariy Jandwsry., Charges that the Soviets were aid- ing the GS in building a “cordon” around China carry no sense of urgency, however, The parlidious US and Soviet scheme is presented ag in process hut not noar conpletion . a8. Only in a small nweber of private communica. tions duping January and February did the Chinese ~§-— NOOR IGN DISSEM ET Bite Be ag dndigate that they regarded 4 U8 attack as coming Boon, These "messages" appeared intended not di- rectly for the US; but for U5 friends and others who might be persuaded to bring pressure on Wash ingtean. 19, Yhe Chinese leaders probably do feel isa- lated and encirclad by anemies--with good reason and largely as the consequence of their ows actions, They are likewise convinced of HS hostility and Yedornize that Peking's course in Vietnam carries. Some Lisk of an @exnansion of the war inte China, Their apprehendions probably ineressed somewhet when the US military bulldup began to gather speed last spring and was carriod forward during the summer. Peking'’s fears of an attack, however, appear to have leveled off at a point far short of any “certainty that the U5 would strike at China soon—-or that such action was “Anevitablo” in the foresegable future. 20, Currant Chinese propaganda chatees of nevvression intent and recent private statements implying that Peking regards an “invasion” as either possible or likely ln the next five or six months appear, therefore, to be part of a paycholegical wartare campaign. When Peking wae apparently gunuinely alarmed over posaibie US-supperted Chi- nese Nationglist landings in June 1962, the Comme- aists moved quickly to bring! in heavy reinforon. nents--ag wany aS Seven or cight divisions--for | ooastal defense opposite Taiwan, There have thus far beam no indications that such a mowe is now oontenplated or under wy. a oe NO POREIGN DISSHM Sean erences iaaiammmesternrmenenns ean DIFFERENTLY EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS roved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 8 March 1966 No. 0789/66 Copy No. INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM PEKING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE THREAT OF US ATTACK i DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and ___declassification Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 WARNING This Document contains information affecting the Na- tional Defense of the United States, within the mean- ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited. Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 ~ wi? No. 0789/66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 8 March 1966 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Peking's Attitude Toward the Threat of US Attack SUMMARY Peking appears to be engaged in a deterrent psychological warfare campaign. This is expressed in its recent propaganda concerning Chinese readi- ness to repel a US assault, in private statements of concern over the possibility of imminent US at- tack, and to some extent also in current fulmina- tions about "imperialist encirclement," By por- traying themselves as "encircled," fearful of at- tack, but ready to fight a bitter-end war in self- defense, the Chinese probably hope to stimulate additional political pressure--within the US as well as among American allies and neutrals—-against "rash" US escalation which might cause a miscalculation by apprehensive men in Peking. In emphasizing that China will respond militarily only if directly at- tacked by the US the Chinese may be attempting to establish ground rules which if the US adhered to them would, over the longer term, prevent a war with the US. The evidence available at this time does not support a conclusion that genuine Chinese anxiety concerning a US attack has increased significantl during the past few months, SECRET 1 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 25X1 we He ee Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 ~ SECRET ~ 25X11 be expected if Peking actually regarded an invasion-- which recent Chinese statements imply is threatened-- as likely in the near future. While their actions belie their protestations that they expect an early attack by the US, the Chi- nese leaders, as orthodox Marxist-Leninists, prob- ably do believe that a war with the US in inevitable," in the long historical sense. We do not believe, how- ever, that this will make them fatalistic and will. lead them, any more than it did Lenin or Stalin, into provocative acts or even lead them in the present circumstances to take actions more risky than those they would have taken without this belief. There has not been, for example, any. indication of a change in Chinese policy regarding support for the Communist war effort in Vietnam-~toward either a more cautious line or a more adventurous course, Peking continues to provide military assistance and political backing for North Vietnam, aimed at keeping Communist forces steadfast _a the US in South Vietnam. 25X1 . It seems probable that if the Chinese actually éxpected a US attack soon, some pronounced change in Peking's Vietnamese policy would be observed. 1. From the outset, Peking probably recognized and accepted the risk that Chinese support for North Vietnam's effort to subvert the South might lead to a conflji uary a year ago Chen Yi told hat the Chinese saw US "fireworks" as a possibility before the eventual Communist victory he claimed was certain. It seems likely that rapid escalation of the US war effort during the winter and early spring of 1965 increased apprehensions in Peking. The Chinese press as early as 26 March began to take note:of "rabid threats of war against China" by the US and a People's Daily editorial three days later declared that the Chinese could see that after US "occupation" of South Vietnam and "aggression" against North Vietnam the "next step will be aggression against China," Bea Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 d . Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA4RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 25X11 2, By May 1965, the increasing weight of US airstrikes against the DRV as well as their steady progress northward toward the Sino-Vietnamese border had apparently further increased Chinese concern, On 10 May Peking broadcast the full text of a long Red Flag article by Vice Minister of National De- fense and Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching in which the possibility of war with the US--including nuclear attack against China--~was raised. 3. Lo charged that the US had "spread the flames of war over North Vietnam and was preparing to spread them further to China.'' He called for readiness, stressing that political and ideological work to this end must be given first priority. The article closed with a defiant statement that China would go on helping the Vietnamese Communists no- matter what the US did to enlarge the war, adding to this the qualification--now a central theme in Peking'’s propaganda--that "we will not attack un- less we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack. " 4, Peking's outcry against alleged US plans for spreading the war to China was in part deter- rent propaganda but it probably reflected genuine fear that the probability of US air attacks on China was growing. The war in South Vietnam was going very badly for Saigon forces, and the Chinese, perhaps taken in to some degree by their own propa- ganda about "imperialist" aggressiveness, may have felt that the US might lash out in desperation. 25X11 6, On 31 May, Peking sent private warnings to the ‘US, doubtless intended to support deterrent 25X11 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 4CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 ee ae Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 25XT i propagand During. 20X1 25X1 a conversation hen Yi stated P that although ina did no esire a war with the US, it was ready for one if the US exceeded the "limits" set by Peking, In this connection Chen referred specifically to airstrikes against tar- gets in China, 7. There was, however, no apparent speedup in Peking's efforts to increase its air defense capa-~ bility in either’.the border region or elsewhere in China, Peking had begun a program to build up air defense capabilities in South China shortly after 25X1 - the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August. 1964, 25X1 8, Starting in May, Peking also launched a heavy domestic propaganda compaign on the theme that it had become the nation's foremost task to prepare against the possibility that the US might attack "at any ti 25x1 25X1 ~4- 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 ow i ww I. ' . 25X11 : 11. By last fall, the regime began to slack off on domestic propaganda concerning the imminence of a possible conflict with the US, perhaps because Peking believed it was necessary to calm down people who had been made jittery by the campaign during the spring and summer. There is evidence that Peking has been i using the war preparation theme internally to justify , long-standing domestic programs--e.g., the dispersal to the countryside of redundant urban Laborers--and \ to increase’ the effectiveness of its home propaganda by playing on the Chinese people's patriotism. While the necessity for "war preparations" continues as an . | mportant theme 25X1 - 25X14 [fit as now being presented in terms of a 2 contingency that is still a year or two: in the future, 25X1_ - at the annual meeting of the CPPCC--a propaganda forum for united front organizations—-~said that a US attack was expected "by 1969."' Twice during Jan- uary 1966, People's Daily underscored the long-run nature of the US threat by noting that the contin- gency of a US attack was an important factor in long- term economic planning. 14, Meanwhile, Chinese propaganda directed at external as well as domestic audiences throughout the summer and fall continued to accuse the US of planning to attack China, and to trumpet that the Chinese were "standing in battle array" ready to repel any adventurous thrusts and to "utterly Se. | eT ~ | Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 ee ae Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIAARDP80B01676R000400190030-7 oa 25X1, l destroy" the aggressors. There was, however, no special emphasis on the immediacy of the US threat, The emphasis throughout was that the US was moving "step by step” to impose war on China but as re- gards timing declared only that the US wanted a trial of strength "sooner or later." 15. Chen Yi's remarks during his press confer- i ence on 29 September put war in the standard condi- tional framework--if the US took the initiative-- and projected the possibility into the indefinite ' future. He declared in an angry outburst that China was ready for an assault by the US--~aided by the Indians, British, Japanese, and "modern revisionists"-—- . which might come “as early as tomorrow," Chen went on to say, however, that the Chinese had been wait- ing for a US invasion for 16 years--while his hair had turned gray--and added that if by chance he did not live long enough to see an invasion, his children would "resolutely carry on the fight." 16, From time to time during October and November Chinese propaganda reiterated the charge that the "spearhead of US aggression' was pointing not only at Vietnam and Korea but also at China. The context, however, was generally on_ the need for long-range strengthening of defenses i 25X1 25X1 17. Peking's recent propaganda statements re- garding "encirclement" of China are used to bolster charges~of US aggressive intent, but it is clear that they are also a key element in the Chinese Struggle with the Soviet Union--which received new impetus as a result of Shelepin's trip to Hanoi in early January. Charges that the Soviets were aid- ing the US in building a "cordon" around China carry no sense of urgency, however. The perfidious US and Soviet scheme is presented as in process but not near completion, 25x11 251 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7 , f P80B01676R000400190030-7 =! a ae Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA- Ld 25X11. 25X11 19. The Chinese leaders probably do feel iso- lated and encircled by enemies~-with good reason and largely as the consequence of their own actions. They are likewise convinced of US hostility and recognize that Peking's course in Vietnam carries some risk of an expansion of the war into China. Their apprehensions probably increased somewhat when the US military buildup began to gather speed last spring and was carried forward during the summer. Peking's fears of an attack, however, appear to have leveled off at a point far short of any "certainty" that the US would strike at China soon--or that such action was "inevitable" in the foreseeable future. 20, Current Chinese propaganda charges of US aggression intent and recent private statements implying that Peking regards an "invasion" as either possible or likely in the next five or six months appear, therefore,.to be part of a psychological warfare campaign. When Peking was apparently genuinely alarmed over possible US-supported Chi- nese Nationalist landings in June 1962, the Commu- nists moved quickly to bring in heavy reinforce- ments--as many as seven or eight divisions-—-for coastal defense opposite Taiwan. There have thus far been no indications that such a move is[ | 25X1 : Bae 25x1 Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190030-7